United States v. Caiba-Antele, 10th Cir. (2012)
United States v. Caiba-Antele, 10th Cir. (2012)
United States v. Caiba-Antele, 10th Cir. (2012)
Clerk of Court
No. 11-2140
(D.C. No. 2:10-CR-02316-WJ-1)
(D. N. M.)
JOSE CAIBA-ANTELE,
Defendant - Appellant.
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ORDER
_________________________________
Before KELLY, SEYMOUR, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
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This matter is before the court to direct the clerk to issue for publication, sua
sponte, the Order & Judgment issued in this matter originally on December 7, 2012. The
decision will be published and reissued nunc pro tunc to the original filing date. A copy
of the re-issued opinion is attached to this order. The Clerk is directed to file it forthwith.
Entered for the Court
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 7, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2140
JOSE CAIBA-ANTELE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Specifically, the PSR stated that the victims family members did not want the children to
testify.
Mr. Caiba-Antele admitted the procedural history of the charges as described in
the PSR, but filed a written objection to their veracity. Contending he was innocent of the
acts alleged, he asserted the court should not consider those prior charges in sentencing
him because he had not been convicted and because, absent direct testimony from the
alleged victims, the evidence that he had committed the charged crimes lacked sufficient
indicia of reliability.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which two detectives and a state
prosecutor who had been involved in the 2007 case against Mr. Caiba-Antele testified.
Both detectives testified at length about the interviews they had conducted with the
children, and the transcripts of those interviews were entered into evidence. Each
detective independently testified that he found the childrens accusations against Mr.
Caiba-Antele credible because of the level of detail contained in the allegations, the
consistency of their statements, and the childrens demeanor during the interviews. Both
detectives had significant past experience working with child victims of abuse and sexual
molestation.
The state prosecutor confirmed in her testimony that the charges against Mr.
Caiba-Antele were dropped due to the risk of psychological harm to one of the child
witnesses, who had recently suffered a mental breakdown and attempted suicide, and
because the other child witness wanted to move on with her life and was no longer willing
to testify. Mr. Caiba-Antele objected to the detectives testimony as hearsay too
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unreliable to establish his guilt of the charged crimes, particularly without an opportunity
to cross-examine his accusers. He did not testify at the hearing.
The district court issued a memorandum opinion overruling Mr. Caiba-Anteles
objections to the PSR. The court found the testimony of the detectives, which was based
on their first-hand observations of the children and their professional experience with
other sexually abused children, to be credible. The court held that Mr. Caiba-Antele had
more likely than not committed the acts of sexual abuse and rape he had been accused of,
and that the evidence of these acts exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability. The court
also calculated that if, hypothetically, Mr. Caiba-Antele had been convicted of the
charges he faced in state court, his guidelines sentencing range for reentry of a removed
alien would have been forty-six to fifty-seven months, in contrast to the range of eight to
fourteen months because the charges were dropped.
At a final sentencing hearing, the district court heard arguments from both parties
and correctly noted the applicable offense level, criminal history category, guideline
sentencing range of eight to fourteen months, and the statutory maximum sentence of ten
years. The court then examined each of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors in
light of the facts contained in the PSR, including the need for the sentence imposed to
reflect the seriousness of the crime, the importance of deterrence and the necessity of
protecting the public from future crimes. In light of these sentencing factors and the
earlier finding that Mr. Caiba-Antele had sexually assaulted his niece and his girlfriends
children, the district court determined that an upward variance from the guidelines was
appropriate.
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The court also noted the unchallenged portions of the PSR established that Mr.
Caiba-Antele had used several aliases and multiple social security numbers, which the
court interpreted as evidence that he was engaged in some sort of wrongful conduct. The
court highlighted that defendant had previously been convicted of one misdemeanor and
one felony immigration violation in New Mexico, as well as several traffic violations in
both Arizona and New Mexico, all additional evidence of his lack of respect for the law.
The court referred to the hypothetical guideline sentencing range of forty-six to fiftyseven months had Mr. Caiba-Antele been convicted of the sex abuse charges, and then
sentenced Mr. Caiba-Antele to fifty-one months of imprisonment to be followed by a
three-year term of supervised release.
II.
We review sentences for reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Haley, 529 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38 at 51 (2007)). Our review includes both procedural
reasonableness, which encompasses the manner in which a sentence was calculated, and
substantive reasonableness, which concerns the length of the sentence. United States v.
Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 803 (10th Cir. 2008). A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if
the district court incorrectly calculates or fails to calculate the Guidelines sentence, treats
the Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the 3553(a) factors, relies on clearly
erroneous facts, or inadequately explains the sentence. Haley, 529 F.3d at 1311 (citing
Gall, 552 U.S. at 50-51). A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the length is
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unreasonable given the totality of the circumstances in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)
factors. Id.
Mr. Caiba-Antele contends the district courts upwards variance from the
sentencing guidelines violated his Sixth Amendment rights because it was significantly
higher than the recommended range and was based on facts found by the judge rather
than on facts determined by a jury or admitted by the defendant. He concedes, however,
that this argument is foreclosed by binding precedent. Aplt. Br. at 12. See United States
v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 745 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), to deny similar Sixth Amendment challenge); see also
United States v. Cook, 550 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 2008) (uncharged conduct need
only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence for sentencing purposes). Because
[w]e are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a
superceding contrary decision by the Supreme Court, Mr. Caiba-Anteles Sixth
Amendment claim must fail. In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993).
Mr. Caiba-Antele also challenges the upward variance under the Due Process Clause,
claiming that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because it was based on
evidence that lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. In sentencing, a district court may
rely on hearsay evidence as long as the evidence is sufficiently reliable. See Cook, 550
F.3d at 1296 & n.4; see also U.S.S.G. 6A1.3(a) (sentencing court may consider any
relevant evidence provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy.). Defendant contends the testimony of the detectives and
the state prosecutor, in conjunction with the transcripts of the accusers interviews with
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the detectives, lacks reliability. He emphasizes the lack of physical evidence or other
corroboration that the sexual abuse occurred, apart from the testimony of the complaining
witnesses who were not subject to cross-examination. He also maintains the district court
erred by relying on law enforcement agents to determine the credibility of the
complaining witnesses.
But the facts in Cook are similar to this case. There we upheld a sentencing
enhancement based on a district court finding that the defendant had more likely than not
committed felony menacing, a charge which had been brought against the defendant in
state court but was later withdrawn. Cook, 550 F.3d at 1294. The district court based its
finding on the following: an affidavit of one of the police officers who interviewed the
victims of the alleged menacing; the narrative remarks of another police officer
describing the events surrounding the defendants arrest from a police report, which was
based on a phone conversation with one of the complaining witnesses; and an Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms Report of Investigation, which also related the accusations of the
victims. Id. at 1295-96. We held in Cook that this evidence exhibited the necessary
indicia of reliability based on three factors. First, the officers had the opportunity to
observe [the victims] demeanor and form an opinion regarding their veracity. Id. at
1297. Second, the complaining witnesses each corroborated the sequence of events that
had transpired. Id. And third, at a later date, one of the complaining witnesses retold the
same version of events to another police officer over the phone. Id.
Our decision in United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812 (10th Cir. 1995), is not to the
contrary. In determining the proper sentence for Mr. Fennell, who had pled guilty to
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PSR meets the standard of minimum indicia of reliability. Accordingly, the court did not
abuse its discretion in relying on that evidence to determine Mr. Caiba-Anteles sentence.
We AFFIRM.
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