United States v. Bryan Whitehead, 11th Cir. (2015)
United States v. Bryan Whitehead, 11th Cir. (2015)
United States v. Bryan Whitehead, 11th Cir. (2015)
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Offense Conduct
In 2010, Whitehead robbed a bank at gunpoint, ordering the bank employees
to empty their cash drawers and forcing them to the vault to give him money from
there as well. After taking the money, Whitehead escaped.
Two years later, in 2012, Whitehead robbed another bank at gunpoint, again
forcing the tellers to give him money from their cash drawers and from the banks
vault. After the second bank robbery, Whitehead was apprehended.
Following a jury trial, Whitehead was convicted of two counts of bank
robbery (Counts 1 and 3) and two counts of brandishing a firearm during the bank
robberies (Counts 2 and 4).
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B.
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was remanding for resentencing, it did not address Whiteheads argument that his
sentences were substantively unreasonable. Id.
C.
Resentencing
At Whiteheads resentencing, the parties agreed that: (1) the mandatory
minimum consecutive terms for the firearm counts, Counts 2 and 4, remained 84
months and 300 months, respectively; and (2) with the two-level physical-restraint
enhancement, the advisory guidelines range for the bank robbery counts, Counts 1
and 3, was now 70 to 87 months.
Whitehead again asked for a downward variance. Whitehead argued that the
total mandatory minimum 32-year sentence on Counts 2 and 4, due to 924(c)s
requirement that those sentences be stacked, was more than adequate to serve the
purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), especially given that Whitehead had no criminal
history before the bank robberies. In support, Whitehead submitted an excerpt
from a 2011 Sentencing Commission Report to Congress (Report). See U.S.
Sentencing Commn, Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the
Federal Criminal Justice System (October 2011). The Report notes that 924(c)s
requirement that mandatory minimum sentences be stacked can result in unduly
harsh sentences where all the stacked 924(c) offenses are charged in the same
indictment as part of a crime spree and the defendant had no prior criminal history.
Id., ch. 12 at 359-60. The Report recommends that 924(c) be amended so that,
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inter alia, the mandatory stacking requirement apply only when the first 924(c)
offense is the result of a prior conviction. Id., ch. 12 at 364.
The government requested a 70-month sentence, at the low end of the
advisory guidelines range. The government pointed out that, although Whitehead
did not have any prior convictions before this prosecution, he committed the two
bank robberies two years apart and not as part of a single criminal episode. Thus,
stacking his 924(c) offenses did not result in an excessively harsh sentence on
Whiteheads firearm counts and did not justify a downward variance with respect
to his bank robbery counts. In response, Whitehead argued that his stacked
924(c) sentences were too harsh because he is not a true recidivist in the sense
that he was not convicted and imprisoned on his first offense before committing a
second offense.
The district court asked to be reminded of the testimony of the victim at the
original sentencing hearing. The government stated that one of the tellers
previously testified about the harrowing nature of the robbery and that she still
suffered from post-traumatic stress issues.
Before imposing the sentence, the district court noted that it had considered
the parties arguments and all of the 3553(a) factors, emphasizing in particular
the need to promote respect for the law, deter future criminal conduct, and provide
a just punishment. The district court granted Whiteheads request for a downward
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reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). The
party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that the sentence is
unreasonable in light of the record and the 3553(a) factors. Dougherty, 754 F.3d
1353 at 1361. 1
Here, Whitehead has not shown that his total 432-month sentence is
substantively unreasonable or that the district court abused its discretion by varying
downward only to 48 months as to Counts 1 and 3, the bank robbery offenses. 2
Whiteheads 48-month concurrent sentences on Counts 1 and 3 are 22 months
below his advisory guidelines range of 70 to 87 months and well below the 20-year
statutory maximum in 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), both indications of reasonableness.
See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
The 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9)
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).
2
The parties agree that the district court was statutorily required to impose the mandatory
minimum sentences on Counts 2 and 4 and to run the sentences consecutive to any other
sentence. Thus, the only question here is whether the district courts decision to impose
concurrent 48-month sentences on Counts 1 and 3 was an abuse of discretion.
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AFFIRMED.
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