United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
2d 483
This is an action brought by Kenneth Alder for himself and other underwriters
at Lloyd's against Damacio Garcia and wife, John Deere Company of Kansas
City, and Deere & Company to recover on an assignment to Lloyd's of one-half
of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment recovered by Garcia from Deere
& Company. The appeal is only as to Damacio Garcia and Deere & Company,
and is taken by the plaintiff-appellant from the action of the trial court in
denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, in granting Garcia's motion
for summary judgment, and in granting Deere & Company's motion to dismiss
for improper venue.
This suit grew out of injuries sustained by Garcia while moving a hay elevator
owned by and located on a farm of Valley Gold Dairies. The machine was
manufactured by Deere & Company. Lloyd's, appellant here, was the insurer of
Valley Gold Dairies. Garcia sued Valley Gold in the Valencia County, New
Mexico, court, and the matter was settled by payment by Lloyd's to Garcia of
$40,000.00 for a release of Valley Gold Dairies, a joint tort-feasor release, and
for an assignment by Garcia to Lloyd's of one-half of any recovery or
settlement not to exceed $80,000.00, which Garcia might obtain in a future
action from Deere & Company. A suit was filed thereafter by Garcia against
Deere & Company, in which Garcia was assisted by the attorneys of Lloyd's
who defended the original action brought by Garcia against Valley Gold
Dairies. Deere & Company learned of the assignment by Garcia to Lloyd's
taken in the original suit, and it then settled with Garcia by payment to him of
$40,000.00 and by agreeing to indemnify and defend him against any suit by
Lloyd's on its assignment from Garcia. Lloyd's did bring such suit against
Garcia and Deere & Company to enforce the assignment, and this is the case at
bar.
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The trial court found that the assignment by Garcia to Lloyd's was void and
unenforceable as contrary to the laws and public policy of New Mexico. It also
found that Deere & Company was not doing business nor authorized to do
business in New Mexico nor was it incorporated in that state.
"A release by the injured person of one [1] joint tortfeasor does not relieve him
from liability to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor unless the release
is given before the right of the other tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for
contribution has accrued, and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro
rata share of the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages
recoverable against all the other tortfeasors."
The combination of the assignment with the joint tort-feasor release would
permit Lloyd's to recover from Deere & Company by way of indirect
contribution although Lloyd's settled in a way as to preserve Garcia's right of
action against Deere & Company. The statute also provides in 24-1-12(3): "A
joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not
entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to
the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement." If the settlement had
extinguished the liability of Deere & Company to Garcia, appellant could have
sued Deere & Company for direct contribution; however, the settlement did not
have such consequences. O'Keefe v. Baltimore Transit Co., 201 Md. 345, 94
A.2d 26; Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1101. The express agreement was instead made
that Lloyd's would assist in the action by Garcia against Deere & Company and
obtain one-half of any recovery or settlement there obtained by him.
Appellant urges that Deere & Company is primarily liable to Garcia anyway;
however, the matter of primary liability and indemnity was not adjudicated in
the other related suits, and it has not been litigated in this action. Appellant
could have commenced a suit to determine who was primarily liable, but did
not do so nor did anyone else. Allied Mutual Casualty Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 279 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.). The problems of burden of proof in such a suit
perhaps account for such inaction. In any event, appellant secured an interest in
Garcia's claim against Deere & Company by the assignment, and if it were to
be permitted to secure relief here, the result would be to recoup to the extent of
one-half of the settlement. This payment to appellant would of course come
from its joint tort-feasor and appellant would thereby have benefited in a
manner contrary to the public policy of the state as expressed in the New
Mexico Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act.
The second point of appellant relates to venue. The trial court granted the
motion of Deere & Company to dismiss because of improper venue. Appellant
in his brief states that he has abandoned any contention that Deere & Company
can be sued in New Mexico under 28 U.S.C. 1391(c). Instead appellant
contends that the company has made a general appearance by defending Garcia
under its indemnity agreement with him. Appellant relies on Ocean Accident &
Guarantee Corp. v. Felgemaker, 143 F. 2d 950 (6th Cir.), where under the
particular circumstances an insurance company was held to have made a
general appearance by conducting the defense. However, this case has not been
generally followed. Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 81
S.Ct. 557, 5 L.Ed.2d 546. The appellee in undertaking the defense of Garcia in
this action did not make a general appearance for itself. The objection to venue
in New Mexico was timely raised and properly disposed of by the trial court.
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The parties have raised several other points which have been considered but
which need not be discussed separately.
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Affirmed.
Notes:
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