Beauford White v. Richard L. Dugger, As Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida, 828 F.2d 10, 11th Cir. (1987)
Beauford White v. Richard L. Dugger, As Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida, 828 F.2d 10, 11th Cir. (1987)
Beauford White v. Richard L. Dugger, As Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida, 828 F.2d 10, 11th Cir. (1987)
2d 10
This Petition was filed with this Court on the evening of August 26, 1987,
although as discussed below, the pleadings and supporting materials were
lodged with this Court several days previously.
The current appearances on behalf of Petitioner in both State and Federal Court
This time around, on August 19, 1987 Petitioner initially filed a Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Motion for Stay of Execution with the Supreme
Court of Florida. On August 20, 1987, the Supreme Court of Florida denied the
petition and denied the stay. Petitioner then, on August 21, 1987, filed a motion
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 with the Circuit Court of
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, seeking to vacate
the judgment and sentence imposed on him, and he also moved for an
emergency stay of the execution set for 7:00 a.m. on Wednesday, August 26,
1987. By order dated August 22, 1987, Circuit Judge Friedman denied the
petition and denied the application for the stay. Immediately thereafter,
Petitioner appealed the trial court's denial of relief to the Supreme Court of
Florida. By order entered on August 25, 1987, the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's denial of relief and stay of execution. The Petitioner
then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus accompanied by a motion to
stay execution in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
The Honorable Stanley Marcus, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of Florida, held a hearing on the evening of August 25, 1987, in Key
West, Florida. In a carefully reasoned thirty-five page Memorandum Opinion
and Order, Judge Marcus denied the Petition on August 26, 1987.
We have now received and have carefully reviewed the Memorandum Opinion
and Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus entered by Judge
Marcus on the evening of August 26, 1987. It addresses each contention
thoroughly and in detail, and comes to the correct result in denying the prayers
of Petitioner. The district judge is to be commended for producing this
impressive order, especially in light of the present circumstances of rigid time
constraints.
7
We agree with the district court that the allegedly suppressed materials were
available to the attorney at the time of the trial and that Detective Derringer's
reference to such information in his testimony at trial put defendant on notice of
the existence of such records. We agree with the district court that White's
failure to raise this issue in his original federal habeas corpus petition
constitutes an abuse of the writ. Although we need not reach the merits of the
issue, the district court's discussion of the merits amply demonstrates that the
"ends of justice doctrine" does not warrant an exception to the abuse doctrine
on this issue.
The claim based on Tison v. Arizona, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d
127 (1987) was presented in the original federal habeas corpus petition and was
resolved against White on the merits. Accordingly, it is barred by the
successive writ doctrine unless the "ends of justice" warrant an exception. We
agree with the District Court that the "ends of justice" do not indicate
reconsideration of this issue. The district court found "that the Florida Supreme
Court found that White possessed an intent to kill. See White v. Wainwright,
632 F.Supp. 1140, 1157 n. 7." We agree with the district court that Tison sets
forth a standard which is less stringent than the findings previously made in this
case.
We agree with the district court that the jury override claim is barred by the
abuse of the writ doctrine. While we need not reach the merits, it appears to us
that the state-court review of the override was appropriate and constitutionally
adequate. We therefore agree with the district court that the ends of justice do
not merit review of this claim.
10
The other claims raised by White are also barred by the abuse of the writ
doctrine for the reasons discussed by the district court, and those claims
warrant no further discussion here.
11
Having found that White's claims are barred by the abuse/successive writ
doctrine, we also conclude that this result would not be debatable among jurists
of reason. Accordingly, the application for a certificate of probable cause is
DENIED.
12
13
14
15
The motion for certificate of probable cause having been DENIED, any other
motions presently pending are DENIED.