United States v. William F. Quarry, David William Russo, Bruce Lester Dempsey, and Mark Reeve Fowden, 576 F.2d 830, 10th Cir. (1978)
United States v. William F. Quarry, David William Russo, Bruce Lester Dempsey, and Mark Reeve Fowden, 576 F.2d 830, 10th Cir. (1978)
United States v. William F. Quarry, David William Russo, Bruce Lester Dempsey, and Mark Reeve Fowden, 576 F.2d 830, 10th Cir. (1978)
2d 830
The trial of the seven was concluded, and before the case was submitted to the
jury, motions of two of the seven for judgments of acquittal were granted. The
appellees also moved for judgments of acquittal, but the judge reserved ruling.
The case against the remaining five was then submitted to the jury. As part of
the instructions given to the jury, the trial court said:". . . I want to be very clear
about this. Unless you find them all guilty, you can't find any of them guilty
because there are only five left, only five left, and the requirement is that the
gambling activity involve five or more persons that did these things . . ."
3
Thus the trial court instructed the jury they had to find all remaining defendants
guilty or acquit them all, as to do otherwise would not be in conformance with
18 U.S.C. 1955. The jury deliberated for two and one-half days, and returned
a verdict of guilty as to appellees Quarry, Russo, Dempsey, and Fowden, but
found the fifth defendant, Peake, not guilty.
The motions of appellees, previously made, were granted and the court entered
judgments of acquittal as to each of the four appellees. The trial court stated: ".
. . This jury has acquitted Peake, the statute requires five persons and the
motion for a judgment of acquittal of all five is granted." The Government has
taken this appeal from the judgments pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3731.
The Government urges on this appeal that the trial judge improperly interpreted
the five or more requirement of 1955 to mean that at least five defendants in
the same proceeding must be found guilty. The appellees argue that to permit
this appeal would be a violation of their Fifth Amendment rights and, in any
event, the result reached by the trial court must be upheld because a defect in
the jury's instructions constituted plain error.
The Government maintains that when the trial judge rules in favor of a
defendant after a jury verdict of guilty, the case can be appealed by the
Government. Thus in this case it is argued that if the trial judge was in error on
his interpretation of the five-person requirement, the guilty verdicts may
properly be reinstated because no further factual resolution will be necessary.
10
There is no question but that this court may assert jurisdiction over the
Government's appeals. This is made clear from the line of authority beginning
with United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232
(1975), and culminating in United States v. Calloway, 562 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.
1977). Appellees insist that any judicial act terminating a prosecution which is
denominated as an acquittal is not appealable under any circumstance.
However, in Wilson, supra, the Court said:
11 have rejected this position in the past, and we continue to be of the view that
"We
the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the
Government to appeal after a verdict of acquittal. Granting the Government such
broad appeal rights would allow the prosecutor to seek to persuade a second trier of
fact of the defendant's guilt after having failed with the first; it would permit him to
re-examine the weaknesses in his first presentation in order to strengthen the second;
and it would disserve the defendant's legitimate interest in the finality of a verdict of
acquittal. These interests, however, do not apply in the case of a postverdict ruling of
law by a trial judge. Correction of an error of law at that stage would not grant the
prosecutor a new trial or subject the defendant to the harassment traditionally
associated with multiple prosecutions."
12
13
The Government argues that the trial court misconstrued the five or more
persons requirement of 1955. The misinterpretation, the Government
maintains, was manifest in the "all or nothing" instruction given to the jury. The
trial court erred when it granted the post-verdict acquittals because the jury
failed to find all five defendants guilty. The Government thus contends that
1955(b)(1)(ii), requires only that it be shown that "five or more persons
conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed, or own all or part of such
business." The subsection of the statute uses the term "illegal gambling
business" and makes it illegal to "conduct," etc. such a business. To constitute a
violation the "business" is a gambling business which: "(ii) involves five or
more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or
part of such business and . . . ."
14
The defendants rely on the trial court's interpretation and argue that they were
"acquitted."
15
In United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973), this court said
that:
18
The trial court did instruct the jury as to the required number of participants
under 1955 by quoting from the statute several times, but gave also the
erroneous instruction as hereinabove stated. Thus he gave partly correct
instructions to the jury and partly wrong. However, we hold that the equivalent
of a fully correct instruction was provided to the jury. The jury rejected one
instruction of the judge as to the number, but followed the statute and followed
his quotation from the statute which he included in his instruction. The jury,
after deliberating a short time, requested that it be provided a copy of the statute
as it related to the number of participants. Without objection the court provided
the jury with a copy of 1955.
19
The jury could easily follow it, and this we hold to be the equivalent of a
correct instruction from the judge. The jury thus had conflicting instructions
and from the verdict it followed the correct one and rejected the incorrect
instruction. Under these somewhat unusual circumstances the verdicts may be
reinstated as supported by the evidence and correct under the five person
requirement.
23
Having decided that this court has jurisdiction, and that the Government did
establish sufficient evidence of participation by at least five persons in violation
of 18 U.S.C. 1955, the jury's verdict below must be reinstated.
24
The contentions of the appellees as to the failure to properly develop the law of
Utah as to gambling presents an issue not before this court as no final judgment
has been entered which would permit their consideration.
25
The judgments of acquittal are hereby set aside as to each appellee, and the
several cases are remanded with directions to reinstate the verdict of guilty as to
each appellee.