Cases For Unlawful Detainer

Cases for unlawful detainer
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
and
NATIONAL
POWER
CORPORATION, both represented
by
the
PRIVATIZATION
MANAGEMENT OFFICE,
Petitioners,
- versus -
SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 194880

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 20, 2012

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DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
unlawful detainer filed by petitioners herein with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power

Corporation (NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land located
along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and covered by four
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).[1] The main subject matter of the instant
Petition is one of these four parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with an
area of approximately 22,294 square meters (hereinafter, the subject property).
Eighty percent (80%) of the subject property is owned by petitioner Republic,
while the remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to petitioner NPC. [2]Petitioners
are being represented in this case by the Privatization Management Office (PMO),
which is the agency tasked with the administration and disposal of government
assets.[3] Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty Development Corporation (Sunvar)
occupied the subject property by virtue of sublease agreements, which had in the
meantime expired.
The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December
1977, petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property, to
the Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25
years beginning 01 January 1978 and ending on 31 December 2002.[5] Under the
Contract of Lease (the main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the right to
sublease any portion of the four parcels of land.[6]
[4]
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject

property to respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements (the sublease
agreements).[7] Although these agreements commenced on different dates, all of
them contained common provisions on the terms of the sublease and were
altogether set to expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFIs main
lease contract with petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of respondent:[8]
The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years
and [variable] months commencing on [variable], renewable for another twentyfive (25) years at SUNVARs exclusive option.[9]
According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar

agreed to return or surrender the subleased land, without any delay whatsoever
upon the termination or expiration of the sublease contract or any renewal or
extension thereof.[10]
During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful

improvements, consisting of several commercial buildings, and leased out the
spaces therein.[11] It also profitably utilized the other open spaces on the subject
property as parking areas for customers and guests.[12]
In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was
dissolved. In its stead, the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation
(PDAF) was created, assuming the functions previously performed by TRCFI.[13]
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease
contract and the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as
successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option to
renew the sublease over the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate
and a renewal period of another 25 years. [14] On even date, it also wrote to the
Office of the President, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and
petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the same desire to renew the lease over the
subject property under the new rental rate and renewal period.[15]
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of
the lease had already been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a
response.[16] It further explained that the proposal of respondent for the renewal of
the sublease could not yet be acted upon, and neither could the proposed rental
payments be accepted.[17] Respondent acknowledged receipt of the letter and
requested PDAF to apprise the former of any specific actions undertaken with
respect to the said lease arrangement over the subject property.[18]
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire,
petitioner NPC through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General
Counsel notified PDAF of the formers decision not to renew the contract of lease.
[19]
In turn, PDAF notified respondent of NPCs decision.[20]
On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified PDAF of the formers
decision not to renew the lease contract.[21] The Republic reasoned that the parties
had earlier agreed to shorten the corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the latters
assets to the former for the purpose of selling them to raise funds. [22] On 25 June
2002, PDAF duly informed respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republics decision not
to renew the lease and quoted the Memorandum of Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary Flores.[23]
On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its
sublease agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners
recovered from PDAF all the rights over the subject property and the three other
parcels of land. Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred the subject property to
the PMO for disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the
property.
On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired,
petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised
respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the subject property within thirty (30)
days.[24] The latter duly received the Notice from the OSG through registered mail,
[25]
but failed to vacate and remained on the property.[26]
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a
final notice to vacate within 15 days.[27] When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar
again refused to vacate the property and continued to occupy it.
On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to
determine the fair rental value of the subject property and petitioners lost income a
loss arising from the refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate the property after the
expiration of the main lease contract and sublease agreements. [28] Using the market
comparison approach, the PMO determined that the fair rental value of the subject
property was 10,364,000 per month, and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners
a total of 630,123,700 from 01 January 2002 to 31 March 2009.[29]
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for
unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City.
Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject property
and to pay damages for the illegal use and lost income owing to them:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully
prayed that after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and all persons, natural and juridical, claiming rights under it,
to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender the same, with the
useful improvements therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized
representative; and
2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (630,123,700.00) for the illegal and
unauthorized use and occupation of the subject property from January 1, 2003
to March 31, 2009, and the amount of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (10,364,000.00) per month from April 1,
2008 until the subject property, together with its improvements, are completely
vacated and peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to their authorized
representative.[30]
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the
allegations of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful
detainer, since no privity of contract existed between them. [31] In the alternative, it
also argued that petitioners cause of action was more properly an accion
publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC,
considering that the petitioners supposed dispossession of the subject property by
respondent had already lasted for more than one year.
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss and directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners Complaint.
[32]
The lower court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration [33] filed by
respondent.[34] Respondent later on filed its Answer[35] to the Complaint.[36]
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment,
respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati
City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss.[37]
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue
the jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure
expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the interlocutory
orders of the MeTC.[38] Hence, they prayed for the outright dismissal of
thecertiorari Petition of respondent Sunvar.
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary
circumstances called for an exception to the general rule on summary proceedings.
[39]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [40] which was subsequently

denied by the RTC.[41] Hence, the hearing on the certiorari Petition of respondent
proceeded, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.[42]
In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits
of the certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the
MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction.
[43]
The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer
case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease
agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion
publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.[44]
I
Petitioners Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are
procedural issues that merit preliminary attention.
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners resort to a Rule 45 Petition for
Review on Certiorari before this Court is an improper mode of review of the
assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly, petitioners should have availed themselves of a
Rule 65 Petition instead, since the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the
Complaint, from which no appeal can be taken except by a certiorari petition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds
that the resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the
bounds of our procedural rules.
As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of
the RTC dismissing an action without prejudice, [45] but the aggrieved party may file
a certiorari petition under Rule 65.[46] Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any
of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in caseonly questions
of law are raised or involved.[47] This latter situation was one that petitioners
found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of
law.
In Republic v. Malabanan,[48] the Court clarified the three modes of appeal

from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error
under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under
Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of
Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode
of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only
on questions of law.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the
facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter.[50] The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances.[51]
In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the
jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the
interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the
present case is the correct application of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or,
more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took cognizance and
granted the certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC of the Motion to
Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question of law that involves
the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore, the
instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that
it was erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of
respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this
relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed
RTC Decision is annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65

against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a
prohibited pleading.[52] The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is
unnecessary verbiage.[53] The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent
Sunvars Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners
have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the
dismissal of the certiorari Petition.[54] Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss
the certiorari Petition,[55] but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the
merits.
Respondent Sunvars reliance on Bayog v. Natino[56] and Go v. Court of
Appeals[57] to justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to extraordinary
circumstances is misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar and specific
circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited pleadings under
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure conditions that are not availing in the
case of respondent Sunvar.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against
Alberto Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a house over his
property. When Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the
MCTC to file his answer within 10 days, he was stricken with pulmonary
tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only after the
reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed three days
after the lapse of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take
cognizance of his Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayogs land.
When his house was demolished in January 1994, Magdato filed a Petition for
Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly instituted
tenant in the agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog,
the landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment covering a
summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC, however, denied his
Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief
from judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice,
since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury:
We disagree with the RTCs holding that a petition for relief from judgment
(Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment, or a petition
for certiorari,mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court, it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding
petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively.
These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section
19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules
of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief
from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the
mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this
case, unless some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO, the grave
injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no fault or
negligence on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief
from judgment which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either
as an exception to the rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC, or even an action
to annul the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an
exception, the RTC correctly held that the circumstances alleged therein and the
justification pleaded worked in favor of MAGDATO, and that the motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit. xxx [58] (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with
a procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the
resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the preliminary conference in
the subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance involving
the same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party
appealed the suspension order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a
summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the MTCC to proceed with the
hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed
the filing of a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment
suit, considering that the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the
MTCCs erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the procedural void in this wise:
Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for it does
not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on
the merits of the case. It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be
challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that the proper remedy in such
cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits incorporating
in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals
from interlocutory orders would result in the sorry spectacle of a case being
subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often
as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory
rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous
and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief,
the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory.
But neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of which considers
petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings:
xxxxxxxxx
Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught between
Scylla and Charybdis in the procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and
the RTC.Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained
to provide it with a remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution
of cases.
As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, the purpose of the
Rules on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical rules. (Section 36, Chapter III,
BP Blg. 129) Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari,
like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to
expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, however, private respondent
challenged the MTCC order delayingthe ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the
mischief envisioned by the Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary
proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary
circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life
to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the
disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the said Rules. [59] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in

these two cases are not comparable with respondents situation, and our rulings
therein are inapplicable to its cause of action in the present suit. As this Court
explained in Bayog, the general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari may
be filed with a superior court from cases covered by the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment
suit pending before the MeTC. Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was the
denial of respondents Motion to Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory
order, which is generally not the subject of an appeal. No circumstances similar to
the situation of the agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog are present to support the
relaxation of the general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have
been deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary
judicial proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of
Appeals that would justify respondents resort to a certiorari Petition before the
RTC. When confronted with the MeTCs adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in
the ejectment case, the expeditious and proper remedy for respondent should have
been to proceed with the summary hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its resort
to a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary
ejectment proceeding was not only prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already
a superfluity on account of respondents having already taken advantage of a
speedy and available remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary
circumstances that would constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining
inBayog and Go. The Court hesitates to liberally dispense the benefits of these two
judicial precedents to litigants in summary proceedings, lest these exceptions be
regularly abused and freely availed of to defeat the very goal of an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax
the interpretation of the prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions under
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with
similar prayers from adversely affected parties questioning every order of the
lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of summary proceedings in
forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition whether
the Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion publiciana lodged with the RTC.
At the heart of the controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year requirement
for unlawful detainer suits.
Whether or not petitioners action for unlawful detainer was brought within
one year after the unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it
was properly filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the one-year period
should be counted from respondent Sunvars receipt on 03 February 2009 of the
Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year
period and appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the
reckoning period is pegged from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or
sublease agreement, then petitioners proper remedy should have been an accion
publiciana to be filed with the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for
unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may by
virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful
deprivation bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person
unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages and
costs.[60] Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only
after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is
made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served upon the
person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15
days in the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.[61]
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,[62] the Court recently defined the nature
and scope of an unlawful detainer suit, as follows:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from
one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his
right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession by
the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in
nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial
court. The action must be brought up within one year from the date of last
demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical possession.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful

detainer if it states the following elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was
by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiffs
notice to the defendant of the termination of the latters right of
possession.
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the latters enjoyment.
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint
for ejectment.[63]
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the
right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding
to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.In other
words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or
illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.[64]
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three

requisites for an action for unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived
its right to possess the subject property from its sublease agreements with TRCFI
and later on with PDAF. However, with the expiration of the lease agreements on
31 December 2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the subject property.
Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for almost seven years
thereafter. It was only on 03 February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand
upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the property. What is disputed, however, is the
fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and
that the one-year period should be counted from the final demand made on 03
February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,[65] the one-year period to file an
unlawful detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on
31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the
reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful
detainer. Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiffs last
demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of
that period does the possession become unlawful.[66]
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the
date of the last demand.[67] In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,[68] the Court, speaking
through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the
unlawful detainer Complaint filed on 25 February 1997 from the latest demand
letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier demand letter dated 03 July
1995:
Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400square meter property located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon
was constructed a two-storey house and a three-door apartment identified as No.
1-A, B, and C.
Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to
occupy Apartment C without paying any rentals.
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioners further contend that respondents remedy is accion

publiciana because their possession is not de facto, they having been authorized
by the true and lawful owners of the property; and that one year had elapsed
from respondents demand given on July 3, 1995 when the unlawful detainer
complaint was filed.
The petition fails.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the allegations in the complaint make
out a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is
the registered owner of the property and that petitioners, who are tenants by
tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the notice to vacate sent to them.
Likewise, contrary to petitioners contention, the one-year period for filing
a complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in
this case October 24, 1996, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive
his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain
meanwhile in the premises.Thus, the filing of the complaint on February 25,
1997 was well within the one year reglementary period. [69] (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired
(01 January 2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the
subject property. Absent any express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement
or any separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed
to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners petitioners herein. Thus,
respondent Sunvars possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on
03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and
without any contract between them, respondent is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that it will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. [70] Upon service of the final notice of
demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the property and, consequently,
petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in which to resort to the
summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint was
filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on
22 February 2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing
an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their
right of action against respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its occupation
of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later
gave respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as

occupants by mere tolerance. Consequently, the one-year period for filing a
summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned from the
latest demand to vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the
nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year
period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period
will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand. [71] If the subsequent
demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the oneyear period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first
demand.[72] However, respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below
this question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is
now too late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate
was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any event, this
factual determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule 45 Petition, which is
limited to resolving questions of law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject
property since the expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual
issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration of
the sublease to the present was never raised or sufficiently argued before this
Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Courts attention that almost a decade
has passed without any resolution of this controversy regarding respondents
possession of the subject property, contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant
Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court
emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once and for
all, especially since this case involves a prime property of the government located
in the countrys business district and the various opportunities for petitioners to gain
public revenues from the property.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari
dated 14 February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic and National Power
Corporation, which are represented here by the Privatization Management Office.
The assailed Decision dated 01 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 134, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed
with the summary proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in Civil Case No.
98708.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1]
TCT Nos. 458364, 458365, 458366 and 458367.

Petitioner Republic owns approximately 17,574 square meters of the subject property, while petitioner NPC owns
5,350 square meters. (NPC Resolution No. 2009-13 dated 09 March 2009; rollo, p. 73)
[3]
Executive Order No. 323 dated 06 December 2000, Art. III, Sec. 2.
[4]
Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 3-4, para. 4; rollo, pp. 77-78.
[5]
Contract of Lease between petitioners Republic and NPC with TRCFI; rollo, pp. 492-502.
[6]
The LESSEE [TRCFI] shall have the right, upon notice to the LESSORS [petitioners Republic and NPC], to
sublease the whole or part of the leased land. (Contract of Lease, Sec. VI, p. 6; rollo, p. 497)
[7]
The entire subject property was subleased by TRCFI to respondent Sunvar in five agreements: (a) Agreement
dated 18 August 1980 (rollo, pp. 503-519); (b) Sub-Lease Agreement dated 28 February 1982 (rollo, pp. 523-536);
(c) 1983 Sub-Lease Agreement with illegible exact date (rollo, pp. 537-545); (d) Sub Lease Agreement dated 28
August 1983 (rollo, pp. 546-554); and (e) the remaining portions were also subleased by Sunvar, according to
petitioners (Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 6, para. 9; rollo, p. 80)
[8]
Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 6, para. 10; rollo, p. 80.
[9]
(a) Agreement dated 18 August 1980, p. 9; rollo, p. 511 (22 years and 5 months from 31 July 1980); (b) Sub-Lease
Agreement dated 28 February 1982, p. 3; rollo, p. 526 (20 years and 10 months from 28 February 1982); (c) 1983
Sub-Lease Agreement with illegible exact date, p. 2; rollo, p. 538 (19 years and 9 months from March 1983); and (d)
Sub Lease Agreement dated 28 August 1983, p. 2; rollo, p. 547 (19 years and 3 months from September 1984).
[10]
[11]
Among these commercial buildings are what are known today as Premier Cinema, Mile Long Arcade, Makati
Creekside Building, The Gallery Building and Sunvar Plaza. (Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 6-7, para. 12; rollo,
pp. 80-81)
[12]
Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 6-7, para. 12; rollo, pp. 80-81.
[13]
[14]
Respondent Sunvars Letter dated 26 April 2002 to PDAF; rollo, pp. 714-715.
[15]
Respondent Sunvars Letter dated 26 April 2002 to the Office of the President, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, and petitioner NPC; rollo, pp. 712-713.
[16]
PDAFs letter dated 10 May 2002; rollo, p. 716.
[17]
We wish to inform you that as of this date, our office has not received any response from the NG [petitioner
Republic] nor the NPC. Consequently, since the renewal of our Sublease Contract is dependent on our Foundations
own renewal of our Contract of Lease with the NG and the NPC, we cannot yet act on your letter or give favorable
consideration on your desire to renew our Sublease Contract, notwithstanding the provisions thereof.
In view hereof, we likewise cannot accept any proposed rental payments from your office for the renewal term until
such time that we already have an indication of the terms and conditions of any renewal acceptable to the NG and
the NPC and, hence, our decision to return the check you sent to us. (PDAFs letter dated 10 May 2002; rollo, p. 716)
[18]
Respondent Sunvars Letter dated 27 May 2002; rollo, p. 717.
[2]
[19]
We wish to inform you that in its last meeting on May 29, 2002, the NPC Board of Directors decided not to
renew the contract of lease which is set to expire on December 31, 2002 (NPC Letter dated 03 June 2010 [rollo, p.
555]; see also Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 7, para. 14 [rollo, p. 81])
[20]
PDAFs Letter dated 14 June 2002; rollo, p. 718.
[21]
You are hereby given by this Office notice that subject lease should no longer be renewed/extended.
The Lease should end by January 2003, so that Notice of Non Renewal/ Non Extension should be given to Lessor
not less than 6 months from said date given PDAF is now in the process of dissolution. (Memorandum dated 13
June 2002; rollo, p. 556)
[22]
[23]
PDAF Letter dated 25 June 2002; rollo, p. 557.
[24]
As you very well know, this property is owned by the National Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the National Power Corporation, both of which has not extended or renewed, either expressly or impliedly, any
lease [contract] involving the same in favor of any party, private or public. This being the case, your sublease
agreement with the Philippine Development Alternative Foundation (PDAF) which expired on December 31, 2002
could not possibly have been renewed or extended. We hereby advise you to completely vacate said property within
THIRTY (30) DAYS from receipt of this letter. (OSG Letter dated 22 February 2008;rollo, p. 558)
[25]
Registry Receipt No. 2826; rollo, p. 559.
[26]
[27]
This is in reiteration of our first letter dated February 22, 2008 demanding that you vacate the property covered
by your sublease agreements with the Philippine Development Alternative Foundation (PDAF) which expired on
December 31, 2002, or more specifically, the parcel of land covered by TCT No. (458365) S-77242 located between
De la Rosa and Arnaiz streets and parallel to Amorsolo street in Legaspi Village, Makati City.
Once again, we demand that you completely vacate said property within FIFTEEN (15) days from receipt of this
letter, or we will be constrained to file the necessary legal action against you before the proper court. (OSG Final
Notice to Vacate dated 26 January 2009; rollo, p. 560)
[28]
Inspection and Appraisal Report dated 02 April 2009; rollo, pp. 563-566.
[29]
As per instruction, please see attached copy of Inspection and Appraisal Report dated April 2, 2009 indicating a
Fair Rental Value of Php 10,364,000 per month and an Income Loss of Php 630,123,700, respectively. (PMO letter
dated 02 April 2009; rollo, p. 562)
[30]
Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 11; rollo, p. 85.
[31]
Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter) dated 07 August 2009; rollo, pp. 90-102.
[32]
MeTC Order dated 16 September 2009, docketed as Civil Case No. 98708; rollo, pp. 116-117.
[33]
Respondent Sunvars Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 16 September 2009); and (2)
to Hold in Abeyance the Period to File an Answer dated 02 October 2009; rollo, pp. 118-141.
[34]
MeTC Order dated 08 December 2009; rollo, pp. 162-163.
[35]
Respondent Sunvars Verified Answer ad Cautelam dated 18 December 2009; rollo, pp. 678-711.
[36]
Thereafter, MeTC Judge Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag voluntarily inhibited himself, and petitioners unlawful
detainer suit was re-raffled to Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura.
[37]
Petition for Certiorari dated 22 January 2010; rollo, pp. 164-208.
[38]
Petitioners Comment (In Compliance with the Honorable Courts Order Issued in Open Court on February 12,
2010) dated 18 February 2010; rollo, pp. 255-272.
[39]
Thus, in view of the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in the present petition, the Court resolves to relax the
application of the rules and to proceed with the hearing on the petitioners application for TRO/Injunction on March
12, 2010 at 2:00 in the afternoon. (RTC Order dated 08 March 2010; rollo, pp. 273-275)
[40]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 16 March 2010; rollo, pp. 276-295.
[41]
RTC Order dated 29 April 2010; rollo, pp. 296-297.
[42]
Respondent Sunvars Memorandum dated 10 June 2010 (rollo, pp. 805-843); Petitioners Memorandum dated 11
June 2010 (rollo, pp. 844-868).
[43]
RTC Decision dated 01 December 2010; rollo, pp. 62-72.
[44]
Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 February 2011; rollo, pp. 25-61.
[45]
Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 1 (g).
[46]
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided
in Rule 65. (Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 1)
[47]
Appeal by Certiorari In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 2 [c]).
[48]
G.R. No. 169067, 06 October 2010, 632 SCRA 338.
[49]
Id. at 344-345.
Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco, G.R. No. 175291, 27 July 2011, 654 SCRA 643, citing Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila v. CA, 327 Phil. 810, 825-826 (1996), citing Arroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de
Molo, 132 Phil. 9 (1968).
[51]
Five Star Marketing Co., Inc., v. Booc, G.R. No. 143331, 05 October 2007, 535 SCRA 28.
[52]
1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Sec. 19 (g).
[53]
Muoz v. Yabut, Jr., G.R. No. 142676 & 146718, 06 June 2011, 650 SCRA 344.
[54]
Petitioners Comment (In Compliance with the Honorable Courts Order Issued in Open Court on February 12,
2010) dated 18 February 2010; rollo, pp. 255-272.
[55]
RTC Order dated 08 March 2010; rollo, pp. 273-275.
[56]
327 Phil. 1019 (1996).
[57]
358 Phil. 214 (1998).
[58]
327 Phil. 1019, 1040-1041 (1996).
[59]
358 Phil. 214, 223-225 (1998).
[60]
Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 1.
[61]
Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 2.
[62]
G.R. No. 178096, 23 March 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334, citing Valdez, Jr. v. CA, 523 Phil. 39, 46 (2006).
[63]
Macaslang v. Spouses Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, 30 May 2011, 649 SCRA 92, 104, citing Cabrera v. Getaruela,
586 SCRA 129, 136-137 (2009); see also Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, 18 January 2012 and Delos
Reyes v. Spouses Odones, G.R. No. 178096, 23 March 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334-335, Iglesia Evangelica Metodista
en Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF), Inc. v. Juane, G.R. No. 172447 & 179404, 18 September 2009, 600 SCRA 555,
562-563; Parsicha, v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 136409, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA 273,
288; Fernando v. Spouses Lim, G.R. No. 176282, 22 August 2008, 563 SCRA 147, 159-160.
[64]
Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, 25 September 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 157.
[65]
Hence, in the present petition, upon the expiration of the term of the sublease on December 31, 2002, the private
respondents (petitioners Republic and NPC) have one year to file an unlawful detainer case. The complaint having
been filed beyond the prescribed one year period it cannot properly qualify as an action for unlawful detainer over
which the lower court can exercise jurisdiction as it is an accion publiciana. (RTC Decision dated 01 December
2010, p. 10; rollo, p. 71)
[66]
Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, 07 April 2009, 584 SCRA 81, 90, citing Sarmiento v.
Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 154 (1995); Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 535,
542; Varona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124148, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 577, 583-584.
[67]
Labastida v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 162 (1998), citing Sy Oh v. Garcia, 28 SCRA 735 (1969) and Calubayan
v. Pascual, 128 Phil. 160 (1967).
[68]
G.R. No. 141418, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 423.
[69]
Id, at 424-428.
[70]
Spouses Beltran v. Nieves, G.R. No. 175561, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 242, 249, citing Calubayan v. Pascual,
128 Phil. 160, 163 (1967).
[71]
Racaza v. Gozum, 523 Phil. 694 (2006), citing Desbarats v. Laureano, 124 Phil. 704 (1966).
[72]
Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Torres, 374 Phil. 529 (1999), citing Pacis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102676, 03
February 1992, min. res., cited in Summary of 1992 Supreme Court Rulings, Part III, by Atty. Daniel T. Martinez, p.
1847; Desbarats v. de Laureano, supra.
[50]
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
VIEGELY SAMELO, represented

by Attorney-in-Fact CRISTINA
SAMELO,
G.R. No. 170509

Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus -
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
MANOTOK SERVICES, INC.,

allegedly represented by
PERPETUA BOCANEGRA
(deceased),
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 27, 2012
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by

Viegely Samelo (petitioner), represented by her attorney-in-fact
Cristina Samelo, to challenge the decision dated June 21,
2005[2] and the resolution dated November 10, 2005 [3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85664.
Background Facts
Manotok Services, Inc. (respondent) alleged that it is the

administrator of a parcel of land known as Lot 9-A, Block 2913,
situated at 2882 Dagupan Extension, Tondo, Manila. On January
31, 1997, the respondent entered into a contract with the
petitioner for the lease of a portion of Lot 9-A, Block 2913,
described as Lot 4, Block 15 (subject premises). The lease
contract was for a period of one (1) year, with a monthly rental
of P3,960.00. After the expiration of the lease contract on
December 31, 1997, the petitioner continued occupying the
subject premises without paying the rent. [4] On August 5, 1998,
the respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok, sent a letter to
the petitioner demanding that she vacate the subject premises
and pay compensation for its use and occupancy. [5]The petitioner,
however, refused to heed these demands.
On November 18, 1998, the respondent filed a complaint for

unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 3, Manila.[6] The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 161588-CV. The respondent prayed, among others,
that the petitioner and those claiming rights under her be ordered
to vacate the subject premises, and to pay compensation for its
use and occupancy.
In her answer, the petitioner alleged that the respondent had no

right to collect rentals because the subject premises are located
inside the property of the Philippine National Railways (PNR). She
also added that the respondent had no certificate of title over the
subject premises. The petitioner further claimed that her
signature in the contract of lease was obtained through the
respondents misrepresentation. She likewise maintained that she
is now the owner of the subject premises as she had been in
possession since 1944.[7]
The MeTC Ruling
The MeTC, in its judgment[8] of March 28, 2002, decided in

favor of the respondent, and ordered the petitioner to vacate the
subject premises and to deliver their peaceful possession to the

respondent. The MeTC held that the only issue to be resolved in
an unlawful detainer case is physical possession or possession de
facto, and that the respondent had established its right of
possession over the subject premises. It added that the
petitioners right under the lease contract already ceased upon the
expiration of the said contract. It further ruled that the petitioner
is already estopped from questioning the right of the respondent
over the subject premises when she entered into a contract of
lease with the respondent. The dispositive portion of the MeTC
judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

for the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter and all
persons claiming rights under her:
1.
To vacate the premises located at 2882 Dagupan Extension,

Tondo, Manila, and deliver the peaceful possession thereof to
the plaintiff[;]
2.
To pay plaintiff the sum of P40,075.20 as compensation for

the use and occupancy of the premises from January 1, 1998
to August 30, 1998, plus P4,554.00 a month starting
September 1, 1998, until defendant and all person[s]
claiming rights under her to finally vacate the premises[;]
3.
To pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 for and as attorneys

fees; and
4.
To pay the cost of suit.[9]
The RTC Decision
The petitioner filed an appeal[10] with the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), Branch 50, Manila. The RTC, in its decision [11] of July 1,
2004, set aside the MeTCs decision, and dismissed the complaint
for unlawful detainer. The RTC held, among others, that the
respondent had no right to collect rentals as it failed to show that
it had authority to administer the subject premises and to enter
into a contract of lease with the petitioner. It also ruled that the
subject premises, which were formerly owned by the PNR, are
now owned by the petitioner by virtue of her possession and stay
in the premises since 1944.
The CA Decision
Aggrieved by the reversal, the respondent filed a petition for

review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85664. [12] The CA,
in its decision of June 21, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC
decision, and reinstated the MeTC judgment. The CA held that the
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the right of the
respondent over the subject property. It explained that in an
action involving the possession of the subject premises, a tenant
cannot controvert the title of his landlord or assert any rights
adverse to that title, without first delivering to the landlord the
premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between
themselves. The appellate court added that the petitioner cannot
claim that she repudiated the lease contract, in the absence of
any unequivocal acts of repudiation.
The CA further held that the only issue in an ejectment suit

is physical or material possession, although the trial courts may
provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose
of determining the issue of possession. It explained that the issue
of ownership is not required to determine the issue of possession
since the petitioner tacitly admitted that she is a lessee of the
subject premises.[13]
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA

denied her motion in its resolution dated November 10, 2005. [14]
In presenting her case before this Court, the petitioner

argued that the CA erred in ruling that a tenant is not permitted
to deny the title of his landlord. She maintained that the
respondent is not the owner or administrator of the subject
premises, and insisted that she had been in possession of the
land in question since 1944. She further added that she
repudiated the lease contract by filing a case for fraudulent
misrepresentation, intimidation, annulment of lease contract, and
quieting of title with injunction before another court. [15]
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Respondent has a better right of possession over the subject

premises
An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person

unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or
from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue
of any contract, express or implied. [16] The only issue to be
resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties involved. [17]Thus, when the
relationship of lessor and lessee is established in an unlawful
detainer case, any attempt of the parties to inject the question of
ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it might throw
light on the right of possession.[18]
In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner and

the respondent entered into a contract of lease. We note in this
regard that in her answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaim before the MeTC, the petitioner did not deny that
she signed the lease contract (although she maintained that her
signature
was
obtained
through
the
respondents
misrepresentations). Under the lease contract, the petitioner
obligated herself to pay a monthly rental to the respondent in the
amount of P3,960.00. The lease period was for one year,
commencing on January 1, 1997 and expiring on December 31,
1997. It bears emphasis that the respondent did not give the
petitioner a notice to vacate upon the expiration of the lease
contract in December 1997 (the notice to vacate was sent only on
August 5, 1998), and the latter continued enjoying the subject
premises for more than 15 days, without objection from the
respondent. By the inaction of the respondent as lessor, there can
be no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract.
[19]
An implied new lease was therefore created pursuant to Article
1670 of the Civil Code, which expressly provides:
Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should

continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the
acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by
either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an
implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for
the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the
original contract shall be revived.
An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when

the following requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the
original contract of lease has expired; b) the lessor has not given
the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the lessee continued
enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence
of the lessor.[20] As earlier discussed, all these requisites have
been fulfilled in the present case.
Article 1687 of the Civil Code on implied new lease provides:
Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is
annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if
the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.
Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of

lease is considered to be from month to month, in accordance
with Article 1687 of the Civil Code.[A] lease from month to month
is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the
end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor.
[21]
When the respondent sent a notice to vacate to the petitioner
on August 5, 1998, the tacita reconduccion was aborted, and the

contract is deemed to have expired at the end of that month. [A]
notice to vacate constitutes an express act on the part of the
lessor that it no longer consents to the continued occupation by
the lessee of its property.[22] After such notice, the lessees right to
continue in possession ceases and her possession becomes one of
detainer.[23]
Estoppel of tenant
We find no merit in the petitioners allegation that the

respondent had no authority to lease the subject premises
because the latter failed to prove that it is its owner or
administrator.
The Rules of Court protects the respondent, as lessor, from

being questioned by the petitioner, as lessee, regarding its title or
better right of possession over the subject premises. Section 2(b),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that the tenant is not
permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them. Article 1436 of the Civil Code likewise states that a lessee
or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or
received, as against the lessor or bailor.
These provisions bar the petitioner from contesting the

respondents title over the subject premises. The juridical
relationship between x x x [a] lessor and x x x [a lessee] carries
with it a recognition of the lessor's title. As [lessee, the petitioner
is] estopped [from denying the] landlord's title, or to assert a

better title not only in [herself], but also in some third person
while [she remains] in possession of the subject premises and
until [she surrenders] possession to the landlord. This estoppel
applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the
relation of [the] lessor and [the] lessee was created, and may be
asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who
succeed to his title.[24] Once a contact of lease is shown to exist
between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof, however
strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a
valid title to or a better right of possession to the subject
premises than the lessee.
The Court thus explained in Tamio v. Ticson:[25]
Indeed, the relation of lessor and lessee does not depend on the
formers title but on the agreement between the parties, followed by
the possession of the premises by the lessee under such agreement.
As long as the latter remains in undisturbed possession, it is immaterial
whether the lessor has a valid title or any title at all at the time the
relationship was entered into. [citations omitted]
The issue of ownership
We are likewise unpersuaded by the petitioners claim that

she has acquired possessory rights leading to ownership [26] over
the subject premises, having been in possession thereof since
1944. We emphasize that aside from her self-serving allegation,
the petitioner did not present any documentary evidence to
substantiate her claim that she stayed on the subject premises
since 1944. That the petitioner presented certificates of title of
the Manila Railroad Company over certain properties in Tondo,

Manila, which allegedly cover the subject premises, is of no
moment. One cannot recognize the right of another, and at the
same time claim adverse possession which can ripen to
ownership, thru acquisitive prescription. For prescription to set in,
the possession must be adverse, continuous, public, and to the
exclusion of [others].[27] Significantly, the RTC decision failed to
state its basis for concluding that the petitioner stayed in the
subject premises since 1944.
At any rate, we hold that no need exists to resolve the issue

of ownership in this case, since it is not required to determine the
issue of possession; the execution of the lease contract between
the petitioner, as lessee, and the respondent, as lessor, belies the
formers claim of ownership. We reiterate that the fact of the
lease and the expiration of its term are the only elements in an
action for unlawful detainer. The defense of ownership does not
change the summary nature of [this] action. x x x. Although a
wrongful possessor may at times be upheld by the courts, this is
merely temporary and solely for the maintenance of public order.
The question of ownership is to be settled in the proper court and
in a proper action.[28]
Interest on rentals due
Additionally, the petitioner is liable to pay interest by way of

damages for her failure to pay the rentals due for the use of the
subject
premises.[29] We
reiterate
that
the
respondents
extrajudicial demand on the petitioner was made on August 5,
1998. Thus, from this date, the rentals due from the petitioner
shall earn interest at 6% per annum, until the judgment in this
case becomes final and executory. After the finality of judgment,
and until full payment of the rentals and interests due, the legal
rate of interest to be imposed shall be 12%.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the

petition. The decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated June 21, 2005 and November 10, 2005, respectively, in CAG.R. SP No. 85664 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the unpaid rentals shall earn a corresponding interest of six
percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from August 5, 1998
until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be computed at
twelve percent (12%) per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Chairperson
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 11-19.
[2]
Id. at 24-32; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, and concurred in by Associate Justices
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
[3]
Id. at 34-37.
[4]
Id. at 53-55.
[5]
Id. at 60.
[6]
Supra note 4.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 61-63.
[8]
Dated March 28, 2002; id. at 50-52.
[9]
Id. at 52.
[10]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103656.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 44-49.
[12]
Id. at 187-203.
[13]
Supra note 2.
[14]
Supra note 3.
[15]
Supra note 1, at 15.
[16]
Racaza v. Gozum, 523 Phil. 694, 707 (2006).
[17]
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 261, 265 (2005).
[18]
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 544, 554 (2002).
[19]
See Bowe v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95771, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA 158, 166. In this case, the Court also
ruled that an express notice to vacate must be made within the statutory 15-day period.
[20]
Paterno v. Court of Appeals, 339 Phil. 154, 160-161 (1997).
[21]
Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 385 Phil. 1200, 1219 (2000).
[22]
Tagbilaran Integrated Settlers Assoc. (TISA) Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 486 Phil. 386, 394 (2004).
[23]
See Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 84154-55, July 28, 1990, 188 SCRA 23, 36.
[24]
Century Savings Bank v. Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 261, 277.
[25]
485 Phil. 434, 444 (2004).
[26]
Rollo, p. 61.
[27]
Corpuz v. Padilla, Nos. L-18099 and L-18136, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 814, 820.
[28]
Ocampo v. Tirona, 495 Phil. 55, 66-67 (2005).
[29]
See Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78.

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
HEIRS OF JOSE MALIGASO, SR., G.R. No. 182716

namely, ANTONIO MALIGASO,
CARMELO MALIGASO and
Present:
JOSE MALIGASO, JR.,
Petitioners,
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION
- versus -
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
SPOUSES SIMON D. ENCINAS

and
ESPERANZA E. ENCINAS,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 20, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court of the Decision[1] dated November 26, 2007 and
Resolution[2] dated April 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 64775. The CA reversed and set aside the
Decision[3] dated April 2, 2001 of Branch 51 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, which affirmed the
Decision[4] dated August 22, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon dismissing the Spouses Simon D.
Encinas and Esperanza E. Encinas (respondents) complaint for
unlawful detainer.
Respondents are the registered owners of Lot No. 3517 of the

Cadastral Survey of Sorsogon, which has an area of 2,867 square
meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T4773.[5] The subject matter of this controversy is a portion
of Lot No. 3517 with an area of 980 square meters, which the
Heirs of Jose Maligaso, Sr. (petitioners) continue to occupy despite
having received two (2) notices to vacate from the respondents.
Lot No. 3517 was previously covered by Original Certificate

of Title (OCT) No. 543, which was issued in the name of Maria
Maligaso Ramos (Maria), the petitioners aunt, on February 7,
1929. Sometime in May 1965, Maria sold Lot No. 3517 to Virginia
Escurel (Virginia). Three (3) years later, on April 5,
1968,Virginia sold Lot No. 3517 to the respondents, resulting to
the cancellation of OCT No. 543 and issuance of TCT No. T-4773. [6]
On March 16, 1998 and June 19, 1998 or approximately thirty (30)
years from the time they purchased Lot No. 3517, the
respondents issued two (2) demand letters to the petitioners,
asking them to vacate the contested area within thirty (30) days
from notice.[7] The petitioners refused to leave, claiming that the
subject area was the share of their father, Jose Maligaso, Sr. (Jose,
Sr.), in their grandparents estate. Thus, the respondents filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against them with the MTC,
alleging that the petitioners occupation is by mere tolerance and
had become illegal following their refusal to vacate the property
despite being demanded to do so twice.
The petitioners, in their defense, denied that their possession of

the disputed area was by mere tolerance and claimed title thereto
on the basis of their fathers successional rights. That the
petitioners occupation remained undisturbed for more than thirty
(30) years and the respondents failure to detail and specify the
petitioners supposedly tolerated possession suggest that they and
their predecessors-in-interest are aware of their claim over the
subject area. The petitioners also attacked the validity of OCT No.
543 and TCT No. T-4773, alleging that it was thru fraud that Maria
was able to register Lot No. 3517, including the disputed area,
under her name. The petitioners likewise moved for the dismissal
of the complaint, claiming that the allegations therein indicate
that it was actually an action for reconveyance. Further, laches
had already set in view of the respondents failure to assail their
possession for more than thirty (30) years. [8]
In an August 22, 2000 Decision, [9] the dispositive portion of which

is quoted below, the MTC dismissed the respondents complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
1.
Dismissing the instant case;
2.
Adjudicating the possessory rights over the litigated

portion to the defendants;
3.
Ordering the Register of Deeds to cause the

annotation of the equitable title of defendants, who are
entitled to their fathers rightful inheritance which is part
of the property in plaintiffs TCT No. T-4773 as a lien or
encumbrance;
4.
Ordering the plaintiffs to pay defendants the amount

of [P]10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5.
The cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The MTC gave more weight to the petitioners possession of

the contested area than the respondents title as the former is
founded on Jose Sr.s successional rights and even held that the
registration of Lot No. 3517 in Marias name created a trust in Jose
Sr.s favor insofar as the disputed portion is concerned. The MTC
also held that the respondents are barred by laches from pursuing
their cause of action against the petitioners given their inaction

for more than thirty (30) years despite being fully aware of the
petitioners adverse possession and claim over the subject
property.
The RTC dismissed the respondents appeal and affirmed the MTCs
Decision dated August 22, 2000. In a Decision [11] dated April 2,
2001, the RTC found the respondents allegations relative to the
petitioners merely tolerated possession of the subject area to be
wanting. The RTC also concluded, albeit implicitly, that the
petitioners possession is a necessary consequence of their title as
evidenced by their occupation in the concept of an owner for a
significant period of time. The dispositive portion thereof states :
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision

is AFFIRMED with the modification that the annotations and the
payment of attorney[]s fees as ordered by the Court a quo be
deleted. The instant appeal is DISMISSED, for lack of merit.[12]
Consequently, the respondents filed with the CA a petition for

review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. This was given due
course and the RTCs Decision dated April 2, 2001 was reversed
and set aside. In its Decision[13] dated November 26, 2007, the CA
had a different view and rationalized the grant of possession to
the respondents as follows:
The rule is well-entrenched that a person who has a Torrens title over
the property is entitled to the possession thereof. In like manner, prior
physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary in unlawful
detainer cases as the same is only required in forcible entry
cases. Moreover, the allegations in the answer of [the] defendant as to
the nullity of plaintiffs title is unavailing and has no place in an
unlawful detainer suit since the issue of the validity of a Torrens title
can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. This may be gleaned from Spouses Apostol vs. Court of
Appeals and Spouses Emmanuel, where the Supreme Court held
that:
xxx
In the case at bench, petitioners are the registered owners of Lot No.
3517 and, as a consequence of such, are entitled to the material and
physical possession thereof. Thus, both the MTC and RTC erred in ruling
that respondents prior physical possession and actual possession of
the 980-square meter disputed portion of Lot No. 3517 should prevail
over
petitioners Torrens title
over
the
said
property. Such
pronouncement contravenes the law and settled jurisprudence on the
matter.[14] (Citation omitted)
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in

its Resolution dated April 28, 2008.[15]
As earlier intimated, the petitioners anchor their possession

of the subject property on their fathers right thereto as one of his
parents heirs. The petitioners insist on the nullity of the
respondents title, TCT No. T-4773, as the inclusion of the
contested area in its coverage was never intended. The
petitioners accuse Maria of fraud for having registered Lot No.
3517 in her name, including the portion that their father allegedly
inherited from his parents, thus, reneging on her promise to cause
the registration of such portion in his name. It was their father
who had a legitimate claim over the subject area and Maria never
acquired any right thereto. Therefore, respondents purchase of
Lot No. 3517 did not include the portion occupied by the
petitioners, who succeeded to Jose Sr.s rights thereto.
On the other hand, the respondents cause of action is based on

their ownership of Lot No. 3517, which is evidenced by TCT No. T4773, and on their claim that they merely tolerated the
petitioners occupation thereof. According to the respondents, their
being registered owners of Lot No. 3517, including the portion
possessed by the petitioners, entitles them to the possession
thereof and their right to recovery can never be barred by
laches. They also maintain that the petitioners cannot collaterally
attack their title to the subject property.
The point of inquiry is whether the respondents have the

right to evict the petitioners from the subject property and this
should be resolved in the respondents favor. Between the
petitioners unsubstantiated self-serving claim that their father
inherited the contested portion of Lot No. 3517 and the
respondentsTorrens title, the latter must prevail. The respondents
title over such area is evidence of their ownership thereof. That a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein and that a person who has a Torrens title
over a land is entitled to the possession thereof [16] are
fundamental principles observed in this jurisdiction. Alternatively
put, the respondents title and that of their predecessors-ininterest give rise to the reasonable presumption that the
petitioners have no right over the subject area and that their stay
therein was merely tolerated. The petitioners failed to overcome
this presumption, being inadequately armed by a narration that
yearns for proof and corroboration. The petitioners harped that
the subject area was their fathers share in his parents estate but
the absence of any evidence that such property was indeed
adjudicated to their father impresses that their claim of ownership
is nothing but a mere afterthought. In fact, Lot No. 3517 was
already registered in Marias name when Jose Sr. built the house
where the petitioners are now presently residing. It is rather

specious that Jose Sr. chose inaction despite Marias failure to
cause the registration of the subject area in his name and would
be contented with a bungalow that is erected on a property that is
supposedly his but registered in anothers name. That there is
allegedly an unwritten agreement between Maria and Virginia that
Jose Sr.s and the petitioners possession of the subject area would
remain undisturbed was never proven, hence, cannot be the basis
for their claim of ownership. Rather than proving that Jose Sr. and
the petitioners have a right over the disputed portion of Lot No.
3517, their possession uncoupled with affirmative action to
question the titles of Maria and the respondents show that the
latter merely tolerated their stay.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary

proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or the right to the possession of the
property involved. The avowed objective of actions for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, which have purposely been made
summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and
expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of
property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time,
thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the
community.[17] The said objectives can only be achieved by
according the proceedings a summary nature. However, its being
summary poses a limitation on the nature of issues that can be
determined and fully ventilated. It is for this reason that the
proceedings are concentrated on the issue on possession. Thus,
whether the petitioners have a better right to the contested area
and whether fraud attended the issuance of Marias title over Lot
No. 3517 are issues that are outside the jurisdiction and
competence of a trial court in actions for unlawful detainer and
forcible entry. This is in addition to the long-standing rule that
a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which an

ejectment proceeding, is not an exception.
In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion,[18] a similar

allegation possession of the property in dispute since time
immemorial was met with rebuke as such possession, for
whatever length of time, cannot prevail over a Torrens title, the
validity of which is presumed and immune to any collateral
attack.
In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns the property on
the basis of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12892, which was issued in
the name of Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x x married to Nenita L.
Songco. It is a settled rule that the person who has a Torrens title over
a land is entitled to possession thereof. Hence, as the registered owner
of the subject property, respondent is preferred to possess it.
The validity of respondents certificate of title cannot be attacked

by petitioner in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except
in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law.The
issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed
in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not
petitioner has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond
the power of the trial court to determine in an action for unlawful
detainer.[19] (Citations omitted)
In Salandanan,[20] the prohibition against the collateral attack of

a Torrens title was reiterated:
In Malison, the Court emphasized that when [a] property is registered

under the Torrens system, the registered owners title to the property is
presumed and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere
action for unlawful detainer. In this particular action where petitioners
alleged ownership cannot be established, coupled with the
presumption that respondents title to the property is legal, then the
lower courts are correct in ruling that respondents are the ones entitled
to possession of the subject premises. [21] (Citation omitted)
Given the foregoing, the petitioners attempt to remain in

possession by casting a cloud on the respondents title cannot
prosper.
Neither will the sheer lapse of time legitimize the petitioners

refusal to vacate the subject area or bar the respondents from
gaining possession thereof. As ruled inSpouses Ragudo v. Fabella
Estate Tenants Association, Inc.,[22] laches does not operate to
deprive the registered owner of a parcel of land of his right to
recover possession thereof:
It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land

registered under the Torrens system. In a long line of cases, we have
consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty
Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we held that a claim of acquisitive
prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land
because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code, in relation to Act 496 (now,
Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529).
xxxx
Petitioners would take exception from the above settled rule by arguing
that FETA as well as its predecessor[-]in[-]interest, Don Dionisio M.
Fabella, are guilty of laches and should, therefore, be already

precluded from asserting their right as against them, invoking, in this
regard, the rulings of this Court to the effect that while a registered
land may not be acquired by prescription, yet, by virtue of the
registered owners inaction and neglect, his right to recover the
possession thereof may have been converted into a stale demand.
While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners posture, a

closer look at our jurisprudence negates their submission.
To start with, the lower court found that petitioners possession of the
subject lot was merely at the tolerance of its former lawful owner. In
this connection, Bishop vs. Court of Appeals teaches that if the
claimants possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful
owner, the latters right to recover possession is never barred by
laches.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the

private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally
occupying
their
property. This
right
is
imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners occupation of the property, and
regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful
owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is
never barred by laches.[23] (Citations omitted)
It is, in fact, the petitioners who are guilty of laches.

Petitioners, who claimed that Maria fraudulently registered the
subject area inherited by their father, did not lift a finger to
question the validity of OCT No. 543, which was issued in 1929.
Petitioners waited for the lapse of a substantial period of time and
if not for the respondents demands to vacate, they would not
have bothered to assert their fathers supposed successional
rights. The petitioners inaction is contrary to the posture taken by

a reasonably diligent person whose rights have supposedly been
trampled upon and the pretense of ignorance does not provide
justification or refuge. Maria was able to register Lot No. 3517 in
her name as early as 1929 and respondents acquired title in April
5, 1968 and knowledge of these events is imputed to the
petitioners by the fact of registration.
In fine, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse and set

aside the findings and conclusions of the CA.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition
is DENIED and the Decision dated November 26, 2007 and
Resolution dated April 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 64775 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTURO D. BRION
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as Amended)
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Vicente Q.
Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 31-41.
[2]
Id. at 49-50.
[3]
Id. at 112-116.
[4]
Id. at 102-111.
[5]
Id. at 67-68.
[6]
Id. at 32.
[7]
Id. at 33.
[8]
Id. at 34.
[9]
Id. at 102-111.
[10]
Id. at 110-111.
[11]
Id. at 112-116.
[12]
Id. at 116.
[13]
Id. at 31-41.
[14]
Id. at 37-38.
[15]
Id. at 49-50.
[16]
Esmaquel v. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 429, 438, citing Caa v. Evangelical
Free Church of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157573, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 225, 238-239.
[17]
Salandanan v. Mendez, G.R. No. 160280, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 195, citing Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v.
Booc, G.R. No. 143331, October 5, 2007, 535 SCRA 28, 43-44.
[18]
G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 315.
[19]
Id. at 329-330.
[20]
Supra note 17.
[21]
Id. at 198.
[22]
503 Phil. 751 (2005).
[23]
Id. at 763-764.

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES MANUEL AND
G.R. No. 170575
FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO,

Petitioners,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
GERRY
ROXAS
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 8, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are
the determinants of the nature of the action[1] and of which court has
jurisdiction over the action.[2]
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which
dismissed the Petition for Review before it. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution[4] dated November 15, 2005 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina Del

Rosario
and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed by the former against the latter,
the surrounding circumstances relative thereto as summarized by the
CA in its assailed Decision are as follows:
The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner

of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974 located in Roxas City which is described in and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397 of the Registry of Deeds
for the City of Roxas.
Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took
possession and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of
agreement entered into by and between it and the City of Roxas. Its
possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being lessee
thereof.
In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the
respondent to vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not
heed such notices because it still has the legal right to continue its
possession and occupancy of said land.[5]
On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint [6] for Unlawful

Detainer against the respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-2391. Said
complaint contains, among others, the following significant
allegations:
3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel

of land, situated at Dayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffs by the Register
of Deeds for Roxas City as evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is
hereto attached as Annex A.
4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the

plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property,
developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes.
xxxx
7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make

use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendants
possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.
8. But [plaintiffs] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in

the last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands upon said
defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the property.
xxxx
10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed

and refused, as it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly
rentals for the use and occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject
premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said
demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners
thereof.[7]
Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer[8] dated

July 31, 2003 where it averred that:
3. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of

the Complaint to the effect that the defendant took full control and
possession of the subject property, developed the same and has been using
the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and
the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or
opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long
years; the defendant specifically DENIES the allegations contained in the last
part of this paragraph 4 of the Complaint that the defendant has used the
property leased for commercial purposes, the truth of the matter being that
the defendant has used and [is] still using the property only for civic nonprofit endeavors hewing closely to purposes of the defendant Gerry Roxas
Foundation Inc., inter alia, devoted to general welfare, protection, and

upliftment of the people of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and
elsewhere in the Philippines; that the Foundation has spent out of its own
funds for the compliance of its avowed aims and purposes, up to the
present, more than P25M, and that all the improvements, including a
beautiful auditorium built in the leased premises of the Foundation shall
accrue to the CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation whatsoever, upon
the expiration of this Lease (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex 2 hereof),
eighteen (18) years hence;
xxxx
5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in

paragraph 7 of the Complaint, the truth being that the defendant took
possession of the subject property by virtue of Memorandums of Agreement,
photo-copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes 1 and 2 and made
integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant and the City of Roxas, which
is the true and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject
property by the defendant foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof;
xxxx
8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of

the Complaint that defendant refused to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs
and to vacate the premises, but specifically DENIES the rest of the
allegations thereof, the truth being that defendant has no obligation
whatsoever, to the plaintiffs, as they are neither the owners or lessors of the
land occupied by defendant;
xxxx
As and by way of
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further

that:
12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant.
The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the
[defendant] as [lessee] of the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having
acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs way back on February 19, 1981,
as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which is hereto attached as
Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof. While, admittedly, the said
certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the
ownership of the property covered therein has already transferred to the
City of Roxas upon its delivery to it. Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides
that, ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the
moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to
1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee. It is also provided under Article
1498 of the Civil Code that, when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
thing, which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does
not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Upon execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Annex 3), the plaintiffs have relinquished ownership of the
property subject thereof in favor of the vendee, City of Roxas. Necessarily,
the possession of the property subject of the said Deed of Absolute Sale now
pertains to the City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right,
whatsoever, to the possession of the same. It is defendant foundation by
virtue of the Memorandums of Agreement (Annexes 1 and 2 hereof), which
has the legal right to have possession of the subject property;[9]
After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary
conference, respondent filed on October 20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve
its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of Cause of Action. Records
show that before the instant case was filed, the City of Roxas had
already filed a case against petitioners for Surrender of Withheld
Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107, [Presidential Decree No.]
1529 docketed as Special Case No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of RoxasCity. Subsequently, on October 27, 2003,
petitioners filed their Opposition to the said Motion.
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order[10] resolving

the respondents Motion. In the said Order, the MTCC held that:
The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The

defendant is the lessee of the City of Roxas of the parcel of land in
question. There has been no previous contractual relationship between the
plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc.
affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas Foundation. The
Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the possession of
the land it is leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical possession of the
land leased by it from the City of Roxassubsists and continues to subsist
until the termination of the contract of lease according to its terms and
pursuant to law.
The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property
was already sold by the plaintiffs to the present lessor of the property, the
City of Roxas thru a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 19, 1981
executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors.
Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported
Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist; rather, they contend that said
document is merely defective. They had not even denied the signatories to
the said Contract of Sale; specifically the authenticity of the spousesplaintiffs signatures; all that plaintiffs did merely referred to it as null and
void and highly questionable without any specifications.
When the parties pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either
because all the factual allegations have been admitted expressly or
impliedly; as when a denial is a general denial; there is no need of

conducting a trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence
anymore. The case is then ripe for judicial determination, either through a
judgment on the pleadings (Rules of Court, Rule 34) or by summary
judgment under Rule 35, Rules of Court.
In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without

the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and
possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for
commercial purposes. x x x for so many years, plaintiffs patiently waited for
someone to make representation to them regarding the use of the subject
property, but the same never happened. Plaintiff[s] have allowed the
defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual
or legal basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject property is only
by tolerance.
xxxx
Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant

took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same
and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements with the
City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without any
objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over
twenty-two long years.
That the defendants possession of the subject property is by virtue of

a contract of lease entered into by the defendant foundation with the City of
Roxas which is the true and lawful owner, the latter having acquired said
property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale as early as February 19, 1981,
long before the defendant foundations occupation of the property. In Alcos v.
IAC 162 SCRA 823 (1988), Buyers immediate possession and occupation of
the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity
of the deed of sale.
WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum

shopping interposed by the defendant to be untenable and unmeritorious,
and hence, denied; this Court still finds the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs-
spouses to be without a cause of action and hence, dismisses this instant

complaint. With cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a

Decision[12] dated July 9, 2004 affirming the MTCC Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for

Review. However, the CA, in a Decision[13] dated April 26, 2005,
dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the RTC.
Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] which

was, however, denied in a Resolution[15] dated November 15, 2005.
Issues
Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition

for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a

court should limit itself in interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the
complaint; and,
II. Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.[16]
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The allegations in petitioners Complaint

constitute judicial admissions.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1)
sometime in 1991, without their consent and authority, respondent took full control and
possession of the subject property, developed the same and used it for commercial
purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for several years, to make use of the land
without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners thus conclude that respondents
possession of subject property is only by tolerance.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in

the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x
A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial

as to dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with
some rules of practice necessary to be observed and complied with. [17] Correspondingly,
facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon
him.[18] The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive
as against the pleader.[19]
In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and
possession of subject property without their consent and authority and that respondents
use of the land was without any contractual or legal basis.
Nature of the action is determined by the

judicial admissions in the Complaint.
In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,[20] citing Caiza v. Court of Appeals,

[21]
this Court held that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.
This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,[22] differentiated the distinct causes of action
in forcible entry vis--vis unlawful detainer, to wit:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue
is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and
the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the
party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession.[23]
The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth shall include every
situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property
and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom. [24] The foundation of the
action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has
entered without right.[25]
The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom
necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.
[26]
The employment of force, in this case, can be deduced from petitioners allegation that
respondent took full control and possession of the subject property without their consent
and authority.
Stealth, on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid
discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without
permission,[27] while strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to
gain possession of the subject property.[28] The CA found that based on the petitioners
allegations in their complaint, respondents entry on the land of the petitioners was by
stealth x x x.[29] However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is not
availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent into the property appears to be
with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners allegation in their
complaint that [c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant foundation and
considering further that it is plaintiffs nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now the Mayor
of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or contractual
right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of
the foundation using their property.[30] To this Courts mind, this allegation if true, also
illustrates strategy.
Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the

Complaint establish a cause of action for
forcible entry, and not for unlawful detainer.
In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by

means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.[31] [W]here the defendants
possession of the property is illegal ab initio, the summary action for forcible entry
(detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.[32]
In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and
control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis. [33] Assuming that
these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondents possession was illegal from
the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners complaint is one for forcible
entry that is the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered
without right.[34] Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as
petitioners alleged that respondents possession was illegal at the inception.[35]
Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in

petitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this
Court finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible
Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer.
Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for

Forcible Entry within the reglementary oneyear period from the time of dispossession.
Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession

and occupancy of subject property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry
must be filed within one year from the time of dispossession,[36] the action for forcible
entry has already prescribed when petitioners filed their Complaint in 2003. As a
consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the respondent.
In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA
correctly affirmed said order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005
and the Resolution dated November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87784 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1]
Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo, 453 Phil. 170, 176-177 (2003).
[2]
Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672, 683-684 (1946).
[3]
CA rollo, pp. 98-104; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices
Vicente L. Yap and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
[4]
Id. at 118-119
[5]
Id. at 99.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 139-141.
[7]
Id. at 140-141.
[8]
Id. at 129-138.
[9]
Id. at 129-132.
[10]
CA rollo, pp. 69-73; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Filpia D. Del Castillo.
[11]
Id. at 71-73.
[12]
Id. at 22-27; penned by Judge Edward B. Contreras. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant appeal is denied for lack of merit, and the questioned Order of
the court a quo in Civil Case No. V-2391 is affirmed.
[13]
Id. at 98-104. The dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the assailed decision and order of the RTC in Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-009-04.
[14]
Id. at 105-111.
[15]
Id. at 118-119.
[16]
Rollo, p. 9.
[17]
FRANCISCO VICENTE J., THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, EVIDENCE, Volume
VII Part I, 1997 edition, p. 90 citing 2 Jones on Evidence, sec. 894; Andersons Dict.; Bouv. Dict.; 1 Green on
Evidence, Sec. 27.
[18]
Federation of Free Farmers v. Court of Appeals, 194 Phil. 328, 401 (1981).
[19]
Alfelor v. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 451, 460.
[20]
Supra note 1 at 175. Emphasis supplied.
[21]
335 Phil. 1107 (1997).
[22]
G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372.
[23]
Id. at 382-383, citing 3 MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 312 (1980 ed.).
Emphasis supplied.
[24]
Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil 752, 756 (1918).
[25]
Id.
[26]
Id.
[27]
Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 384.
[28]
Id.
[29]
Rollo, p. 23.
[30]
Id. Emphasis supplied.
[31]
Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 382.
[32]
Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565, 572 citing Emilia v. Bado, 131 Phil.
711 (1968).
[33]
Rollo, p. 21
[34]
Wong v. Carpio, G.R. No. 50264, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118, 124.
[35]
Muoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 216, 224.
[36]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Section 1.

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES
RUBEN and MYRNA
LEYNES,
G.R. No. 154462
Petitioners,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
FORMER TENTH DIVISION

OF
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT,
BRANCH
21,
BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL
SUR, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
ABAD,* and
PEREZ, JJ.
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 1,

BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL
SUR, andSPOUSES
GUALBERTO
&
RENE
CABAHUG-SUPERALES,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 19, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

assails the (1) Resolution[1] dated December 20, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK, dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and preliminary injunction of petitioners spouses Ruben and
Myrna Leynes (spouses Leynes); and (2) Resolution dated May 7,
2002 of the appellate court in the same case, denying the
spouses Leynes Motion for Reconsideration.
This case originated from a Complaint [2] for forcible entry,

damages, and attorneys fees filed by respondents spouses
Gualberto and Rene Cabahug Superales (spouses Superales)
against the spouses Leynes before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Branch 1 of Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 471 (2000)-B. The Complaint alleged
the following material facts:
3. That the [spouses Superales] were the actual occupants and

possessors, being lawful owners of that certain parcel of a residential
lot within the Nebrada Subd., Bansalan, Davao del Sur, known as Lot
No. 2423-B-5-K-2, Psd-11-050478, being a portion of lot 2423-B-5-K,
Psd-11-008104, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41240,
containing an area of Three Hundred Thirty Six (336) Square Meters,
more or less, and registered in the name of Rene Cabahug Superales,
in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Davao del Sur;
xxxx
4. That sometime in February 2000, the [spouses Leynes]

through force, stealth and strategy encroached upon and occupied a
portion of the [spouses Superales] titled property consisting of 76
square meters, more or less, dispossessed the [spouses Superales] and
constructed therein a comfort room as an extension of their house
without first obtaining the required building permit from the Municipal
Engineers Office, of Bansalan, Davao del Sur;
5. That the [spouses Superales] promptly called the attention of

the [spouses Leynes] and protested their intrusion into their property
but notwithstanding their protestations the [spouses Leynes] continued
on their construction and occupation of a portion of the [spouses
Superales] property;
6. That the [spouses Superales] reported to the Barangay

Captain of Brgy. Poblacion, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, the [spouses
Leynes] encroachment on their titled property and the illegal

construction being made on a portion of their property and their
complaint was docketed as Brgy. Case No. 1649;
7. That Amicable Settlement of the dispute was however,

repudiated by the [spouses Leynes] when they refused to recognized
the relocation survey conducted on the property of the [spouses
Superales] and prevented the [spouses Superales] surveyor from
planting monuments on the boundary between the [spouses
Superales] and the [spouses Leynes] lot;
xxxx
8. That as per relocation survey conducted, the [spouses

Leynes] have encroached and occupied a total of Seventy Six (76)
Square Meters, of the [spouses Superales] titled property, thereby
reducing the area of the [spouses Superales] lot from 336 Square
Meters, more or less to 260 Square Meters, more or less;
xxxx
9. That the [spouses Superales] also complained to the

Municipal Engineers Office in order to stop the illegal construction
undertaken by the [spouses Leynes], but [spouses Superales]
complaint fell on deaf ears as no action has been taken by the
Municipal Engineers Office on the said illegal construction;
xxxx
10. That the [spouses Leynes] have unlawfully occupied and are
continuously occupying illegally a portion of the [spouses Superales]
property consisting of 76 Square Meters, thereby denying the [spouses
Superales] the use and enjoyment of the said property being
unlawfully withheld by the [spouses Leynes];
11. That the [spouses Superales] must be promptly restored to

the full and peaceful possession of the portion of 76 Square Meters, of
their property taken forcibly and illegally by the [spouses Leynes], by
ordering the [spouses Leynes] to remove and/or demolish their
construction and improvements erected on the lot of the [spouses
Superales], and should they fail or refuse to do so, [spouses Superales]
be given the authority to cause the removal of the [spouses Leynes]
improvements at the expense of the [spouses Superales];
12. That in the meantime that the [spouses Leynes] are

occupying a portion of the [spouses Superales] property, [spouses
Leynes] be made to pay the [spouses Superales] the amount
of P500.00 per month as reasonable rental for the property until they
shall have restored the property to the full and peaceful possession of
the [spouses Superales].[3]
Summons together with a copy of the aforementioned

Complaint was served on the spouses Leynes on May 10, 2000,
giving them ten (10) days from receipt within which to file their
answer pursuant to Section 6 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure. The 10-day period for the filing of the spouses Leynes
answer prescribed on May 20, 2000, a Saturday.
The spouses Leynes filed their Answer with Counterclaim on

May 22, 2000, and their Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer
with attached Answer with Counterclaim the day after, on May 23,
2000. The spouses Leynes explained that they were not able to
file their Answer with Counterclaim on May 20, 2000, even though
there were court employees on duty that Saturday, because they
had to serve first a copy of said pleading on the spouses
Superales counsel, whose office was located in Davao City. Davao
City is approximately one-hour ride by bus from Digos City. The
spouses Leynes added that they were not even sure if the office
of the spouses Superales counsel was open on Saturdays. [4]
The spouses Superales opposed the spouses Leynes Motion

to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer contending that the answer
should have been filed within 10 days from receipt of a copy of
the complaint; and the spouses Leynes motion to admit is in the
nature of a motion for extension of time to file an answer, which is
a prohibited pleading in summary proceedings. The spouses
Superales further pointed out that the spouses Leynes motion to
admit was not set for hearing and was, thus, a pro forma motion
which should be denied outright.
The spouses Superales subsequently filed an Ex Parte Motion

for Judgment on May 23, 2000, in which they prayed that since
the spouses Leynes failed to file their answer to the Complaint
within the prescribed period, then judgment could now be
rendered based on the evidence and allegations contained in the
Complaint.
On May 29, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Judgment denying

the spouses Leynes Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer and
resolving Civil Case No. 471 (2000)-B entirely in the spouses
Superales favor. Said MCTC judgment reads:
This treats the ex-parte motion for judgment filed by Atty.

Rogelio E. Sarsaba, counsel for the [spouses Superales] alleging in
substance that the last day of filing of answer for the [spouses Leynes]
was on May 20, 2000 and [the spouses Leynes] did not file any. Be it
noted on such date although it was Saturday the Court was opened
and Court personnel, Benedicta Abagon and Anastacia Vale were
present at that time to receive cases and motions filed in Court. On
May 22, 2000 [spouses Leynes] filed [their] answer which answer was
filed out of the time prescribed by law. Under Section 7 of Rule 70,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the law provides: Should the defendants
fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the
court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment
as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited
to what is prayed for therein. The Court, may in its discretion reduce
the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive
or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of
Section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants.
From the foregoing facts, the [spouses Leynes] really failed to

answer the complaint within the period prescribed by law, which period
under the rules cannot be extended.
WHEREFORE, the ex-parte motion for judgment filed by the

[spouses Superales] is hereby APPROVED, AND judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the [spouses Leynes]:
1.
To remove their construction and/or improvements on

the 76 square meters lot belonging to the [spouses
Superales] and surrendered (sic) the same area
promptly and peacefully to the [spouses Superales];
2.
To pay the [spouses Superales] the amount

of P500.00 per month as reasonable rentals of the 76
square meters lot occupied by the [spouses Leynes]
from February 2000 until the said area shall have been
delivered to the full possession and control of [the
spouses Superales] in the concept of damages;
3.
To pay the [spouses Superales] the sum of P4,000.00

as reimbursement for the cost of the survey and the
relocation of [the spouses Superales] property; and
4.
To
pay
the
[spouses
Superales]
the
sum
[5]
of P15,000.00 as reimbursement for attorney fees.
Aggrieved, the spouses Leynes appealed the foregoing MCTC

Judgment to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21 of Bansalan,
Davao del Sur. Their appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. XXI228 (00). In its Decision dated July 9, 2001, the RTC affirmed the
appealed MCTC Judgment, ruling thus:
The lower court was right when it did not allow or entertain the
belatedly filed Answer with Counterclaim of the [spouses Leynes]. The
Motion to Admit Belated Answer partakes of a motion for extension of
time to file pleading which is not allowed as explicitly provided in
Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Since
the law on this matter is unambiguous, unequivocal, its application is
imperative.
Wherefore, the judgment rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial

Court is hereby affirmed, with the sole modification that the amount of
monthly rental for the Seventy-Six (76) square meter-lot be reduced
from P500.00 to P200.00.[6]
The spouses Leynes filed with the RTC a Motion for

Reconsideration in which they sought the recall of the Decision
dated July 9, 2001 and the remand of the case to the MCTC for
trial on the merits. However, the RTC, in a Resolution also
strangely dated July 9, 2001, refused to reconsider its earlier
decision. The RTC stressed that:
This case falls under the Rules on Summary Procedure. As such,

the answer should be filed within ten (10) days from the service of
summons and must be served on the plaintiff.
The [spouses Leynes], in filing a Motion to Admit Belated Answer

in effect admitted that their Answer was filed out of time. Having made
that admission, they may no longer be heard to claim otherwise.
Wherefore, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration

is hereby denied.[7]
On October 11, 2001, the spouses Superales filed with the

RTC a Motion for Execution pursuant to Rule 70, Section 21 of the
Revised Rules of Court[8]which provides for the immediate
execution of the RTC judgment against the defendant
notwithstanding further appeal of the same before the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court. Expectedly, the spouses Leynes
opposed the spouses Superales Motion for Execution.
The spouses Leynes then filed a Petition for Certiorari with

Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals on November 17,
2001. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK.
In its Resolution dated December 20, 2001, the Court of

Appeals dismissed the spouses Leynes petition outright for being
the wrong remedy and for failure to state the material dates. The
appellate court explicated that:
(1) It is a wrong remedy. Under the heading Timeliness Of This Petition

[spouses Leynes] alleged that the petition is directed against the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 in Bansalan, Davao
del Sur in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. This case
originated from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 1,
Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur (docketed as Civil Case No.
471 [2000]-B where, herein Respondents, Spouses Gualberto and
Rene Superales filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against
Petitioners, Spouses Ruben and Myrna Leynes. If that be so, then
the correct and appropriate mode of review should be appeal by
way of a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules. Under
paragraph 4 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, an appeal taken to
either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
(2) Upon the other hand, if the present petition for certiorari were to
be regarded as the correct or appropriate remedy (which it is not)
still it is procedurally flawed because [the spouses Leynes] violated
the amendment introduced to Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules,
as amended, by Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98, effective
September 11, 1998, which states as follows ---
Section 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements ---
xxxx
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate
the material dates showing when notice of judgment or final order
or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed, and when notice of the
denial thereof was received.
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the

foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
of the petition.
Here, [the spouses Leynes] did not indicate just when it was that
they received the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration
that they allegedly filed with the RTC of Bansalan, Davao del Sur,
Branch 21, on August 18, 2001, the resolution whereon, denying their
motion for reconsideration was allegedly strangely dated July 9, 2001.
WHEREFORE, the present petition must be denied due course

and consequently DISMISSED. Needless to say, inasmuch as the
prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is
merely an adjunct to the main petition, the same must be pro
tanto DENIED.[9]
On January 28, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the

spouses Superales Motion for Execution. The RTC observed that
the Court of Appeals did not issue a TRO as prayed for by the
spouses Leynes in their petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420UDK. Instead, the RTC referred to the Resolution dated December
20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals dismissing outright the spouses
Leynes petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK.
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution on

February 2, 2002, for the satisfaction of its Decision dated July 9,
2001.
On February 11, 2002, the spouses Leynes filed with the RTC
a Manifestation with motion to hold in abeyance the enforcement
of the writ of execution, considering their pending Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated December 20, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK. In its Order

dated February 15, 2002, the RTC directed the Sheriff to hold in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Execution until said
trial court has resolved the spouses Leynes latest motion.
In a Resolution dated May 7, 2002, the Court of Appeals

found no reason to modify or overturn its earlier Resolution dated
December 20, 2001, which dismissed the spouses Leynes petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK. The dispositive portion of said
Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, for lack of merit,

must be as it hereby is DENIED. Accordingly, the appended Petition for
Certiorari is ordered expunged from the records, and the enclosed
Postal Money Orders Nos. J 7318284 and B 2678220, both dated 19
November 2001, in the amount of P500.00 and P1,000.00,
respectively, posted at the Ateneo University, Davao City, payable to
the clerk of court of this Court from a certain Ruben Leynes, are hereby
ordered returned to the sender/payee.[10]
Not long thereafter, on May 13, 2002, the RTC issued an

Order resolving the issue of execution of its Decision dated July 8,
2001. The RTC reasoned that:
[I]n an ejectment case, the appellate court which affirms a decision

brought before it on appeal cannot decree its execution in the guise of
an execution of the affirmed decision. The only exception to that is
when said appellate court grants an execution pending appeal.
xxxx
Considering that this does not involve a motion for execution

pending appeal, this Court (sitting as an appellate court) cannot decree
its execution.[11]
Thus, the RTC decreed:
Wherefore, this case is hereby remanded to the court of origin,

that is, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (Br. 001) Bansalan-Magsaysay
with which the motion for execution shall be filed. [12]
On May 17, 2002, the spouses Leynes received a copy of the

Court of Appeals Resolution dated May 7, 2002 denying their
Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition in CAG.R. SP No. 4420-UDK. Thereafter, on July 17, 2002, the spouses
Leynes filed the instant Petition for Certiorari charging the Court
of Appeals, as well as the RTC and the MCTC, with grave abuse of
discretion, particularly committed as follows:
IN DISMISSING [the spouses Leynes] EARLIER PETITION, THE COURT OF

APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CONSIDERING
THAT IT DENIED THE PETITION ON A MERE TECHNICALITY WITHOUT
CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUES RAISED ARE NOVEL AND HIGHLY
MERITORIOUS.
II
THE MCTC BRANCH 1 AND THE RTC BRANCH 21 BOTH COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED TO ADMIT [the spouses Leynes]
ANSWER AND RULING THAT SINCE THE LAST DAY FOR FILING [the
spouses Leynes] ANSWER FELL ON A SATURDAY, THE SAME SHOULD
HAVE BEEN FILED ON THE SAID DAY SINCE THERE WERE COURT
PERSONNEL ON DUTY.
III
THE MCTC BRANCH 1 AND THE RTC BRANCH 21 COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED TO ADMIT [the spouses Superales]
COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAME
WAS FILED MORE THAN ONE YEAR FROM ITS SUPPOSED HAPPENING. [13]
Procedural Matters
The Court of Appeals dismissed the spouses Leynes Petition

for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK for being the wrong
mode of appeal and for failure to state a material date.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 clearly lays down the

proper modes of appeal to the Court of Appeals from the RTCs:
3. Appeals to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, appeals

by certiorari will not lie with the Court of Appeals. Appeals to that Court
from Regional Trial Courts may be taken:
a) by writ of error (ordinary appeal) where the appealed

judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
regional trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; or
b) by petition for review where the judgment was

rendered by the regional trial court in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction.
The mode of appeal in either instance is entirely distinct from an

appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
4. Erroneous Appeals. An appeal taken to either the Supreme

Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed. (Emphases ours.)
The RTC decided Civil Case No. XXI-228 (00) in its appellate
jurisdiction. Hence, the RTC Decision dated July 9, 2001, which
affirmed the MCTC Judgment of May 29, 2000 against the spouses
Leynes, and Resolution inadvertently also dated July 9, 2001,
which denied the spouses Leynes Motion for Reconsideration,
should have been appealed to the Court of Appeals by means of a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
The spouses Leynes, however, went before the Court of

Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corp.,
[14]
we presented the following discourse distinguishing between
an appeal (whether an ordinary appeal or a petition for review)
and a petition for certiorari, to wit:
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors

of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its
function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur:

(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute

lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court
transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other
words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are

substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the

correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure
Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule
in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error

committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be
allowed. The administration of justice would not survive
such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ

of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the
intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis
either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are
incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one
of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment
appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its

appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher
court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of
control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An
appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition
for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of
the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the
action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the
aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the
lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the
public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and

those that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable. Since the issue
is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against
an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the
judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within

fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the
said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be
filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the
decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition
should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or
final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not

later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or
resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was
timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for

reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition
for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct
the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required
before appealing a judgment or final order.
Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy

if Appeal Is Available
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action

for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorariare mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in
ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the
requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain,
speedy
and
adequate
remedy. Where
an
appeal
is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is
grave abuse of discretion.[15]
The remedy of appeal to the Court of Appeals was available

to the spouses Leynes, only that they failed to avail of it in
time. This much is clear from the following explanation of the
counsel for the spouses Leynes:
10. Until the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court Branch
21, [the spouses Leynes] were represented by their former counsel of
record, Atty. Christopher Abarilla. Aggrieved by the way their case was
handled by their former counsel of record, [the spouses Leynes]
engaged the services of the undersigned Counsel in the second week
of November 2001 for the purpose of elevating their case to the Court
of Appeals. Since no other remedy under the Rules of Court was
no longer available to [the spouses Leynes] because the 15day period within which to file a Certiorari under Rule 42 had
already lapsed, recourse under Rule 65 was instead resorted
to as there was no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law by which [the spouses Leynes] could
question the assailed decisions of both the lower court and the RTC
Branch 21.[16] (Emphasis ours.)
We reiterate the well-settled rule that certiorari is not

available where the aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is plain,
speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being
that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to
appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action
for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive. [17] The
special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for
an appeal which the petitioner already lost. [18]
Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals held, the spouses

Leynes Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK failed to
comply with the requirement under Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court that a petition for certiorari should indicate material
dates, such as when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed, and when notice of the
denial thereof was received. The spouses Leynes did not refute
that their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals did
not state the date they received a copy of the RTC Resolution
denying their Motion for Reconsideration. That the said Resolution
was strangely dated July 9, 2001, the same date as the RTC
Decision sought to be reconsidered, is immaterial. The timeliness
of the filing by the spouses Leynes of their petition before the
Court of Appeals is determined from the date they received the
challenged RTC resolution and not the date the RTC issued the
same.
Seeking recourse from this Court, the spouses Leynes once

more filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The spouses Leynes yet again availed themselves of the
wrong remedy.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the

Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 which is
not similar to a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final
orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e.,
regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved,
may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would
be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original
case. A special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action
based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general
rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an

ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when
a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be
dismissed outright.[19]
Nevertheless, we bear in mind that the acceptance of a

petition
for certiorari, as well as the grant of due course thereto is,
in
general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The
provisions of the Rules of Court, which are technical rules, may be
relaxed in certain exceptional situations. Where a rigid application
of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, it is within our
power to suspend the rules or exempt a particular case from its
operation.[20]
We pronounced in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo[21] that:
All things considered, however, we do not agree in the

conclusion of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner's Petition
based on a procedural faux pax. While a petition for certiorari is
dismissible for being the wrong remedy, there are exceptions
to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader
interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are
null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In Sebastian v. Morales, we ruled that rules of procedure must

be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure, thus:
[C]onsidering that the petitioner has presented a good

cause for the proper and just determination of his case,
the appellate court should have relaxed the stringent
application of technical rules of procedure and yielded to
consideration of substantial justice.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed

despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with
the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application
of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far
better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the
ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and
cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.[22] (Emphases ours.)
Given the peculiar circumstances extant in the case at bar, the

dismissal of the spouses Leynes Petition for Certiorari would result
in the miscarriage of justice.The spouses Leynes were unjustly
declared in default by the MCTC and deprived of the opportunity
to present arguments and evidence to counter the spouses
Superales Complaint. Hence, we are accepting and giving due
course to the spouses Leynes petition in the interests of
substantial justice and equity.
Reglementary Period
The MCTC rendered its Judgment dated May 29, 2000 ex

parte, declaring the spouses Leynes in default for their failure to
file their answer to the spouses Superales Complaint within the
reglementary period for doing so. According to the MCTC, the

spouses Leynes only had until May 20, 2000 to file an answer; and
although May 20, 2000 was a Saturday, the court was open and
court personnel Benedicta Abagon and Anastacia Vale were
present at that time to receive cases and motions filed with the
court.
We disagree.
Sections 6, Rule 70 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary

Procedure gives a defendant 10 days from service of summons to
file his/her answer:
Section 6. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of

summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and
serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff.Affirmative and negative defenses
not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims
not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within ten (10)
days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded.
In computing said 10-day period, we resort to Rule 22,

Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of

time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or
by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date
of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day. (Emphases ours.)
We emphasized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of

Appeals,[23] that non-working days (Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays) are excluded from the counting of the period only when
the last day of the period falls on such days. Rule 22 does not
provide for any other circumstance in which non-working days
would affect the counting of a prescribed period.
The spouses Leynes were served with the summons on May

10, 2000. The last day of the 10-day period within which the
spouses Leynes should have filed their answer, May 20, 2000, fell
on a Saturday. The next working day was May 22, 2000, a
Monday, on which the spouses Leynes did file their Answer with
Counterclaim. Based on the aforequoted rules, the spouses
Leynes answer was filed within the reglementary period, and they
were not in default. The MCTC should not have rendered an ex
parte Judgment against them.
Court personnel were at the MCTC on May 20, 2000, a

Saturday, in compliance with the Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 2-99, on Strict Observance of Working Hours and
Disciplinary Action for Absenteeism and Tardiness, which took
effect on February 1, 1999. Pertinent provisions of said circular
are reproduced below:
A. Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts shall assign by

rotation, Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in multiple sala stations within their respective
territorial areas, to be on duty on Saturdays from 8:00 A.M. to 1:00
P.M., assisted by a skeletal force, also on rotation, primarily to act
on petitions for bail and other urgent matters.
xxxx
B.
Court offices, (e.g., Office of the Clerk) and units which deal
directly with the public, such as receiving, process-serving and
cashiers units, shall maintain a skeletal force on Saturdays from
8:00 A.M. to noon, and from 12:30 P.M. to 4:30 P.M. Those assigned
to work on Saturdays shall be notified of their assignment at least
three days in advance. An employee so assigned shall have a full
day-off the following week, on a day to be specified by the
Justice/Judge concerned. (Manual for Clerk of Courts, Chapter II,
Section A, 1) (Emphases ours.)
Administrative Circular No. 2-99 should not affect the

manner by which periods set by the rules or the courts are
computed under Rule 22, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court. Administrative Circular No. 2-99 is an administrative
issuance signed by then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide to govern
the attendance of judiciary officials and employees. It cannot
amend or take precedence over the Rules of Court, duly approved
by the Court en banc and published for the information of and
compliance by the public. In fact, Administrative Circular No. 2-99
itself states that it supersedes and modifies accordingly any
previous Orders or Circulars on the matter, but not the Rules of
Court.
Moreover, Administrative Circular No. 2-99 requires certain

trial court judges and employees to be present on Saturdays
primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters. We
fail to see an answer to a complaint for forcible entry as among
such urgent matters that would have required filing by the party
and action by the court not a day later. In addition, Administrative
Circular No. 2-99 directs the Office of the Clerk of Court to
maintain a skeletal force on Saturdays. Civil Case No. 471 (2000)B, the spouses Superales complaint for forcible entry against the
spouses Leynes, was already raffled to and pending before the
MCTC-Branch 1 of Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur; thus, the
answer and other pleadings in said case should already be filed
with the said Branch and not with the Office of the Clerk of
Court. There is no showing that the Office of the Branch Clerk of
Court was also open on May 20, 2000.
MCTC Jurisdiction
We do not subscribe, however, to the spouses Leynes

argument that the spouses Superales Complaint for forcible entry
had already prescribed.
Rule 70, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the

provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of
any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person,
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis ours.)
In forcible entry cases, the action must be brought within

one year from the date of actual entry on the land. In paragraph 4
of their Complaint, the spouses Superales alleged that the
spouses Leynes, through force, stealth, and strategy, encroached
upon and occupied a portion of the spouses Superales titled
property, consisting of 76 square meters, sometime in February
2000. The spouses Superales already filed their Complaint for
forcible
entry,
damages,
and
attorneys
fees,three
months thereafter, in May 2000.
Even so, the MCTC rendered judgment against the spouses

Leynes ex parte. The spouses Leynes Answer with Counterclaim
was not admitted by the MCTC and they had no opportunity to
present evidence in support of their defenses.
The spouses Leynes averred before us that:
48. It is clear from the language of the law that [the spouses
Superales] cause of action accrued from the very moment they found
in 1995 that [the spouses Leynes] buildings allegedly intruded into
their supposed property when they acquired title over the same. But
for the next five years or so, [the spouses Superales] never raised a
howl of protest over the alleged encroachment. Not having acted on
their rights within the limits stipulated under the law, then the
complaint for Forcible Entry should also be considered as belatedly
filed before the MCTC Branch.
49. [The spouses Superales], however, have been very careful to

allege that [the spouses Leynes] structures were built in the year 2000
to enable them to get around the prescriptive period imposed by the
Rules. But the truth is, and the same could have been very well
established had a trial on the merits proceeded, the comfort rooms
were built in 1985 and the bunkhouse followed two years later. [The
spouses Superales] then were not yet claimants or possessors of the
land they now say is theirs. In 1995 when they surreptitiously acquired
title over Jose Cabahugs property, they contested for the first time, the
location of [the spouses Leynes] buildings. Yet, after having done so,
[the spouses Superales] never filed the complaint for Forcible Entry
within the one (1) year period as mandated. At the onset therefore,
[the spouses Superales] cause of action was already tainted with a
serious congenital infirmity which, had a trial been convened, would
have necessarily resulted in the unwarranted complaint against [the
spouses Leynes].[24]
These averments obviously involve factual matters which the

spouses Leynes must back up with evidence. We cannot rule on
the same since this Court is not a trier of facts. Consequently, it is
only prudent that the case be remanded to the MCTC for further
proceedings.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is GRANTED. The ex
parte Judgment dated May 29, 2000 of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Branch 1 of Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, in Civil
Case No. 471 (2000)-B, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the same court which isDIRECTED to admit the
Answer with Counterclaim of the spouses Ruben and Myrna
Leynes and accordingly conduct further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Per Raffle dated January 10, 2011.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 23-24; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and
Mariano C. del Castillo (now Supreme Court Associate Justice), concurring.
[2]
Id. at 45-50.
[3]
Id. at 45-47.
[4]
Id. at 6.
[5]
Id. at 64-65.
[6]
Id. at 67.
[7]
Id. at 73.
[8]
Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional
Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that
may be taken therefrom.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[10]
Id. at 33.
[11]
Id. at 94.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 10-11.
[14]
479 Phil. 768 (2004).
[15]
Id. at 778-783.
[16]
Rollo, p. 7.
[17]
Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 410, 420 (2005).
[18]
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156394, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 205, 216.
[19]
Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 783, 791 (2002).
[20]
Tan v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., G.R. No. 148420, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 115, 120-121.
[21]
G.R. No. 173415, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 348.
[22]
Id. at 367-368.
[23]
G.R. No. 142731, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 168.
[24]
Rollo, pp. 18-19.
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
DOLORES ADORA
MACASLANG,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 156375
Present:
CARPIOMORALES,
Chairperson,
-versus -
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, and
SERENO, JJ.
RENATO AND
MELBAZAMORA,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
May 30, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is not limited in its review of

the decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to the issues
assigned by the appellant, but can decide on the basis of the
entire records of the proceedings of the trial court and such
memoranda or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or
required by the RTC.
The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on July 3,

2002,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversedfor having no
basis in fact and in law the decision rendered on May 18,
2000[2] by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Danao City (RTC)
thathad dismissed the respondents action
for ejectment against the petitioner, andreinstated the decision
dated September 13, 1999 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of DanaoCity (ordering the petitioner as defendant to
vacate the premises and to pay attorneys fees of P10,000.00 and
monthly rental of P5,000.00 starting December 1997 until they
vacated the premises).[3]
We grant the petition for review and rule that contrary to the
CAs conclusion, the RTCas an appellate court properly considered
and resolved issues even if not raised in the appeal from the
decisionrendered in an ejectment case by the MTCC.
ANTECEDENTS
On March 10, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful

detainer in the MTCC, alleging that the [petitioner] sold to
[respondents] a residential land located in Sabang, DanaoCity and
that the [petitioner] requested to be allowed to live in the house
with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a
new residence. They further alleged thatdespitetheir demand
after a year, the petitioner failed or refused to vacate the
premises.
Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the

complaint, the petitioner did not file heranswer. The MTCC
declared her in defaultupon the respondents motion to declare
her in default, and proceeded to receivethe respondentsoral
testimony and documentary evidence. Thereafter, on September
13, 1999, the MTCC rendered judgment against her, disposing:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, Judgment is hereby
rendered in favor [of] plaintiffs (sic) spouses Renato Zamora and Melba
Zamora and against defendant Dolores AdoraMacaslang, ordering
defendant to vacate the properties in question, to pay to plaintiffs
Attorneys Fees in the sum of P10,000.00 and monthly rental
ofP5,000.00 starting December, 1997 until the time the defendant
shall have vacated the properties in question.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The petitioner appealed to the RTC, averring the following as

reversible errors, namely:
1.
Extrinsic Fraud was practiced upon defendant-appellant which

ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of
which she has been impaired of her rights.
2.
Defendant-Appellant has a meritorious defense in that there was

no actual sale considering that the absolute deed of sale relied
upon by the plaintiff-appell[ees] is a patent-nullity as her signature
therein was procured through fraud and trickery. [5]
and praying through her appeal memorandum as follows:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed for

that judgment be rendered in favor of defendant-appellant ordering
that this case be remanded back to the Court of Origin, Municipal Trial
Court of Danao City, for further proceedings to allow the defendant to
present her evidence, and thereafter, to render a judgment anew. [6]
On May 18, 2000, the RTC resolved the appeal, to wit: [7]
WHEREFORE,judgment is hereby rendered

complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
dismissing
the
The same may, however, be refiled in the same Court, by alleging

plaintiffs cause of action, if any.
Plaintiffs Motion for Execution of Judgment of the lower court is

rendered moot by this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTCs decision

for disregarding the allegations in the complaint in determining
the existence or non-existence of a cause of action.
On July 3, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs

decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision in favor of the
respondents, disposing:
WHEREFORE,foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby

GIVEN DUE COURSE. Resultantly, the impugned decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having no
basis in fact and in law, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The
petitionersmotion
onNovember 19, 2002.
for
reconsideration
was
denied
ISSUES
Hence, the petitioner appeals the

submitting legal issues, as follows:
CAs
adverse
decision,
1.
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its

Appellate Jurisdiction is limited to the assigned errors in the
Memorandum or brief filed before it or whether it can decide the
case based on the entire records of the case, as provided for in Rule
40, Sec. 7. This is a novel issue which, we respectfully submit,
deserves a definitive ruling by this Honorable Supreme Court since
it involves the application of a new provision, specifically underlined
now under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil procedure.
2.
Whether or not in an action for unlawful detainer, where there was

no prior demand to vacate and comply with the conditions of the
lease made, a valid cause of action exists?
3.
Whether or not in reversing the Regional Trial Court Decision and

reinstating and affirming the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, which was tried and decided by the MCTC in violation of the
Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court of Appeals sanctioned a
gross departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings? [9]
The issues that this Court has to resolve are stated thuswise:
1. Whether or not the CA correctly found that the RTC

committed reversible error in ruling on issues not
raised by the petitioner in her appeal;
2. Whether or not the CA correctly found that the

complaint stated a valid cause of action;
3. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that there

was a valid demand to vacate made by the
respondents on the petitioner; and
4. Whether or not the petitioners defense of ownership

was meritorious.
RULING
We grant the petition for review.
A.
As an appellate court, RTC may rule
upon an issue notraised on appeal
In its decision, the CA ruled that the RTC could not resolve
issues that were not assigned by the petitioner in her appeal
memorandum, explaining:
Indeed(,) We are rather perplexed why the Regional Trial Court, in

arriving at its decision, discussed and ruled on issues or grounds which
were never raised, assigned, or argued on by the Defendant-appellee
in her appeal to the former. A careful reading of the Defendantappellees appeal memorandum clearly shows that it only raised two
(2) grounds, namely (a) alleged extrinsic fraud, (b) meritorious
defenses based on nullity of the Deed of Sale Instrument. And yet the
Trial Court, in its decision, ruled on issues not raised such as lack of
cause of action and no prior demand to vacate having been made.
Only errors assigned and properly argued on the brief and those
necessarily related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court
in resolving an appeal in a civil case. Based on said clear
jurisprudence, the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it resolved Defendant-appellees
appeal based on grounds or issues not raised before it, much less
assigned by Defendant-appellee as an error.
Not only that. It is settled that an issue which was not raised during the
Trial in the court below would not be raised for the first time on appeal
as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. CA, 333 SCRA 663). We can
therefore appreciate Plaintiffs-appellants dismay caused by the
Regional Trial Courts blatant disregard of a basic and fundamental right
to due process.[10]
The petitioner disagrees with the CA and contends that the

RTC as an appellate courtcould rule on the failure of the complaint
to state a cause of action and the lack of demand to vacate even
if not assigned in the appeal.
We concur with the petitioners contention.
The CA might have been correct had the appeal been

a first appeal from the RTC to the CA or another proper superior
court, in which instance Section 8 of Rule 51, which applies to
appeals from the RTC to the CA,imposesthe express limitation of
the review to only those specified in the assignment of errorsor
closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly
argued in the appellants brief, viz:
Section 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does

not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the
judgment appealed from or the proceeding therein will be

considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or
closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain
errors and clerical errors.
Butthe petitioners appeal herein,being taken from the

decision of the MTCC to the RTC, was governed by a different rule,
specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 18. xxx

xxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial
Court. (7a)
As such,the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction,was not

limited to the errors assigned in the petitioners appeal
memorandum, but coulddecide on the basis of the entire record of
the proceedingshad in the trial court and such memoranda and/or
briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.
The difference between the procedures for deciding on

review is traceable to Section 22 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129,
[11]
which provides:
Section 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
their respective territorial jurisdictions.Such cases shall be decided
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin [and] such memoranda and/or briefs as may be

submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial
Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be
appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals which may
give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the
lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a
reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be
reviewed.[12]
As its compliance with the requirement of Section 36

of Batas PambansaBlg. 129to adopt special rules or procedures
applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical
rules, the Court promulgated the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, whereby it institutionalized the summary procedure for
all the first level courts. Section 21 of the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedurespecifically stated:
Section 21. Appeal. Thejudgment or final order shall be

appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall
decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil
cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful
detainer shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further
appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be
deemed repealed.
Later on, the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, effective on July 1, 1997, and incorporated in Section 7
of Rule 40 thereof the directive to the RTC to decide appealed
caseson the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed,viz:
Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.
(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal,

the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of
such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of
the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the
errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by
him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
appellants memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum.
Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for
dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the

expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered
submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the
case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had
in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed. (n)
As a result, the RTC presently decides all appeals from the

MTC based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin and such memoranda or briefs as are filed in the
RTC.
Yet, even withoutthe differentiation in the procedures of

deciding appeals, thelimitation of the review to onlythe errors
assigned and properly argued in the appeal brief or memorandum
and the errors necessarily related to such assigned errorsought
not to have obstructed the CA from resolving the unassigned
issues by virtue of their coming under one or several of the
following recognized exceptions to the limitation, namely:
(a) When the question affectsjurisdiction over the

subject matter;
(b) Matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors

within contemplation of law;
(c) Matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving

at a just decision and complete resolution of the
case or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding
dispensing piecemeal justice;
(d) Matters raised in the trial court and are of record

having some bearing on the issue submitted that
the parties failed to raise or that the lower court
ignored;
(e) Matters closely related to an error assigned; and
(f) Matters upon which the determination of a question

properly assigned is dependent.[13]
Consequently,
the
CA
improperly
disallowed
the
consideration and resolution of the two errors despite their being:
(a)necessary in arriving at a just decision and acomplete
resolution of the case; and (b) matters of record having some
bearing on the issues submitted that the lower court ignored.
B.
CA correctly delved into and determined
whether or not complaint stateda cause of action
The RTC opined that the complaint failed to state a cause of

action because the evidence showed that there was no demand
to vacate made upon the petitioner.
The CA disagreed, observingin its appealed decision:
But what is worse is that a careful reading of Plaintiffs-appellants

Complaint would readily reveal that they have sufficiently established
(sic) a cause of action against Defendant-appellee. It is undisputed that
as alleged in the complaint and testified to by Plaintiffs-appellants, a
demand to vacate was made before the action for unlawful detainer
was instituted.
A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the

withholding of possession or the refusal is unlawful without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law (Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., 340
SCRA 525). In the case at bench, par. 4 of the Complaint alleges, thus:
4. After a period of one (1) year living in the

aforementioned house, Plaintiff demanded upon
defendant to vacate but she failed and refused;
From the foregoing allegation, it cannot be disputed that a demand to

vacate has not only been made but that the same was alleged in the
complaint. How the Regional Trial Court came to the questionable

conclusion that Plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of action is beyond
Us.[14]
We concur with the CA.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful

detainer if it states the following:
(a)Initially, the possession of the property by the

defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
(b)Eventually, such possession became illegal upon

notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the
termination of the latters right of possession;
(c)Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of

the property and deprived the plaintiff of its
enjoyment; and
(d)Within one year from the making of the last demand

to vacate the propertyon the defendant, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment. [15]
In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of actionor

not, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered. The
test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the
complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for.
[16]
Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts,
are considered for purposes of applying the test. [17]
To resolve the issue, therefore, a look at the respondents

complaint is helpful:
2. On September 10, 1997, defendant sold to plaintiffs a

residential land located in Sabang, Danao City, covered by Tax
Dec.0312417 RB with an area of 400 square meters, including a
residential house where defendant was then living covered by Tax Dec.
0312417 RB, a copy of the deed of absolute [sale] of these properties
is hereto attached as Annex A;
3. After the sale, defendant requested to be allowed to live

in
the
house which plaintiff
granted on
reliance
of
defendants promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a
new residence;
4. After a period of one (1) year living in the aforementioned

house, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant to vacate but she
failed or refused.
5. Plaintiffs sought the aid of the barangay Lupon of Sabang,

Danao City for arbitration but no settlement was reached as shown by
a certification to file action hereto attached as Annex B;
6. Plaintiffs were compelled to file this action and hire counsel

for P10,000 by way of attorneys fee;
7. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiffs a monthly rental of P5,000

for the period of time that the former continued to live in the said
house in question.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to

render judgment ordering the defendant to vacate the properties in
question, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the
sum of P10,000, ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs a monthly
rental of P5,000 starting in October 1997, until the time that defendant
vacates the properties in question. Plaintiffs pray for such other refiefs
consistent with justice and equity.[18]
Based on its allegations, the complaintsufficiently stated a

cause of action for unlawful detainer. Firstly, it averred that the
petitioner possessed the property by the mere tolerance of the
respondents. Secondly, the respondents demanded that the
petitioner vacate the property, thereby rendering her possession
illegal. Thirdly,she remained in possession of the property despite
the demand to vacate. And, fourthly, the respondents instituted
the complaint on March 10, 1999,which was well within a year
after the demand to vacate was made around September of 1998
or later.
Yet, even as we rule that the respondents complaint stated a

cause of action, we must find and hold that both the RTC and the
CA erroneously appreciatedthe real issue to be about the
complaints failure to state a cause of action. It certainly was not
so, butthe respondents lack of cause of action. Their erroneous
appreciationexpectedly prevented the correct resolution of the
action.
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action

are really different from each other.On the one hand, failure to
state a cause of actionrefers to the insufficiency of the pleading,
and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where
the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the
pleading. Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on
remedial law, has explained the distinction: [19]
xxx What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause

of action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of
insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included
as the last mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the
situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of action. This is,
therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause
of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The
remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the
remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to
Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure
would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of
action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a
demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence

of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of

said legal right.
If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the

concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action.Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a

cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint
but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action.Failure to
state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an
action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of action
may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been
resolved on the basis of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence
presented.[20]
Having found that neither Exhibit C nor Exhibit E was a

proper demand to vacate,[21] considering that Exhibit C (the
respondents letter dated February 11, 1998)demanded the
payment of P1,101,089.90, and Exhibit E (theirletter dated
January 21, 1999) demandedthe payment of P1,600,000.00, the
RTC concluded that the demand alleged in the complaint did not
constitute a demand to pay rent and to vacate the premises
necessary in an action for unlawful detainer. It was this conclusion
that caused the RTC to confuse the defect as failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
The RTCerred even in that regard.
To begin with, it was undeniable that Exhibit D (the

respondents letter dated April 28, 1998) constitutedthedemand to
vacate that validly supported their action for unlawful detainer,
because of its unmistakable tenor as a demand to vacate, which
the following portion indicates:[22]
This is to give notice that since the mortgage to your property has
long expired and that since the property is already in my name, I will
be taking over the occupancy of said property two (2) months

from date of this letter.
Exhibit D, despite not explicitly using the wordvacate,

relayed to the petitionerthe respondents desire to take over the
possession of the property by givingher no alternative exceptto
vacate.The
word vacate,according
toGolden
Gate
Realty
[23]
Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, is not a talismanic
word that must be employed in all notices to vacate.The
tenantsin Golden Gate Realty Corporationhad defaulted in the
payment of rents, leading theirlessorto notify them to pay with a
warning that a case of ejectment would be filed against
themshould they not do so. The Court held that the lessor had
thereby given strong notice that you either pay your unpaid
rentals or I will file a court case to have you thrown out of my
property,for therewas no other interpretation of the import of the
notice due to the alternatives being clear cut, in that the tenants
must pay rentals that had been fixed and had become payable in
the past, failing in which they must move out. [24]
Also, the demand not being to pay rent and to vacate did not
render the cause of action deficient. Based on the complaint, the
petitioners possession was allegedly based on the respondents
tolerance, not on any contract between them. Hence, thedemand
to vacate sufficed.
C.
Ejectment was not proper due
to defense of ownership being established
The respondents cause of action for unlawful detainer was

based on their supposed right to possession resulting from their
having acquired it through sale.
The RTCdismissed the complaint based on its following

findings, to wit:
In the case at bench, there is conflict between the allegation of

the complaint and the document attached thereto.
Simply stated, plaintiff alleged that she bought the house of the
defendant for P100,000.00 on September 10, 1997 as stated in an
alleged Deed of Absolute Sale marked as Exhibit A to the complaint.
Insofar as plaintiff is concerned, the best evidence is the said Deed of
Absolute Sale.
The Court is surprised why in plaintiffs letter dated February 11,

1998, marked as Exhibit C and attached to the same complaint, she
demanded from the defendant the whooping sum of P1,101,089.90. It
must be remembered that this letter was written five (5) months after
the deed of absolute sale was executed.
The same letter (Exhibit C) is not a letter of demand as

contemplated by law and jurisprudence. The plaintiff simply said that
she will appreciate payment per notarized document. There is no
explanation what this document is.
Plaintiffs letter dated April 28, 1998 (Exhibit D) contradicts her

allegation that she purchased the house and lot mentioned in the
complaint. Exhibit D, which is part of the pleading and a judicial
admission clearly shows that the house and lot of the defendant was
not sold but mortgaged.
Again, for purposes of emphasis and clarity, a portion of the letter

(Exhibit D) reads:
This is to give notice that since the mortgage to your

property has long expired and that since the property is
already in my name, I will be taking over the occupancy of
said property two (2) months from date of this letter.
x xxx
Exhibit E, which is a letter dated January 21, 1999, shows the real
transaction between the parties in their case. To reiterate, the
consideration in the deed of sale (Exhibit A) is P100,000.00 but in their
letter (Exhibit E) she is already demanding the sum of P1,600,000.00
because somebody was going to buy it for P2,000,000.00.
There are indications that point out that the real transaction
between the parties is one of equitable mortgage and not sale. [25]
Despite holding herein that the respondents demand to

vacate sufficed, we uphold the result of the RTC decision in favor
of the petitioner. This we do,because therespondents Exhibit Cand
Exhibit E, by demandingpayment from the petitioner,
respectively,of P1,101,089.90 and P1,600,000.00, revealedthe
true nature of the transaction involving the property in question
as one of equitable mortgage, not a sale.
Our upholding of the result reached by the RTC rests on the

following circumstancesthat tended to show that the petitioner
had not really sold the property to the respondents, contrary to

the latters averments, namely:
(a)The petitioner, as the vendor, was paid the amount

of only P100,000.00,[26] a price too inadequate in
comparison
with
the
sum
of P1,600,000.00
[27]
demanded in Exhibit E;
(b) The petitioner retained possession of the property

despite the supposed sale; and
(c) The deed of sale wasexecuted as a result or by

reason of the loan the respondents extended to the
petitioner,because they still allowed the petitioner
to redeem the property by paying her obligation
under the loan.[28]
Submissions of the petitioner further supported the findings

of the RTCon the equitable mortgage. Firstly, there was the earlier
dated instrument (deed of pactode retro)involving the same
property, albeit the consideration was only P480,000.00, executed
between the petitioner as vendor a retro and the respondent
Renato Zamora as vendee a retro.[29] Secondly, there were two
receipts for the payments the petitioner had made to the
respondentstotaling P300,000.00.[30]And,
thirdly,
the
former
secretary of respondent Melba Zamora executed an affidavit
acknowledging that the petitioner had already paid a total
of P500,000.00 to the respondents.[31] All these confirmed the
petitioners claim that she remained the owner of the property and
was still entitled to its possession.
Article 1602 of the Civil Codeenumerates the instances when

a contract, regardless of its nomenclature, may be presumed to
be an equitable mortgage, namely:
(a) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is

unusually inadequate;
(b) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or

otherwise;
(c) When upon or after the expiration of the right to

repurchase another instrument extending the period
of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(d)When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the

purchase price;
(e)When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on

the thing sold; and,
(f) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that

the real intention of the parties is that the
transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or
the performance of any other obligation.
The circumstances earlier mentioned were, indeed, badges

of an equitable mortgage within the context ofArticle 1602 of
the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the findingsfavorable to the petitioners

ownership are neitherfinally determinative of the title in the
property, nor conclusive in any other proceeding where ownership
of the property involved herein may be more fittingly
adjudicated.Verily, where the cause of action in an ejectment suit
is based on ownership of the property, the defense that the
defendantretainedtitle or ownership is a proper subject for
determination by the MTC but only for the purpose of adjudicating
the rightful possessor of the property. [32]This is based on Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant

raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.(4a)
D.
MTC committed procedural lapses
that must be noted and corrected
The Court seizes theopportunity to note and to

correctseveralnoticeable procedural lapses on the part of the
MTCC, to avoid the impression that the Court condones or
tolerates the lapses.
The first lapse wasthe MTCCs granting of the respondents

motion to declare the petitioner in default following her failure to
file an answer. The proper procedurewas not for the plaintiffs to
move for the declaration in default of the defendant who failed to
file the answer. Such a motion to declare in default has been
expressly prohibited under Section 13, Rule 70 of
theRules of Court.[33]Instead, the trial court, either motuproprio or
on motion of the plaintiff, should render judgment as the facts
alleged in the complaint might warrant. [34]In other words, the
defendants failure to file an answer under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Courtmight result to a judgment by default, not to a declaration of
default.
The second lapse wasthe MTCCsreception of the oral

testimony of respondent Melba Zamora. Rule 70 of the Rules of
Courthas envisioned the submission only of affidavits of the
witnesses (not oral testimony) and other proofs on the factual
issues defined in the order issued within five days from the
termination of the preliminary conference; [35]and has permittedthe
trial court, should it find the need to clarify material facts, to
thereafterissue an order during the 30-day period from
submission of the affidavits and other proofs specifying the
matters to be clarified, and requiring the parties to submit
affidavits or other evidence upon such matters within ten days
from receipt of the order.[36]
The procedural lapses committed in this case are beyond

comprehension.The MTCC judge could not have been unfamiliar
with the prevailing procedure, considering that therevised version
of Rule 70, although taking effect only on July 1, 1997,was derived
from the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in effect
since November 15, 1991. It was not likely, therefore, that the
MTCC judge committed the lapses out of his unfamiliarity with the
relevant rule. We discern thatthe cause of the lapses was his lack
of enthusiasm in implementingcorrect procedures in this case. If
that was the true reason, the Court can only be alarmed and
concerned, for a judge should not lack enthusiasm in applying the
rules of procedure lest the worthy objectives of their promulgation
be unwarrantedly sacrificed and brushed aside. The MTCC judge
should not forget that the rules of procedure were always meant
to be implemented deliberately, not casually, and their noncompliance should only be excused in the higher interest of the
administration of justice.
It is timely, therefore, to remind all MTC judges to display full

and enthusiastic compliance with all the rules of procedure,
especially those intended for expediting proceedings.
WHEREFORE,we grant the petition for review on certiorari;

set aside the decision promulgated on July 3, 2002 by the Court of
Appeals; and dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer for lack
of a cause of action.
The respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 30-33; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio(retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice
Hilarion L. Aquino (retired) and Associate Justice Perlita J. TriaTirona(retired).
[2]
Id., pp. 47-51; penned by Judge Meinrado P. Paredes.
[3]
Id., pp. 43-46; penned by Judge Manuel D. Patalinghug.
[4]
Id., p. 46.
[5]
Rollo, p. 14.
[6]
CA Rollo, p. 87.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 47-51.
[8]
Supra, note 1.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 11-26.
[10]
Id., pp. 32-33.
[11]
Also known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which became effective upon its approval on August
14, 1981 by virtue of its Section 48 providing that: This Act shall take effect immediately.
[12]
Interestingly, Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), as amended by Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 6031 (An Act to Increase the Salaries of Municipal Judges and to Require Them to Devote Full Time to
their Functions as Judges, to convert Municipal and City Courts into Courts of Record, to make final the Decisions
of Courts of First Instance in Appealed Cases falling under the Exclusive Original Jurisdiction of Municipal and
City Courts except in questions of law, amending thereby Sections 45, 70, 75, 77 and 82 of Republic Act Numbered
Two Hundred And Ninety Six, Otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, and for other purposes), which
governed the appellate procedure in the Court of First Instance, had an almost similar tenor, to wit:
Section 45.Appellate Jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all cases arising in city and municipal courts, in their respective
provinces, except over appeals from cases tried by municipal judges of provincial
capitals or city judges pursuant to the authority granted under the last paragraph of
Section 87 of this Act.
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of
the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal
courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with
oral argument if so requested: Provided, however, That if the case was tried
in a city or municipal court before the latter became a court of record, then
on appeal the case shall proceed by trial de novo.
In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts which are appealed
to the courts of first instance, the decision of the latter shall be final: Provided, That the findings of facts
contained in said decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the conclusions are not
clearly against the law and jurisprudence; in cases falling under the concurrent jurisdictions of the municipal
and city courts with the courts of first instance, the appeal shall be made directly to the court of appeals
whose decision shall be final: Provided, however, that the supreme court in its discretion may, in any case
involving a question of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and under rules and
conditions that it may prescribe, require by certiorari that the case be certified to it for review and
determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
[13]
Comilang v. Burcena, G.R. No. 146853, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 342, 349; Sumipat v. Banga, G.R. No.
155810, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 521, 532-533; Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
112519, November 14, 1996, 264 SCRA 181, 191-192.
[14]
Id., pp. 32-33.
[15]
Cabrera v. Getaruela, G.R. No. 164213, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 129, 136-137.
[16]
Peltan Development, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 117029, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 82, 91.
[17]
G & S Transport Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 120287, May 28, 2002, 382 SCRA 262, 274.
[18]
Rollo, p. 37.
[19]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume I, Ninth Revised Ed. (2005), p. 182.
[20]
Bank of America NT&SA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120135, March 31, 2003, 400 SCRA 156, 167168; Dabuco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133775, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 853, 857-858.
[21]
Id., pp. 48-51.
[22]
Id., p. 42.
[23]
No. L-4289, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 684, 691.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Rollo, pp. 48-51.
[26]
Id., p. 39.
[27]
Id., p. 49
[28]
Id., p. 42.
[29]
CA Rollo, pp. 89-90.
[30]
Id., p. 91.
[31]
Id., p. 92.
[32]
Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118284, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 347, 362-367.
[33]
Section 13.Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following petitions, motions, or

pleadings shall not be allowed:
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third-party complaints;
12. Interventions. (19a, RSP)
[34]
Section 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 7.Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above
provided, the court, motuproprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its
discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of Section 3(c), Rule 9, if there are two or more defendants.
[35]
Section 10, Rule 70, Rules of Court.
[36]
Section 11, Rule 70, Rules of Court.

Cases For Unlawful Detainer

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Cases for unlawful detainer

Republic of the Philippines

SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT

G.R. No. 194880

June 20, 2012

Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power

Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject

According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar

During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [40] which was subsequently

In Republic v. Malabanan,[48] the Court clarified the three modes of appeal

Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65

Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in

Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful

There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three

Petitioners further contend that respondents remedy is accion

gave respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

TCT Nos. 458364, 458365, 458366 and 458367.

Republic of the Philippines

VIEGELY SAMELO, represented

G.R. No. 170509

MANOTOK SERVICES, INC.,

June 27, 2012

Before us is the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by

Manotok Services, Inc. (respondent) alleged that it is the

On November 18, 1998, the respondent filed a complaint for

In her answer, the petitioner alleged that the respondent had no

The MeTC Ruling

The MeTC, in its judgment[8] of March 28, 2002, decided in

subject premises and to deliver their peaceful possession to the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

To vacate the premises located at 2882 Dagupan Extension,

To pay plaintiff the sum of P40,075.20 as compensation for

To pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 for and as attorneys

To pay the cost of suit.[9]

The RTC Decision

The petitioner filed an appeal[10] with the Regional Trial Court

Aggrieved by the reversal, the respondent filed a petition for

The CA further held that the only issue in an ejectment suit

The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA

In presenting her case before this Court, the petitioner

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious.

Respondent has a better right of possession over the subject

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person

In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner and

Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should

An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when

Article 1687 of the Civil Code on implied new lease provides:

Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of

on August 5, 1998, the tacita reconduccion was aborted, and the

We find no merit in the petitioners allegation that the

The Rules of Court protects the respondent, as lessor, from

These provisions bar the petitioner from contesting the

is] estopped [from denying the] landlord's title, or to assert a

The Court thus explained in Tamio v. Ticson:[25]