AVRO ARROW An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History

The following article was originally published in the September/October issue of Engineering
Dimensions, 1988.
It has been republished with permission from Palmiro Campagna, P.Eng., and the Association
of Professional Engineers of Ontario. (PEO).
Thank You for the many requests for accurate information, which is what made this
republication
possible.
Scott McArthur.
Webmaster
Arrow Recovery Canada Inc.

AVRO ARROW
An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History
Paul Campagna, P.Eng.
"The
biggest,
most
powerful,
most
expensive
and
potentially
the fastest
fighter
that the
world has
yet seen. .
. " -Flight
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AVRO ARROW An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History

Magazine,
1958

In 1958, the heroes of every Canadian boy (and probably quite a few girls) were the test
pilots flying the CF-105, known as the Avro Arrow. Behind the test pilots were the engineers,
creating what was to be the fastest, most powerful aircraft yet conceived. 1988 marks the
30th anniversary of its first flight, 1989 the last. Many articles have been written about the
Arrow, some true, many false. Here, for the first time, are the engineering facts, painstakingly
researched by a young Canadian engineer as a testament to the integrity of the team which
created the Arrow.

INDEX:

(selectable links)

PAGE 1

PAGE 2

PAGE 3

Introduction

Fuselage

Engines

Company

Weapons Carriage

Problems

Aircraft

Landing Gear

Consequences

Wing

Fly-by-Wire

Why was the Arrow

Cancelled?

Setting the Record

Straight: The Designer's
View by Margaret
McCaffery

"A Flawed Plane and an

Inept Corporation"?
The Historian's View by
Margaret McCaffery

Acknowledgements

References

Introduction

Four years of excellence in Canadian engineering, research and design culminated in the
maiden flight of the CF-105 Avro Arrow all-weather, supersonic jet interceptor from Malton,
Ontario, on March 25, 1958. The world watched Canada's major contribution to aerospace
engineering but not for long. On Friday, February 20,1959, the Canadian government
ordered all work on the Arrow cancelled.
Some 14,000 employees were fired immediately. Within two months, five superb flying
machines and a more powerful sixth, which had been within days of takeoff, were ordered
reduced to scrap. Also, 31 others in various stages of assembly, along with all parts,
drawings, accessories, blueprints and photographs were ordered destroyed.
Even today, some Canadians are unaware of the aircraft's existence, yet it still ranks as
one of the most technically challenging projects ever undertaken in this country. Design of a
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AVRO ARROW An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History

supersonic interceptor with the parameters of the Avro Arrow presented colossal
engineering problems which were systematically overcome. However, less than 30 years
later, much misinformation exists about the Arrow, such as the number of aircraft that
actually flew, what speeds were reached and technologically just how far ahead it really
was.

The Company

A.V. Roe Canada Limited was established as a subsidiary of the British Hawker-Siddeley
Group in 1945. On purchasing the Malton based Victory Aircraft Ltd, which was producing
Lancaster bombers for the war effort, A.V. Roe turned its attention to commercial jet
transports and military jet aircraft. On August 10, 1949, some two weeks after the British
Comet made a short hop from its runway, Avro flew the C-102 Jetliner on its maiden flight
to 13,000 feet, becoming the first commercial jet transport to fly in North America.
Unlike the Comet, the jetliner was not plagued with catastrophic fatigue failure. Despite
meeting the Trans-Canada Airlines specifications to which it was designed, the jetliner never
went into production. Instead, the company was told to focus on producing the CF-100
all-weather fighter, partly to support the Korean war effort. After flying for seven years, the
lone jetliner, a milestone in aviation, was cut to scrap, forcing Canada to depend on foreign
markets for jet transport aircraft.
Although the CF-100 project was a success, it was decided that a new all-weather,
supersonic jet interceptor would be required to meet Canada's expanding defense needs. In
May, 1953, in response to an RCAF specification, A.V. Roe Canada submitted its report
which examined five possible delta winged configurations, with varying wing sizes and
engine types. In July, 1953, the Department of Defence Production chose the 1,200 square
foot version, thus launching the CF-105 program.

The Aircraft

To set the record straight, the first production CF-105 aircraft, dubbed the Arrow, was rolled
out on October 4, 1957, only four years after the start of the program a major achievement
in itself. Its first flight was March 25, 1958. On its third flight, the aircraft was flown
supersonically at Mach 1.1. On its seventh flight, it exceeded 1,000 mph while climbing.
Four more production aircraft were flown. Eventually, the Arrows would fly to Mach 1.98
(approximately 1,300 mph), although they were never pushed to their performance limit.

PHOTO: DND

All five aircraft were equipped with two Pratt and Whitney J75 engines, each with
approximately 18,000-Ib static thrust and 26,000-Ib with afterburner. A sixth aircraft was
produced and ready for roll-out at the time of cancellation on February 20, 1959. This
aircraft was equipped with the more powerful Iroquois engine, at 23,000-ib static thrust and
30,000-Ib with afterburner.' Arrow number six was expected to break all speed records.
No "prototype" Arrow was ever built, only production aircraft. To move from drawing
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AVRO ARROW An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History

board to produc- tion line, one of the most extensive programs of wind tunnel, structural
and systems testing ever undertaken on any aircraft was conducted. In addition, detailed
mockups were built for checking system installation.
Part of the test program involved the use of fully instrumented one-eighth scale free-flight
models launched on Nike rocket boosters. These models would telemeter information
concerning various flight parameters including drag and stability. Today, those stainless
steel models rest in Lake Ontario, ap- proximately 13 miles off Point Petrie, waiting for
some enterprising underwater enthusiasts to retrieve them.

The Wing

A striking feature of the Arrow was its large delta wing. It was determined that the delta
was the most aerodynamically efficient platform for high speed and high altitude
performance, while providing a large internal fuel capacity for the required range. To permit
higher angles of attack and greater stability, the leading edge of the wing was extended,
drooped and slotted, creating more favourable airflow conditions over the wing. These
features had been used singly on other aircraft, such as the notch on the English Electric
F-23, the leading edge on the Grumman F-9 and the droop on the F-102, forerunner of the
F-106 Delta Dart. To- day, combinations of these are used on most fighters, including the
Russian MIC series and the F/A-18 Hornet. An early prototype of the F/A 18 incorporated
the notch. At the time, the combination of notch, droop and leading edge extensions made
the Arrow unique and aerodynamically superior.
Another addition was negative camber, a slight concavity in the upper surface of the wing
that helps to reduce the amount of elevator deflection required for stability and control
(trim) during supersonic flight. This, in turn, reduces the amount of drag that would
otherwise be created with greater elevator deflections.

Continued on Page 2>>

CONVERTED TO HTML, AND HYPERLINKS ADDED, JANUARY 22, 2001.
Scott McArthur.

CLICK HERE FOR DOWNLOADS

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AVRO ARROW: An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History; Page 2

The following article was originally published in the September/October issue of Engineering
Dimensions, 1988.
It has been republished with permission from Palmiro Campagna, P.Eng., and the Association
of Professional Engineers of Ontario. (PEO).
Thank You for the many requests for accurate information, which is what made this
republication possible.
Scott McArthur.
Webmaster
Arrow Recovery Canada Inc.

AVRO ARROW
An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History
Paul Campagna, P.Eng.

PAGE 2
INDEX:

(selectable links)

PAGE 1

PAGE 2

PAGE 3

Introduction

Fuselage

Engines

Company

Weapons Carriage

Problems

Aircraft

Landing Gear

Consequences

Wing

Fly-by-Wire

Why was the Arrow

Cancelled?

Setting the Record

Straight: The Designer's
View by Margaret
McCaffery

"A Flawed Plane and an

Inept Corporation"?
The Historian's View by
Margaret McCaffery

Acknowledgements

References

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AVRO ARROW: An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History; Page 2

Drawing: DND

AVIONICS ARMAMENT EQUIPMENT ENGINE FUEL

The Fuselage

The aircraft was extensively "area ruled." This concept involves aerodynamic shaping of the
cross-sectional area of the fuselage along its length, to reduce drag to a minimum. Also
called the "Coke bottle" design, the fuselage is characteristically pinched at the waist at the
wing joint, although this was not immediately noticeable on the Arrow.
Similarly, the cockpit was designed as an extension of the fuselage rather than as a
separate bubble, again for good aerodynamic performance. The cockpit canopy itself was of
unusual design, opening and closing in clam-shell fashion due to its size and weight, as well
as for case of entry and exit. The canopy was made of a magnesium alloy with partly glazed
glass. In back, drag was reduced by trailing the canopy off into a spine running the length of
the aircraft to the tail, This also doubled as a conduit for controls and wire cabling. In short,
everything possible was done to reduce aerodynamic drag, including the internal carriage of
weapons.

The Weapons Carriage

The concept of internal weapons carriage has spawned several misguided criticisms about an
aircraft that would destroy itself if the weapons package were lowered during supersonic
flight. In fact, the weapons package was designed to be lowered and removed only while on
the ground. In this way, a fully loaded package could be "snapped" into place, considerably
reducing the turnaround time per aircraft. This concept also allowed easy reconfiguration for
other roles, including reconnaissance and bomber. The pack was never designed to be
lowered in flight; since it was 16 feet long and nine feet across, lowering in flight would have
been ludicrous. At no time were any of the completed aircraft fitted with weapons.
Initially, the Arrow was to have carried the Hughes Falcon guided missile. The Falcons
were to be re- placed by Sparrow 2D missiles, with a sophisticated weapons control system
known as ASTRA. However, Avro engineers judged the Sparrow missiles to be inferior for use
in a high performance aircraft without further development.
Each missile was to be mounted on its own hydraulically activated retractable launching
mechanism. Be- cause of their large fins, Sparrows would sit partially within and partially
outside the belly of the aircraft. (This is similar to the manner in which missiles are carried
on the Tornado aircraft: they are recessed into the underbelly; however, no retractable
launcher is required.) The smaller Falcon missiles would have been fully internal to the

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aircraft. Missiles would extend from their own individual bay doors. Aft missiles would be
fired first, followed by forward missiles.(2) A sliding bay' door arrangement was being
considered for the Sparrows. Door opening or closing was to have been completed in 0.35
seconds; extension was to have taken another 1.25 seconds or less.
It has been argued that no other fighter has duplicated this internal weapons carriage.
This is simply not the case. The CF-101 Voodoo aircraft, for example, employed a rotating
platform, which carried some of the weapons internally and the remainder externally. The
F-106 Delta Dart used an almost identical internal missile system to that of the Arrow.
Internal weapons carriage may also become the future norm.
As calculated by Avro engineers, externally mounting four missiles could have increased
drag by some 20% at Mach 1.5. Bill Gunston (3) states that the move towards faster, more
agile fighters is slowly forcing the removal of externally mounted weapons in order to take
every advantage of the resulting reduced drag. He states it will simply no longer be good
enough to hang missiles on pylons. One solution is to use the recessed method of missile
carriage and the other is to place weapons in an internal bay.
A recent article (4) describes stealth design techniques to reduce radar cross-sectional
(RCS) area. These include using aerodynamic shapes such as delta wings, blending cockpit
and wings into the fuselage and, of course, carrying weapons internally. Aerodynamic and
stealth efficiency appear to be complementary design requirements. The Arrow was not a
stealth aircraft, but obviously the concept of a "clean" aircraft could have several inherent
advantages.

Setting the Record Straight: The Designer's View

Margaret McCaffery

" I feel for the youngsters. In our day you

could get on with the job and not worry
about going over the precipice." Those
hardly sound like the words of a man who
has known overwhelming disappointment
in "getting on with the job," yet they
capture the spirit of the man who
designed the C-102 jetliner-which the New
York press claimed "licks anything of ours"
-was vice-president of engineering for
Avro Aircraft when it was building the
CF-105 (Avro Arrow), and ended up
consulting on production of the AngloFrench Concorde.
James C. Floyd, P.Eng., epitomizes the
cheery "mustn't grumble" attitude of his
native Manchester, yet he's a proud
Canadian, who retired to this country after
spending 20 years working in Britain
following cancellation of the Arrow and
the crumbling of A.V. Roe Canada. His
concern for "the youngsters" has led him
on a concerted campaign to set the
history books straight if possible, and if
not, well, he's written one of his own.(1)
He is currently helping to set up the
Canadian Aerospace Heritage Foundation
which aims to build a full-scale replica of
the Arrow and other Canadian aircraft for
permanent exhibit.
What does someone who was

as part of this deal, long before

Diefenbaker came out and said that the
Arrow was can- celled. That's a new one
to me.
4 Then the Americans were cutting down
on their development of manned
airplanes. Although they'd put out a
specification for the F-108, which was a
very highly supersonic airplane, probably
as near to the Arrow as you can get,
they'd cancelled it, because they weren't
too sure that manned aircraft would be
needed. The British government had put
out a White Paper saying that they didn't
foresee that there'd be any fighter aircraft
designed from that point on. So I really
don't blame Diefenbaker for his
uneasiness looking at the program. I
would blame him, though, for the way he
accomplished the cancellation.
ED: Did you suspect that the program was
going to be cancelled?
Floyd: We suspected that there'd be
some hiccup. In September 1958, we
were told that the whole thing would be
reviewed in March, so of course we were
on tenterhooks. But the appraisal was
done on February 20 and the cancellation came the same day. That was
the biggest shock of the century. We were
in a board meeting with John Plant

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responsible for the design of the Avro

(president of Avro Aircraft) trying to settle
Arrow think about the criticisms of its
some very mundane union situation about
abilities? Jim Floyd and other Avro
seniority Joe Morley (sales and service
engineers have expressed themselves
manager) came running down the corridor
eloquently to the publishers of Professor
with a man from the DDP (Department of
Morton's books, but he sees this kind of
Defence Production) saying they'd heard
misinformation as part of a larger picture: on the radio that Diefenbaker had
"High technology is, by its very nature, cancelled the Arrow.
difficult for the layman or voter to
ED. So you heard about it at the same
adequately assess, and its worth and
time as the general public?
impact can only be fully appreciated, even Floyd: Later than the general public--by those who have to ensure its survival, they heard it on the radio.
if it is properly and compre- hensively
ED: It sounds like the government had a
presented. In the past, Canadian
gun to its head.
engineers have tended to adopt a low
Floyd: We were told to close everything
profile in the political arena and have
down and that nothing would be paid as
rarely been consulted about the long-term from that day. My first thought was to see
effects of the decisions made by the
if any of our other projects could be got
'captains of industry' or their political
into shape so I could keep my 1,500
counterparts. As an example, I firmly
engineers. I'd been pleading for years to
believe that had Mr. Howe been exposed get another project going at the same
to a proper and full-scale engineering
time as the Arrow, but Fred Smye (general
briefing on the Jetliner project, he would manager), who was a most sincere man,
not have made the utterly erroneous
felt we had a duty to do the best we could
statements about the alleged technical
on that airplane.
shortcomings of the aircraft, which must ED: I still find it very difficult to
have influenced his decision to abandon
understand why it was ordered scrapped,
the project and which later caused him
especially when today we're all talking
considerable embarrassment, even within about technology transfer, joint ventures,
his own party."'
etc.
Although he refers to himself (with a
Floyd: You're in very good company, The
twinkle in his eye) as "just a poor
first thing that I did was to get on to the
engineer" who doesn't know anything
RAE (Royal Aircraft Establishment) in the
about politics, he was embroiled in the
UK to see if they'd be interested in taking
Cold War politics of the late 1950s by his some of these airplanes and they said of
involvement with the Arrow. In this
course, provided we could back them up
interview with Engineering
with parts. Well, we had 31 aircraft back
Dimensions' editor Margaret McCaffery, through the plant in different stages of
he relives those days at Malton.
production, so we had plenty of parts.
ED.. Why do you think Diefenbaker
We'd even worked out a method of
cancelled the Arrow?
transportation over the northern route and
Floyd: Diefenbaker had the worst advice then the order to scrap came down. (This
possible. His main advice came from
was mid-April 1959. Floyd had been
General Pearkes, who was a brave old
ordered to scrap the Jetliner, his admitted
soldier, but he didn't know anything about favourite project, on November 23, 1956.
airplanes at all. He'd been hoodwinked by Three years later, after setting up another
a visit to the States where he was told
first class design tearn at Hawker-Siddely,
that airplanes are out and missiles are in UK, where he led the feasibility study on
and there'll never be another manned
the Concorde, Jim Floyd experienced the
airplane bought by any air force.
disappointment of seeing the design study
ED: Was it on the strength of that advice for Concorde go to Bristol Aviation
alone that Diefenbaker acted?
Corporation. Saying he didn't want to see
Floyd: Oh no. It was such a complex
another aircraft, he quit and took his
picture, it was like a tree: even the leaves family on vacation. On his return, his first
had something to do with it dying. There call was from the minister in charge of the
were four major reasons: 1 Diefenbaker
Concorde asking him to consult on the
could see the costs of the Arrow rising. It project. That one flew!)
isn't unusual for the costs on high
ED: What message would you have for
technology to be going up all the time;
today's engineers?

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AVRO ARROW: An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History; Page 2

one of the prime examples would be the

Concorde, which by the time it flew cost
more than double what it had been
estimated at. The Arrow was going the
same sort of way.
2 General Pearkes had said we can only
justify this sort of a cost if we could sell it
to the Yanks or the Brits. So he went out,
completely prematurely, because you
never sell an aircraft to a foreign
government before you've de- veloped it
yourself, and of course he came back with
a no.
3 Then there's this memorandum Paul
Campagna brought back from Washington
(see p. 51). It's obvious that the
Americans had virtually insisted on the
cancellation of the Arrow

Floyd: The best things I've learned have

been about dealing with people to bring
out the best in them. The old things I
learned in England I rebelled against. I try
to coax people rather than beat them over
the head. Canadians are very flexible:
treat them the right way and you can get
anything out of them.
One of the things I'm trying to do with
the Canadian Aerospace Heritage
Foundation is to help young people get
the incentive to do some of the things we
tried to do. Today there seems to be an
apathy, a sense of too many things in the
way. I'd like to give the kids some hope.
Reference
1. Floyd, J. The Avro Canada C-102
Jetliner, Erin: Boston Mills Press, 1986.

Photo: J.C. FLOYD, P.Eng.

Avro Arrow design team, left to right. Bob Lindley, chief engineer; Jim Floyd, vice president, engineering;
Guest Hake, Arrow project engineer, and Jim Chamberlin, chief, technical design.

The Landing Gear

The requirement for such a large weapons bay necessitated stowage of the main landing
gear in the thin delta wings. This caused a number of engineering difficulties, overcome by
Dowty Engineering Limited. On retraction, the main gear would be shortened, angled
forward and then twisted in order to be accommodated Given the 30-ton weight of the
aircraft and resulting 200,000-ib compressive load on the main gear on landing,
ultra-high-tensile steel with an ultimate tensile strength of 260,000-280,000 psi was
required. Use of aluminum was obviously precluded, as was the use of butt and gas welding
techniques. Instead, large forgings were made, using a die process. For example, the main
outer leg was the largest forging, weighing 1,000 lb. After machining this would be reduced
to 167 lb. Solutions to the problem put Dowty and Avro engineers at the forefront of
metallurgical research.
Likewise, the engineers at Jarry Hydraulics were obtaining patents for their steering
mechanism in the nose gear arrangement, among others. In fact, Avro engineers and their
subcontractors made enormous strides in developing high temperature alloys, high pressure
and high temperature systems, fuel technol- ogy for supersonic flight and human

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engineering, in terms of cockpit layout and design. These techniques pushed the world
aircraft industry further ahead. In support of these advances, Avro maintained a huge
metal-to-metal autoclave, a special heat treat furnace, a giant skin mill and a 15,000-ton
rubber pad forming press (then the largest in the world).

Fly-by-wire

Early in the design, it was decided that some form of power assist would be required to help
control and fly the aircraft during supersonic flight. The chosen result was fly-by-wire. In
conventional systems, the pilot's stick and rudder controls are mechanically linked via steel
cables or rods to valves which control high pressure fluid flow to the actuators. These
powerful hydraulic actuators, in turn, operate the aircraft's control surfaces, such as
elevators and ailerons. In military aircraft, automatic flight control systems, gyroscopes and
position sensors are also mechanically linked to the actuators through the control rods.
In the Arrow automatic flight control system (AFCS), in automatic mode, the pilot's stick
and position- ing sensors were linked electrically to electro-hydraulic actuators. Hence,
stability, command and control were effected almost instantaneously in all three axes.
Analogue computers with a mix of vacuum tube and transistor technology were used,
together with autostabilization of the tail fin and artificial feel, to give the pilot some sense of
force on his control stick.
Not until the 1970s did fighter planes use a similar AFCS, although variations had been
employed in ex- perimental aircraft and the SR 71 Blackbird. The F-16 and Panavia Tornado
both used analogue fly-by-wire.The first fighter to replace the analogue system with digital
electronics was the F/A-18 Hornet.
How effective was the Arrow fly-by-wire automatic flight control system? According to test
pilot Spud Potocki, in a 60-degree climb, with full afterburner, he would shut down one
engine and experience no expected sideslip or roll. The AFCS would compensate
instantaneously. Automatic approaches and takeoffs were also successfully completed. The
Arrow was the most modern interceptor in the world, clearly over 20 years ahead of its time.

Continued on Page 3>>

CONVERTED TO HTML, AND HYPERLINKS ADDED, JANUARY 22, 2001.
Scott McArthur.

CLICK HERE FOR DOWNLOADS

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AVRO ARROW: An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History; Page 3

The following article was originally published in the September/October issue of Engineering
Dimensions, 1988.
It has been republished with permission from Palmiro Campagna, P.Eng., and the Association
of Professional Engineers of Ontario. (PEO).
Thank You for the many requests for accurate information, which is what made this
republication possible.
Scott McArthur.
Webmaster
Arrow Recovery Canada Inc.

AVRO ARROW
An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History
Paul Campagna, P.Eng.

PAGE 3
INDEX:

(selectable links)

PAGE 1

PAGE 2

PAGE 3

Introduction

Fuselage

Engines

Company

Weapons Carriage

Problems

Aircraft

Landing Gear

Consequences

Wing

Fly-by-Wire

Why was the Arrow

Cancelled?

Setting the Record

Straight: The Designer's
View by Margaret
McCaffery

"A Flawed Plane and an

Inept Corporation"?
The Historian's View by
Margaret McCaffery

Acknowledgements

References

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AVRO ARROW: An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History; Page 3

Flight
tested in
a B47 but
never in
an
Arrow,
the
Iroquois
engine
was 19
feet long,
four feet
in
diameter
and
composed
of some
20%
titanium
alloys
overall.
With a 1:1
weight to
thrust
ratio, it
would
have
given the
Arrow
better
than
Mach 2
speed.

The Engines

Due to problems in acquiring a suitable engine, Avro decided to fit the first five aircraft with
the Pratt and Whitney J75, which would give the Avro subsidiary, Orenda Engines, time to
complete development of the lighter yet more powerful Iroquois engine. The Iroquois was
approximately 19 feet long and four feet in diameter. To reduce weight, it employed fewer
compressor stages and was composed of some 20% titanium alloys overall. In producing the
rotor blades from titanium, Orenda's subcontractor, Canadian Steel Improvements, patented a
process of precision casting.
At a combined 60,000-Ib thrust for an approximate 60,000-Ib aircraft, the Iroquois would
have provided a 1:1 thrust to weight ratio. This would have given the Arrow a better than
Mach 2 speed and perhaps Mach 3, limitations due to structural heating, not lack of power.(5)
On November 1, 1957, dry thrust runs at over 20,000-Ib were demonstrated. Twelve days
later, the Iroquois was flight tested on a B47 and proved that it alone could have powered
this aircraft. Like the airframe, the Iroquois pushed the state of the art in engine technology.
Unfortunately, it was never flown in the Arrow.

The Problems

As good as it was, the Arrow was not without some problems. During the flight test program,
two significant accidents occurred. The first, on flight number 11, involved failure of the left
main landing gear to extend properly, causing the aircraft to veer off the runway. During an
approach landing of the second Arrow, all wheels on the main gear skidded, with subsequent
tire burst. The aircraft again veered off the runway. The resulting investigation showed that
on this touchdown, the elevator had moved down, causing some backlift. This caused the
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pilot to overcorrect by applying too much braking pressure too soon, locking the wheels.
Other problems included failure of the nose gear door to retract and malfunctions with
indicator lights and switches. Each was corrected in turn as the Arrow continued to meet and
exceed specifications.
Jan Zurakowski, principal test pilot, stated that handling characteristics and performance
agreed well with estimates. In flight number seven, he flew at 47,000 feet at Mach 1.52,
while climbing. He indicated he was still accelerating and showing excess thrust available, and
that handling was good. Pilot jack Woodman, the only military pilot to fly the Arrow, said the
aircraft was "...performing as predicted and meeting all guarantees."

The Consequences

In 1958, Canada had an aircraft industry that was among the best in the world. Many foreign
engineers emigrated to Canada specifically to become part of "The Team." After cancellation,
both Britain and the United States eagerly sought to get the Avro Arrow for research
purposes.
In 1959, the brain drain reversed. Many Avro engineers went to NASA, including John
Hodge who became associate flight director, Project Mercury, flight director, Gemini, and later
flight director, Project Apollo. Likewise, Jim Chamberlin became head of the Space Task
Group's Engineering Division. Jim Floyd, P.Eng, the man who largely conceived the overall
program and who was vice-president of engineering at Avro, returned to Britain where he was
consultant on the Concorde and other leading edge, high technology projects. Others went to
McDonnell, Boeing and other aircraft manufacturers.
Back at Avro, the remaining 200 engineers continued on in various projects. One of these
was the Avro- car, an experimental all-wing vertical take-off vehicle, completed for the U.S.
Air Force. In 1962, Avro closed its doors, leaving a legacy of concepts and ideas, including a
vertical takeoff CF-100, a supersonic transatlantic transport, a spaceplane concept, and
monorail- testimony to the advanced thinking of one of the best engineering teams ever
assembled.
Recently, some newspapers carried a story of one reporter's flight in an F/A 18. In it, he
exclaims how far Canadians have come in aircraft technology, just 79 years after J.D.
McCurdy's first flight in Nova Scotia. We were there 30 years ago with a wholly Canadian
product, the most powerful aircraft in the world.

"A Flawed Plane and an Inept Corporation"?

The Historian's View
Margaret McCaffery
Thirty years ago, the Canadian public was cheering the launch of an aircraft that
made headlines around the world. Three years ago, one of Canada's foremost
historians, Dr. Desmond Morton, principal of Erindale College, University of
Toronto, described the Avro Arrow as "a fatally flawed weapon, on a par with those
earlier monuments to our military-industrial blundering, the Ross rifle or the
MacAdam shovel." In an article in the Toronto Star, he said: "Politicians, our
professional scapegoats, took the blame for aborting a design whose irnperfections
should have been obvious to a first-year engineering student."
In The Illustrated History of Canada, a text which most Canadian school-children
will read, Professor Morton claims that then Prime Minister John Diefenbaker
cancelled the Avro Ar- row, not because guided missiles had made it obsolete, but
because it was "a flawed plane and an inept corporation."
In A Military History of Canada, Dr. Morton refers to "crippling design flaws in a
reputed triumph of Canadian engineering. The Arrow's Mach-2 speed depended on
carrying its missiles in a belly pack. Opened for action at high speeds, the rocket
pack acted like an air brake-or threatened to tear off."
The basis for Dr. Morton's claims of technological flaws are the presumed effects
if the Arrow's weapons pack had been lowered during flight. Yet, as several
engineers have since informed Dr. Morton, it was never designed to be lowered in
flight, only on the ground. Engineer Paul Campagna comments: "The scenario of

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instability previously described (by Dr. Morton) in fact occurred on the CF-100,
Mark IV prototype. The author seems to have gotten the two aircraft confused."
Were the engineers who designed the Arrow no better than Dr. Morton claims
they were-or was he himself the victim of misinformation? And if he was
misinformed, why? Like any journalist, Dr. Morton won't name his Ottawa sources,
who, he says, "believed there was a lot more to the story than they were able to
tell." He admits that he "was misled" about the design for the weapons pack, but
contends that there were other problems which would still justify the description of
the Arrow as "a magnificent airplane that had major flaws." He maintains that since
the plane's weapons and avionics systems "were being bought off the American
shelf" and had not been tested in flight, their incorporation would have caused
major problems "that would have involved considerable redesign."
In this interview with Engineering Dimensions' editor Margaret McCaffery,
Professor Morton explains why the story of the Arrow is itself flawed.
ED: Do you think you will change your account of the Avro Arrow in subsequent
editions of your books?
Morton: I may reflect on this controversy. Particularly when you're dealing with
contemporary history, you've got a very partial access to sources. You have people
alive with very strong feelings and knowledge, which they may or may not share.
ED: Would it be fair to suggest that your sources wanted to see an opinion
expressed that the cancellation of the arrow was the fault of the company and the
engineering?
Morton: They may have, although that wasn't how I approached them. I simply
wanted to know if there was more to this than defenders of the Arrow have said.
The problem with the Arrow is that it has become another myth of absolute
perfection. When the politicians came to make their decision about the Arrow,
though they had a lot of faulty information, they also had some facts, some of
which we know, some of which we don't know. When I look at the story of the
Arrow, which was only a quarter of a century ago, there's a great deal that's
hidden. I'm denied access to what went on in Cabinet, in the Prime Minister's
Office, in the Department of National Defence. What I'd like to see come out of
this, and what I suspect my sources would like, would be access legislation being
used to open up all the records related to the Arrow, including the decision to
destroy the prototypes.
Who precisely ordered the destruction of the existing prototypes and why? It was
an act of extraordinary vandalism and vengefulness and no one has formally taken
responsibility for it. I'm told there were American arguments that the aircraft was
flawed-although that may be the same sour grapes attitude that you've suggested.
I think it was a tragedy that the opportunity to perfect it was never achieved.
ED: Did you ever speak with Mr. Floyd, who was vice-president of engineering at
Avro during this time?
Morton: No.
ED: What do you think his response would have been?
Morton: Oh I know what it is, because I've received a copy of the letter he and a
group of engineers sent to the Toronto Star. That's one of the reasons why I wrote
the Star article-to see what response I'd get, who was willing to talk. I've learned a
great deal since then.
ED: It's been suggested that there's more on file in Washington about the Avro
Arrow than there is in Ottawa. With the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, wouldn't
it be easier to get information from Washington?
Morton: Yes, but I was led to believe that if I saw what was on file in Washington
I would have an even more hostile view of the Arrow. Arguments were certainly
put up for the U.S. not to buy it. It would be inherently improbable that they would
try to suppress a good aircraft to produce an inferior one. They would be more
likely to try and acquire the technology for themselves.
ED: In an ideal world, what kind of access to information would you want?
Morton: Our Access to Information Act is a very imperfect document; in fact, it's
worse than no access legislation. At several points in the '70s, beginning with the
first cabinet order on access and ending with the Access to Information and Privacy

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Act, researchers found themselves pushed out of information sources that they had
been able to use before. While the government of the day could proclaim in
glowing terms that they had opened the books, in each case they had not.
The downside of a freedom of information act is the fear that people will prune
the records. As a historian, in contrast to journalists, I would rather have the
record complete and postponed for 20 years, than have it destroyed and available
tomorrow.

Why Was the Arrow Cancelled?

A recently declassified U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum dated June 1, 1960
says:

"Prior to the NSC (National Security Council) paper (December 1958) and following a visit of
the President to Canada in July 1958, Canada took the following actions with the
understanding that her defense industry depended largely upon the U.S. channelling defense
business into Canada; cancelled the CF-105 and related systems contracts; decided to make
maximum use of U.S. developed weapons, integrated into NORAD; worked with U.S. toward a
fully integrated continental defence."
What exactly transpired at the July meeting with the President? The Defense Production
Sharing Arran- gements were signed at this time. Was the Arrow program, because of its
rising costs, a bargaining chip for less expensive American goods? Was the program
effectively cancelled shortly after this July, 1958 meeting?
Oddly enough, after its first successful flights, a media campaign attempted to discredit the
aircraft.(7) Perhaps the reprieve until February 20, 1959, was to allow the flight test program
to prove how poor the aircraft really was, making cancellation more palatable and logical. The
opposite proved to be the case. Could this be why Arrow number six was never allowed to fly
and break that speed record? Could this be why six of the most advanced aircraft ever built,
along with all memory, had to be erased?
And how well did the defence sharing arrangements program work? The same
memorandum continues:

"The last quarterly meeting of the Production Sharing Policy Group was held on 25 May
(1960). Despite all efforts, over the period 1 January 59 through 31 March 60, Canadian
defense business in the United States almost doubled that placed in Canada. Canada is not
satisfied with these results, nor do they appear acceptable from our view."
Whatever the reasons for cancellation, the loss to Canada's engineering community and
aviation in- dustry remains incalculable. It is clear from international reports of the day that
the rest of the world was highly impressed with the Avro corps of engineers and the Arrow.
Thirty years later, it is time for Canadians and Canadian engineers to look back and be proud
of this magnificent engineering achievement.
Do you have any memories of the
Arrow-facts, figures, reminiscences
or photographs? If so, send them to
The Editor, Engineering Dimensions,
1155 Yonge Street, Toronto, Ontario

Paul Campagna, P.Eng., is the

electromagnetic environmental effects
(E3) engineer for the Directorate of
Avionies, Simulators and Photography of
the Department of National Defence,
Ottawa.

Acknowledgements

Jim Floyd, P.Eng., designer of the Avro Arrow, provided valuable assistance in preparation of
the article and supplied photographs of the Jetliner. Other photographs courtesy Department
of National Defense and Arnold Rose, P.Eng.

References

1. Paul Wilkinson, Aircraft Engines of the World, Washington: Paul Wilkinson Publishers, 1958,
pp. 108, 109, 182, 183, 311.
2. The Arrowheads, Arrow, Erin: Boston Mills Press, 1986, pp. 83-93.
3. William Gunston, An illustrated Guide to Future Fighters and Combat Aircraft, New York:
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Arco Publishing Corps, 1984, pp. 1-35.

4. John Adam, "How to Design an Invisible Aircraft", IEEE Spectrum, April 1988, Vol 25,
Number 4.
5. J.S. Butz, "Iroquois Based on Supersonic Efficiency" Aviation Week, July 29, 1957, pp.
26-27.
J.S. Butz, Canada Seeks U.S. Defense Contracts" Aviation Week, March 2, 1959, pp. 25-27.
6. Robin Ludlow, "Canada's CF-18' A bat out of hell'," Ottawa Citizen, Saturday March 19,
1988, Section H, pp.H1.
7. K.Shaw, There Never Was An Arrow, Ottawa: Steel Rail Publishing, 1981, pp. 66-111.
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