The Paquete Habana Case Brief 175 U.S.

677
Keyed to Damrosch 5th
Status: Supreme Court of the United States, 1900
Facts: Two fishing vessels that were fishing out of Havana, Cuba, sailed under a Spanish flag were fishing
off the Cuba coast. They were owned a Spanish subject that was born in Cuba and living in Havana. The
vessels were commanded by a subject of Spain, also residing in Havana. Their cargo consisted of fresh
fish, caught by their crew. The fish were kept alive to be sold alive. Until stopped by the blockading
squadron they had no knowledge of the existence of the war or of any blockade. She had no arms or
ammunition on board, and made no attempt to run the blockade after she knew of its existence, nor any
resistance at the time of the capture.
Procedural History: DC for the Southern District of Florida condemned the two fishing vessels and their
cargos as prizes of war.
Issues: Whether a court may look to established rules of other nations when their own nation lacks any
treaty, legislation, proclamation, or instruction that is on point for a particular matter?
Analysis: By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening
into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in
fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war.
In 1403 and 1406 Henry IV ordered that fisherman of foreign nations become under his special protection
so that the fisherman in the course of their duty would not be hindered, interfered, or molested by any of
his subjects.
The doctrine which exempts coast fishermen, with their vessels and cargoes, from capture as prize of war,
has been familiar to the United States from the time of the War of Independence.
On June 5, 1779, Louis XVI., our ally in that war, addressed a letter to his admiral, informing him that the
wish he had always had of alleviating, as far as he could, the hardships of war, had directed his attention
to that class of his subjects which devoted itself to the trade of fishing, and had no other means of
livelihood; that he had thought that the example which he should give to his enemies, would determine
them to allow to fishermen the same facilities which he should consent to grant; and that he had therefore
given orders to the commanders of all his ships not to disturb English fishermen, nor to arrest their
vessels laden with fresh fish, provided they had no offensive arms, and were not proved to have made any
signals creating a suspicion of intelligence with the enemy; and the admiral was directed to communicate
the Kings intentions to all officers under his control.
Among the standing orders made by Sir James Marriott, Judge of the English High Court of Admiralty, was
one of April 11, 1780, by which it was ordered that all causes of prize of fishing boats or vessels taken
from the enemy may be consolidated in one monition, and one sentence or interlocutory, if under 50 tons
burthen, and not more than 6 in number. But by the statements of his successor, and of both French and
English writers, it apears that England, as well as France, during the American Revolutionary War,
abstained from interfering with the coast fisheries.
In the treaty of 1785 between the United States and Prussia, provided that, if war should arise between
the contracting parties, all women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth,
artisans, manufacturers, and fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, or places, and
in general all others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be
allowed to continue their respective employments, and shall not be molested in their persons, nor shall
their houses or goods be burnt or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted by the armed force of the
enemy, into whose power, by the events of war, they may happen to fall; but if anything is necessary to be

taken from them for the use of such armed force, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price. Here
was the clearest exemption from hostile molestation or seizure of the persons, occupations, houses, and
goods of unarmed fishermen inhabiting unfortified places.
Wheatons International Laws, says: In many treaties and decrees, fishermen catching fish as an article of
food are added to the class of persons whose occupation is not to be disturbed in war.
The English government, soon afterwards, more than once unqualifiedly prohibited the molestation of
fishing vessels employed in catching and bringing to market fresh fish. On May 23, 1806, it was ordered
in council that all fishing vessels under Prussian and other colors, and engaged for the purpose of catching
fish and conveying them fresh to market, with their crews, cargoes, and stores, shall not be molested on
their fishing voyages and bringing the same to market.
In the war with Mexico, in 1846, the United States recognized the exemption of coast fishing boats from
capture. It appears that Commodore Conner, commanding the Home Squadron blockading the east coast
of Mexico, on May 14, 1846, wrote a letter to Mr. Bancroft, the Secretary of the Navy, inclosing a copy of
the commodores instructions to the commanders of the vessels of the Home Squadron, showing the
principles to be observed in the blockade of the Mexican ports, one of which was that Mexican boats
engaged in fishing on any part of the coast will be allowed to pursue their labors unmolested; and that on
June 10, 1846, those instructions were approved by the Navy Department.
In the treaty of peace between the United States and Mexico, in 1848, were inserted the very words of the
earlier treaties with Prussia, already quoted, forbidding the hostile molestation or seizure in time of war of
the persons, occupations, houses, or goods of fishermen.
France in the Crimean war in 1854, and in her wars with Italy in 1859 and with Germany in 1870, by
general orders, forbade her cruisers to trouble the coast fisheries, or to seize any vessel or boat engaged
therein, unless naval or military operations should make it necessary.
Since the English orders in council of 1806 and 1810, before quoted, in favor of fishing vessels employed
in catching and bringing to market fresh fish, no instance has been found in which the exemption from
capture of private coast fishing vessels honestly pursuing their peaceful industry has been denied by
England or by any other nation. And the Empire of Japan by an ordinance promulgated at the beginning of
its war with China in August, 1894, established prize courts, and ordained that the following enemys
vessels are exempt from detention, including in the exemption boats engaged in coast fisheries, as well
as ships engaged exclusively on a voyage of scientific discovery, philanthrophy, or religious mission.
Wheaton observes: Without wishing to exaggerate the importance of these writers, or to substitute, in
any case, their authority for the principles of reason, it may be affirmed that they are generally impartial
in their judgment. They are witnesses of the sentiments and usages of civilized nations, and the weight of
their testimony increases every time that their authority is invoked by statesmen, and every year that
passes without the rules laid down in their works being impugned by the avowal of contrary principles.
Chancellor Kent says: In the absence of higher and more authoritative sanctions, the ordinances of
foreign states, the opinions of eminent statesmen, and the writings of distinguished jurists, are regarded
as of great consideration on questions not settled by conventional law. In cases where the principal jurists
agree, the presumption will be very great in favor of the solidity of their maxims; and no civilized nation
that does not arrogantly set all ordinary law and justice at defiance will venture to disregard the uniform
sense of the established writers on international law.
This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that
at the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any
express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of international law, founded on considerations
of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent states,

that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly
pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of
war.
This rule of international law is one which prize courts administering the law of nations are bound to take
judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own
government in relation to the matter.
Holding: Yes
Judgment: Ordered, that the decree of the District Court be reversed, and the proceeds of the sale of the
vessel, together with the proceeds of any sale of her cargo, be restored to the claimant, with damages and
costs.
Rule: A court may look to established rules of other nations when their own nation lacks any treaty,
legislation, proclamation, or instruction that is on point for a particular matter.
Where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.
Dissent or Concurrence: Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice
McKenna, dissenting:
The district court held these vessels and their cargoes liable because not satisfied that as a matter of law,
without any ordinance, treaty, or proclamation, fishing vessels of this class are exempt from seizure. This
court holds otherwise, not because such exemption is to be found in any treaty, legislation, proclamation,
or instruction granting it, but on the ground that the vessels were exempt by reason of an established rule
of international law applicable to them, which it is the duty of the court to enforce.
Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits)Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports, 1960, p. 6
21. Portugal claimed before the International Court that she had a right of passage through intervening
Indian territory to the extent necessary for the exercise of her sovereignty over two small enclaves and
that India had refused to recognize the obligations imposed by this right.
22. In support of her claim Portugal relied in part on certain agreements concluded in the 18th century
between Portugal and the local Maratha ruler. Although the Court found that the agreements concerned
amounted only to a revenue grant, and not to a grant of sovereignty together with a right of passage, it
appears to have assumed that any such rights granted would have been binding on successor States.16
The Court found, however, that:
. . . the situation underwent a change with the advent of the British as sovereign of that part of the
country in place of the Marathas. The British found the Portuguese in occupation of the villages and
exercising full and exclusive administrative authority over them. They accepted the situation as they found
it and left the Portuguese in occupation of and in exercise of exclusive authority over, the villages.
The Portuguese held themselves out as sovereign over the villages. The British did not, as successors of
the Marathas, themselves claim sovereignty, nor did they accord express recognition of Portuguese
sovereignty, over them. The exclusive authority of the Portuguese over the villages was never brought in
question. Thus Portuguese sovereignty over the villages was recognized by the British in fact and by
implication and-was subsequently recognized by India. As a consequence the villages comprised in the
Maratha grant acquired the character of Portuguese enclaves within Indian territory.17
23. Concerning the right of passage, the Court reached the conclusion that:
. . . with regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general there existed during the British

and post-British periods a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Daman and the
enclaves. This practice having continued over a period extending beyond a century and a quarter
unaffected by the change of regime in respect of the intervening territory which occurred when India
became independent, the Court is, in view of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied that that practice
was accepted as law by the Parties and has given rise to a right and a correlative obligation/18
In the case of armed forces and armed police, the Court found that their passage had been dependent on
the discretionary power of the territorial sovereign and that no right of passage as such existed in favour
of Portugal.
The course of dealings established between the Portuguese and the British authorities with respect to the
passage of these categories excludes the existence of any such right. The practice that was established
shows that, with regard to these categories, it was well understood that passage could take place only by
permission of the British authorities. This
situation continued during the post-British period.19
24. The Court held that India had not acted contrary to its obligations regarding the passage of private
persons, since such passage was subject at all times to Indias power of regulation and control. the
Permanent Court of International Justice held that obligations in the nature of real rights had been
created, which attached to the District of St. Gingolph and remained binding upon the successor State
after sovereignty had passed from Sardinia to France.
[International Law] Asylum Case: Columbia v Peru 1950 ICJ Rep. 266 Case Summary.
Facts Victor Raul Haya de la Torre was a Peruvian national. In Oct 3rd, 1948 one military rebellion broke
out in Peru which is organized and directed by the American Peoples Revolutionary Alliance led by Haya de
la Torre. The rebellion was unsuccessful. The Peruvian Government issued a warrant for his arrest on
criminal charges related to this political uprising. He fled to the Columbian embassy in Lima seeking for
asylum from them. Columbia the requested permission from Peru for Haya de la Torres safe passage from
the Columbian embassy, through Peru, goes to Columbia. Peru refused to give such permission. Columbia
then brought this suit against Peru in the International Court of Justice, based on the agreement made by
both named Act of Lima. These are the submissions made by the two parties: 1) The Columbian had
pleaded for the court to declare that Columbia had properly granted asylum based on 2 submissions:- a.
They are competent to qualify the offence for the purpose of the said asylum. b. That Peru is bound to
give the guarantees necessary for the departure of the Haya de la Torre, from the country, with due
regard to the inviolability of his person. 2) Counter-claim by Peru is that for the court to declare that the
grant of asylum made by the Columbian Ambassador to Haya de la Torre was made in violation of the
Convention on Asylum. Argument Plaintiff (Columbian) arguments based on the Convention in force which
are the Bolivarian Agreement 1911 on Extradition, the Havana Convention 1928 on Asylum, the
Montevideo Convention 1933 on Political Asylum and American International Law. The Defendant (Peru)
counter-claim relied on the rules of Havana Convention first, Haya de la Torre was accused, not a political
offense but of a common crime and second, because the urgency which was required under the Havana
Convention in order to justify asylum was absent in that case. Issue 1. Whether or not Columbia is
competent in granting asylum to qualify the offence as based on conventions, which in force between both
countries, and in general from American international law. 2. Whether or not Peru is bound to give the
guarantees necessary for the departure of the refugees from the country, with due regard to the
inviolability of his person? Decision 1) Columbia was not competent to qualify the nature of the offence by
a unilateral and definitive decision binding on Peru. 2) Columbia was not entitled to claim that the Peru
was bound to gives guarantees necessary for the departure of Haya de la Torre, with due regard to the

inviolability of his person. 3) Peru counter-claim that Haya de la Torre was an accused of a common crime
was rejected. Therefore it was not in accordance with Article I, Paragraph I of the Havana convention. 4)
Peru Counter-claim that the grant of asylum by the Columbian government to Haya de la Torre Torre was
made in violation of Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Havana Convention was approved by the court. Ratio
Decidendi 1) The court reject the Columbian argument based on Bolivarian Agreement on the reason that
the principle of International Law did not recognize any rule of unilateral and definitive qualification by the
state granting diplomatic asylum. On the other hand, the Bolivarian Agreement laid down rules on
extradition and it was not possible to deduce from them conclusions concerning diplomatic asylum as it
was different in the meaning. The court also rejected the Havana Convention invoke by the Columbian as
the convention did not recognize the right of unilateral qualification. And the third convention, Convention
of Montevideo, had not been ratified by Peru and could not be invoked against it. As for the American
international law, Columbia had failed to prove that it had constant and uniform practice of unilateral
qualification as a right of the State of refuge and an obligation upon the territorial state. The fact
submitted to the court disclosed too much contradiction and fluctuation, shows that therein a usage
peculiar to Latin America and accepted as law. 2) The court also rejected the Columbian claim based on
Havana Convention that the Peru was bound to gives guarantees necessary for the departure of Haya de la
Torre, on the reason that the convention only applicable if the territorial State demanded the departure of
the refugee from its territory. It was only after such demand that the diplomatic Agent who granted
asylum could require safe-conduct. 3) Peru counter-claim that Haya de la Torre was an accused of a
common crime was rejected on the reason that the refugee was charged for military rebellion, which was
not a common crime as needed under the Havana Convention. 4) The court came into conclusion on Peru
Counter-claim that the grant of asylum by the Columbian government to Haya de la Torre Torre was made
in violation of Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Havana Convention was on the reason that the absent of
element of urgency needed to justify the asylum, in order to protect the person from danger. In this case
the danger that only faced by Haya de la Torre is legal preceding that will be imposed on him, not a
deprivation of his right. The Havana Convention according to the court was not intended to protect a
citizen who had plotted against the institutions of his country from regular legal proceedings. Asylum could
only intervene against the action of justice in cases where arbitrary action was substituted for the rule of
law. Rationale 1) Before a convention can be accepted to be used as the law under Article 38 of Statute of
International Court of Justice, it must be ratified by the contesting state. This has been shown by the
reluctance of the court to used certain provision in the convention as had not been ratified by the party
country. Ie: see rules on Montevideo Convention. 2) The principle of International Law that are not
recognizing the rules of unilateral treaty. 3) This decision also shows us that in order for the custom to be
international custom it must be a general practice. Ie: see rules on American International Law
The Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway)
The Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) was the culmination of a dispute, originating in 1933, over
how large an area of water surrounding Norway was Norwegian waters (that Norway thus had exclusive
fishing rights to) and how much was high seas (that the UK could thus fish).
On 24 September 1949, the UK requested that the International Court of Justice determine how far
Norways territorial claim extended to sea, and to award the UK damages in compensation for Norwegian
interference with UK fishing vessels in the disputed waters, claiming that Norways claim to such an extent
of waters was against international law.
On 18 December 1951, the ICJ decided that Norways claims to the waters were not inconsistent with
international laws concerning the ownership of local sea-space.

I. Case of the S.S. Wimbledon (PCIJ, Ser. A., No. 1, 1923)

II. Facts
A. The British, French, Italian, and Japanese Governments filed an application with the registry of the
court (PCIJ) on January 16, 1923 against the German Government for refusing a steamship right of
passage. The PCIJ heard and decided the case on August 17, 1923.
B. On March 21, 1921, the German government refused to let the English steamship Wimbledon
(chartered by a French company Les Affreteurs Reunis) pass through the Kiel Canal. The ship picked up
4,200 tons of
ammunition and artillery stores in Salonica, Greece, to be brought to the Polish Naval Base at Danzig, but
when the ship arrived at the entrance to the Kiel Canal it was refused passage because of the German
neutrality order in accordance with the Russo-Polish war. The French Ambassador in Berlin asked the
Germans to allow the S.S. Wimbledon passage, and several days later the German Government responded
that it couldnt allow the vessel to pass because of the military cargo that it carried. The French company
then told the ship to go to Danzig via the Danish Straits, resulting in the cargo arriving thirteen days lateeleven for detainment by the Germans and two for the extra time it took to go the alternate route.
Diplomatic relations between the states did not end in a resolution, so the matter was then brought before
the League of Nations and thus the Permanent Court of International Justice to hear the case.
C. The plaintiffs in this case are the British, French, Japanese, and Italian governments who claim that
Germany violated Articles 380 to 386 of the Treaty of Versailles, which, among other things, states that
the Kiel Canal will remain free and open to the vessels of commerce of war of all nations at peace with
Germany on terms of entire equality. The plaintiffs argue that despite the cargo on the ship, the nation
chartering the ship was not at war with Germany and thus should have been allowed passage.
D. The defendant in this case is the government of Germany who claims that despite the articles of the
Treaty of Versailles, they were under no obligation to allow the passage of the S.S. Wimbledon because
they issued a Neutrality Order for the Russo-Polish War, which would be broken by allowing weapons
to be shipped to Poland.
III. Questions
A. Is a state allowed to refuse free passage to a vessel of another state based on the cargo that it is
holding if there is a treaty demanding free passage, but another order stating neutrality from military
conflict?
B. Can a state be obligated to allow free passage, even if this denies the state its right to neutrality in
times of war?
IV. Decision
The Court ruled that Germany had no right to refuse entrance to the S.S. Wimbledon on behalf of the
cargo that it was carrying. In addition, the Court claimed that the Kiel Canal is no longer in the same
category as normal internal waterways that are ruled at the discretion of the state they are housed in, but
rather it should be considered an international waterway as laid out in the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, the
Kiel Canal
should be open to all vessels, regardless of state, as long as that state is at peace with Germany, because
the point of the canal is to provide easier access to the Baltic. Since the Treaty of Versailles specifically
said that the canal could deny access to states at war with Germany, it obviously was not a mistake that it
did not include the closure of the canal if Germany was neutral in a war between two other states. Also,
the intent of the writes of the Treaty of Versailles was to have the canal be an international waterway to
the Baltic. In addition, the Court cited precedent from the Suez and Panama Canals as illustrations to the
invalidity of Germanys claim. Finally, the Court dismissed Germanys claim that their Neutrality Order

superseded the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

V. Principles
A. A key international law issue in this case is that a neutrality order issued by an individual state cannot
hold more power than the provisions of an international treaty of peace.
B. This case asserts that the right of passage in internal waterways can become designated as not being
considered internal waterways, and thus the state has limited rights over its control, whereas the
international community has a much greater say.
C. If a states vessel is denied access to a waterway, it affects the commerce and rights of all states who
may have vested interests in the area, and thus these states have the jurisdiction to bring a case against
the state who is restricting the rights of free passage.
VI. Conclusion
The importance of this case lies in that it shows that despite a state having a waterway within its
boundaries, it does not always have ultimate control over the right of passage of other states vessels.
This case put a limit on some state sovereignty and gave more power to international law in that it
affirmed that international peace treaties hold more weight than individual Neutrality Orders of specific
states. This decision showed that the PCIJ considered the Treaty of Versailles to be binding and not open
to interpretation by individual states that signed the treaty.
Individuals as objects of Intl LawCase: The Barcelona Traction Case (1970; ICJ)
Facts: Barcelona Traction was a corporation that controlled light and powerutilities in Spain and was
incorporated in Toronto, (Canada). In 1948, there wasan adjudication in bankruptcy in Spain of Barcelona
Traction. Its object was toseek reparation for damage alleged by Belgium to have been sustained by
Belgiannationals, shareholders in the company. The Belgian Government, contended thatafter the First
World War Barcelona Traction share capital came to be very largelyheld by alleged Belgian nationals, but
the Spanish Government, maintained that theBelgian nationality of the shareholders was notproven.Issue:
Whether Belgium can bring this case in the ICJ. No.Holding: Belgiums claim is rejected.Reasoning: The
Belgian government lacked the standing to exercise diplomaticprotection of Belgian shareholders in a
Canadian company with respect to measurestaken against that company in Spain. The court ruled on the
side of the Spanish,holding that only the nationality of the corporation (the Canadians) can sue.The case is
important as it demonstrates how the concept of diplomatic protectionunder international law can apply
equally to corporations as to individuals.Notes Facts:Incorporated in Canada, Belgians hold majority of
shares
Belgian govt say they own the shares
Business bankrupted in Spain
Issue settled without Belgians involved, and Belgian govt seeks
reparation The connection of the company with Belgium very strong, but court still decidedthat Belgium
govt cannot submit claims on behalf of its citizens.
Nuclear Tests Case (Australia & New Zealand v. France)
Procedural History: Proceeding before the International Court of Justice.
Overview: Australia and New Zealand (P) demanded that France (D) cease atmospheric nuclear tests in
the South Pacific. France (D) completed a series of nuclear tests in the South Pacific. Australia and New
Zealand (P) applied to the !.C.). demanding that France (D) cease testing immediately. While the case was

pending, France (D) announced the series of tests was complete and that it did not plan any further such
tests. France (D) moved to dismiss the applications.
Issue: May declarations made by way of unilateral acts have the effect of creating legal obligations?
Rule: declerations made by way of unilateral acts may have the effect of creating legal obligations.
Analysis: The unilateral statements made by French authorities were first communicated to the
government of Australia. To have legal effect there was no need tor the statements to be directed to any
particular state. The general nature and characteristics of the statements alone were relevant for
evaluation of their legal implications.
Outcome: Yes. Declarations made by way of unilateral acts may have the effect of creating legal
obligations. The sole relevant question is whether the language employed in any given declaration reveals
a clear intention. One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations is
the principle of good faith. The statements made by the President of the French Republic must be held to
constitute an engagement of the State in regard to the circumstances and intention with which they were
made. The statements made by the French authorities are therefore relevant and legally binding.
Applications dismissed.
Mijares v. Ranada
Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations
during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand
Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of
international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of
Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final
Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject
matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the nonpayment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was
capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the
payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign
judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.
Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.
Held:
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other actions
not involving property. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis
of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners Complaint was
lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US
District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary
estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance
wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under
the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein
the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money.
But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for

13
enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the
RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it
beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over
Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is 7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving
property.