Burnham v. Layron, 209 F.2d 237, 10th Cir. (1953)
Burnham v. Layron, 209 F.2d 237, 10th Cir. (1953)
Burnham v. Layron, 209 F.2d 237, 10th Cir. (1953)
2d 237
BURNHAM et al.
v.
LAYRON et al.
No. 4578.
F. Robert Bayle and Elias Hansen, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellants.
Arthur H. Nielson and Grover A. Giles, Salt Lake City, Utah, for
appellees.
Before HUXMAN, MURRAH and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.
PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
The Laytons brought this action against the Burnhams for an accounting of
moneys and property received from transactions growing out of the purchase,
operation and sale of a ranch in Blaine County, Idaho, known as the Cove
Ranch. It was alleged that Clifton B. Layton entered into a written contract to
purchase the Cove Ranch; that after an interest in the contract had been
assigned to Jack B. Layton, the Burnhams advanced substantial sums of money
to complete the purchase and took fee title to the ranch and personal property
thereon to secure the repayments of the advances; and that the Burnhams had
received income from the operation and sale of the ranch over and above that
advanced and expended for its maintenance and operation. An accounting was
ordered following which a judgment for $82,375.10 was entered in favor of the
Laytons. The Burnhams were also directed to convey to the Laytons certain real
and personal property. This appeal is from that judgment.
On July 23, 1953, an opinion was filed by this court reversing the judgment of
the trial court reversing the judgment of the trial court with directions to enter
judgment for the Burnhams. A petition for rehearing was granted and that
opinion is hereby withdrawn.
For determination of the questions presented, it is necessary that the facts be set
forth in detail. On November 22, 1946, Clifton B. Layton entered into a
contract with the owners to purchase the Cove Ranch, together with water
rights, Taylor Grazing Permits and shares of stock in the Sawtooth Grazing
District. The purchase price was $70,000. It was payable $20,000 on or before
January 1, 1947, and $50,000 within one year from January 21, 1947, with
interest thereon from and after August 1, 1946. Edsell Christensen and Ray
Rosebraugh represented the owners of the ranch and held an option to purchase
the same. In connection with the execution of the contract, Clifton B. Layton
and his wife gave Christensen and Rosebraugh their promissory note for
$10,000, secured by a mortgage on the ranch. Clifton B. Layton was without
sufficient funds to make the initial payment on the contract. The Burnhams
advanced $17,000 for this purpose. When the balance of the purchase price
became due, Layton was unable to raise the money and the Burnhams advanced
an additional $46,102.25 and took title to the property in their name. At this
time the total advances amounted to $71,655. Prior to the acquisition of the title
to the ranch by the Burnhams, Clifton Layton had assigned the contract of
purchase to his son, Jack B. Layton and his wife. This assignment allegedly was
made to strengthen the son's credit at the bank and to defeat the Christensen
and Rosebraugh mortgage.
After the Burnhams had acquired the ranch, they gave Jack Layton and his wife
a contract, dated January 1, 1948. In substance, the contract provided that any
time within six months after the Burnhams had acquired the ranch, they would
make, execute and deliver a contract of sale of it to Jack Layton and his wife. It
provided that the conditions set out in the contract of January 1, 1948, should
be incorporated in the purchase contract; that the purchase price of the property
should be $71,655, one-half thereof payable within one year and the balance
within two years, together with interest. It provided that upon proper execution
of deeds from the owners of the Cove Ranch to the Burnhams, they should take
immediate possession, control and management of the ranch, provided however
that Jack Layton should remain on the ranch and operate it under the direction
and supervision of the Burnhams. The contract contained other provisions with
respect to what should be included in the contract of purchase, should one be
executed.
Jack Layton took possession of the ranch and operated it under the contract.
The second contract contemplated by this agreement was never entered into.
Early in 1948, the ranch property was listed for sale with a real estate broker
who produced three Randall brothers as prospective purchasers. In April of that
year, Clifton B. Layton negotiated with the Randall brothers, and a price of
$150,000 for the ranch, livestock and equipment was discussed. The Burnhams
continued these negotiations. A contract uas executed whereby the Randalls
agreed to pay $140,000 for the ranch, livestock and equipment, $70,000 of
which was to be paid within two years, and the balance in six equal annual
installments. It was agreed that to secure the $70,000 payment, each of the
Randall brothers would execute a promissory note in the sum of $25,000,
secured by real estate mortgages. Clifton Layton objected to the taking of the
three notes and mortgages for the down payment, and he testified that the
Burnhams said that they would treat the notes as a cash item.
7
In June of 1947, the Laytons vacated the ranch and the Randalls took
possession. One of the Randalls was unable to furnish the mortgage
contemplated by the contract and some of the cattle were taken back by the
Burnhams in lieu of this mortgage. It soon became apparent that the Randalls
would be unable to perform the conditions of the contract and in March of
1949, they expressed a desire to cancel the contract and return the property. The
Burnhams and the Laytons were dissatisfied with the operation of the ranch by
the Randalls and were desirous of withdrawing from the transaction and
obtaining possession of the property. After a conference between the Burnhams
and the Laytons, both parties authorized their attorney to cancel the contract
and settle the matter entirely upon the payment of $10,000 cash or security
approved by one of the Burnhams, together with the settlement of a claim of a
real estate broker and the replacement of all personal property which had been
removed from the ranch. This settlement was to include a cancellation of the
obligations created by the three $25,000 notes. The settlement made by the
attorney was for the surrender of possession of the ranch and a note for $6,000,
payable within one year. The Laytons made some complaint about the
settlement but apparently accepted it. The $6,000 was paid at a later date.
During the time that the Randall matter was being settled, another sale, known
as the Baird Transaction, was negotiated. A contract was entered into wherein
the Burnhams agreed to sell the ranch to Baird and associates for $100,000, of
which $5,000 was received in cash. Jack Layton was present when the Baird
contract was executed and later met with the Burnhams and received $3,299 of
the $5,000 payment.
In the meantime, a suit was brought in the State Court of Blaine County, Idaho,
to foreclose the Christensen and Rosebraugh mortgage. The Laytons and the
Burnhams were all made defendants in this action and they joined in the
defense.
In separate answers, filed March 21, 1949, the Laytons alleged that the
Burnhams acquired the ranch by purchase and that they were then the owners
in fee of the property. The Idaho court found that the mortgage created a lien
upon the ranch property, subject to the claim of the Burnhams, and ordered the
property sold under foreclosure. The Burnhams were the purchasers at the
foreclosure sale for approximately $80,000. The Laytons then negotiated a sale
of the property to Albert E. Reid and his wife for a consideration of $100,000.
The Burnhams received $81,085.74 of the purchase price and the Laytons,
$12,275.40. The Laytons quitclaimed all of their interest in the property to the
Reids, and the U-rnhams agreed to convey a sufficient certificate of redemption
covering the ranch and appurtenances. Of the original ranch property, the
Burnhams still held title to 160 acres of land and 100 shares of stock in the
Sawtooth Grazing District which was not included in the mortgage foreclosure.
10
Upon these facts the trial court held that the advances to the Laytons were
loans and that the Burnhams took title to property, including livestock and other
personal property, as security for the repayment of these loans. It concluded
that throughout all of the transactions the Laytons were the equitable owners of
the ranch properties, and that the Burnhams should be required to account to
them for all funds which they received over and above the advances which they
had made to the Laytons and expenditures in connection with the maintenance
and preservation of the property. In the accounting it was held that the
Burnhams accepted the three $25,000 notes from the Randalls as cash and in
full payment of all amounts then owing to them by the Laytons and that all
rights of the Burnhams in the property ceased at the time of the execution of the
Randall contract. The Burnhams were required to account for all money
received by them after the execution of the Randall contract in May, 1948. The
court allowed certain expenditures and payments made to the Laytons and for
their use and benefit after the Randall transaction.1 From the evidence and from
their conduct, it appears to us to be conclusive that from the time the Burnhams
took title to the property until the final disposition to the Reids, they recognized
and understood that the Laytons had rights which could be exercised by paying
to them the amounts which they had advanced and paid out for the operation
and maintenance of the ranch. It was equally conclusive that, before and after
the Randall sale, the Laytons recognized and understood that their rights were
subject to the payment of the Burnham claims. Up to the final sale to the Reids,
they made no contention to the contrary.
11
It is quite clear that throughout all of this period the Burnhams were attempting
to be made whole for their advances and expenditures, and that the Laytons
were attempting to salvage something over and above the Burnham claim. It is
difficult to determine whether the rights of the Laytons are those of an ordinary
mortgagor, or whether their rights lie in an agreement of the Burnham
advances. The latter was the purpose of the contract between the Burnhams and
Jack Layton after the Burnhams took title to the property. The second contract
contemplated by the Jack Layton agreement was never executed. This may be
accounted for from the fact that the sale was made to the Randalls before the
expiration of the six months' period. In any event, it appears to us that the
conduct of the parties is such as to clearly establish that the Burnhams were to
be repaid all of their advances and expenditures necessarily made for the
operation, maintenance and preservation of the ranch property, and that upon
sale of the property the Laytons were entitled to any balance. Regardless of the
theory upon which these rights are based, we think that in a court of equity the
same result would be reached in this kind of a case. We therefore hold that the
Burnhams are entitled to receive all advances and all expenditures necessarily
made by them to operate and preserve the property, together with interest
thereon from the date of each advance or expenditure. If there is a balance,
either in money or property, it belongs to the Laytons.
12
We then reach the accounting. We think the court's conclusion that the
acceptance of the three $25,000 notes by the Burnhams from the Randalls to
secure the down payment of the contract of purchase was the same as cash, and
constituted payment of the Burnham claim in full, is clearly erroneous. The
initial payment of $70,000 on that contract was not paid, and the security taken
was returned when the contract was cancelled with the consent and authority of
all the parties and for their mutual benefit. The settlement was not made in
accordance with the authorization, but the Laytons with full knowledge of the
facts failed to repudiate it, acted upon it, and accepted its benefits. This amounts
to a ratification. 2 Am.Jur.Agency, 209; Doner v. Honstead, 61 Idaho 669, 106
P.2d 868; Annotation 87 A.L.R. 794; 48 A.L.R. 925. At no time after the
Randall settlement did the Laytons claim that the Burnhams had no further
interest in the property. They did not object to the Baird sale. Almost a year
later they alleged in their answers filed in the Christensen and Rosebraugh
litigation that the Burnhams were the owners in fee of the mortgaged property.
The Idaho court found that the Burnhams had a lien on the real property sold in
foreclosure. During all of this time the Burnhams, without objection from the
Laytons, retained possession, management and control of the property.
13
The trial court disallowed all items of expenditure by the Burnhams which were
made after the Randall transaction except those items listed in findings 9 and
10. The Burnhams claimed expenditures totaling $23,304.76,2 most of which
were disallowed upon the ground that they were made after the Randall sale
and were 'for the personal benefit of defendants and not for the protection or
preservation of said ranch properties for the plaintiffs'. Under our view of the
case these were proper expenditures made in the operation of and for the
preservation of the properties. They were made with the knowledge and
consent of the parties and for their benefit and should be allowed, except for
the expenditures of Robert O. Burnham, which appear to be expenses in
connection with the receipt of the redemption money after the Reid sale and
which have no relation to the properties. Other items claimed by the Burnhams
and disallowed by the court were for personal travel, hotel expenses and per
diem, and totaled $2,790.70.3 We are unable to ascertain from the record what
these expenditures were for. If they were expenditures necessary for the
operation and maintenance of the ranch properties they should have been
allowed. These items are returned for further consideration and findings by the
trial court.
14
Prior to the trial, the Burnhams sought to have Albert E. Reid and his wife
made involuntary plaintiffs in the action. It was alleged that they were
indispensable parties to a complete disposition of the case. There is no merit in
this contention. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.,
provides that persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and joined,
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The Reids had no interest in this accounting
action and they are not indispensable, or even necessary parties, to a full
determination of the rights of the parties hereto. A final judgment herein will
not in any manner injure the rights of the Reids. The court did not err in
refusing to make them parties. Dunham v. Robertson, 10 Cir., 198 F.2d 316;
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations v. Seitz, 10 Cir., 193 F.2d 456, certiorari
denied 343 U.S. 919, 72 S.Ct. 676, 96 L.Ed. 1332.
15
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded with
instructions to proceed and enter judgment in accordance with the views herein
expressed.
"Date
"August 6, 1948
Source
Amount
From sale of horses in 1948 ................... 266.60
"April 6, 1949
"October 31, 1949
"September 12, 1950
'In addition to the foregoing items of cash, Defendants have retained and now
retain as trustee for the Plaintiffs 160 acres of land, including water rights,
forming a part of the ranch properties, 100 shares of stock in the Sawtooth
Grazing District and Abstracts of Title covering all of said ranch properties.
'9. Subsequent to the sale of said ranch properties to the Randalls, Defendants
expended certain moneys in connection with said ranch for the use and benefit
of the Plaintiffs, for which they are entitled to receive reimbursement, as
follows:
"Date
"August 9, 1948
"December 12,
1948
"August 8, 1949
"May 19, 1951
Nature of Expenditure
Amount
One-half of taxes for 1946 and all of taxes for
1947 ........................................... $ 3,061
Kraft Cheese Company (balance owing on
certain cattle) .................................. 1,469
H.P.H. Agency (grain insurance for crops
produced in 1949) ................................... 45
Amount owing as real estate commission on
sale of ranch properties to Randalls ............. 6,000
------"Total ....................................... $10,576
To Whom Paid
Amount
Clifton B. Layton .. $
250.00
Clifton B. Layton ...... 100.00
Clifton B. Layton .... 1,115.68
Clifton B. Layton ....... 25.00
Jack B. Layton ....... 3,299.25
---------"Total ......... $ 4,789.93
'All other items expended by Defendants subsequent to the sale of the ranch
properties to the Randall Brothers were made voluntarily and for the personal
benefit of Defendants and not for the protection or presevation of said ranch
properties for the Plaintiffs. Said items are therefore disapproved and not
allowed as changes or offsets against the amount owing to Plaintiffs.'
Miscellaneous
Nature of Expenditure
Am
Franklin Serum Company (Branding Oil and Copper
Brand) .................................................. $
11-15-48 Carl Randall--trucking cattle ................................. 4
1-20-49 Carl Randall--trucking cattle ................................. 4
1-20-49 Nek Stelma--hauling cattle .................................... 2
12- 5-49 Paul Potter--accounting services .............................. 2
6- 2-50 Blain County Sheriff--fee .................................... 13
9- 1-50 Lincoln Kelly Company--auditing service ...................... 15
6- 7-50 Alfalfa Seed and Planting in 1950 .......................... 1,30
4-20-50 C. A. Gardner, Treasurer
4- 1-50 Water Assessment for 1950; ................................. 1,63
Dorothy Povey, Additional .................................... 29
6- 6-50 Dorothy Povey, Treasurer, Taxes for 1/2 of the year 1948
and all of 1949 on Cove Ranch ............................ 2,51
3- 6-50 Mabel Beveridge--copy of deeds for use in Abegglen trial ...... 1
6- 6-50 Ernest L. Gomes, Sawtooth Grazing Assessments for 1950 ........ 5
8- 5-50 C. W. Gardner--witness fee--Stewart trial Legal ................
(J. D. Skeen) Legal
3-26-48 Paid to J. D. Skeen "as expense Money" ....................... 20
10- 4-48 Paid to J. D. Skeen "as expense Money" ....................... 20
12-16-48 Paid to J. D. Skeen "as expense Money" ....................... 12
11-28-49 Paid to J. D. Skeen "as expense Money" ........................ 3
7-20-49 Paid to J. D. Skeen as expense money for Abegglen
matter ..................................................... 10
2-24-50 Paid to J. D. Skeen as expense money for Abegglen
matter ...................................................... 7
6- 9-50 Paid to J. D. Skeen as expense money for Abegglen
matter ...................................................... 8
7-26-50 Paid to J. D. Skeen as espense money for Abegglen
matter .......................................................
11-29-50 Paid to J. D. Skeen as expense money for Abegglen
matter ...................................................... 4
8-17-50 Court Costs sued against surety company ....................... 1
4-12-49 Legal Services ............................................. 1,00
4- 4-50 Legal Services ............................................. 2,00
9-19-50 Legal Services ............................................. 3,00
2-14-51 Legal Services (Re: Abegglen Appeal) ......................... 25
2-28-51 Legal Services (Re: Abegglen Appeal) ......................... 25
Date
Legal
Am
6-21-49 Services at Stewart trial .................................... 10
8-10-49 Expenses such as telephone .....................................
4-20-50 Two days services at Cove Ranch ............................... 6
5- 4-50 Legal Services--Cove Ranch .....................................
6-27-50 Services for Cove Ranch ....................................... 8
9-19-50 Services to Clifton B. Layton on Cove Ranch and other
matters .................................................. 1,58
10-10-50 Services and telephone expense (Re: Payment of
redemption money) .......................................... 15
12-26-50 Telephone, telegraph expenses ..................................
(L. L. Sullivan)
Date
2-18-48