Gaiters v. City of Catoosa, 10th Cir. (2007)

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT
May 22, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
EU GEN E A . GAITER S,
as Trustee and Beneficiary,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
RICHARD H. M ORTON, as Trustee and
Beneficiary; M .G.H. TRUST,
an Irrevocable Trust,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF CATOOSA , a municipality of
Rogers County, Oklahoma, and named
representatives: CURTIS CONLEY, M ayor
of the City of Catoosa, individually and in
his official capacity; JUD Y SCU LLAW L,
in her official capacity as Clerk of the City;
GEORGE GREGORY, Code Enforcement
Officer for the City of Catoosa, individually
and in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CATHY PINKERTON BAKER,
Rogers County Treasurer, in her official
capacity; A RK WR EC KIN G CO M PANY
OF O KLAHOM A, INC., an
Oklahoma corporation,
Defendants.
No. 06-5168
(D.C. No. 03-CV -425-CV E)
(N.D. Okla.)
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BR ISC OE, SE YM OU R, and A ND ER SO N, Circuit Judges.
Eugene A. Gaiters appeals pro se from three post-judgment orders entered

by the district court in this case. W e have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1291, and we affirm.
A brief review of the procedural history of this case is necessary to
understand the limited scope of this appeal. Plaintiffs filed this action alleging
civil rights and other claims in connection with a dispute involving real property.
Plaintiffs and four of the defendants, City of Catoosa, Curtis Conley, George
Gregory and Judy Scullawl, executed a settlement agreement, after which a
stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was filed on September 23, 2004. Several
months later, when plaintiffs had allegedly failed to comply with the terms of the
settlement agreement, these defendants filed a motion to enforce it. Adopting a
magistrate judges report and recommendation, the district court ruled that it did
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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not have jurisdiction to entertain defendants motion. In doing so, it rejected their
assertion that federal courts retain jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements
after an action has been dismissed with prejudice. In an order dated M arch 17,
2005, the court also denied as moot plaintiffs pending pro se motion to vacate
and set aside the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs did not appeal that ruling.
Almost a year later, on February 24, 2006, they filed an amended motion to
vacate and set aside the settlement agreement and stipulation of dismissal,
asserting that the settlement was procured by fraud. On M ay 30, the district court
again adopted a magistrate judges report and recommendation, finding that
plaintiffs motion was untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (2) or (3) and that
the court therefore did not have jurisdiction to rule on it.
M r. Gaiters then proceeded on his own to continue to seek relief in the
district court. He first filed a letter asking the district court judge to recuse
herself based upon her alleged personal bias in favor of his former counsel, who
had withdrawn from his representation of plaintiffs before the district court ruled
on their motions to vacate the settlement. The district court construed the letter
as a motion and denied it on June 9, 2006. M r. Gaiters next filed a motion
asserting that the district courts post-judgment orders adopting a magistrate
judges recommendations were void, because a magistrate judge may only be
assigned to hear pre-trial matters under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) and 28 U.S.C.
636(b)(1)(A). The district court denied that motion on June 21. And, finding
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that any further filings in this matter would be frivolous, the court imposed filing
restrictions on M r. Gaiters. He then filed an application with the clerk of the
court, as required by the filing restrictions, seeking permission to file a new
motion to vacate the separate stipulated dismissal of another defendant, Ark
W recking Company of Oklahoma, Inc. (Ark W recking Co.). The district court
held that the application did not comply with the requirements of the filing
restrictions and denied it on July 28.
M r. Gaiters did not file a notice appealing any of these rulings. Instead, he
filed an application for a writ of mandamus in this court. W e denied the
application, but treated it as a misdirected notice of appeal. But many of the
numerous issues raised in M r. Gaiters opening brief on appeal are not properly
before this court. A timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our
review. Alva v. Teen Help, 469 F.3d 946, 948 (10th Cir. 2006). 1 W e therefore
limit our review to the three district court orders addressed in his application for a
writ of mandamus, as to which the notice of appeal was timely: specifically, the
orders dated June 9, June 21, and July 28, 2006. 2
M r. Gaiters application for a writ of mandamus, filed on July 10, 2006, did
not effect a timely appeal of the district courts M ay 30 order holding that the
court lacked jurisdiction to review plaintiffs amended motion to vacate.
On August 10, 2006, M r. Gaiters filed an application to supplement the

record on his pending petition for writ of mandamus, in which he challenged the
district courts July 28 order. W e treated this filing as another misdirected notice
of appeal.
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Regarding the district courts June 9 order, M r. Gaiters argues that the
district court judge abused her discretion in denying his motion to recuse. Under
28 U.S.C. 455(a), a district judge shall disqualify [herself] in any proceeding
in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Recusal is
appropriate only where a reasonable person, were he to know all the
circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judges impartiality. United
States v. M endoza, 468 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
This court reviews the denial of a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. Id.
The district court denied M r. Gaiters motion because he failed to provide any
facts to show that a reasonable person could question the district court judges
impartiality. The court also found that the m otion was untimely and M r. Gaiters
presented no reason for his delay. W e have reviewed the record and find no legal
error or abuse of discretion in the district courts denial of the motion to recuse.
W e therefore affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district
courts June 9, 2006, order.
M r. Gaiters challenges both the substance of the June 21, 2006, order and
the imposition of filing restrictions. In his motion M r. Gaiters asserted that the
district courts post-judgment orders adopting the recommendations of a
magistrate judge were ultra vires, void, and a denial of due process, because a
magistrate judge has no authority to adjudicate post-trial matters. R., Doc. 74
at 2. W e construe M r. Gaiters motion as filed under Rule 60(b)(6), and therefore
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review the district courts decision for an abuse of discretion. See Searles v.
Dechant, 393 F.3d 1126, 1130-31 (10th Cir. 2004). Although the district court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, and therefore did not exercise its discretion
to consider M r. Gaiters motion, we need not remand because w e can affirm
the district courts denial of the motion as a matter of law. See Simons v.
S.W. Petro-Chem, Inc., 28 F.3d 1029, 1030 (10th Cir. 1994) (resolving issue
district court failed to consider, where record was sufficient to permit decision
as a matter of law). W e have previously held that a district court may refer
post-judgment matters to a magistrate judge under the additional duties
provision of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(3), so long as the district judge retains the
ultimate responsibility for decision making. See Colo. Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. B.B. Andersen Constr. Co., 879 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1989).
Here, based on our review of the record, M r. Gaiters assertion that the district
court failed to retain ultimate decision-making responsibility is unfounded.
M r. Gaiters also asserts that the district court improperly imposed filing
restrictions in its June 21 order. The restrictions require him to satisfy five
criteria in an application to the court clerk, before he will be granted permission
to file any further pleadings in this case. Specifically, he must set forth the legal
and factual bases for his proposed pleading, a statement that the issue raised has
never been finally disposed of by any court, the identity and nature of assistance
by any third party, and a statement of compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
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Federal courts have the inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive
litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate
circumstances. Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Assn, 469 F.3d 1340, 1343 (10th Cir.
2006) (quotation omitted). W e review a district courts imposition of filing
restrictions for an abuse of discretion. Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 354
(10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
M r. Gaiters argues only that he has no previous history of filing frivolous
pleadings. Yet even after the district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction
over plaintiffs amended motion to vacate, he persisted in filing additional
non-meritorious motions. W e have examined the filing restrictions and note that
they are not unreasonable, nor do they prevent the filing of meritorious pleadings.
Further, they pertain only to further pleadings in this case, which was dismissed
by the parties with prejudice in 2004. W e hold that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing these narrow ly-tailored restrictions.
Finally, M r. Gaiters argues that the district court should have granted him
permission to file a new motion to vacate the separate stipulated dismissal of Ark
W recking Co. The district court held that he failed to satisfy the filing
restrictions because he did not set forth the legal or factual bases for his proposed
motion, and he refused to fully disclose any legal assistance he had received.
W e find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the district courts decision and
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therefore affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth in its order dated
July 28, 2006.
The judgment of the district court is A FFIRM ED. M r. Gaiters motion to
add A rk W recking C o. as an appellee is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

May 22, 2007

OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *

Before BR ISC OE, SE YM OU R, and A ND ER SO N, Circuit Judges.

Eugene A. Gaiters appeals pro se from three post-judgment orders entered

On August 10, 2006, M r. Gaiters filed an application to supplement the

Entered for the Court

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