Brenda Knott v. DeKalb County School District, 11th Cir. (2015)

Case: 14-13687
Date Filed: 08/18/2015
Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-13687
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-02683-SCJ
BRENDA KNOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM,
Ramona Tyson, Interim Superintendent,
Defendant,
DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(August 18, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-13687
Page: 2 of 7
Brenda Knott, pro se, appeals from the district courts grant of summary
judgment in favor of DeKalb County School District (DeKalb County) on her
employment Title VII retaliation claim filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a).
On appeal, Knott argues that: (1) the district court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of DeKalb County because she established a prima facie case of
retaliation by showing that DeKalb County did not renew her teaching contract
after she reported gender discrimination by the high schools principal; (2) she also
showed that DeKalb Countys reasons for non-renewal of her contract were pretext
for retaliation; and (3) the district court erred by concluding that DeKalb County
had preserved its defense that Knott had failed to satisfy a condition precedent by
not filing a timely charge with the EEOC. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a district courts order granting summary judgment de novo.
Brooks v. Cnty. Commn, 446 F.3d 1160, 1161-62 (11th Cir. 2006). Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, viewing all of the
facts in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.; see
also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine factual dispute exists if a jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079,
1085 (11th Cir. 2004).
Case: 14-13687
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Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee

because the employee opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII (the
opposition clause), or made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in a
Title VII proceeding or investigation (the participation clause). 42 U.S.C.
2000e-3(a). Absent direct evidence of discrimination, when analyzing claims for
retaliation, we employ the analytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307
(11th Cir. 2009). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of retaliation. Id. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption by
articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. Id. at 1308. The plaintiff then has an opportunity to demonstrate that the
defendants proffered reason was pretext for discrimination. Id.
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff may show
that: (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) she established a causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse action. Id. at 1307-08. Where a plaintiff is engaged in
protected conduct pursuant to the opposition clause, a plaintiff need not prove
that the underlying discriminatory conduct that she opposed was actually unlawful,
but rather must show that she had a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer
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Case: 14-13687
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was engaged in unlawful employment practices. Little v. United Techs., Carrier

Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff must not only
show that she subjectively, in good faith, believed that her employer was engaged
in unlawful employment practices, but also that her belief was objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and record. Id. We have previously said that a
plaintiff did not satisfy the objective reasonableness inquiry where the plaintiff
failed to cite any statutory or case law that could reasonably be believed to support
the plaintiffs claim. Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 857 (11th Cir. 2010).
Unfair treatment, absent discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin, is not
an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. Coutu v. Martin County Bd. of
County Comrs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1995).
To establish pretext, the plaintiff may demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employers
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find
them unworthy of credence. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, Meadowcraft, Inc.,
106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). But a reason cannot be
proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason
was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. St. Marys Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (emphases omitted). Accordingly, it is not
Case: 14-13687
Page: 5 of 7
enough to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiffs
explanation of intentional discrimination. Id. at 519 (emphases omitted).
In this case, the district court did not err in concluding that Knott failed to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation. For starters, although Knott filed an
EEOC charge, it was not until after DeKalb County failed to renew her contract.
Therefore, for Knott to succeed on her prima facie case of retaliation, she must
proceed under the opposition clause and establish that she had a good faith,
objectively reasonable belief that DeKalb County discriminated against her based
on her gender. See Little, 103 F.3d at 960. Although Knott alleges she in good
faith and subjectively believed that Principal James Jackson discriminated against
her based on her gender because of his hostility towards her, she failed to provide
any evidence that this was an objectively reasonable belief. Knott alleged that
Jackson demonstrated that hostility towards her by excessively monitoring her
classroom, failing to provide her with a prompt and sufficient orientation, calling a
conference with a student and parent without consulting Knott or attending
himself, and referring Knott to two teacher support programs. However, these
allegations reflect only potentially unfair treatment, which is not actionable under
Title VII. Coutu, 47 F.3d at 1074.
The only evidence Knott provides that Jacksons actions were based on her
gender was the fact that Jackson had originally hired a male for the position that
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Case: 14-13687
Page: 6 of 7
she filled. But this does not lead to an objectively reasonable conclusion that she
was discriminated against on the basis of her gender. Nor does she cite to any
statutory or case law that could reasonably be believed to support her claim. See
Dixon, 627 F.3d at 857.
The district court also correctly concluded that Knott failed to rebut DeKalb
Countys legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the non-renewal of her
contract. As the record shows, DeKalb County stated numerous reasons for the
non-renewal of Knotts contract -- including the deficiencies noted in her
classroom instruction, her failure to adhere to the GPS, her failure to abide by the
PDP requirements, her insubordination by not meeting with administrative
personnel regarding the MTE program, and the numerous complaints by students
and parents. Knott has not offered any evidence that DeKalb Countys proffered
reasons were false and that discrimination was the real reason. See Hicks, 509
U.S. at 515. Instead, she has provided a summary of the events that led up to the
non-renewal of her contract, but does not explain how this conduct evidences that
DeKalb Countys motivation for her non-renewal was retaliatory. Knott also
alleges that DeKalb County failed to follow its own policies and procedures, but
does not offer any evidence of this other than her conclusory allegations.
Accordingly, because Knott failed to establish either a prima facie case of
retaliation or that DeKalb Countys stated reasons for the non-renewal of her
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Case: 14-13687
Page: 7 of 7
contract were pretext for retaliation, we need not reach Knotts argument regarding
the timeliness of her EEOC charge.
AFFIRMED.

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Case: 14-13687

Date Filed: 08/18/2015

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

Date Filed: 08/18/2015

Date Filed: 08/18/2015

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee

Date Filed: 08/18/2015

was engaged in unlawful employment practices. Little v. United Techs., Carrier

Date Filed: 08/18/2015

Date Filed: 08/18/2015

Date Filed: 08/18/2015

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