United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

77 F.
3d 493
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
Susan RADECKI, Individually and as Personal Representative

of the Estate of Chester A. Radecki, DECEASED;
Kristin Radecki; Kerry Radecki; Renee
Radecki; Robert Radecki,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Ron BARELA, Personally and in his official capacity; Benjie
Montano, Personally and in his Official Capacity,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 94-2185.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Feb. 16, 1996.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT1
1
Defendant Ron Barela appeals the district court's denial of his motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 and remand to the district court for further
proceedings.
The record before us reveals the following facts. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on
the morning of August 8, 1992, Chester Radecki awoke to the sound of a
woman screaming outside his bedroom window in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Mr.
Radecki looked out the window and heard more screaming and the sound of
someone walking around outside. Shortly thereafter, a law enforcement vehicle
arrived nearby with its lights flashing. Mr. Radecki left his home, got in his car,
and drove to the scene.
Defendant Barela, a deputy sheriff with the Santa Fe County, New Mexico,
Defendant Barela, a deputy sheriff with the Santa Fe County, New Mexico,
Sheriff's Department, arrived on the scene. A motorcycle lay on the side of the
road. Eric Trujillo drove up in a tow truck. Defendant Barela detected a man in
the bushes, and with his flashlight recognized him as Daniel Martinez. Mr.
Martinez staggered out of the bushes.
Mr. Martinez, who appeared intoxicated, told Defendant Barela and Mr.
Trujillo that his girlfriend had run him off the road, causing him to wreck.
Defendant Barela began to look around the area for other vehicles or injured
persons.
Mr. Radecki arrived in a robe carrying a flashlight. Mr. Radecki told Defendant
Barela that he lived nearby, and that he heard screams, as if a woman was being
raped. Defendant Barela and Mr. Radecki explored the scene with their
flashlights.
When Defendant Barela shined his flashlight on a car in the bushes, Mr.
Martinez tried to grab the officer's nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol. The
two men wrestled for control of the gun. Defendant Barela yelled to Mr.
Radecki, "Hit him with your flashlight. Hit him. Get him off me."
It is unclear whether Mr. Radecki hit Mr. Martinez with his flashlight. In
response to Defendant Barela's words, however, Mr. Radecki approached the
struggling pair. At that point, Mr. Martinez wrested the gun away from
Defendant Barela. Defendant Barela fled to the bushes. Mr. Martinez turned
and shot Mr. Radecki in the chest, killing him.
Plaintiff Susan Radecki, appearing as personal representative of the estate of

Mr. Radecki, filed this action in the district court against Defendant Barela
under 42 U.S.C.1983. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Defendant Barela
violated Mr. Radecki's Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process
by recklessly creating the dangerous situation that culminated in Mr. Radecki's
death. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Barela violated Mr.
Radecki's substantive due process rights by increasing Mr. Radecki's
vulnerability to harm by a third party when Defendant Barela ordered Mr.
Radecki to intervene in the struggle over the gun, surrendered the weapon to
Mr. Martinez, and hid in the bushes when Mr. Martinez gained control of the
weapon.
Defendant Barela moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

After a hearing, the district court denied Defendant Barela's motion for
summary judgment. This appeal followed.
10
Defendant Barela asserts the district court erred in denying his motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Defendant Barela contends
that Plaintiff failed to allege conduct that demonstrates he acted with the
requisite reckless intent to violate Mr. Radecki's substantive due process rights
by creating a dangerous situation wherein Mr. Martinez injured Mr. Radecki.2
11
"Qualified immunity protects public officials from individual liability in a 1983

action unless the officials violated 'clearly established ... constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.' " Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d
475, 478 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). The plaintiff initially bears a heavy two-part burden when the
defendant pleads the defense of qualified immunity. Albright v. Rodriguez, 51
F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir.1995). The plaintiff must show (1) "that the
defendant's actions violated a constitutional or statutory right," and (2) that the
right "allegedly violated [was] clearly established at the time of the conduct at
issue." Id. We review the district court's qualified immunity determination at
the summary judgment stage de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (1995).
12
The district court analyzed Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Barela violated Mr.
Radecki's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights under Medina
v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir.1992). In Medina, we
ruled that a state actor may be liable under 1983 for violating an individual's
substantive due process rights if the state actor recklessly creates a danger that
culminates in injury to the individual, although a third party, and not the state
actor, actually inflicts the harm upon the individual. See id. at 1495-96. In so
doing we recognized a "danger creation theory" exception to the rule that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended "to protect
people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each
other." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
196 (1989). A state is liable under 1983 and the "danger creation theory,"
however, only if the state actor recklessly created the danger that caused the
constitutional violation and the state actor directed his or her conduct toward
the plaintiff. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1496. In Medina, we determined:
13 reckless conduct can be considered directed toward the plaintiff if (1) the
that
plaintiff is a member of a limited and specifically definable group, (2) the
defendant's conduct specifically put the members of that group at substantial risk of
serious, immediate, and proximate harm, (3) the risk was obvious or known, and (4)
the defendant acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk.
14
Id.
15
Applying Medina, the district court in the instant case ruled that Plaintiff
alleged facts that demonstrated that Defendant Barela acted with the reckless
conduct necessary to violate Mr. Radecki's substantive due process rights under
the "danger creation theory." The district court determined that by ordering Mr.
Radecki to hit Mr. Martinez with his flashlight, Defendant Barela acted
recklessly and in conscious and unreasonable disregard of the consequences of
his act, thereby creating the danger that harmed Mr. Radecki. Thus, the district
court ruled that Plaintiff alleged conduct that amounted to a constitutional
violation under Medina.
16
While this appeal was pending, however, we ruled in Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d
567 (10th Cir.1995) that to prevail on a substantive due process claim, a
plaintiff "must demonstrate that the state acted in a manner that 'shocks the
conscience.' " Id. at 571 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503
U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (quotation and alteration omitted)). In Uhlrig, we
attempted to define conduct which "shocks the conscience:"
17 satisfy the "shock the conscience" standard, a plaintiff must do more than show
[T]o
that the government actor intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by
abusing or misusing government power. That is, the plaintiff must demonstrate a
degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly
conscience shocking.
18
Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574.
19
Merging Medina with the "shocks the conscience" standard, we held in Uhlrig
that in order for a state to be held liable under 1983 for creating a danger where
someone other than a state actor injures the plaintiff, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that:
20
(1)the plaintiff was a member of a limited and a specifically definable group;
21
(2)the defendant's conduct put the plaintiff and other members of that group at
substantial risk of serious, immediate and proximate harm;
22
(3)the risk was obvious or known;
23
(4)the defendant acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk; and
24
(5)such conduct, when viewed in total, is conscience shocking.
Id. at 574.
25
26
The district court denied Defendant Barela's motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity on August 2, 1994. Uhlrig became the law of this
circuit on August 30, 1995. The district court, therefore, did not have the
benefit of Uhlrig when it analyzed Defendant Barela's motion for summary
judgment. More specifically, the district court did not determine whether
Plaintiff alleged conduct which "shocks the conscience" in support of Plaintiff's
claim that Defendant Barela violated Mr. Radecki's substantive due process
rights by creating the danger which led to his death. Nor have the parties
briefed Uhlrig or the "shocks the conscience" standard as applied to the facts of
the instant case. We think it prudent in light of the fact-specific qualified
immunity inquiry and the unique facts of this case to remand this case to the
district court to apply Uhlrig. Consequently, we REMAND to the district court
with instructions to: (1) VACATE its order denying Defendant Barela qualified
immunity, and (2) consider whether Plaintiff Radecki has alleged conduct or
presented genuine issues of material fact as to conduct constituting a
constitutional violation under Uhlrig. On remand, the parties are entitled to
supplement the record with material bearing on the issue of whether Defendant
Barela's alleged conduct "shocks the conscience" of the court. Entered for the
Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3
Defendant Barela also argues the district court erred in denying him qualified
immunity because: (1) the law was not clearly established that he could be
liable under 1983 to Mr. Radecki for acts of a third party, and (2) DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) bars Plaintiff's
suit. We express no opinion regarding these arguments in light of our decision
to remand for the district court to consider Defendant Barela's motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity under Uhlrig v. Harder, 64
F.3d 567 (10th Cir.1995)

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77 F.

Susan RADECKI, Individually and as Personal Representative

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Plaintiff Susan Radecki, appearing as personal representative of the estate of

Defendant Barela moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

"Qualified immunity protects public officials from individual liability in a 1983

Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574.

(1)the plaintiff was a member of a limited and a specifically definable group;

(3)the risk was obvious or known;

(4)the defendant acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk; and

(5)such conduct, when viewed in total, is conscience shocking.

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