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Renewable distributed generation: The hidden

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Article in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews May 2016
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Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 58 (2016) 14571465

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/rser

Renewable distributed generation: The hidden challenges A review

from the protection perspective
Patrick Tendayi Manditereza a, Ramesh Bansal b,n
a
b

Department of Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering, Central University of Technology, Free State, South Africa
Department of Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering, University of Pretoria, South Africa

art ic l e i nf o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Received 4 February 2015
Received in revised form
20 December 2015
Accepted 27 December 2015
Available online 2 February 2016

This review paper is focused on the impact of distributed generation (DG) on distribution system protection. The integration of DG is transforming the traditional radial distribution system into a multisource system that requires protection that is capable of maintaining proper coordination under bidirectional and variable power ow conditions. The multiple types of DGs with different short circuit
characteristics mean that the protection must also be effective under conditions of unpredictable fault
currents. New grid code requirements demand that DGs remain connected under fault conditions to
provide grid support and improve system reliability and security of supply. A discussion is given of the
traditional protection techniques for the distribution system and the shortcomings of such techniques
when DGs are integrated into the system. The paper also presents a wide survey and review of recent
techniques proposed by various researchers to mitigate the effects of DG integration on the performance
of distribution system protection. Centralised and distributed techniques have been proposed that
include deployment of intelligent smart devices and communication systems to enhance and provide
novel ideas for solving the protection problem. The implementation challenges of these techniques are
discussed and proposals for the future given.
& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
Distributed generation
Renewable sources
Distribution system protection
Protection coordination

Contents
1.
2.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The impact of DG penetration on distribution network protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.
Current protection practices with DG penetration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Protection strategies for the future distribution network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.
Economy-driven strategies: performance enhanced traditional strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.
Non-traditional fault identication and location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.
Development of new relay characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.
Further challenges with the non-traditional approaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Other technical issues arising from integration of DGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.
System stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.
DG interface requirements on protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.
Islanding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1. Introduction
n

Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (P.T. Manditereza),
[email protected] (R. Bansal).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.12.276
1364-0321/& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The energy policies that are being promulgated by governments

world-wide to promote the exploitation and use of renewable energy
resources [14], and the parallel de-regulation of the energy sector

1458

P.T. Manditereza, R. Bansal / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 58 (2016) 14571465

that now permits open and non-discriminatory access for small and
medium independent power producers (IPPs) to the national grids [5
8], has seen an increasing number of distributed generation (DG) units
based on renewable energy being integrated into the power grids.
According to the REN21 Renewables 2014 Global Status report [9], over
the past few years the costs of electricity generation from onshore
wind and, in particular, solar PV, have fallen sharply. This has seen
renewables accounting for more than 56% of net additions to global
power capacity in 2013 [9].
In South Africa, the Integrated Resource Plan (revised 2013) of
the government projects an output of 17,800 MW from renewables, representing 21% of envisaged total energy output, by 2030
[1]. The renewable sources will primarily be wind, concentrated
solar power (CSP) and solar photo-voltaic (PV), with these preferred technologies being added at an average of 800 MW per
annum [1].
Studies [10,11] identied sites with viable potential for the
installation and generation of electricity from wind and solar
renewable resources in South Africa. The studies put the maximum potential wind capacity at approximately 76.6 GW. Most
regions of the country are also considered viable for solar resource
with the PV potential estimated at 886 GW, much higher than the
potential wind capacity.
Renewable energy generation systems being installed worldwide range from household scale systems of a few kW up to
utility-scale systems of tens to hundreds of MW. Currently, some
of the utility scale renewable projects that are being developed in
South Africa fall under the Renewable Energy Independent Power
Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) initiated by the
South African government and managed by Eskom, the country's
predominant power utility company. The approved IPPs sell the
generated power to Eskom.
The traditional power system has a vertical architecture and
consists of large generating stations located at a relatively few
locations [12] with stable power outputs. DG units are being
integrated into the grid through the low to medium voltage networks [1315], though the very large DGs such as wind farms
(above 50 MW) are connected at sub-transmission and transmission level [16]. Integration of huge numbers of DGs of smaller
capacity, that are dispersed according to the resource availability,
is leading to fundamental changes to the topology of the power
network, especially at the distribution level, that may ultimately
transform the power system architecture to a horizontal one.
This increasing integration of DGs has raised many technical
concerns such as impact of the DGs on voltage regulation, supply
security and reliability, system stability, equipment control, protection, islanding and safety [1619]. The system energy management protocols also need to be reviewed because of the
uncertainty of the DG contribution [20], considering the stochastic
behaviour of renewable sources that is dependent on weather
conditions, leading to network recongurations when the DGs are
not active, or islanded.
This review paper is focused on the impact of the DGs on
system protection, but with the realisation that the other abovementioned technical concerns can be mitigated through proper
system protection and control [18,21]. A discussion is given of the
traditional protection techniques for the distribution system and
the shortcomings of such techniques when DGs are integrated into
the distribution system. The paper also presents a wide survey and
review of recent techniques proposed by various researchers to
mitigate the effects of DG integration on distribution system
protection performance. The implementation challenges of these
techniques are discussed and proposals for the future given.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the
impact of DG penetration on the traditional distribution system
protection. Section 3 reviews protection strategies proposed for

the future DG-integrated distribution system. Section 4 reviews

issues of stability and islanding related to integration of DGs. The
conclusions are presented in Section 5.

2. The impact of DG penetration on distribution network

protection
Traditional distribution networks are generally radial by design
and the protection strategies that are in use assume single-source
in-feed and radial current ows [2226]. Simple and low cost
timecurrent graded protection is applied and the overcurrent
devices can be easily coordinated to give discriminative clearance
of faults [5,25,27,28].
However, integration of DGs that are fundamentally active
devices transforms the distribution network into a multi-source
system allowing two-way power ows. With the DGs also contributing to the fault currents, the protection philosophy that
assumed radial or one-way ow of currents from a single source
no longer applies, resulting in unpredictable operating times of the
existing protection devices leading to possible loss of coordination
[2224,26,2931]. In addition, connecting variable DG to the system will have the effect of producing variable fault levels and
currents, further compromising the protection coordination.
The loss of protection coordination impacts negatively on the
reliability of the distribution system. Studies [21,3234] have
shown that the reliability of the traditional distribution system is
degraded signicantly by the loss of protection coordination
resulting from high penetration of DGs.
Two particular cases of mis-coordination can be identied that
result from incorporation of DGs: protection blinding and sympathetic (false) tripping. Blinding occurs when the sensitivity of a
protective relay is reduced. It can be shown [35] that fault currents
seen by an upstream protective device may be reduced by the
presence of a DG located downstream of the protective device. The
effective reduction will depend on the relative short circuit
impedances of the main source and the DG, and the impedance of
the feeder to the point of fault. The upstream protection device
may thus be blinded to downstream faults and fail to pick up.
Sympathetic tripping occurs when a protective device in one
feeder operates for a fault in another, upstream or parallel, feeder
when the protection device's security is lost as a result of current
back-feed towards the fault from incorporated DGs [35]. These
currents would otherwise not exist in the absence of the DGs. This
is false tripping as the fault is in an entirely non-related zone. This
problem would not arise with directional elements but most of the
overcurrent protection devices used on the distribution network
are non-directional and will pick-up bi-directional faults. Directional feature would require voltage transformer (VTs) which are
not installed at most points on the distribution system.
DGs may also create problems with fuse saving [36]. Fuses are
commonly used on the distribution system for protection of lateral
feeders. The protection philosophy applied is for the fuse to clear
permanent faults and an upstream protection device such as an
auto-recloser to clear the transient faults and save the fuse.
However, a DG inserted at an intermediate location may continue
supplying fault current leading to the possible loss of the fuse for
transient faults.
Another complication arises where multiple types of DGs are
installed. Studies [4,29,37] have shown that DGs have different
short circuit characteristics and contribute fault currents to varying degrees depending on the type. Four main types of DG can be
identied [38]: (1) synchronous generators directly coupled to the
grid such as hydro micro-turbine generators or thermal generators
with CSP systems; (2) asynchronous generators directly coupled to
the grid such as squirrel cage induction generators (SCIG) and

P.T. Manditereza, R. Bansal / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 58 (2016) 14571465

wound rotor induction generators (WRIG); (3) doubly-fed asynchronous generators, with power converter in the rotor circuit
(DFIG); and (4) power converter interfaced units, with or without
a rotating generator such as photo-voltaic (PV) and fully controlled
wind generator (FCWG).
The type 1 and 2 DGs are characterized by high short-circuit
current contribution that may reach 10 per unit (p.u.) of the rated
current, depending on the reactance of the generator and connecting transformer [29,32,3941]. However, for type 2 (asynchronous) DGs, the currents will decay rapidly and may reach
values below the rated current, mainly because the asynchronous
generator does not have an independent excitation system. This
phenomenon makes it difcult for a relay to pick up the fault. The
DFIG (type 3) will usually have a crowbar scheme for protection of
the rotor circuit. With the crowbar activated, the rotor is shortcircuited and the DFIG behaves like the conventional asynchronous generator [38], with a large initial current that quickly
decays. The type 4 (converter interfaced) DGs are characterized by
a limited contribution to short-circuit currents of up to 4 p.u. of
the rated current. The rapid response of the inverter control
ensures that this current is quickly reduced to below the withstand level of the power electronic devices [29,3941].
Network operators have recently introduced regulations (grid
codes) that require the DGs on the distribution network to have
the capability to ride through faults and remain connected for a
dened duration dependent on the severity of the disturbance
[42]. The DGs must not only remain connected but must provide
active and reactive power support to maintain the system frequency and voltage following fault clearance. To meet these
requirements, DG manufacturers introduced the control techniques that, however, also have impact on the short circuit behaviour of the various types of DGs [42]. The control techniques are
not standardised and have introduced uncertainty in the fault
current contribution of the DGs [38].
From the above discussion, it is apparent that integration of
DGs requires protection that is capable of maintaining protection
coordination under bi-directional and variable power ow conditions. The protection must also operate correctly under the conditions of unpredictable fault currents. The traditional distribution
protection is designed for radial current ows of predictable
magnitudes, and will fail under unpredictable current ow conditions. The growing penetration of DGs, therefore, makes distribution network protection an important research topic on the
future of power systems [18,43,44].
The DG integration raises two other important issues: violation
of short-circuit ratings and islanding. In the presence of DGs, fault
current is supplied both from power system and DG. This can
result in increased short circuit current which can surpass breaker
capacity. The ratings of circuit breakers and other installed devices
thus need to be re-assessed following installation of DGs; the
design short-circuit capacities should not be exceeded.
The integration of DGs raises possibilities of islanding, when
part of a network may keep on operating as an island following the
opening of a circuit breaker or breakers at some point in the
network to clear a fault. Islanding has been considered undesirable
for various reasons, including difculty with voltage and frequency
control, problems with reconnecting the island, poor power
quality in the islanded system, safety issues and the difculty of
clearing arcing faults if the DGs remain connected [44,45].

1459

protection of the DG, to prevent islanding [35], and also to ensure

that the DGs do not contribute to the short-circuit currents and the
system protection can operate according to the original coordination settings without the DG units [1315,46,47].
The practice of disconnecting the DGs every time a fault occurs
may lead to unnecessary blackouts [48] making the DG supply,
and as a consequence the distribution system, very unreliable.
Further, because of the increased contribution of the DGs to network security, the indiscriminate disconnection of un-faulted DGs
is not desirable and neither is it acceptable in a deregulated and
competitive multi-owner energy market [18]. Additionally, reliability can be improved signicantly if the affected areas have the
capability to separate from the grid with the DGs continuing to
feed the islanded system, in which case no blackouts are experienced and there is no loss to the owners of un-faulted DGs that
continue supplying power.
Some system operators have recently introduced grid codes
that require the DGs to ride through faults and remain connected
to provide ancillary services frequency and voltage support at
point of connection. The DG protection is still required to trip if a
disturbance (such as low voltage resulting from a short circuit) of a
dened severity is not removed after a dened duration [49].
Whilst connected, the DG will contribute fault current and the
distribution system protection coordination is not certain. Inverter
and other control techniques introduced by manufacturers to give
DGs fault-ride-through capability result in fault current contributions of less than the DG rated current. The DG will thus have little
impact on protection operation but this may lead to difculties in
detecting and isolating the faults [42].

3. Protection strategies for the future distribution network

As discussed in Section 2, integration of DGs requires protection that is capable of maintaining proper coordination under bidirectional and variable power ow conditions. The protection
must also be effective under conditions of unpredictable fault
currents. The protection must also allow islanding to improve the
reliability of the distribution system. New grid code requirements
demand that the DGs remain connected for a short time under
fault conditions; this requires protection that is fast to enable
quick fault clearance and recovery of the voltage. New protection
strategies thus need to be realised and adopted to replace the
existing industry practice of indiscriminately disconnecting DGs in
the event of fault or abnormal condition on the power network.
Currently, distribution system applications tend towards lowcost solutions [5,25,27] based on the philosophy that protection on
the distribution system should just be sufcient to ensure safety
and minimise damage. This practice is a consequence of economic
considerations due to the huge number of distribution and supply
points that need protective devices. Hence, a suitable compromise
must be reached between economy and complexity for any future
protection strategy for the distribution system incorporating DGs.
Any fundamental shift from the basic timeovercurrent protection
strategies on the distribution network will require considerable
capital investment leading to higher electricity costs.
A wide range of strategies that attempt to improve protection
coordination in the presence of DGs have been proposed in the
literature, and these are discussed and critically reviewed in the
following sections, according to the criteria established above.

2.1. Current protection practices with DG penetration

Current utility industry practice, based on standards including
the IEEE 1547 [31,46], requires that protection systems be installed
to ensure the disconnection of the DGs from the network in the
event of a power system disturbance or fault. This is necessary for

3.1. Economy-driven strategies: performance enhanced traditional

strategies
Economic considerations have led to development of solutions
that attempt to retain the traditional protection system structures

1460

P.T. Manditereza, R. Bansal / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 58 (2016) 14571465

and devices so as to offset any new capital investments. Such

solutions have been proposed in [22,26,31,33]. These solutions are
based on the premise that for any given network, the optimum
locations, sizes of DGs, maximum DG penetration levels, and also
protection settings, may be identied that minimise incidents of
loss of protection coordination and hence improve system reliability [21].
However, the exibility for selection of appropriate DG locations and capacity may not be available in practice; and such
exibility may actually offset the benets, and the very principle,
of distributed generation. Some optimisation constraints might
also be imposed such as locating the DGs to minimise system
losses [5052]. The minimum acceptable level of loss of protection
is not dened, nor how this can be characterised. These solutions,
in effect, do not solve the problem as any changes to DG penetration, capacity or disconnections will lead to changes in fault
levels and further loss of protection coordination. Any such
developed strategy is network and time specic and no generic
attributes can be derived for application elsewhere.
The traditional protection scheme may be enhanced by
employing adaptive protection principles where the protective
devices such as relays respond to the changing system conditions
and adapt (the settings) according to the actual system state. The
devices will need information about the current status of the
network and, hence, communication systems need to be implemented. The concept of the smart grid [37,53], the next generation
power system that will be characterised by two-way communication, has helped promote these communications-based solutions [18,25].
Research presented in [54] employs adaptive protection within
a traditional relay-recloser-fuse protection structure but using
digital relays and reclosers. The relay located at the substation,
runs an algorithm that detects possible locations of DGs using
current measurements at all recloser and fuse locations, and then
depending on the relative current magnitudes, adapts or shifts the
recloser fast curves for sustained recloser-fuse coordination. This
technique is, however, only effective up to a certain level of DG
penetration, above which the fault currents fall outside the
recloser-fuse coordination range. Additionally, the measurements
and communications requirements far exceed the cost of the fuses
making this technique not viable.
Solutions suggested in [19,25,31,55] employ a central computer
to adjust the settings of the protection devices on receipt of
information about the network conguration and DG connections
or disconnections, in the attempt to retain coordination between
the devices. However, coordination may not exist during the time
between network reconguration and calculation of the new settings [47]. These solutions assume the protection devices have all
been upgraded to, or replaced by, digital relays.
Some researchers [30,47] suggest solutions for the distribution
system protection that share some characteristics with the complex and high-cost transmission system protection, such as current
differential and distance schemes. The transmission system,
however, consists of large generating stations located at a few and
stable locations. In contrast, integration of huge numbers of DGs
complicates the application of these protection schemes because
of the potential substantial generation changes and power network recongurations, especially where islanding is allowed [47].
For example, the distance scheme, though it has many advantages
when compared with overcurrent feeder protection, will suffer
from the problem of under-reaching where DGs are connected at
several nodes along the distribution feeder. These DGs create infeeds that cause the impedance presented to an upstream relay to
be higher than the actual [56].

3.2. Non-traditional fault identication and location

The techniques proposed in Section 3.1 attempt to maintain
protection coordination in the presence of DGs, but have deciencies and limitations that hinder their possible application. The
traditional protection structure may thus need to be changed. The
concept of the smart grid, and its underlying communicationbased structure, has promoted a substantial paradigm shift in the
approach towards the protection of DG-integrated distribution
systems. Communications-based solutions are being promoted
that attempt to detect and locate faults within the distribution
network. The appropriate circuit breakers are then identied to
trip and clear the fault.
Solutions proposed by [27,28] attempt to detect and locate a
fault by facilitating data communications between intelligent
electronic devices (IEDs) in the distribution network and a central
computer that runs an algorithm to identify the appropriate circuit
breakers to trip and clear the fault, based on the system measurements and DG statuses. The algorithm proposed in [28]
iteratively searches, through impedance calculations, for the faulted section. Once the section has been identied appropriate circuit breakers are tripped to isolate that fault. However, the iterative nature of this algorithm may lead to excessive fault clearance
times. Unrealistic assumptions are also made such as having xed
loading conditions for the algorithm to work correctly.
Research work in [27] considers the application of neural networks to determine the fault location. The algorithm iteratively
searches for the paths with installed DGs that are feeding the fault.
Once the paths have been identied appropriate circuit breakers
are tripped to isolate the fault. However, the training requirement
of neural network algorithms to determine the weights, that may
be large in number considering the structure, may prove difcult.
Questions may arise as to whether the neural network will perform correctly when some combination of inputs is presented to it
[48]. The structure and depth of the neural network may also lead
to slower response and excessive fault clearance times.
Solutions suggested by [18] apply simpler algorithms but are
applicable to distribution networks within an urban setting that
allow possibility of temporary switch-over to ring conguration.
The algorithm depends on the current, voltage and directional
signals received from remote IEDs to generate trip or block signals
that are send back to the IEDs on the faulted path. Installation of
VTs is thus required at all points to generate the directional signals.
The suggested algorithm is, however, not applicable to a typical
rural network consisting only of radial feeders.
The work presented by [15] proposes a centralised architecture
where off-line fault calculations are used to adapt the short circuit
(SC) data of the network to the current system conguration. A
run-time algorithm is used to compare these SC data with the
actual system measured currents in order to locate a fault and
determine the faulted zone and the circuit breakers that must be
tripped. The short circuit data needs to be updated following every
network reconguration or DG connection or disconnection.
Centralised control in protection and control has its drawbacks.
Failure of the central computer, or the communication system, will
disable the protection for the entire distribution network for the
length of time it takes to restore services. A distributed approach
has advantages in this respect in that failure of one node will only
affect a localised portion of the distribution network. Hence,
solutions with distributed architecture have been proposed that
attempt to detect, classify and determine the fault location using
relay agents and peer-to-peer communications [23,24,57].
An agent is dened as an intelligent device that is capable of
autonomous action within an environment to meet its design
objectives [5862], which is the protection function in this
instance. The IED agents are located at points on the distribution

P.T. Manditereza, R. Bansal / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 58 (2016) 14571465

network such that the network is divided into several sections or

zones. The agents exchange data through a communication network, essentially transforming the traditional protection systems
on the distribution network into a complex, network-wide, distributed protection system.
Using the known locations and capacities of the DGs, some
coefcients, that effectively represent the expected normal and
abnormal current ows at each busbar for each type of fault, are
calculated and stored in the IED and are subsequently used for the
classication and identication of a fault and its location. The
agents measure the bus currents at which they are located, sharing
this information with other agents, and compare the values with
the calculated coefcients in order to detect, classify and determine the fault location. These coefcients, however, have to be recalculated for each agent in the event of changes to the network
topology or DG penetration, thereby imposing huge computing
and communication overheads on the protection system.
3.3. Development of new relay characteristics
Reference [30] proposed a new relay characteristic for protection of DG-integrated distribution systems. The proposed relay has
an inverse time-admittance characteristic where the operating
time of the proposed relay depends on the measured line admittance. The relay measures the admittance of the protected line and
is thus sensitive to the location of the fault on the feeder.
Relays of this type can be coordinated in a similar manner to
simple timeovercurrent relays. However, more work is required
to prove its functionality and implementation as its complexity is
likely to be comparable to that of impedance relaying. This relay
type may not function correctly with inverter-interfaced DGs that
limit the fault current to a xed level, in which case the fault
current presented to the relay is independent of fault location. The
control strategies of such inverter-interfaced DGs need to be
reviewed to ensure the DG contributes variable fault current that
depends on fault location. This will enable such relays to detect
and isolate faults effectively [30].
Additionally, it can be shown [35] that fault currents seen by an
upstream protective device may be reduced by the presence of a
DG located downstream of the protective device. The effective
reduction will depend on the relative short circuit impedances of
the main source and the DG, and the impedance of the feeder to
the point of fault. An upstream admittance protection relay may
thus see a reduced current causing the relay to over-reach.
3.4. Further challenges with the non-traditional approaches
The adaptive and other communication-based solutions
described above assume zero fault impedance. A lot of faults will
likely be arcing faults [30], which may cause the measured fault
current values to be different from the expected values stored in
the central computer, or those used to adjust the settings of the
protective devices, leading to problems of under- or over-reaching
and the erroneous tripping of circuit breakers. The effects of fault
resistance on the performance of these strategies need to be
investigated and mitigated.
Additionally, the requirement for continuous monitoring of the
system variables and DG statuses for protection purposes will
impose huge load on the communication system. No specic
communication techniques are suggested in the literature, except
that the smart grid will make such communications possible. In
traditional protection schemes, especially at transmission level,
signalling is initiated only when some event is detected [5]. Data
networks capable of transferring data in real time in a secure
manner and with adequate latency will be required to achieve
high speed protection and control. However, the use of emerging

1461

protocols such as the IEC61850 for the transmission of critical data

such as GOOSE1 and Sampled Values (SV) of currents and voltages
has been investigated in [63] for possible application on the distribution system, outside of the substation for which the protocol
was initially intended.
Ultimately, the practical implementation of adaptive protection, as well as relay agents, requiring intelligent devices and data
communication networks will require a huge initial capital
investment in the replacement of traditional relaying with digital
relays and communication networks [15,24].
Back-up protection strategies in the event of communication
failure between the centralised protection unit and the remote
IEDs are not formulated in the proposed strategies such as those
given in [15,25,27,28,31]. It will be necessary for the strategies
with centralised computing to have a fall-back strategy whereby
the protection must operate based solely on local measurements
[47]. Primary and back-up protection systems are usually required
to operate on different principles [5].
Most of the proposed protection strategies in the literature
assume the existence of suitable fault detection techniques without explaining what they are. Fault detection in distribution systems incorporating DGs may be difcult due to the variable fault
levels. This is exacerbated by the low fault current contribution of
inverter-interfaced DGs [30,48]. This problem becomes critical
when islanding is allowed and fault infeed from the grid is
removed resulting in very low fault levels in the created microgrid.
The control strategy of inverter-interfaced DGs should be reviewed
to ensure these DGs contribute to the fault and aid in the detection
and isolation of the fault [30].
Some researchers such as [15,18] developed and used test
systems, including the necessary system data, based on the networks in their particular regions or countries leading to the
development of strategies peculiar to the particular network
topology, but not transferable to networks with different topologies. The test systems formed the basis for evaluation of the levels
of DG penetration that have impact on the fault levels, and consequently the system protection. The proposed protection strategies were implemented on these network models to validate
compliance with the specied performance requirements. However, other studies [19,22] used one or other of the IEEE standard
distribution test networks [64,65]. The IEEE test systems are well
documented allowing for the simulation of numerous scenarios
due to the large set of available data [65]. This also allows for the
generation of generic results, which is not possible with a practical
system [65].
In addition to the test system topologies not being universal,
most of the proposed solutions are also DG-technology specic
and may not be applicable to distribution systems incorporating
multiple technologies that have different dynamic behaviours and
short circuit current contributions.

4. Other technical issues arising from integration of DGs

4.1. System stability
A typical power system is a high-order multi-variable process
whose dynamic performance is inuenced by a wide variety of
incorporated devices and their controls [66]. Faults or disturbances
will cause variations in power ows, rotor angles and bus voltages
that may lead to possible stability issues. Stability is a major topic
in power system design and operation, including protection [48].
The integration of huge amounts of DGs that are fundamentally
1

GOOSE is an acronym for Generic Object Oriented Substation Event

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P.T. Manditereza, R. Bansal / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 58 (2016) 14571465

active devices introduce additional behaviours and controls that

need to be studied. The simple voltage-behind-the-impedance
models that had traditionally been used for the DGs are not adequate for such studies.
Understanding the behaviour of the individual generating units
is important for power system stability. During a fault, the generating units must supply sufcient short-circuit current to ensure
correct coordinated operation of the protection devices. Following
fault clearance, the generating units should recover and supply
active power as fast as possible without undue oscillations, and
further, supply reactive power, or reduce reactive power consumption, in order to support quick voltage recovery [67].
Traditionally, stability has not been an issue at the distribution
level as the network was considered passive, and the voltage
sources were represented by simple static Thevenin models
[13,18]. Faults on the distribution network were considered not to
have an impact on the behaviour of generating units located on
the transmission system [18].
However, rstly, because of the increasing contribution of DGs
to network security, disconnection of large numbers of DG units
following system disturbance or fault, according to current practice, will lead to signicant imbalance between the generation and
demand leading to possible system instability. Secondly, the high
DG penetration, especially of PV, has the effect of reducing the
effective system inertia leading to reduced system dynamic performance [20,68]. Traditionally, the power system is required to
have adequate inertial energy that may be called upon instantly to
stabilise the dynamics when abnormal conditions occur. The stabilisation requires both real and reactive energy and control [69].
How DGs may contribute inertia to the power system is a topic
under extensive discussions. PV, for example, may need to provide
the equivalent inertia by electronic means using stored energy in
order to maintain the system capability [69]. Wind generators may
also provide equivalent inertia by extracting the kinetic energy
stored in rotational parts of the wind turbines through a converter
control strategy referred to as synthetic inertia [70]. The integration of CSP-based thermal generation DG offers the opportunity
for integrating synchronous machines into the energy mix and
improving the system inertia [71]. Currently, however, only utilityscale CSP systems are being integrated through the transmission
system. Research is required to develop down-scaled versions for
integration at the distribution level. Such systems will introduce
signicant inertia and spinning reserve into the distribution system that are necessary components for successful islanding.
Most of the strategies from the literature proposed for the
protection of the DG-integrated distribution system attempt to
address the issue of coordination between protection devices but
do not discuss the impact of the protection strategies on the
dynamic performance and stability of the system [68]. Signicant
research has been done on the stability problem but from the
control perspective, to establish control strategies that aid in
maintaining system stability for the DG-integrated distribution
system [72]. The stability issue also needs to be viewed from the
protection perspective and any proposed protection scheme need
to be evaluated against the dynamic response and stability of the
system.
The stability problem is complicated by the integration of DGs
of a variety of technologies. Little is reported in the literature [73]
on the stability problems arising from the interaction of the
multiple types of DGs and between DGs and active loads, especially with regard to small-signal stability following islanding of a
section of the distribution system. Small-signal dynamic interactions have been extensively investigated for high voltage transmission systems, but very little at the distribution level [16].
However, small-signal stability studies in [73,74] conclude that

dynamic interactions among DGs in a distribution network signicantly affect the small-signal stability of the system.

4.2. DG interface requirements on protection

Current industry practice requires the disconnection of DGs to
avoid islanding due to various challenges including difculty with
voltage and frequency control, problems with reconnecting the
island, poor power quality in the islanded system, safety issues
and difculty of clearing arcing faults while DGs are connected
[16,44,45,75]. The disconnection is also done to eliminate their
interference with the network following faults or other system
disturbances. However, to ensure continuous energy supply with
high levels of reliability and quality, updated grid codes for the
distribution system issued by various network operators in several
countries specify that the DGs should remain connected and
support the grid during contingencies [76].
As far as voltage support is concerned, under normal conditions
DGs operate on power factor (PF) between 0.95 leading to 0.95
lagging and are not allowed to actively regulate the voltage at the
point of coupling to the grid. This is done to prevent excessive
voltages being generated and causing a safety hazard to persons
and equipment [16,20,46]. However, it has been shown [16] that,
with a high penetration of DGs, this practice of PF control of the
DGs may actually lead to voltage regulation and instability problems, with the voltage either dipping below the lower limits or
exceeding the upper limits depending on whether the DG is
operating on lagging or leading PF. It is then shown that a combination of PF and voltage control modes at identied locations is
necessary for improved reliability and stability, by allowing the
DGs to absorb or inject the necessary vars.
Faults on the system will result in voltage drops that may be
sufcient for the DG protection to trip. The voltage must recover
quickly to remove this possibility and ensure that the DGs are able
to ride through any transient voltage sags. The response of conventional voltage regulators is slow [77] but the DGs themselves,
in particular the inverter-interfaced DGs, can quickly supply the
necessary vars to restore voltage and prevent the DG from tripping
on low voltage [77]. Hence, it is desirable for the DGs themselves
to participate in voltage control. Updated grid codes issued by
network operators require DGs to have such capability.
Power system stability may be compromised by depressed
voltages leading to cascaded, or sympathetic, tripping of the DGs.
Voltage dips resulting from faults or other causes may lead to
signicant imbalances between instantaneous mechanical power
input and electrical power output and, if sustained, will lead to
loss of synchronism and disconnection of the DG, which may lead
to further disconnection of other DGs [16]. For inverter-interfaced
DGs the depressed voltage may cause the interface protection to
trip on under-voltage, the result of which may overload some
feeders leading to operation of overcurrent protection [29]. The
DGs should be able to ride through these voltage dips, which is
possible only if the protection acts to remove the cause and allow
the voltage to recover within the critical clearing time of the DG.
The PQ problems encountered also depend on the design variations of the DGs, especially with regard to wind turbines [78].
These problems include reactive power consumption and power
uctuations resulting from wind variations leading to severe voltage uctuations and signicant power system transients and
harmonics and high line losses [78]. The multiple types of DGs
respond differently, placing differing requirements on the protection [79].

P.T. Manditereza, R. Bansal / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 58 (2016) 14571465

4.3. Islanding
Current industry practice requires the disconnection of DGs to
avoid islanding. However, disconnection of large amounts of DG
compromises the reliability of the supply, which can be improved
if islanding of the affected part of the network is allowed, with the
DGs remaining available during and after fault occurrence. It is
also desirable for the DGs to remain connected to support voltage
recovery [20,79] by having fault-ride-through capability.
Research is on-going [48] in the development of control concepts for islanded microgrid systems. Micro-grid voltage and frequency control are some of the important challenges regarding its
implementation despite the numerous benets of micro-grid
operation. Power from the DGs must be controlled to match the
load requirement and hence there should be a control scheme to
regulate the power ow from the DG and maintain quality and
reliability of supply [80]. The control scheme used should
allow accurate power sharing and provide voltage and frequency
regulation.
Protection is also a major challenge especially regarding the
issue of inverter-interfaced DGs. The inverter fault currents are
limited by the rating of the power electronic devices. Fault currents in islanded inverter-based microgrid may not have sufcient
values to use traditional overcurrent protection techniques [81].
The protection must operate correctly in either of the two operating modes grid-connected or islanded. The same protection
strategies must operate correctly for both islanded and gridconnected operation. Hence, faults within the microgrid need to
be cleared with techniques that do not rely on high fault currents.
The research in the literature is focused on the development
and control of microgrids with well-dened topologies including
known single or multiple PCC (point of common coupling) to the
grid. Following the fault occurrence, however, the islanded system
will be dened by the locations of the circuit breakers that trip to
isolate a fault. Thus, the constituent components of such an island
are not predened. The research into microgrids needs to be
widened to include the situation where the DGs in an unpredetermined section of the network can be successfully islanded to continue supplying the localised load.

5. Conclusion
The traditional distribution protection fails in its function when
a signicant amount of DG is integrated into the distribution
system. The DGs affect the short circuit current magnitudes and
direction of ow, reducing the sensitivity of the relays and causing
the protection to lose coordination.
Various protection strategies proposed by many researchers for
protection of DG-integrated distribution systems were reviewed.
To a greater extent the suggested protection strategies are
applicable to networks with specic structures or topologies, or
are designed for a specic DG technology due to the differing short
circuit behaviours of the DGs. The proposed strategies need to be
enhanced and formulated for application to a general distribution
system with multiple types of DG. This would require review also
of the control strategies of inverter-interfaced DGs so that they
contribute sufcient fault current to facilitate detection and isolation of faults.
Stability at the distribution level is now an important topic due
to the expected high penetration of DG, and protection schemes
need to be evaluated against the dynamic response and stability of
the system. This was found lacking in the currently proposed
strategies. The protection system employed should also facilitate
transition into islanded operation to improve supply reliability.
This capability is not apparent in the currently proposed solutions.

1463

Protection schemes with both centralised and distributed

architecture are proposed in the literature. However, looking at the
limitations and deciencies of each type, a hierarchical algorithm
for protection may be desirable. The distributed algorithms will
protect against local faults with minimum communication
requirements, reducing the impact of communication link failure.
Local protection systems are often not capable of protecting
against system-wide disturbances, such as those caused by transient and voltage stability problems, for which a higher-level
centralized algorithm may be implemented.

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