Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 137933

January 28, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALENTIN BARING, JR., accused-appellant.
BUENA, J.:
Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-appellant, was indicted for statutory rape committed against a seven-year-old
girl in an information that reads"That prior to August 2, 1997 and on several occasions thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province
of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs,
by means of force, violence and intimidation taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of the
victim who is only seven (7) years old, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge of one Jennifer Donayre, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On his arraignment accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision dated January 20, 1999, convicting accusedappellant of rape, to wit
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of rape, the accusedValentin Baring Jr. is sentenced to die by lethal injection and to pay the victim an indemnity of P50,000.00
plus moral damages of another P50,000.00 plus the cost of this suit.
"SO ORDERED."2
In a sworn complaint,3 Jennifer Donayre accused Valentin Baring, Jr., her grandmothers commonlaw husband, of
raping her on several occasions. It appears that Jennifer was living with her grandmother in Dasmarias, Cavite.
She does not know her real father since her mother and father were separated.4 Since 1990, when she was about 8
months old5 until 1997, she was left under her grandmothers care and custody. She calls Valentin Baring, Jr. as
"Papa."6
According to Jennifer, the repeated sexual abuse happened when she was about 6 years old whenever she was left
alone in the house. Accused-appellant would touch her private parts, and on such occasions, accused-appellant
would remove her panty, mount on her and violate her. She informed her grandmother that accused-appellant
sexually abused her.7
On July 29, 1997, Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza visited her daughter Jennifer, herein victim, in Dasmarias, Cavite.
She learned from her daughter that the latter was sexually abused by accused-appellant. Acting on her daughters
accounts of sexual abuse, she took Jennifer to the National Bureau of Investigation and filed a complaint.
Thereafter, Jennifer underwent a medical examination at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
Service in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Dr. Dennis G. Bellen, the medico-legal officer at Camp Crame found that
Jennifer was in "non-virgin state physically." The examination disclosed a "congested, fleshy-type hymen with
shallow healing laceration at 9 oclock position and the external vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiners smallest
finger."8
For his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations against him.9 According to accused-appellant, he has
been living with Jennifers grandmother for ten (10)10 or eighteen (18) years.11 Accused-appellant claimed that
Jennifer was not living with them during the time the alleged rape occurred.12 Later on, he testified that prior to July,
1997, Jennifer was living with them since 1990.13 However, Jennifer was taken from them sometime in July 1997,
but he does not know why.14
The trial court meted out its judgment of conviction on the basis of the victims clear, trustworthy and positive
testimony that she was raped several times by accused-appellant. Because of the penalty imposed, this case is now
before us on automatic review.
On April 20, 1999, accused-appellant, through his counsel, filed a petition before this Court to dismiss the case that
is subject of our automatic review because (i) the three-page double-spaced decision of the trial court is bereft of
material facts supporting the conviction; (ii) the medico-legal certificate is merely a scrap of paper since the
physician who conducted the examination was not presented as a witness that deprived accused-appellant of his
right to cross-examination; (iii) the case of attempted homicide filed by the victims grandmother against accusedappellant was provisionally dismissed; and (iv) accused-appellant was merely a "fall guy" and that another person is
responsible for the commission of the crime charged against him.15

In the appellants brief filed on November 4, 1999, accused-appellant assigns the following errors"The lower court erred:
"I. In promulgating a brief and short decision with material facts that have been omitted with no allusions to
the transcripts of records erroneous of tenses and grammar jotted by the Court Stenographer.
"II. In denying the accused his right to plead for a DNA Test to determine that the blood found in the panty of
the victim is not his but of another man, Venancio Mendoza, live-in husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer
Donayre, the victim.
"III. In not finding the accused as a fall guy framed up to take the place of Venancio Mendoza, live-in
husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer, whose behavior in the courtroom as a witness has been beyond
normal."16
The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.17 This vital requirement is not only demanded
from the courts. Quasi-judicial bodies are similarly required to give basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments
pursuant to the Administrative Code18 whose roots may also be traced to the Constitutional mandate.
A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are
clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid.
Nonetheless, in order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision should not be
simply limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to
the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunals assessments and
conclusions on the case. This practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether
the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions
of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision.19 Compliance with this requirement will sufficiently apprise
the parties of the various issues involved but more importantly will guide the court in assessing whether the
conclusion arrived at is consistent with the facts and the law.
In the case at bar, the trial courts decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such doubt may be
engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against accused-appellant but by the trial courts failure to fully
explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the evidence presented for or against the accused,
the assessments made from the evidence presented, and the conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the
pertinent law as basis of the decision.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of rape despite prosecutions failure
to present the examining physician to appear in court depriving him of his constitutional right to confront a witness
against him.20 However, a review of the transcript of stenographic notes reveal that accused-appellants counsel
waived presentation of the medico-legal officer and thus, was not deprived of his constitutional right to confront said
witness, to wit"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
Your Honor, I was informed by the mother of the private complainant that the doctor is no longer connected
with the Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City but was reassigned to the Eastern Police
District at Mandaluyong City.
"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
I just prefer that a subpoena be sent. We have to ask for the postponement.
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
We can dispense with the testimony.
"COURT:
Provided this is admitted.
"COURT:
Do you admit the due execution and authenticity of the report of the doctor?
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
We admit everything written here because (sic) doctor says.
"COURT:
Yes, whatever is written there, do you admit that?

ATTY. ABUBAKAR
Yes, your Honor.
"COURT:
No need to present the doctor
"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
We will no longer present Dr. Dennis G. Bellen of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Service at
Camp Crame, Quezon City. We have here the xerox copy of the medico legal report no. M-2831-97.
"COURT:
Will you show that to Atty. Abubakar.
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
Yes, your Honor.
"COURT:
Admitted.
You dispense the testimony of the doctor.21
A medical certificate after all is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape.22 It is well entrenched in our
jurisprudence that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as
the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime.23 Besides, testimonies of
rape victims who are of tender age are credible,24 and the testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and
credit.25
Accused-appellant likewise impugns the credibility of the victim by pointing out that the rape was filed one year after
its commission, which allegedly leaves doubt as to the real identity of the culprit.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any doubt over the credibility of the complainant nor can it be
taken against her.26 The following realities justified the delay in the filing of the case against accused-appellant: (1)
the victim was merely six years old when she was sexually abused; (2) the victim lived separately from her mother
and was left under her grandmothers care; and, (3) the victims sexual abuser happens to be her step-grandfather.
According to accused-appellant, he was simply framed-up and that another person also raped the victim.27 He
avers that his allegation is supported by the testimony of the victims mother Jenelyn that the victim was likewise
abused by the latters husband.
The categorical testimony of the victim that she was raped by accused-appellant cannot be overturned by the bare
denial and defense of being framed-up interposed by accused-appellant. The victim made a positive, clear and
categorical declaration pointing to accused-appellant as the person who sexually ravaged her"Q:

Are you the same Jennifer Donayre the private complainant against the accused Valentin Baring, Jr.?

"A:

Yes, sir.
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"Q:

Who is your father?

"A:

I do not know the name of my father because my father and mother are separated.

"Q:

If your father is in the courtroom can you point to him?

"A: Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man inside this courtroom when asked given [sic] his name as Valentin
Baring.)
"Q:

Is he your true father?

"A:

No sir. He is my stepfather.

"Q: You were pointing to your stepfather, do you know what things or particular things, if any, he did to
you?
"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q:

What were those particular things your stepfather had done to you?

"A:

He raped me.

"Q:

When your stepfather raped you, what actually did your stepfather do to you?

"A:

He removed my panty.

"Q:

What did your stepfather do after removing your panty?

"A:

He placed himself on top of me.

"Q:

Was he naked when he placed himself on top of you?

"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q:

When he was on top of you, did he place his penis inside your private parts?

"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q:

What did you feel when his penis was inside your private parts, if any?

"A:

I felt pain.

"Q: Was your private part bleeding as a result of the insertion of the penis of your stepfather into your
private parts?
"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q:

Did he kiss you while he was on top of you?

"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q:

What parts of your body or face was kissed?

"A:

My cheek.

"Q:

Where did this happen?

"A:

Dasmarias, Cavite.

"Q:

In whose house or place?

"A:

In the house of my grandmother.

"Q:

Who are the residents of that house at that time?

"A:

At that time nobody was in the house because they were working.
"xxx

xxx

xxx

"Q: Can you recall if the rape you mentioned to us happened while you were 7 years old, 6 years old?
What was your age then if you can recall?
"A:

6 years old.

"Q: How many times did your stepfather do to you these things you mentioned to us that is by placing (sic)
on top of you and inserting his penis into your private parts and kissing you?
"A:

10 times.

"Q:

Do you know how to count?

"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q:

How many is this? (prosecutor is depicting two fingers)

"A:

Two, sir.

"Q:

How about this, how many? (Prosecutor is depicting five fingers).

"A:

Five, sir.

"Q:

How about this?(Prosecutor is depicting 10 fingers)

"A:

Ten, sir.28

Accused-appellant even contends that the failure of the prosecution to establish the dates when the other alleged
rapes were committed justifies the outright dismissal of the case.29
Failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective
on its face.30 When all the essential elements of the crime of rape are stated in the information, an accused is
sufficiently apprised of the charged against him. Moreover, the precise time of the commission of the crime of rape
is not an essential element of rape.31 Neither is the exact date of commission of rape an element of the crime32 for
the gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse without consent.33
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court denied him his right to subject the blood found on the victims panty
for DNA testing.
The records reveal that accused-appellants counsel initially asked the court to subject the alleged blood found in
the victims panty to a DNA test for comparison with accused-appellants blood.34 However, he voluntarily withdrew
his proposition.35 Obviously, accused-appellants counsel is misleading the Court. It was even accused-appellants
counsel who recalled the submission for DNA testing. The alleged denial of accuseds right to avail of the DNA tests
is a futile attempt to confuse the issues. He lost sight of the categorical testimony of the victim pinning him down as
the perpetrator. It would have been more prudent for him to attack this damaging evidence directly. It must be noted
that in the prosecution of rape cases, the presentation of the bloodstained panty is not even essential.36 The victims
credible testimony, standing alone, is sufficient basis for the conviction of accused-appellant.
Cases subject of our review, especially those in the nature of child sexual abuse, often involve victims of tender
years. On account of the increased number of children coming into the realm of the judicial system, we adopted
the "Rule on Examination of a Child Witness" to govern the examination of child witnesses who may either be
victims, accused or witnesses to a crime.37 This rule ensures an environment that allows children to give reliable and
complete evidence, minimize trauma, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the
ascertainment of truth.38
In line with our foregoing thrust to protect children, we observed the peculiar physical examination performed by the
doctor on the seven-year-old victim in this wise"GENITAL
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora full, convex and slightly gaping with the pinkish brown labia
minora presenting in between. On separating, the same disclosed a congested, fleshy-type hymen with
shallow healing laceration at 9 o'clock position. External vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiners
smallest finger."39 (emphasis ours)
This Court is disturbed by the method of physical examination done on the seven-year-old victim. We noticed that in
the examiners effort to show the existence of abuse, the examining physician inserted his smallest finger, as shown
in the medico-legal report that the external vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiner's finger.
It bears to stress that this particular manner of establishing evidence by determining the diameter/hymenal
opening in rape cases was a common practice in the past. With the passage of R.A. 7610, this Court has
nonetheless allowed the utilization of the same kind of evidence in the prosecution of Child Abuse cases. In light
however of radical medical developments and findings, specifically as to the determination of the existence of child
sexual abuse, this Court deems it necessary to firmly adopt a more "child sensitive" approach in dealing with this
specie or genre of crime.
In the international scientific community, recent medical studies have shown that measurement of hymenal opening
is unreliable in determining and/or proving child sexual abuse
"The diameter of the hymenal opening previously has been used as a diagnostic criterion for abuse. More
recent studies have shown this to be undependable (Paradise, 1989).Factors affecting hymenal and anal
diameter include the examination position (McCann, Voris, Simon, & Wells, 1990) and the degree of
relaxation of the child. The anal diameter is also affected by the presence of stool in the ampulla. Hymenal
diameter may increase with age and with the onset of pubertal development."40
In fact, there is no evidence, nor published research studies which show that enlarged hymenal opening diameter is
any more common in abused than in non-abused children."41 Thus "In the latest revision of the classification system, enlarged hymenal opening is also removed as a criterion
that should be considered suspicious for abuse. With labial traction, the hymenal opening may appear quite
large, especially to the less experienced clinician, and internal structures such as vaginal ridges, rugae, and
vaginal columns may be visualized. This is purely a matter of how much traction is applied, and the degree
of patient relaxation, and has no proven correlation with past sexual abuse. Likewise, it is not possible to
obtain accurate measurements of the dilated hymenal opening, unless photographs are taken at the point of
maximal dilation and measurements are taken from the photographs using a calibrated measuring device.
Rings of different sizes that are etched into eyepieces of certain types of colposcopes can be used to
estimate diameter size but not to obtain exact measurements."42

Hence, insertion of a finger or any foreign matter inside the hymenal opening under the pretext of determining abuse
is unnecessary and inappropriate. The Philippine Judicial Academy [PHILJA] training program for family court
judges,43 through the auspices of the U.P.-P.G.H. Child Protection Unit, sanctioned that in prepubertal girls44 without
active bleeding, all that is needed is an external examination with a good light source and magnification. Be that as it
may, the physical findings alone will not be conclusive of child sexual abuse, for a child who gives a clear,
consistent, detailed, spontaneous description of being sexually molested may still have normal genital examination.
Despite the physical or laboratory findings, however, a childs clear and convincing description of the abuse has a
high rate of probability.
We are not at all uninformed in this regard for we, in a plethora of cases, have consistently upheld the full weight of
a young victims unwavering testimony.45 Also, there is Section 22 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness,
which categorically states:
Section 22. Corroboration.- Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if
credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the
standard proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.
What is important at this point, and we do not hesitate to reiterate, is that forensic examination inclusive of
physical examination and forensic interview of sexually assaulted children [adolescents included] must be
conducted with maximum sensitivity to the young victims feelings of vulnerability and embarrassment. Great care
must be observed in order to make the examination less stressful lest they be more traumatic to the victim than the
very assault itself. The value of collecting evidence should always be weighed against the emotional cost of the
procedure and examination of the child.
We now come to the matter of the death penalty imposed by the trial court. The single information filed against
accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6334-98, charged him with the crime of "Multiple Statutory
Rape."46 Even then, accused-appellant cannot be held answerable for the other incidents of rape committed. Each
and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of the other rapes charged should be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.47
Article 266-B, paragraph No.5 of the Revised Penal Code, imposes death penalty when the victim is a child below
seven (7) years old. The allegation in the information specifically stated that "xxx the victim xxx is only seven years
old" which clearly rules out the application of this specific provision that can justify the imposition of the capital
punishment. Paragraph No. 1 of the same article which warrants the imposition of the death penalty if the crime of
rape is committed where the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of
the parent of the victim,48 will not apply for while the victim is under eighteen (18) years old, the accused-appellant is
not the common-law husband of the victims mother. The trial court therefore erred in meting out the death penalty
upon accused-appellant for qualified rape. Thus, accused-appellant may only be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
In line with our prevailing jurisprudence,49 we sustain the trial courts award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity
andP50,000.00 moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. 6334-98,
finding accused-appellant Valentin Baring, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the sentence is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141141

June 25, 2001

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), petitioner,

vs.
CARLOS P. RILLORAZA, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari praying for the reversal of the Decision dated August 31, 19991 as well
as the Resolution dated November 29, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51803.
The facts are undisputed:
On November 5, 1997, administrative charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and loss of confidence, were brought against respondent Carlos P. Rilloraza, a casino
operations manager of petitioner PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR).
Respondent allegedly committed the following acts:
Summary description of charge(s):
Failure to prevent an irregularity and violations of casino and regulations committed by co-officers during his
shift on October 9, 1997.
1. During his shift of 6:00 a.m.2:00 p.m. on October 9, 1997, four (4) personal checks with a total
value of Pesos: Five Million (P5,000,000) were issued by a small-time financier/player and were
facilitated by a COM with the Treasury Division which enabled the small-time financier/player to
withdraw and receive said amount. The facilitation of the checks was not authorized by the Senior
Branch Manager (SBM) or the Branch Manager for Operations (BMO) and the COM who facilitated
the checks was not on duty then.
2. He even facilitated one (1) of the personal checks with a value of Pesos: Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00).
3. He failed to stop a top-ranking officer from placing bets over and above the allowable limit of
P5,000.00 per deal, he failed to stop the same officer from playing in the big tables and lastly, he
allowed the same officer to play beyond the allowable time limit of 6:00 a.m.
Respondent duly filed his answer during an investigation conducted by petitioners Corporate Investigation Unit. He
narrated the events that transpired:
"When I reported for my 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift, on October 9, that morning I saw BM RICHARD
SYHONGPAN beside TABLE #22 (BB) sitting at a coffee table inside Area 3. While inside the Area 3, GAM
RENE QUITO approached me with a check worth P500,000.00 requested by a customer for endorsement to
the Treasury. Since Ive been out of Manila branch for 2 years and Ive just been recalled to this branch for
only more than 3 weeks, Im not quite familiar with the systems and I dont know this customer. I immediately
approached COM CARLOS GONZALES, who at that time was still around, to verify regarding the said
check and his immediate reply was "ITS OKAY AND GOOD AND IT WAS GUARANTEED BY BM
SYHONGPAN. In fact, I reconfirmed it again with COM GONZALES since he is more familiar with the
systems and customers, he answered me the same. So I gave the approval to GAM QUITO for
endorsement. When I went in the office, I instructed OOS GILBERT CABANA to beep SBM VIC
ADVINCULA and BMO DARIO CORDERO to call office "ASAP" because I wanted to relay this matter to
them and there were no reply from both of them. I instructed OOS CABANA to send messages again to
SBM & BMO, but still I received no reply. It was until after noontime that BMO CORDERO returned my call
and I reported the incident to him. When I was at home at around 3:30 p.m. SBM ADVINCULA returned my
call and I reported the incident. I also relayed the incident to SBM REYES.
While during my rounds, I went down to the New VIP area and there I saw BM SYHONGPAN sitting at
TABLE #3(BB) and he was holding house cards at that time. I approached and stopped him but he reacted
that the bet was not his but to a CUSTOMERS. I took his words because as a subordinate, I respected him
as one of our superior who very well know all our companys policy esp. that an officer is not allowed to play
at BIG table and are only allowed to bet with a maximum of P5,000.00 only. So I believe it was not his bet
but the said customer. At that time there was no way for me to stop the game because I saw the said
customer, named MS. CORAZON CASTILLO, whom I dont know her [sic] since I was out of Manila Branch
2 years, and whom BM SYHONGPAN was referring to as the player, has a lot of chips worth about P7
Million in front of her and was betting P1.5M on the banker side which was over the maximum table limit by
P500,000.00. I know we are allowed to authorize approval by raising the betting limits as per request of the
playing customers.

After the game, the chips were encashed and I instructed GAM J. EUGENIO to accompany BM
SYHONGPAN to his room because he was too drunk. When I was doing my rounds again, thats how I
found out from rumors within the gaming areas that this MS. CASTILLO was used by BM SYHONGPAN and
COM GONZALES to played [sic] in behalf of them the whole time. And I also learned that there were four
checks endorsed during my shift which I facilitated only one check worth P500,000.00 after I verified and
confirmed it with COM GONZALES. With regards to the other 3 checks, I have no knowledge about it since
they, BM SYHONGPAN and COM GONZALES, kept it a secret from me. When GAM EUGENIO returned
from the room of BM SYHONGPAN he handed me some cash, which according to him, was given by BM
SYHONGPAN as BALATO. I did not accept the money because at that moment I was so mad that they
involved me beyond my innocence since I am new in the branch. I then instructed GAM EUGENIO to return
the money to BM SYHONGPAN. (sic)
Finding Rillorazas explanation unsatisfactory, the PAGCOR Board handed down a Resolution on December 2,
1997 dismissing respondent and several others from PAGCOR, on the grounds of dishonesty, grave misconduct
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and loss of confidence, effective December 5, 1997. The
Board also denied respondents motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 16, 1997.
Respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission. On November 20, 1998, the Commission issued Resolution
No. 983033,2 the dispositive portion of which provides, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Carlos P. Rilloraza is hereby dismissed. However, the Commission finds
appellant guilty only of Simple Neglect of Duty and metes out upon him the penalty of one month and one
day suspension. The assailed Resolution of PAGCOR Board of Directors is thus modified.
The Commission denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in Resolution No. 990465 dated February 16, 1999.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the Commission.4 The appellate court ordered petitioner
to reinstate private respondent with payment of full backwages plus all tips, bonuses and other benefits accruing to
his position and those received by other casino operations managers for the period starting January 5, 1998 until his
actual reinstatement. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,5 which was denied by the appellate court in the
assailed resolution of November 29, 1999.6
Hence, the instant petition.
PAGCOR avers that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED AND REFUSED TO CONSIDER THAT
RESPONDENT WAS A CONFIDENTIAL APPOINTEE OR EMPLOYEE WHOSE TERM HAD EXPIRED BY
REASON OF LOSS OF CONFIDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE CSC RESOLUTIONS
MODIFYING THE PENALTY METED OUT ON RESPONDENT FROM DISMISSAL TO SUSPENSION,
DESPITE THE GRAVITY OR SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THE LATTER ON
ACCOUNT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES REPOSED IN THE
RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF HIS POSITION.
The wellspring of stability in government service is the constitutional guarantee of entrance according to merit and
fitness and security of tenure, viz:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as
far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical, by competitive examination.
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law.7
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the case at bar, we are basically asked to determine if there is sufficient cause to warrant the dismissal, not
merely the suspension, of respondent who, petitioner maintains, occupies a primarily confidential position. In this
connection, Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 18698 provides:
Exemption.All positions in the Corporation, whether technical, administrative, professional or managerial
are exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed only
by the personnel management policies set by the Board of Directors. All employees of the casinos and
related services shall be classified as "Confidential" appointee.

Petitioner argues that pursuant to the aforequoted provision, respondent is a primarily confidential employee.
Hence, he holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power and may be removed upon the cessation of
confidence in him by the latter. Such would not amount to a removal but only the expiration of his term. However,
there should be no lingering doubt as to the true import of said Section 16 of P.D. No. 1869. We have already
definitively settled the same issue in Civil Service Commission v. Salas,9 to wit:
In reversing the decision of the CSC, the Court of Appeals opined that the provisions of Section 16 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to
have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. This is not
completely correct. On this point, we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the
effect that "Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil
Service Law and Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987 Constitution and
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section 16 which provides that "all
employees of the casino and related services shall be classified as confidential appointees." While such
executive declaration emanated merely from the provisions of Section 2, Rule XX of the Implementing Rules
of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in Section 12(9),
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. This later enactment only serves to
bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. Be that as
it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.
Prior to the passage of the aforestated Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized instances when
a position may be considered primarily confidential: Firstly, when the President, upon recommendation of
the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the position to be primarily confidential; and, secondly, in
the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office there exists "close
intimacy" between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
At first glance, it would seem that the instant case falls under the first category by virtue of the express
mandate under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. An in-depth analysis, however, of the second
category evinces otherwise.
When Republic Act No. 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959, Section 5 thereof provided that "the noncompetitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the
non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or
highly technical in nature." In the case of Piero, et al. vs. Hechanova, et al., the Court obliged with a short
discourse there on how the phrase "in nature" came to find its way into the law, thus:
"The change from the original wording of the bill (expressly declared by law x x x to be policydetermining, etc.) to that finally approved and enacted (or which are policy determining, etc. in
nature) came about because of the observations of Senator Taada, that as originally worded the
proposed bill gave Congress power to declare by fiat of law a certain position as primarily
confidential or policy-determining, which should not be the case. The Senator urged that since the
Constitution speaks of positions which are primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly
technical in nature, it is not within the power of Congress to declare what positions are primarily
confidential or policy-determining. It is the nature alone of the position that determines whether it is
policy-determining or primarily confidential. Hence, the Senator further observed, the matter should
be left to the proper implementation of the laws, depending upon the nature of the position to be
filled, and if the position is highly confidential then the President and the Civil Service
Commissioner must implement the law.
To a question of Senator Tolentino, But in positions that involved both confidential matters and
matters which are routine, x x x who is going to determine whether it is primarily confidential?
Senator Taada replied:
SENATOR TAADA: Well, at the first instance, it is the appointing power that determines
that: the nature of the position. In case of conflict then it is the Court that determines whether
the position is primarily confidential or not." xxx
Hence the dictum that, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the
position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly
technical. And the Court in the aforecited case explicitly decreed that executive pronouncements, such as
Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of
conflict. It must be so, or else it would then lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any
officer, by executive fiat, the protection of Section 4, Article XII (now Section 2[3], Article IX-B) of the
Constitution. In other words, Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 cannot be given a literally stringent
application without compromising the constitutionally protected right of an employee to security of
tenure.[italics supplied]
The doctrinal ruling enunciated in Piero finds support in the 1935 Constitution and was reaffirmed in the
1973 Constitution, as well as in the implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines. It may well be observed that both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions contain the
provision, in Section 2, Article XII-B thereof, that "appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which

are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to
merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination." Corollarily, Section 5
of Republic Act No. 2260 states that "the non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of
positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature." Likewise, Section 1 of the General
Rules in the implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 807 states that "appointments in the Civil
Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature,
shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examination." Let it be here emphasized, as we have accordingly italicized them, that these fundamental
laws and legislative or executive enactments all utilized the phrase "in nature" to describe the character of
the positions being classified.
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The question that may now be asked is whether the Piero doctrineto the effect that notwithstanding any
statutory classification to the contrary, it is still the nature of the position, as may be ascertained by the court
in case of conflict, which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or
highly technicalis still controlling with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of
1987, Book V of which deals specifically with the Civil Service Commission, considering that from these later
enactments, in defining positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, the
phrase "in nature" was deleted.
We rule in the affirmative. The matter was clarified and extensively discussed during the deliberations in the
plenary session of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the Civil Service provisions, to wit:
"MR. FOZ: Which department of government has the power or authority to determine whether a
position is policy-determining or primarily confidential or highly technical?
FR. BERNAS: The initial decision is made by the legislative body or by the executive department,
but the final decision is done by the court. The Supreme Court has constantly held that whether or
not a position is policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, it is determined not by
the title but by the nature of the task that is entrusted to it. For instance, we might have a case where
a position is created requiring that the holder of that position should be a member of the Bar and the
law classifies this position as highly technical. However, the Supreme Court has said before that a
position which requires mere membership in the Bar is not a highly technical position. Since the term
highly technical means something beyond the ordinary requirements of the profession, it is always
a question of fact.
MR. FOZ: Does not Commissioner Bernas agree that the general rule should be that the merit
system or the competitive system should be upheld?
FR. BERNAS: I agree that that should be the general rule; that is why we are putting this as an
exception.
MR. FOZ: The declaration that certain positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical has been the source of practices which amount to the spoils system.
FR. BERNAS: The Supreme Court has always said that, but if the law of the administrative agency
says that a position is primarily confidential when in fact it is not, we can always challenge that in
court.It is not enough that the law calls it primarily confidential to make it such; it is the nature of the
duties which makes a position primarily confidential.
MR. FOZ: The effect of a declaration that a position is policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technicalas an exceptionis to take it away from the usual rules and provisions of the Civil
Service Law and to place it in a class by itself so that it can avail itself of certain privileges not
available to the ordinary run of government employees and officers.
FR. BERNAS: As I have already said, this classification does not do away with the requirement of
merit and fitness. All it says is that there are certain positions which should not be determined by
competitive examination.
For instance, I have just mentioned a position in the Atomic Energy Commission. Shall we require a
physicist to undergo a competitive examination before appointment? Or a confidential secretary or any
position in policy-determining administrative bodies, for that matter? There are other ways of determining
merit and fitness than competitive examination. This is not a denial of the requirement of merit and fitness."
It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether apparent, that the primary purpose of the framers of the 1987
Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitive examination as a means for determining
merit and fitness. It must be stressed further that these positions are covered by security of tenure, although
they are considered non-competitive only in the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo
competitive examinations for purposes of determining merit and fitness. [italics supplied]
In fact, the CSC itself ascribes to this view as may be gleaned from its questioned resolution wherein it
stated that "the declaration of a position as primarily confidential if at all, merely exempts the position from
the civil service eligibility requirement." Accordingly, the Piero doctrine continues to be applicable up to the
present and is hereby maintained. Such being the case, the submission that PAGCOR employees have

been declared confidential appointees by operation of law under the bare authority of CSC Resolution No.
91-830 must be rejected.
Justice Regalados incisive discourse yields three (3) important points: first, the classification of a particular position
as primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative
declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. Second, whether
primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical, the exemption provided in the Charter pertains to
exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service. Such employees
are still protected by the mantle of security of tenure. Last, and more to the point, Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as
it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.
Considerations vary so as to make a position primarily confidential. Private secretaries are indisputably primarily
confidential employees.10 Those tasked to provide personal security to certain public officials have also been
deemed to hold primarily confidential positions11 for obvious reasons: the former literally are responsible for the life
and well-being of the latter. Similar treatment was accorded to those occupying the posts of city legal officer12 and
provincial attorney,13 inasmuch as the highly privileged nature of the lawyer-client relationship mandates that
complete trust and confidence must exist betwixt them. National interest has also been adjudged a factor, such that
the countrys permanent representative to the United Nations was deemed to hold her post at the pleasure of the
Chief Executive.14
As casino operations manager, Rillorazas duties and responsibilities are:
JOB SUMMARY: The Casino Operations Manager directs, controls and supervises the Operations Division
of the branch. He reports directly to the Branch Manager or to the Branch Manager for Operations in Metro
Manila branches.
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
1. Formulates marketing programs and plans of action for branch gaming operations in order to
optimize revenue.
2. Institutes and maintains a healthy, organized, mentally alert, and highly motivated human
resource for effective and efficient branch gaming operations performance.
3. Takes measures to maintain and uphold the integrity of the casino games.
4. Reviews, analyzes, and evaluates gaming table and slot machine operations reports, including
income performance.
5. Submits periodic reports to the Branch Manager.
6. Directs the opening and closing of gaming table and slot machine areas.
7. Directs the setting-up, closure or suspension of operations of gaming tables and slot machine
units when deemed necessary.
8. Controls the requisition, storage, and issuance of playing cards, gaming equipment and
paraphernalia, operations keys, and accountable receipts and slips.
9. Ensures that gaming operations personnel adhere to the established House Rules, company
policies and procedures.
10. Ensures that quality and efficient service is extended to casino patrons in accordance with the
established House Rules, company policies and procedures.
11. Directs and controls all activities of the Card Shuffling Center and the Card Distribution Room.
12. Issues directives, memoranda, and other official communications on branch gaming operations
matters.
13. Directs the daily and periodic performance evaluation of operations personnel.
14. Requires written statements from operations personnel regarding disputes, reported irregularities
and violations of House Rules, company policies and procedures.
15. Issues or recommends disciplinary sanctions against delinquent operations personnel, as well as
commendations to deserving ones.
16. Upon the Branch Managers approval, issues preventive suspension to erring employees
pending investigation.
17. Effects immediate changes in House Rules when deemed necessary, subject to management
review.

18. Approves table refill, chip yield, and dropbox yield transactions, as well as the payment for
progressive link super jackpot awards.
19. Directs the cancellation of progressive link super jackpot combinations.
20. Signs chip checks in behalf of the Branch Manager.
21. Approves complimentary food and beverages to deserving players and evaluates the same for
the possible extension of other amenities.
22. Settles disputes arising from gaming operations that have not been effectively settled by gaming
managers and supervisors, and enforces decisions on the interpretation of House Rules, company
policies, and procedures.
23. Recommends to the Branch Manager the banning of undesirable players.
24. Orders the removal of customers or employees from the table gaming (sic) and slot machine
area for justifiable reasons.
25. Implements contingency plans in case of emergencies to ensure the security and safety of
customers and staff.
26. Acts on customer complaints, suggestions, and observations.
27. Chairs the Branch Infractions Committee, the Variance Committee, and other ad hoc committees
of the Operations Division.
28. Represents the Operations Division in Branch Management panel meetings.
29. Apprises the Branch Manager of any incident of doubtful nature and of developments that
require his immediate attention.
30. Performs other duties as may be designated by the Branch Manager.
Undoubtedly, respondents duties and responsibilities call for a great measure of both ability and dependability.
They can hardly be characterized as routinary, for he is required to exercise supervisory, recommendatory and
disciplinary powers with a wide latitude of authority. His duties differ markedly from those we previously ruled as not
primarily confidential: for instance, PAGCORs Internal Security Staff;15 Management and Audit Analyst I of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau;16 a Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank;17 the
Legal Staff of the Provincial Attorney;18 members of the Customs Police;19 the Senior Executive Assistant, Clerk I,
Supervising Clerk I and Stenographer;20 and a Provincial Administrator.21 In this sense, he is a tier above the
ordinary rank-and-file in that his appointment to the position entails faith and confidence in his competence to
perform his assigned tasks. Lacking, therefore, is that amplitude of confidence reposed in him by the appointing
power so as to qualify his position as primarily confidential. Verily, we have observed that:
[i]ndeed, physicians handle confidential matters. Judges, fiscals and court stenographers generally handle
matters of similar nature. The Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals sometimes
investigate, by designation of the Supreme Court, administrative complaints against judges of first instance,
which are confidential in nature. Officers of the Department of Justice, likewise, investigate charges against
municipal judges. Assistant Solicitors in the Office of the Solicitor General often investigate malpractice
charges against members of the Bar. All of these are "confidential" matters, but such fact does not warrant
the conclusion that the office or position of all government physicians and all Judges, as well as the
aforementioned assistant solicitors and officers of the Department of Justice are primarily confidential in
character.22
We further note that a casino operations manager reports directly to the Branch Manager or, in Metro Manila
branches, to the Branch Manager for Operations. It does not appear from the record to whom the Branch Manager
(or the Branch Manager for Operations, as the case may be) reports. It becomes unmistakable, though, that the
stratum separating the casino operations manager from reporting directly to the higher echelons renders remote the
proposition of proximity between respondent and the appointing power. There is no showing of that element of trust
indicative of a primarily confidential position, as we defined it in De los Santos v. Mallare,23 to wit:
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant
of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of
state.
Necessarily, the point of contention now is whether there was cause for the respondents separation from the
service. On this point, having analyzed both parties arguments, we find that the Civil Service Commission did not
err in declaring that Rilloraza was liable only for simple neglect of duty. In the first place, there is no evidence to
sustain a charge of dishonesty. As the latter term is understood, it implies a:

Disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity. Lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.24
In the case at bar, respondents explanation fails to evince an inclination to lie or deceive, or that he is entirely
lacking the trait of straightforwardness. We concur with the appellate courts finding, thus:
Available proof unmistakably demonstrate that upon seeing BM Syhongpan playing at Table No. 3BB,
respondent Rilloraza at once, told him to stop. However, Syhongpan explained that he was merely playing
for a customer, Ms. Corazon Castillo who was seated also at the table. After observing the large number of
chips in front of Ms. Castillo estimated at around P7M, respondent became convinced of the clarification
given by Branch Manager Syhongpan and he must have relied also on the word of said top ranking
PAGCOR official whose representation must ordinarily be accepted and accorded respect and credence by
a subordinate like him. xxx
More importantly, the PAGCOR Adjudication Committee concluded that respondent actually attempted to
stop the game where Syhongpan was playing which was even utilized as basis by the PAGCOR Board in
dismissing respondent. xxx
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

The allegation that respondent Rilloraza allowed Syhongpan to place bets over and above the allowable limit
of P5,000.00 per deal is not anchored on a correct premise. Respondent Rilloraza has steadfastly
maintained that he is of the belief that BM Syhongpan is not playing for himself but for Ms. Castillo. Thus, if
Syhongpan is merely acting for the real casino player, then the policy of not allowing any PAGCOR official to
bet beyond P5,000.00 has no application. Respondent Rilloraza believed in good faith that the bet was not
BM Syhongpans but of Ms. Castillo and should not be unduly punished for his honest belief. The same
reason exists for the claim that respondent allowed BM Syhongpan to play beyond 6:00 a.m. This is non
sequitur since Rilloraza never entertained the idea that Syhongpan was the gambler.
Lastly, if only to consummate respondents alleged dishonesty and grave misconduct by corruptly profiting
from said incident, he could have easily pocketed the balato given by Syhongpan, but he never did, and in
fact, returned the money. xxx
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

On the facilitation of the swap of a P500,000.00 personal check for chips, this Court, after considering the
parties involved and the circumstances of the case, believes that respondent Rilloraza has judiciously
performed all the acts necessary to protect the interests of PAGCOR and has acted as a prudent and
reasonable man. It is evident that respondent had the authority to approve the exchange of checks for
gambling chips. In the exercise of such discretion, We find that the approval by Rilloraza of the exchange
was done with caution and circumspect [sic]. When he was approached by GAM Quito for endorsement of
said personal checks per request of a customer, he immediately approached COM Gonzales to verify the
check who assured him that the check was good and in fact guaranteed by Mr. Syhongpan, Davao City
Branch Manager of PAGCOR. To be sure, he even reconfirmed the same with Gonzales as he is more
familiar with the systems and the customers since he has been recalled to the branch for only three (3)
weeks. After approving the endorsement, he immediately tried to contact SBM Advincula and BMO Cordero,
to notify them of his action but none of them called back. In the afternoon, both returned the call and were
informed by respondent of the exchange of the chips for the check and presumably, the former ratified or
acquiesced to the action of respondent since there was no objection or complaint about the matter. xxx
These same findings negate the conclusion that respondent is guilty of misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. In Manuel v. Calimag, Jr.,25 we defined misconduct, thus:
Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in these words:
"Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a
misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his
character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the
character of the man from the character of the officer x x x. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or
malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and
failure to discharge the duties of the office x x x.
Differently propounded in Canson v. Garchitorena, et al.,26 misconduct is "any unlawful conduct on the part of a
person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the
cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. On the other hand,
the term gross connotes something out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful."
From the facts given, absent is that element of intent to do wrong against petitioner.
CSC Resolution No. 991936 dated August 31, 1999 classifies simple neglect of duty as a less grave offense
punishable as a first offense by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.27 In the imposition of
the proper penalty, Section 54 thereof provides, as follows: (a) the minimum of the penalty shall be imposed where
only mitigating and no aggravating circumstances are present; (b) the medium of the penalty shall be imposed
where no mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present; and (c) the maximum of the penalty shall be

imposed where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present. In turn, the circumstances that may
be properly considered are:
Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. In the determination
of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense shall be considered.
1w phi 1.nt

The following circumstances shall be appreciated:

a. Physical illness
b. Good faith
c. Taking undue advantage of official position
d. Taking undue advantage of subordinate
e. Undue disclosure of confidential information
f. Use of government property in the commission of the offense
g. Habituality
h. Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building
i. Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense
j. Length of service in the government
k. Education, or
l. Other analogous circumstances
Nevertheless, in the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked or pleaded by the proper party,
otherwise, said circumstances shall not be considered in the imposition of the proper penalty. The
Commission, however, in the interest of substantial justice may take and consider these circumstances.
We find that the Civil Service Commission, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly attributed good faith on the
part of respondent. Accordingly, the modified penalty imposed by the Civil Service Commission on the respondent
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was proper under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 31, 1999 as well as the
Resolution dated November 29, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51803 are
herebyAFFIRMED. No costs.