Sharper Edge, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 10th Cir. (1999)
Sharper Edge, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 10th Cir. (1999)
Sharper Edge, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 10th Cir. (1999)
APR 13 1999
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
No. 98-1143
(D.C. No. 96-B-1216)
(D. Colo.)
Plaintiff,
v.
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
HORIZON AGENCY, INC.,
Defendant.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In this diversity action, the Sharper Edge, Inc., appeals the district courts
summary judgment dismissal of its breach of insurance contract claim against
defendant, Continental Insurance Co. We review the grant of summary judgment
de novo, and apply the same legal standard used by the district court under [Fed.
R. Civ. P.] 56(c).
This court originally noted that the appealed judgment was not final
because claims against Horizon Agency, Inc. remained unadjudicated. The appeal
(continued...)
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The coverage for business personal property loss was limited to $25,000.
The policy also included a provision entitled Newly Acquired or
Constructed Property, which stated the policy would cover the loss of business
personal property at any location[ y]ou acquire.
(...continued)
ripened after the district court entered a certification order under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b), and this court now has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
See Lewis v. B.F.
Goodrich Co. , 850 F.2d 641, 645-46 (10th Cir. 1988).
1
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paying the policy limit of $25,000 for all of the inventory stored at Unit A and
Unit B at 2000 Ski Time Square. Because Unit B was newly leased, Sharper Edge
argued it was newly acquired property and that the inventory stored there should
have been covered up to the $500,000 limit for newly acquired property.
Continental disagreed, contending that Unit B was still located at 2000 Ski Time
Square, and was not newly acquired property because it was within the policys
definition of the covered premises.
Sharper Edge brought both a bad faith insurance tort claim and a breach of
contract claim. The district court initially denied Sharpers Edges motion for
summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, concluding that the parties
failure to specify the meaning of crucial terms in this insurance contract results in
an ambiguity subject to clarification through [extrinsic] evidence . . . .
Id. at 71.
Sharper Edge then converted its claim to a pure breach of contract claim. The
district court ordered supplemental summary judgment briefing and ultimately
granted summary judgment in favor of Continental on the breach of contract
claim. The district court stated that when it initially denied Sharper Edges
motion for summary judgment, the record had not contained the relevant pages of
the insurance contract and that the parties had not adequately briefed all of the
issues on the breach of contract claim.
See id . at 117-18.
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The district court held that the insurance contract unambiguously defined
the covered premises as 2000 Ski Time Square and, thus, the coverage for all
losses at this location, including the inventory stored at Unit B, was limited to
$25,000. The district court concluded the insurance contract extended additional
coverage only to newly acquired locations, meaning some location other than
2000 Ski Time Square, and not to additional space leased within this building.
On appeal, Sharper Edge contends the district court erred in reversing
itself, initially finding the insurance policy language ambiguous, and then
deciding that very same language was not ambiguous. We find no error in the
district courts reconsideration of its initial ruling in light of a more complete
record. The grant of summary judgment is not improper merely because an earlier
motion for summary judgment, which raised the same issues, had been denied.
See Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.
(holding that second motion for summary judgment is permissible after previous
motion dismissed if supported by new material, stating that [u]ntil final decree
the court always retains jurisdiction to modify or rescind a prior interlocutory
order.).
Sharper Edge also asserts the district court erred in finding the contract
unambiguous, arguing it applied a strained interpretation of the insurance policy
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language. It asserts the policy is ambiguous and, under Colorado law, ambiguous
insurance policy language is to be construed in favor of coverage.
We have carefully reviewed the parties pleadings and briefs, the record on
appeal, and the district courts decision, and considered them in light of the
applicable law. Reading the insurance contract in its entirety and giving effect to
all of its provisions, we agree with the district courts conclusion that the policy
is plain and unambiguous and that, under its terms, any property located at 2000
Ski Time Square, including Unit B, is not at a newly acquired location. The
district court issued a thorough and well-reasoned order granting summary
judgment to Continental and we cannot better articulate the facts, applicable law,
or reasoning for granting the summary judgment. We thereby AFFIRM the
district courts March 16, 1998 order for substantially the same reasons stated
therein and attach a copy hereto.
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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