Filed: Patrick Fisher
Filed: Patrick Fisher
Filed: Patrick Fisher
TENTH CIRCUIT
APR 28 2000
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
No. 99-5120
JORGE RODRIGUEZ-MORENO,
Defendant-Appellant.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*
Both Salinas Sr. and Salinas Jr. agreed to cooperate with the agents and they
were released the next morning.
On May 1, 1997, Salinas Sr. asked the agents to return to the store because
there were some boxes that he suspected contained marijuana. The agents found
the boxes contained 1581.5 pounds of marijuana. A few days later, Salinas Sr.
made a DEA-monitored telephone call to Garcia-Saldivar to discuss delivery of
the marijuana. On May 13, 1997, Salinas Sr. told Garcia-Saldivar that he did not
have a way to transport the marijuana. Salinas Sr. went to a convenience store to
meet Garcia-Saldivar and left the store with Garcia-Saldivars brother. They
went to a ranch owned by Garcia-Saldivar, and Salinas Sr. was provided a vehicle
to transport the marijuana. Salinas Sr. drove the truck to the McAllen DEA
office, where agents loaded it with 400 pounds of marijuana. After the truck was
loaded, Salinas Sr. drove it to the Wonder Burger to meet Rodriguez-Moreno.
The truck then was driven by Cabrera from the Wonder Burger to the Central de
Abastos, a produce terminal, where Cabrera was arrested, along with Trejo,
Castillo-Salazar, and Peralez-Munoz. Rodriguez-Moreno was arrested at the
Wonder Burger.
DEA agents went to Ropa Usada later that evening after receiving
information that another load of marijuana was to be delivered and found 1,127
pounds of marijuana in a pickup parked outside the store. Keys to the truck were
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II.
Double jeopardy
Rodriguez-Moreno argues the Oklahoma prosecution against him was
barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. We review the
factual findings underlying the defendants double jeopardy claim for clear
, 73 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (10th Cir.
1996). The district courts ultimate determination regarding double jeopardy is,
however, a question of law we review de novo.
Id. at 1025.
United States v.
U.S. 688, 696 (1993)). [I]f two charges of conspiracy are in fact based on a
defendants participation in a single conspiracy, the former jeopardy clause bars
the second prosecution.
quotation omitted). The district court applied the same evidence test in
concluding that the Oklahoma prosecution was not barred by double jeopardy:
Although two of the witnesses in the McAllen, Texas trial would
most likely be called by the prosecution in the Oklahoma case, this is
where the commonality among the evidence ends. The Oklahoma
indictment alleges overt acts which were not alleged in the Texas
indictment, and it does not appear to this Court that evidence
introduced to support the allegations in Texas would suffice to
support the Oklahoma charges. Thus, without deciding whether
there existed one or two conspiracies, it is clear that the same
evidence would not be sufficient to support both inquiries.
Appellants App. I at 93.
In a double jeopardy analysis involving conspiracies, the court must
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determine whether the two transactions were interdependent and whether the
Defendants were united in a common unlawful goal or purpose.
at 1104 (internal quotation omitted
Mintz , 16 F.3d
). [I]nterdependence involves a
that the Texas conspiracy and the Oklahoma conspiracy were interdependent.
In concluding that the Texas and Oklahoma conspiracies were not
interdependent and therefore did not violate double jeopardy, the district court
stated:
The evidence introduced in this case indicates that the actors
working to perpetuate the conspiracies had no information as to what
was transpiring beyond their own criminal objective. Even law
enforcement officials in both Texas and Oklahoma claimed to have
little or no knowledge of related criminal activity occurring outside
their respective jurisdictions. No evidence was presented in the
Texas trial to indicate that the defendants were running a drug
conspiracy which was intended to culminate with a mass distribution
scheme which would stretch across the United States into Oklahoma,
Illinois, and Georgia. The very DEA agent working on bringing
down the Texas conspiracy testified in the hearing on this issue that
he had no knowledge of facts surrounding the Oklahoma distribution
conspiracy, or of the role of the Fletcher Trucking Company in
carrying out the distribution. The DEA agent testified that the Texas
investigation focused solely on events occurring in McAllen, Texas.
Though he believed the marijuana stored at the HS Ropa Usada was
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district courts analysis and conclude that the Oklahoma prosecution was not
barred by double jeopardy.
Collateral Estoppel
Rodriguez-Moreno argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the
government from presenting evidence of the Texas conspiracy at his Oklahoma
trial. The district court allowed Dominguez and Cabrera to testify about
Rodriguez-Morenos acts in Texas to show his state of mind, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b). The record does not indicate that Rodriguez-Moreno
objected to the testimony at trial. A party must object timely and properly to
preserve an alleged error for appeal.
1414 (10th Cir. 1992). Failure to so object constitutes waiver of the issue
unless there is plain error resulting in manifest injustice.
Id. at 1414-15. We
conclude that the district courts admission of the evidence was not plain error.
The federal doctrine of collateral estoppel stands for the principle that
when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any
future lawsuit.
Cir. 1998) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)). A prior
acquittal does not bar the government from presenting evidence of that conduct at
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a later trial under Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides that similar act evidence is
relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the
defendant was the actor.
the evidence is true, even if the first jury did not believe
beyond a reasonable
if the Texas jury did not find the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Rodriguez-Moreno was involved in the alleged conspiracy, that finding does not
prevent a second jury from reasonably concluding that the evidence showed
Rodriguez-Moreno was involved. The doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar
the government from presenting evidence of the Texas acts in the Oklahoma trial
to show Rodriguez-Morenos state of mind under Rule 404(b).
Rodriguez-Morenos conviction is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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