Rodney Keith Dick v. R. Michael Cody and Attorney General of The State of Oklahoma, 69 F.3d 547, 10th Cir. (1995)
Rodney Keith Dick v. R. Michael Cody and Attorney General of The State of Oklahoma, 69 F.3d 547, 10th Cir. (1995)
Rodney Keith Dick v. R. Michael Cody and Attorney General of The State of Oklahoma, 69 F.3d 547, 10th Cir. (1995)
3d 547
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
The district court dismissed appellant Dick's 2254 petition for failure to exhaust
state remedies on the first claim and for failure to assert cognizable grounds for
relief in his remaining claims.2 Mr. Dick failed to file a timely notice of appeal
from that decision, but he nonetheless seeks review in this court.
Ten days after the expiration of the time for perfecting his appeal had lapsed,
Mr. Dick filed a motion under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5) seeking an extension of
time within which to file a notice of appeal. Mr. Dick claimed he failed to file a
timely notice because after the judgment was entered he had been transferred to
a different institution and was consequently without a law library or legal
assistance. The district court examined the file and found Mr. Dick had filed a
notice of his transfer before the entry of the judgment. The court concluded Mr.
Dick's first contention was "unpersuasive." The court further held access to a
law library or legal assistance was not required to file a notice of appeal. As a
consequence, the court denied the motion.
After the court's ruling, Mr. Dick filed a document denominated "Notice of
Intent to Appeal/And Request for Certificate of Probable Cause." In that
document, Mr. Dick asserted the district court erred because he had been
transferred to a second institution after the entry of the court's order denying
habeas corpus. He also asserted he needed access to a law library so he could
make a sufficient showing to obtain a certificate of probable cause. This
pleading was not addressed by the district court.
Our decision here is not arguable. We simply do not have jurisdiction over this
untimely appeal. "[T]he taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is
mandatory and jurisdictional." Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co, 486 U.S.
196, 203 (1988). See also Browder v Director, Ill. Dep't of Corrections, 434
U.S. 257, 264 (1978); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368,
379 (1981). The appeal in 95-5012 is therefore DISMISSED.
The next case questions whether the district court properly denied Mr. Dick's
attempt to gain relief under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5) on the ground he failed to
demonstrate excusable neglect. That judgment is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. City of Chanute, Kan. v. Williams Nat'l Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041,
1045 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. (1995). We believe Mr. Dick's
bald assertion he was transferred to another institution pending the time for
filing a notice of appeal is not a showing of excusable neglect. That move did
not interfere with or delay his receipt of the district court order denying habeas
relief. Moreover, because the notice of appeal must merely cite the party taking
the appeal, the order appealed from, and the court to which the appeal is taken,
Fed. R.App. P. 3(c), his assertion of need for legal research is unfounded.
Therefore, we cannot conclude the district court's holding was an abuse of
discretion.3 The judgment in 95-5047 is AFFIRMED.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the court's General
Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 F.R.D. 470
The ruling was predicated upon Mr. Dick's concurrent state court appeal and
the assertion of errors in the application of state law