Ruben J. Flowers v. The State of Oklahoma and Ray Page, Warden, State Penitentiary, 356 F.2d 916, 10th Cir. (1966)
Ruben J. Flowers v. The State of Oklahoma and Ray Page, Warden, State Penitentiary, 356 F.2d 916, 10th Cir. (1966)
Ruben J. Flowers v. The State of Oklahoma and Ray Page, Warden, State Penitentiary, 356 F.2d 916, 10th Cir. (1966)
2d 916
The undisputed record shows that he was charged in the District Court of
Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma, with the crime of burglary in the second
degree, after conviction of a felony. A jury trial was had and a verdict of guilty
resulted. Under Oklahoma procedure,1 a two-stage trial is required when an
accused is charged as Flowers was and such a two-stage trial was had in this
case. In the first stage the state presents evidence as to the guilt of the accused
of the particular crime charged which was second degree burglary and the jury
then returns a verdict upon that phase of the accusation. If a guilty verdict is
then returned, evidence of prior felony convictions is presented to the same jury
for its consideration. The jury in this case first returned a verdict of guilty as to
the crime of second degree burglary and after hearing evidence of former
felony convictions again retired and then returned a verdict of "guilty of
burglary in the second degree after a prior conviction of a felony" and assessed
his punishment at twenty years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. No
appeal was taken from this judgment of conviction and sentence.
Appellant attempted to compel his presence at the nunc pro tunc proceeding but
his requests were denied. He then filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, which was denied upon the basis of the
pleadings and record and without an evidentiary hearing. There appellant urged
that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had no authority to direct the
holding of a nunc pro tunc proceeding in the sentencing court because that
court had lost jurisdiction and that he was denied his constitutional right to be
present at the nunc pro tunc hearing and to be represented by counsel.
Appellant urges two points here: (1) The trial court erred in denying his
petition without an evidentiary hearing, and (2) the court also erred in not
appointing counsel, pursuant to his request, to aid him in preparing his case in
that court.
We need not tarry long on either point. After reviewing the record, it does not
appear that the petition for habeas corpus alleged the deprivation of a
constitutional right. Correction of the journal entry of judgment to reflect the
actual verdict was within the province of the state courts. The mistake corrected
was a mere clerical error. The procedure to be followed was certainly a matter
for the state to determine and does not here rise to constitutional proportions.
Certainly no new judgment or sentence was imposed in the nunc pro tunc
proceeding. Furthermore, petitioner does not contend that the judgment, as
modified, is incorrect.
The second point urged relates to the right to counsel at the habeas corpus
proceeding below. In light of that court's disposition of the case with which we
agree, there was no need for counsel. In any event, despite the ever increasing
expansion of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings, habeas corpus is a
civil proceeding, and it is settled law that there is no constitutional right to
Affirmed.
Notes:
1
22 O.S.Ann. 860