Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans
application for land registration, disposing thusly:

EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987

September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing
an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition
to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3

BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who
both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel
of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established
by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of
71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased
the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the
property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang
Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is
verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.2

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto
(Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any
period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15,
1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the
CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon
Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to
its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the
Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the
declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable
should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that
the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack
of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support their
argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an

alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was
essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription
at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered
was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on
the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the
land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial
property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v.
Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the
land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that
Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to
validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed
by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration
on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years
reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the
State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference
to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by
implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when
the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of

private ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. 12 Land belonging to the State that
is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or
for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. 13 Land that is other than
part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the
country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, 14 all
lands of the public domain belong to the State. 15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons. 17
Classifications of public lands according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law
might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the
1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done
exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department. 22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the
public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial
lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the
Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive
act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, 25 and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department,
not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the
ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is

duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the
State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of
national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows,
and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the
Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his
application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, 28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in
possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or
earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation
to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino
citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to
classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the
application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public
domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and
overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no
legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or
glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted
that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period
of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the
fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified
as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete
title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This
means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the
ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue
of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the
lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this
reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the
requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at
which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the
applicants possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government,
because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet
titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation
and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be defeated. Indeed,
we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023) 33 in
order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable
public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations. 34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby
converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but
the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. 35 As
such, prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or
lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section
11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural
land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicants
possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and
the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth
are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted
to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be
the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it
as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the
land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the
respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief
filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for
titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

EN BANC

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT
BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR
OF LAND , REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY,
Petitioners,
- versus -

G.R. No. 167707

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD, TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and

ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents.
October 8, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 173775
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS
OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX A OF THIS
PETITION,
Petitioners,
- versus THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants
of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The
island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-shaped islands
three barangays.[5]
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. [7]
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in
the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling
purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition
for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June
12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them.[10]
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified
as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right
to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Islandwas an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest,

which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,[11] as amended.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following
facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay
Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing
trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted
more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were
occupying for tax purposes.[12]
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal:
whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the
lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution
upon submission of their respective memoranda.[13]
The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in
Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.
[15]
The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is

hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.[24]
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration
that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. [25] Hence, the
present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise
provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails,
reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo Gelito,
and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. [30] They allege that the Proclamation
infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested
billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class
resorts on their lots.[31]
[28]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,
with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle
to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands
in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner
prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by
respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey
does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in
their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTACircular No. 3-82 mentioned
that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. [18] The
Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. [19] The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and
53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay
and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve. [22]
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. [23] The Republic then
appealed to the CA.

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation

reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber
land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32]Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for
the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest
land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the
island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is
only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government
act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as
they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.[33]

Issues

THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY? [35] (Underscoring

supplied)

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire
title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in

G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles
over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve
their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF
PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL
OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE
THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL
LANDS
AS
DEFINED
BY LAWS THEN ON
JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS
DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED
RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED
PORTIONS OF BORACAYLAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY
HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN
TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006,
VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC.
8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY
PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 [36] in relation to Act No.
926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; [37] (b) Proclamation
No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 [39] issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,
and such other classes as may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great leeway for
classification.[42] Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification
with one addition: national parks. [43] Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
[44]
Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain
will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.[49]
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in

the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. [50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in
the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain.[51]
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law
of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method
of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth
in said decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or
possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted
into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession
which must be actual, public, and adverse, [56] from the date of its inscription.[57] However,
possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura
Law, or until April 17, 1895.Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. [58]
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant;
(2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title;
(4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
information title.[59]
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit:
agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. [61] The act provided for, among others, the
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold
system).[62] It also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.
[63]
Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court
declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]
x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used
in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which
are not timber or mineral lands. x x x[65] (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as
the Torrens system.[66]
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926,
which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made
provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or
lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning
the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. [67] Under the Act, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the

next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.[68]
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries
which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and
occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874
on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remainsas the existing general
law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. [71]
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July
26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, [72] which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,[73] which now provides for possession
and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. [76] Under the decree, all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within
six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the
recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known
as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as
unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. [79]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there
must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, [80] declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. [81] In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been officially delimited and classified. [82]
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. [83] To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. [84] There must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the

land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.[86]
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum
in Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. [94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an

argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable
and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all
lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of
it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided under the provisions
of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown.[90]

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already
classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these
lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did
not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural
lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided
the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public
domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on
proof presented in each case.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an
applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It
certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-ininterest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land
remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the
State.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines
had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At
that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or
were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.
[91]
This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea
Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better
suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite
the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need

not be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be
deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director
of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners
reliance
upon Ramos
v.
Director
of
Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which
there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of
the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into
mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.[93]

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the

Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in
question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere
fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of
itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral
land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value
of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands,
and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that
in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more
valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.)It is not sufficient to show
that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral.
Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the
exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the
discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may
be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the
proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future

value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering

the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands
in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right
to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the
land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or
mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value
for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the
proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar
[mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or
the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance,
under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself
what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless
private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the
latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a
question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government,
by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what
portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or
mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry,supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from
the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands. [96] Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive
Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-a Since then, courts no longer had the
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
domain.[97]
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title
in 1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of
the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to
resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act
No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial
confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the
courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private
claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the
Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The
Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different
issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general
classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential
lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the
issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on

the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided
when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or
mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued
possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act
No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for
a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was
passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing
of portions of the public domain of the Philippine
Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in
the Islands. It also provided for the issuance of patents
to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for
the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions
and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands
in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;
and that the governments title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties
between Spain and the United States. The term public
land referred to all lands of the public domain whose
title still remained in the government and are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands.
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession
by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the
lands are alienable and disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and the National Mapping and

Resource Information Authority[110]certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the

public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of
lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are
not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to
its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705
may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has
been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a
premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach
resorts on the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry,
do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution[112] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. [113] The discussion in Heirs of
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
[115]
(Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as
a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of
what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.
[116]
At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not
look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from
public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by
then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants
assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of
Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private
lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable [118] does not by itself classify the entire
island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands
and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior
authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared
forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers
under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest
Developments authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it
provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the
specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done
in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the
concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism
potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It
does not address the areas alienability.[119]
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixtyfour (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol,
Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan
de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist
zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas
mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have
been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay
as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. [121]
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably
subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of
the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do
so.[122] Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered
open to disposition.[123]
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter
buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of
way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much
less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Islandmade by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to
existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public
forests into agricultural lands.They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No.
705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul
of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands
of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain
devoted
to
or suitable
for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or
mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall
have determined by law, the specific limits of
the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar
the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land.Boracay Island still remained an
unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.

[124]

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,
the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they
were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land
until released and rendered open to disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of

land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be
no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
Department of Justice[126] on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition
in Section 4(a) is the word reclassification. Where there has been no
previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of
the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest
purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or
some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the meaning of Section
4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL
against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a
prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot,
apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as public forest
under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously
determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with
the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the
said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona
fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. [128]
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801
did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State
property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the
absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a
government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and

applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.
[129]
Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long,
cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.[130]
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural
lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief
that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing
the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a
vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for
a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide
cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence
stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their
occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable
investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The
Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their
home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the
law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang
dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible
to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and
other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their
substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily
mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they
may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire
title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land
laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill
or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to
open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some
sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That
the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its
remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists.These are needs that become
more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly
observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence
to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many
have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about
the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests
constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of
common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on
our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which
they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded
areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will
hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that
wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and
highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing
observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue. [135]
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED ANDSET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be
followed with respect

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can
acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer
Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale
took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the
ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002

December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO.
INC., ETC., respondents.

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who
were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the
possession is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian
Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain;

NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of
land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment
sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five
Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by
the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September
18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant
was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from
the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and
which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh.
'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability
of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration
proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution
had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its
Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the
public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the
1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question
from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48,
paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial
court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer
controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural
minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied
those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by
reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to
have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successorin-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under
any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already
referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels
had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings
instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the
prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in
lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution
of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it
must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands,
the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations
obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et
al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic
corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in
1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the
vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court,
assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco,
a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court
upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section
48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application
cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction
between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no
occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public
domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands,
L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning
with Carino in 1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed
and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public
land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the
better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the
principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of
June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may
prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that
this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree,
but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion
that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The
words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So
that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least
by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.

Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus
made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly
rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency
of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of
public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an
express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "...
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put
in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of

the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973
Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning
private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes
right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution
that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in
public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or
"imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold
or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental
circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973
Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat
a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly
valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to
the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired
a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and
twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of
vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent
repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State,
except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become
fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a
patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name
must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly
more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of
ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the
Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves
confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct
rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by
a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this
appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is
not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality
that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just
give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error
not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as
the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition
against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name
of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of
their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in

their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of
refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court
dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See
Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications
for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of
the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private
lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter
from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of
title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in
empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no
prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the
evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a
real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines
the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past
cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions
of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited
to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.