United States v. DeLeon-Argueta, 11th Cir. (2011)
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14438
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 17, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00149-JDW-TBM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EDY EDUARDO DELEON-ARGUETA,
a.k.a. Edy De Leon-Argueta,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 17, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Edy Eduardo DeLeon-Argueta appeals his 15-month sentence following his
convictions for being found in the United States after having been deported, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(1), and for entering the United States at a time
and place other than designated by immigration officers, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
1325(a)(1). On appeal, DeLeon-Argueta argues that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable in light of his personal history and background.1
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188-89 (11th
Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 24, 2010) (No. 10-727). The
appellant has the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light
of the record and the 3553(a) factors. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788
(11th Cir. 2005).2 In any given case, there is a range of reasonable sentences from
Deleon-Artuega concedes that his sentence is procedurally reasonable.
The 3553(a) factors are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed . . . treatment;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range . . .;
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which the district court may choose. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Therefore, we will
only remand a sentence when the district court commits a clear error of judgment
in weighing the 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the
range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. Id. at 1190
(quotation omitted). A sentence within the guidelines range will ordinarily be
deemed a reasonable one. Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
The district court acknowledged DeLeon-Arguetas experiences in the
Guatemalan army, but chose to give that factor less weight due to the passage of
approximately 15 years. Instead, the court stated that the crimes of conviction
were serious in light of the fact that DeLeon-Argueta continued to reenter the
United States illegally, and, once he reentered, he committed crimes involving
assault, drug possession, and resisting arrest, to name a few. Given these
circumstances, the district court reasonably put more weight on the sentencing
factors of adequate deterrence and the protection of the public, and a sentence of
time served would not have accomplished those sentencing objectives. See 18
U.S.C. 3553(a)(2). The resulting 15-month sentence is within the guidelines
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . .;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities . . .; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. 3553(a).
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range, and well below the statutory maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment.
See Talley, 431 F.3d at 788; United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th
Cir. 2008) (concluding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was
well below the statutory maximum). Although DeLeon-Argueta argues that a sixmonth sentence of time-served would have been reasonable, there is a range of
reasonable sentences from which the district court may choose, and DeLeonArgueta has not shown that the courts weighing of the 3553(a) factors to arrive
at a 15-month guidelines sentence was unreasonable. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189;
Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.3
DeLeon-Arguetas request for oral argument is denied.
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