Bataclan Vs Medina
Bataclan Vs Medina
Bataclan Vs Medina
MEDINA
FACTS:
Past midnight on September 13, 1952, bus no.30 of Medina Transportation operated by owner defendant
Mariano Medina, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by Conrado Saylon with
approximately 18 passengers and Bataclan is one of the passengers of the said bus who was seated beside
of the driver. At 2:00 am, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front
tires burst and the vehicle began to zigzag until it fell into the canal on the right side of the road and the bus
turned over. Consequently, four passengers including Bataclan were trapped inside the bus and could not
get out. After an hour, ten men, carrying lighted torch made of bamboo fueled with petroleum, approached
the bus and a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers.
By reason of the death of Bataclan, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor
children filed a suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees in the total amount of P 87, 150.
The RTC of Cavite awarded P 1000 to the plaintiffs plus 600 as attorneys fee, plus P100, value of the goods
carried by Bataclan for sale in Pasay City. This is for the reason that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus including the four
passengers. That Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive
and so the damages were awarded not for his death but for the physical inquiries suffered by him.
Plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to CA but the latter endorsed the appeal to SC because
of the value involved in the claim of the complaint.
ISSUE/S:
1.
2.
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the
bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus.
Whether or not Medina Transportation is liable.
HELD:
1.
The Supreme Court decided that the overturning of the bus was not the the proximate cause of
the death of Bataclan. Proximate cause as defined in American Jurisprudence is 'that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result there from.
In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the
proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on
its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not
only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it
was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that
said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of
the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is
more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver
and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and
forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned
bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around
the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and
directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned
or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the
part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles
1733, 1759 and 1763.
Medina Transportation is liable. The case involves breach of contract of a common carrier. There was
negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that
at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by
the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where
one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of
about 150 meters. The driver, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but
because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of
150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. Also when the bus has already overturned, driver
should and must have known that in the position of the bus, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor
the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.