Filed: Patrick Fisher
Filed: Patrick Fisher
Filed: Patrick Fisher
TENTH CIRCUIT
APR 13 2004
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
No. 03-3264
v.
D. Kansas
MARCO ANTONIO
CASTRO-HOLGUIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*
BACKGROUND
According to the district courts description of the facts in its order denying
the motion to suppress, Deputy Knowles of the Lyon County Sheriffs Department
stopped Castro-Holguins car, a black El Camino traveling northbound on I-35, at
approximately 6:30 a.m. on May 6, 2002, because it did not appear to have a
visible license plate. In response to Deputy Knowles request for a drivers
license, Castro-Holguin produced a Mexican passport and visa. Deputy Knowles
then asked Castro-Holguin to come with him to his patrol car while the deputy ran
a check on his identification papers. In the patrol car, the deputy asked CastroHolguin about his travel plans, and Castro-Holguin told him he was traveling
from Mexico to Kansas City for vacation. Deputy Knowles then received
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DISCUSSION
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the factual
findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the district courts determination.
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United
States v. Williams , 271 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
We are mindful that at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight given to the evidence, as well as the inferences and
conclusions drawn therefrom, are matters for the trial judge.
United States v.
Caro , 248 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment is a question of law which we review de novo.
Id.
United States v. Holt , 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001)
of Kansas law, which requires vehicles to have rear license plates in a place and
position to be clearly visible, and . . . maintained free from foreign materials and
in a condition to be clearly legible. Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-133. Castro-Holguin
argues, citing expert testimony and photographs, that his license plate was in fact
legible from thirty yards away despite its plastic covering. He questions Deputy
Knowles credibility in stating otherwise. The district court, however, found that
the tinted plastic covering on the license plate obstructed its visibility and that the
deputy in fact could not see the license plate clearly. R. Vol. I, tab 41, at 6.
We have reviewed the record, which includes photographs of the back of the car,
and do not consider the district courts finding clearly erroneous. We thus hold
that Deputy Knowles had reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation
justifying his stop of Castro-Holguins car.
Castro-Holguin next challenges the scope of his detention during the traffic
stop. We have held that a police officer may, during a routine traffic stop, ask
about the drivers authority to operate the vehicle, check the drivers license and
registration, and ask about travel plans.
a motorist has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate
the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to
further delay by police for additional questioning.
such questioning or if the detaining officer has a reasonable articulable basis for
suspecting the motorist of criminal activity.
183 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999). Rather, [w]hether an encounter can be
deemed consensual depends on whether the police conduct would have conveyed
to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officers requests
or otherwise terminate the encounter.
United
at 1194 (quoting United States v. Werking , 915 F.2d 1404, 1409 (10th Cir.
1990)). We do not consider the courts findings on this matter clearly erroneous
and thus uphold its conclusion that the encounter following the return of CastroHolguins papers was consensual.
Castro-Holguin also challenges Deputy Knowles search of the car, arguing
that he did not voluntarily consent to the deputys request to search.
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances.
United States v. Taverna , 348 F.3d 873, 878 (10th Cir. 2003)
Holguins consent was voluntary. The court reasoned that although it was unclear
from the videotape whether Castro-Holguin nodded or said si after reading the
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district courts denial of the motion to
suppress is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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