Paul Handy Nunley v. United States, 294 F.2d 579, 10th Cir. (1961)
Paul Handy Nunley v. United States, 294 F.2d 579, 10th Cir. (1961)
Paul Handy Nunley v. United States, 294 F.2d 579, 10th Cir. (1961)
2d 579
Nunley now seeks relief on the ground that the trial court failed to make a
determination that the guilty plea was made voluntarily and, hence, violated
Rule 11, F.R.Crim.P., 18 U.S.C.A. As the sentencing judge died prior to the
filing of the second 2255 motion, it was heard by another judge who appointed
an attorney for Nunley and who conducted a hearing at which Nunley testified.
The court entered comprehensive findings of fact specifically stating that the
guilty plea was made voluntarily, intelligently, and with understanding of the
nature of the charges. These findings are supported by substantial evidence and
are not clearly erroneous.
3
Nunley, who had four prior felony convictions, consulted with four attorneys
before entering his plea. Over 30 days intervened between the entry of the plea
and the sentence. During that period Nunley made no effort to change his plea.
The transcript of the arraignment and sentencing proceedings shows that
Nunley was advised of the nature of the charges and of the possible penalties.
In response to a question of the court as to whether he wanted to plead guilty he
replied, 'Plead guilty.' His court-appointed counsel, whom this court has
previously held to have represented him competently and effectively, said that
Nunley wanted to plead guilty. While the sentencing court made no express
determination that the guilty plea was entered voluntarily, it adequately appears
that Nunley knew the nature of the charges, did not act under any coercion,
promises or threats, understood the possible penalties, and was well aware of
the entire situation in which he was placed.
Rule 11 does not require any ritualistic ceremonial.2 A sentencing court does
not have to conduct a hearing and make a finding showing compliance with the
rule before accepting any guilty plea. If there is any aspect of the situation
which suggests that the requirements of the rule are not satisfied, appropriate
inquiry must be made. That is not the case here. The accused, experienced in
the ways of criminal proceedings and represented by able counsel, was properly
advised of the charges and the consequent possibilities. This is not a case like
United States v. Lester, 2 Cir., 247 F.2d 496, where the accused was not
represented by counsel and where the judge to whom application for relief was
made failed to ascertain whether the guilty plea was entered in compliance with
the rule. Here the trial court held 'a thorough hearing in which it was
abundantly proved that the defendant's plea was made with knowledge and
volition.'3
Affirmed.
Gundlach v. United States, 4 Cir., 262 F.2d 72, 76, certiorari denied 360 U.S.
904, 79 S.Ct. 1283, 3 L.Ed.2d 1255. See also Edwards v. United States, 103
U.S.App.D.C. 152, 256 F.2d 707, certiorari denied 358 U.S. 847, 79 S.Ct. 74, 3
L.Ed.2d 82, and United States v. Swaggerty, 7 Cir., 218 F.2d 875, certiorari