James T. Michel v. The Ætna Casualty and Surety Company, and The Automobile Insurance Company, 252 F.2d 40, 10th Cir. (1958)

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252 F.

2d 40

James T. MICHEL, Appellant,


v.
The TNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, and The
Automobile Insurance Company, Appellees.
No. 5708.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.


January 29, 1958.
Rehearing Denied March 7, 1958.

Floyd L. Walker, Tulsa, Okl. (Kenneth L. Stainer, Tulsa, Okl., was with
him on the brief), for appellant.
William S. Hall, Tulsa, Okl. (W. E. Green, Raymond G. Feldman, and
George A. Farrar, Tulsa, Okl., were with him on the brief), for appellees.
Before MURRAH, LEWIS, and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Michel, plaintiff below and hereinafter so referred to, brought this
declaratory judgment action claiming that at the time of an accident his 1955
Pontiac station wagon was insured under the automatic coverage provision of a
policy issued to him by the appellees, hereinafter jointly referred to as Aetna.
The case was submitted on a stipulation of facts. The trial court held that there
was no coverage.

Prior to October 3, 1956, plaintiff owned three automobiles. One was a 1955
Chrysler Imperial insured by Aetna under a policy having liability limits of
$50,000-$100,000. The second was a Pontiac Catalina insured by Great
American Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as Great American, under
a policy having liability limits of $5,000-$10,000. The third was a 1952 Dodge
pick-up truck which was not insured.

On October 3, 1956, the plaintiff traded the Dodge and the Pontiac Catalina to

the Carl Lea Motor Company of Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, for a Pontiac
station wagon. This was a "mutual, simultaneous transaction" by which the
motor company acquired the Dodge and the Pontiac Catalina and the plaintiff
acquired the Pontiac station wagon. On the same day, but after the
consummation of the trade, the Pontiac station wagon was delivered to the
plaintiff. At the time of such delivery the only other automobile owned by the
plaintiff was the Chrysler. On October 4, 1956, the Pontiac station wagon,
while being driven by plaintiff's wife, was involved in an accident.
4

The policy issued by Aetna on the Chrysler and the policy issued by Great
American on the Catalina contained identical provisions relating to the
automatic coverage of newly acquired automobiles. Each stated that as used in
the policy, the term "automobile" means:

"(4) Newly Acquired Automobile an automobile, ownership of which is


acquired by the named Insured or his spouse if a resident of the same
household, if (a) it replaces an automobile owned by either and covered by this
policy, or the Company insures all automobiles owned by the named Insured
and such spouse on the date of its delivery, and (b) the named Insured or such
spouse notifies the Company within thirty days following such delivery date; *
* *." No question relating to the notice to the company is raised here. Great
American has conceded that the station wagon became automatically covered
by its policy. This is obviously correct because the station wagon replaced the
Catalina which was originally covered by the Great American policy.

The quoted provision is for the benefit of the insured and has for its purpose
automatic coverage in respect to the operation or maintenance of an automobile
acquired as a replacement for the automobile originally covered1 or acquired as
an additional automobile when the company insures all the automobiles of the
individual.2

The automatic coverage provision becomes effective at the time of the delivery
of the newly acquired automobile.3 This is true as to both the Great American
and Aetna policies. The word "date" as used in the phrase "the date of its
delivery" refers to the particular point of time at which the transaction occurred
rather than the calendar day on which it occurred.4

On October 3, 1956, the plaintiff had two insurance policies, one in Aetna
covering the Chrysler and one in Great American covering the Catalina. On
that day he divested himself of ownership of the Catalina and simultaneously
acquired ownership of the station wagon. He retained ownership of the

Chrysler. The Great American policy on the Catalina, under the replacement
portion of its newly acquired automobile provision, was, at the time of the
simultaneous transaction of exchange, extended to cover the station wagon but
did not become effective for that purpose until delivery of the station wagon.
This deferment of the effectiveness of the policy did not nullify the existence of
the insurance. It merely postponed the time when it became operative. The
conclusion necessarily follows that at the "date" or time of delivery of the
newly acquired automobile, Aetna did not insure all automobiles owned by the
plaintiff. Hence, Aetna is not liable under the newly acquired automobile
provision of its policy.
9

We express no opinion as to what the situation might have been if there had
been a lapse of time between the divestiture of ownership of the originally
insured automobile and the acquisition of the replacement.

10

The judgment is affirmed.

Notes:
1

Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Lund, 10 Cir., 234 F.2d 916, 919

Horace Mann Mutual Casualty Co. v. Bell, D.C., 134 F.Supp. 307, 310-312;
Birch v. Harbor Ins. Co., 126 Cal.App. 2d 714, 272 P.2d 784, 786; Dunmire
Motor Co. v. Oregon Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 166 Or. 690, 114 P.2d 1005, 1008

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Toney, 178 Va. 196, 16 S.E.2d 340, 343; Blixt v.
Home Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 717, 18 N.W.2d 78, 80. Cf. Western Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Lund, supra [234 F.2d 919], wherein this court said that "the
automatic coverage becomes effective immediately upon the replacement."

Kleinschmidt v. Hoctor, 361 Mo. 29, 233 S.W.2d 649, 654; Waggener v.
McCanless, 183 Tenn. 258, 191 S.W.2d 551, 553, 162 A.L.R. 1402; In re
Muldoon, Sup., 123 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712; In re Irvine's Estate, 114 Mont. 577,
139 P.2d 489, 490-491, 147 A.L.R. 882. The Oklahoma statute, O.S.1951, Title
25, Section 23, providing that fractions of a day are to be disregarded in
computations which include more than one day, is obviously not applicable

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