Rizona Ourt of Ppeals
Rizona Ourt of Ppeals
Rizona Ourt of Ppeals
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Donn Kessler joined.
D O W N I E, Judge:
1
Veronica E. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her
parental rights to B.H., S.H., and H.H. (collectively, the children). For the
following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2
On November 2, 2013, the Department of Child Safety
(DCS) received a report that Mother and the childrens father were
engaging in domestic violence. That same day, Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine. DCS took the children into temporary custody and
offered Mother services to address domestic violence, substance abuse,
housing, and parenting issues.
3
Mother minimally participated in services. As of May 27,
2014, she had missed 50% of her required drug tests and had tested positive
for methamphetamine on numerous occasions. Mother was resistant to
outpatient drug treatment at TERROS, fail[ed] to follow through with
appointments, lack[ed] motivation and participate[d] minimally. As a
result, inpatient treatment was recommended.
4
Mother was referred to TERROS Maverick House for
inpatient treatment. But her stay at that facility was short-lived. Mother
told her parent aide she was discharged from Maverick House because she
[did] not need such intense treatment. TERROS, however, reported that
Mother was involuntarily discharged due to her inappropriate behavior.
5
In addition to ongoing concerns about substance abuse, as of
October 2014, when the case plan changed to severance and adoption,
Mother had failed to maintain safe, stable housing or demonstrate
appropriate parenting skills, and she had not resolved her domestic
violence issues. Services ceased in September 2014 when Mother was
sentenced to nine months in jail.
6
DCS moved to terminate Mothers parental rights in
December 2014. A severance trial occurred after Mothers release from jail.
2
9
To terminate parental rights based on 15 months time-incare, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that DCS made
a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services, the children
have been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of
fifteen months or longer pursuant to court order, and the parent has been
unable to remedy the circumstances that cause[d] the child[ren] to be in an
out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent
will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and
control in the near future. A.R.S. 8-533(B)(8)(c); see also 8-537(B)
(grounds for termination shall be based upon clear and convincing
evidence).
10
We review the superior courts order for an abuse of
discretion and will not disturb it unless the courts findings of fact were
clearly erroneous, i.e., there is no reasonable evidence to support them.
Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JV-132905, 186 Ariz. 607, 609 (App. 1996).
Because the superior court is in the best position to evaluate witness
credibility and weigh conflicting evidence, we defer to its judgment on such
matters. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, 4 (App.
2002).
11
Mother does not dispute that, at the time of the severance
trial, the children had been in out-of-home placements in excess of 15
months. She argues instead that the court erred in terminating her rights
because she had made significant progress in her sobriety.
12
When terminating parental rights under the 15 months timein-care ground, the court focuses on the parents success in remedying the
circumstances that led to the out-of-home placement. See, e.g., Jordan C. v.
Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, 96, 17, 31 (App. 2009) (if DCS
offered services designed to improve the parents ability to care for the
child, evidence showing a parents progress, or lack thereof, is critical).
Mothers reported significant progress in her sobriety is relevant, but not
dispositive. At the time of trial, Mother was living in a halfway house.
Although she was sober in that environment, based on her previous periods
of sobriety followed by relapse, DCS and the court were reasonably
concerned about her ability to sustain sobriety in the real world. Indeed,
the court found that Mother is at high risk of relapse and has a very poor
ability to tolerate or cope with problems.
Best Interests
18
In addition to finding a statutory ground for termination, the
superior court must also find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
termination is in the childrens best interests. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377,
15. Termination is appropriate if the children would be harmed if the
relationship continued or would benefit from the termination. Demetrius
L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, 16 (2016). Factors considered are whether:
1) an adoptive placement is immediately available; 2) the existing
placement is meeting the needs of the child; and 3) the children are
adoptable. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, 30.
19
The superior court concluded that severing Mothers parental
rights would benefit the children and failing to do so would harm them. It
found Mother was at a high risk of relapse, which placed the children at
risk of being exposed to drug use. The court further found that
termination would provide the children with a safe stable permanent
home free of substance abuse, mental health issues, and domestic violence.
The court expressed concern that Mother would not acknowledge or
recognize the emotional harm the Children have suffered as a result of
being exposed to the domestic violence and substance abuse.
20
The DCS case worker testified that the youngest child S.H.
was in a home that was willing to adopt her. H.H. and B.H. were placed
together in a long-term foster home that was meeting their needs, though it
was not an adoptive placement. At the time of the trial, H.H. was nine years
:AA
Mead testified that B.H. had given her consent to adoption the day
before trial. Between the first and second day of the trial, however, B.H.
wrote a letter stating, in pertinent part: These past couple of visits have
been amazing and I miss my mom a lot and I cant loose her I cant get
adopted if anything I want to stay with the foster family Im with now until
my mom can get a house in buckeye so no adoption . . . . (Errors in
original.)
1
Given B.H.s changed position, Mother and DCS asked the court to hold the
termination decision as to B.H. in abeyance. The court declined to do so,
but stated it would consider the letter. In its best interests findings, the
superior court discussed B.H.s wavering position about adoption,
concluding:
With Mother currently being sober, it is understandable that
[B.H.] would vacillate on wanting to be adopted. [B.H.] has
previously expressed her fear of reunifying with Mother and
having the same cycle repeat again.
The cycle of
incarceration, substance abuse, and domestic violence have
been a cycle that these Children have observed most of their
lives.
The court was required to consider B.H.s position, and it did so. We find
no error stemming from the courts refusal to hold the proceedings in
abeyance as to B.H. or from the best interests finding as to B.H.