United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
2d 687
The land was part of a school land grant to Utah. Upon survey it was found to
be within a reservation set apart for the Navajo Tribe of Indians. When, prior to
survey, granted land was included within an Indian reservation, the state was
permitted to select other land in lieu thereof.2 Utah by statute provided that
mineral deposits on state lands were reserved from disposition except on a
rental or royalty basis,3 and asserts that the waiver of the state's claim to
granted school land upon the selection of lieu land did not convey the minerals
therein to the United States.
The Navajo Tribe, with the approval of the United States, gave an oil and gas
lease covering the pertinent area and other land to The Superior Oil Company.
Utah gave a similar lease in which appellees Larsen, Western States Refining
Company, Lewis, Notestine, and Continental Bank & Trust Company claim an
interest.
The United States seeks to quiet its title, subject to the Superior lease, against
Utah and the named defendants claiming under the Utah lease. Appellants,
asserting their ownership of the unpatented mining claim, moved to intervene
and with their motion submitted an answer in which they denied that the United
States had fee simple title to the land included within the mining claim and
prayed for a decree adverse to the Navajo Tribe and its lessee, Superior. In a
proposed cross-claim the appellants asserted the validity of their title as against
the defendants and prayed for a decree quieting their title. The motion for leave
to intervene was denied.
The United States, like any other owner of property, may have its property
rights adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction.4 Here the United States
seeks to quiet its title as against the claims of the named defendants. It seeks no
relief against the appellants. Whatever right they have to intervene must be
exercised under Rule 24, F.R.C-v.P., 28 U.S.C.A., which permits intervention
as a matter of right when representation of the applicant's interest is inadequate
and the applicant may be bound by the judgment in the action. Each
requirement is absent.
The defeat of the claim of Utah and those claiming under Utah is essential to
both the United States and the appellants. The interest of the United States is
far greater than that of the appellants as it concerns substantially more land.
This is not a case like United States v. Martin, 10 Cir., 267 F.2d 764, in which
intervention was allowed over the objection of the United States. There the
United States alleged in its complaint that the basic document was contractual
in nature. The interveners asserted rights based on that document. The court
held that vested rights of the interveners, even without the contract, could not
be taken without just compensation and that the intervention presented 'a claim
upon which relief can be granted as one arising out of a constitutionally implied
contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act.'
7
In the Martin case there was a direct conflict of interest between the interveners
and the United States and there was no representation of the interveners in the
main case. Here the United States is vigorously contesting the claim of Utah. In
this regard it is representing the interests of the appellants and we shall not
assume that such representation will be inadequate.5
While the United States in its complaint avers the validity of the Superior lease,
it does so to protect the title of its lessee against the claims of Utah and its
lessee. In so doing it does not seek any determination as to the relative rights of
Superior and the appellants because it did not make appellants parties to the
suit. Both Superior and the appellants assert rights derived from the United
States. The establishment of the basic title of the United States benefits both
Superior and the appellants. The suggestion that the inclusion of Superior as a
party is to prefer Superior over appellants can only amount to a charge that the
government is acting in bad faith. We reject any such insinuation. The good
faith efforts of the United States to maintain its title as against Utah and those
claiming under Utah assures adequate representation for the appellants in
litigation to defeat the Utah claims.
The appellants will not be bound by any decree which may be entered herein in
the sense that it will be res judicata. This is not an action in rem as the
proceedings do not purport to affect the interests of all persons in the property.6
A proceeding to affect only the interests of particular persons is a proceeding
quasi in rem.7 As the appellants are not parties, their rights cannot be
determined by any decree entered herein.8
10
Because the appellants derive whatever rights they may have from the United
States, a decree in favor of Utah and its successors will have a binding adverse
effect unless the appellants by reason of their situation can establish a right
created prior to the grant under which Utah claims. The existence of such a
right may not be determined in this action to which appellants are not parties.
For example, if the mining claim was in existence prior to the Utah grant and
was excluded therefrom and remained subject to the mining laws of the United
States, the rights of the appellants to that mining claim may not be determined
herein.
11
If the United States prevails, then the appellants have those rights to which they
11
If the United States prevails, then the appellants have those rights to which they
are entitled under the mining laws. This action will not determine whether
Superior, the Navajo oil and gas lessee, or the appellants have the better title.
No decree in favor of the United States may determine the conflicting claims of
Superior and the appellants.
12
While the appellants do not rely on permissive intervention under Rule 24(b),
we note in passing that such rule is not helpful to them as intervention
thereunder is discretionary and in the exercise of that discretion the court is
required to consider 'whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.' It is clear that in this case there
would be such delay and prejudice.
13
The appellants have not satisfied the requirements of Rule 24. This makes it
unnecessary to consider the other points raised in the briefs.
14
Affirmed.
43 U.S.C.A. 851-853
Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151, 76 S.Ct. 219, 100 L.Ed.
149
Cf. MacDonald v. United States, 9 Cir., 119 F.2d 821, 827, mod. sub nom.
Great Northern Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 62 S.Ct. 529, 86 L.Ed. 836
Restatement, ibid. Cf. Albion-Idaho Land Co. v. Naf Irr. Co., 10 Cir., 97 F.2d
439, 444
United States v. State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 12, 55 S.Ct. 610, 79 L.Ed. 1267