United States v. Sam Fiorella, Katherine Fiorella, Shades Ridge Holding Company, Inc., Melina Fiorella, Grace Tortomasi, Pritchard, McCall & Jones, A Partnership, 869 F.2d 1425, 11th Cir. (1989)
United States v. Sam Fiorella, Katherine Fiorella, Shades Ridge Holding Company, Inc., Melina Fiorella, Grace Tortomasi, Pritchard, McCall & Jones, A Partnership, 869 F.2d 1425, 11th Cir. (1989)
United States v. Sam Fiorella, Katherine Fiorella, Shades Ridge Holding Company, Inc., Melina Fiorella, Grace Tortomasi, Pritchard, McCall & Jones, A Partnership, 869 F.2d 1425, 11th Cir. (1989)
2d 1425
In this judgment revival case, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama, in an order dated September 29, 1987, denied the United
States' (Government) motion to revive a January 3, 1968, district court
judgment against Sam A. Fiorella (Fiorella). We affirm.Issue
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by denying the
Government's motion to revive the judgment of January 3, 1968.
Background
3
The facts are not disputed. On July 1, 1964, the Government commenced an
action in district court against Fiorella, Fiorella's wife, and Shades Ridge
Holding Company. The Government sought, inter alia, both to recover income
taxes assessed against Fiorella for the 1956 through 1958 tax years and to
foreclose the federal tax liens on all property and rights of property of Fiorella
and Fiorella's wife. On January 3, 1968, the district court, pursuant to a
settlement between the parties involved in the action, entered judgment against
Fiorella in the amount of $286,727.75 and directed that Fiorella's prior cash
payment of $107,500 be credited to the judgment.1
Analysis
6
It is well settled that Alabama law controls the procedure on the execution of a
judgment rendered in a district court located in Alabama.5 Further, Alabama
Code Sec. 6-9-190 provides that a judgment cannot be revived after the lapse of
20 years from its entry.6 The district court, in its denial of the Government's
motion to revive judgment, held that it would be a violation of Alabama law to
continue the vitality of the January 3, 1968, judgment beyond January 3, 1988.
We agree.
The Government's principal contention is that the underlying tax lien continues
to exist independently of the January 3, 1968, district court judgment. The
Government argues that, since the tax lien continues until it is satisfied, the act
of reducing the tax lien to judgment does not subject the tax lien to state
limitations on the enforcement of judgments. We do not decide this issue. Here,
the sole issue properly before this court is whether the January 3, 1968,
judgment is now capable of being revived under Alabama law. We agree with
the trial court that it is not. We do not decide whether the tax lien underlying
the January 3, 1968, judgment remains enforceable.
Conclusion
9
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the district court properly applied
Alabama law and properly denied the Government's motion to revive the
judgment of January 3, 1968. However, we decline to consider the
enforceability of the underlying tax lien since this issue is not properly before
this court.
10
AFFIRMED.
Honorable Edward S. Smith, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting
by designation
Ala.Code Sec. 6-9-190 (1975); see Henry v. State ex rel. Rambow, 16 Ala.App.
670, 81 So. 190 (1919)
United States v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct.
1, 5, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960); United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416, 60
S.Ct. 1019, 1020, 84 L.Ed. 1283 (1940)
Custer v. McCutcheon, 283 U.S. 514, 519, 51 S.Ct. 530, 531, 75 L.Ed. 1239
(1931)