William H. Warren, Jr. v. Jack Cowley, Warden, 930 F.2d 36, 10th Cir. (1991)
William H. Warren, Jr. v. Jack Cowley, Warden, 930 F.2d 36, 10th Cir. (1991)
William H. Warren, Jr. v. Jack Cowley, Warden, 930 F.2d 36, 10th Cir. (1991)
2d 36
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Tenth Circuit Rule 36.3 states that unpublished
opinions and orders and judgments have no precedential value
and shall not be cited except for purposes of establishing the
doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel.
William H. WARREN, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Jack COWLEY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 89-7103.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
(2) The trial court failed to instruct that there must be corroborative evidence
connecting each defendant separately to the ffense (sic) charged and when the
prosecution, compounding the lack of information with misinformation, argued
that any indication that accomplice Grayson knew what he was talking about
constituted corroborating evidence.
(3) The trial judge, over defense objections, permitted codefendant testimony
on the existence of an agreement without there first being independent evidence
showing the exiatence (sic) of an agreement. The fact that Grayson's agreement
testimony was inadmissible in turn caused there to be insuffucuent (sic)
evidence. The prosecution never presented independent evidence of the
existence of an agreement.
(4) Contravention of the fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution and in contravention of Oklahoma law--in permitting the
prosecution to introduce statements of petitioner which were the product of an
illegal arrest. Such error particularly was prejudicial because the prosecution
used the statements to purport that htere (sic) was corroboration of accomplice
Grayson's testimony.
(5) The trial court committed fundamental error by failing to instruct on second
degree murder and on manslaughter in the first degree, in violation of the due
process clauses of the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions.
(6) The trial judge refused ro (sic) allow the defense to question juror Daniels
on her mis trial (sic) statements concerning threats which allegedly had been
made to the state's key witness, accomplice Grayson.
10
(7) The trail (sic) court erred in failing to give petitioner's requested instruction
that Grayson's prior felony conviction could be used by the jury in assessing his
lack of credibility.
11
(8) The trial court committed fundamental error by failing to give a cautionary
(9) The trial court committed reversible error in denying petitioner's motion for
serverance (sic) because such denial caused petitioner to have a death-qualified
jury even though the state was not seeking to execute the petitioner, because
petitioner was prejudiced by evid# nce (sic) which was incriminating as to co
defendant (sic) Johns and not admissible as to petitioner, and because the lack
of severance tented (sic) to confuse the issue of whether there was adequate
corroboration as to petitioner.
13
14
(11) Petitioner was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel under the
authority of Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 83 L.Ed.2d 821, 105 S.Ct. 830
(1985), when counsel failed to present meritorious issues on direct appeal.
15
Appellate counsel failed to present on direct appeal the issue of the states (sic)
star witness testified to a different murder at the preliminary hearing in order to
get petitioner bound over for trial.
16
(12) Petitioner was denied due process of law under the authority of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1184 (1963), when the state
suppressed the statement of the state's star witness.
17
(13) Petitioner was denied due process of law under the authority of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), when the state
suppressed psychological records of the state's star witness.
18
The magistrate's report dealt fully and fairly with each of the issues raised by
appellant. Upon our review of the proceedings, we find no reversible error.
19
Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be cited, or
used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing
the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th
Cir.R. 36.3