Baton Rouge Justice Center Study - Final Report
Baton Rouge Justice Center Study - Final Report
Baton Rouge Justice Center Study - Final Report
Reportx.docx
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................27
1.
Executive Summary
On behalf of Loop Capital Financial Consulting Services (LCFCS or Loop Capital), we are pleased to provide the final
report on the Baton Rouge Justice Center Study. In December 2015, LCFCS was engaged to review current local processes
that affect the jail population against national best practices in order to identify improvements that could expedite the
classification and processing of individuals from their first encounter with law enforcement through the time they are
released from custody. The goal of the engagement is to provide a report that assists policymakers in decisions about the size
and scope of a new facility and that will provide a menu of options for more detailed implementation steps in each of the
recommendations.
The City of Baton Rouge (the City) and the Parish of East Baton Rouge (the Parish) are considering the construction of a
new criminal justice complex, which will include a new Parish prison, and perhaps offices for criminal justice representatives
(including the District Attorneys office) and medical/social services for inmates with the hope of providing a more secure,
more efficient, and more cost effective facility.
Loop Capital gathered information surrounding these processes to help establish and understand national best practices and
new innovations in the national criminal justice field. Our team conducted research on the current criminal justice
landscape, analyzed data provided by the City and Parish and engaged the City and Parishs criminal justice representatives
in in-depth interviews regarding their experiences in and thoughts about the current system. Loop Capital enlisted such
authorities as the McArthur Foundation, BKD and Code for America to better grasp the ways in which other local districts
were improving their criminal justice processes. To compensate for gaps in the data concerning the Parishs current prison
population, Loop Capital partnered with students in the Louisiana State University School of Social Work to conduct a
comprehensive review of 400 current and previous inmates in order to gain insight into average length of stay, recidivism
rates, average bail amounts, and other factors currently affecting the Parishs prison population.
Statement of Problem. The primary problem addressed in this assignment was to identify systemic issues which prolong
a defendants stay in the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (the Parish Prison or the Prison), and thus unnecessarily
increases the Prison population size and prison costs to the Parish.
The Parish Prison faces a shortage of space. The Prison, which currently holds approximately 1,594 inmates, sends anywhere
between 500 and 700 additional inmates to prisons located in other Parishes at a cost to the East Baton Rouge Parish. The
closure of the Earl K. Long Hospital and the downsizing of state mental health facilities, along with recent local budget
issues, have exacerbated the Prisons population, resulting in higher costs and a slower criminal justice process. Baton Rouge
officials and criminal justice representatives have expressed concern regarding the slow processing times for booking and
release; a lack of communication between judges, arresting agencies, prosecutorial and criminal defense agencies and the
prison; a lag in the time of public defender engagement; and an inefficient use of prison resources given the design of the
Prison, all of which have increased the overpopulation of the Parish Prison.
As of 2015, approximately 89% of those in the Prison are in jail awaiting trial. The average stay in the Prison for 2015 is 31.77
days. Therefore, our review included the assumption that the vast majority of those helped would be released in a relatively
short period of time. For these individuals, the question is whether the delays in the system that result in higher costs to
taxpayers produce any additional safety or if jailing some minor and poor offenders may in fact increase criminality.
Figure 1 presents a breakdown of the Parish Prison population by race, gender, primary offense and violent crime as of June
30, 2015. Note that violent crimes include battery, armed robbery, assault, rape and murder.
The majority of
inmates in the
Parish Prison
are black men.
Felonies
outnumber
misdemeanors
by nearly
double,
although most
felonies and
misdemeanors
are non-violent.
Inmates by Gender
1,400
1,200
Male
86%
1,000
800
600
400
200
Female
14%
0
Felony
Misdemeanor
Inmates by Race
1,600
1396
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
478
400
200
0
Black
White
Other
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific Islander
2010
55.50
54.22
71.45
34.16
33.54
49.01
61.51
60.67
72.46
49.28
Black
Non-violent
Violent
White
Non-violent
Violent
Other
Non-violent
Violent
Grand Total
2015
33.82
32.88
45.08
27.31
26.94
36.15
24.69
25.03
16.24
31.77
Average
47.18
45.86
64.19
31.77
31.07
48.55
36.61
35.14
59.58
42.61
70
61.51
60
55.50
51.48 50.44
ALOS
50
47.70
47.28
44.71
40.16
40
33.82
34.16
33.37 32.26
30.79 32.65
30
34.00
27.31
25.17 24.69
20
10
Black
2010
2011
White
2012 2013
Other
2014
2015
Research Overview. The engagement was initiated by reviewing relevant case studies, articles and other data to better
understand the current landscape of the national criminal justice field. Over the past 40 years, jail and prison populations
have soared due primarily to the war on drugs, which has increased financial strains on the state and local government
budgets that are obligated to account for and maintain an ever-growing population of inmates. Since 1990, the United States
has seen its incarcerated population balloon to 2.3 million Americans, an increase of 61% (The Pretrial Justice Institute,
2012). East Baton Rouge Parish Prison has not been immune to these trends. Between 2000 and 2012, the overall annual
bookings at the Prison have increased 99% for males and 120.5% for females (CGL & GraceHebert Architects, APAC, 2014).
This trend continues despite the fact that crime is down to a level not seen since the 1960s (The Pretrial Justice Institute,
2012). The graph on the following page presents the cumulative growth in federal, state and Louisiana institutional
populations based on 1990 populations (US Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014).
250%
200%
150%
100%
50%
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
0%
-50%
Louisiana Institutions
Federal Institutions
State Institutions
Mass incarceration is no longer sustainable or socially acceptable. Dozens of jurisdictions are conducting research and
engaging civic organizations and leaders to reduce our national reliance on incarceration, ameliorate racial and economic
disparities in the criminal justice system and promote public safety in more socially just and effective ways. These goals are
being achieved through the use of pre-trial risk assessment tools, which allow judges and other justice officials to make datadriven bail and bond decisions; jail diversion programs, which allow offenders to receive help with the core cause of their
offense; targeted jail reduction programs, like the implementation of a magistrate court and summons or fines to keep nonviolent offenders out of jail; and data analysis tools, which allow local authorities to better understand their jail and prison
populations and realize programs and initiatives that support and rehabilitate those populations.
Leadership Meeting. Loop Capital met with leaders from the Baton Rouge criminal justice community on December 16,
2015, where we discussed what processes could be improved in the criminal justice system. All major stakeholders were
represented at the leadership meeting, including: the East Baton Rouge Sheriffs Office; the East Baton Rouge District
Attorney; the Mayors Office, the Parish Attorneys Office; the East Baton Rouge Finance Department, the Baton Rouge
Police Department and the Baton Rouge Area Foundation. The leadership meeting produced a number of ways by which the
system could promote lower crime rates, a smaller jail and faster justice, including:
Changes to the Bond Project, which provides judges with a one-page summary of each offenders demographic
information and current charge
Increase resources for the mentally ill, which is a central reason behind the engagement of Health Management
Associates
Interviews. On December 16, 2015, Loop Capital conducted interviews with stakeholders and representatives from the
Parish.
Figure 3 Interviewees
Name
Department
Role
Robert Abbott
Parish Attorney
Kim Brooks
Patricia Calfee
Project Manager
Carl Dabadie
Police Chief
William Daniel
Mark Dumaine
Chief of Administration
Mary Erlingson
Sherriffs Counsel
Warden
David Hamilton
Marsha Hanlon
Finance Director
Frank Howze
Chief Judge
Mike Mitchell
Public Defender
Hillar C. Moore
District Attorney
Nicole Robinson
Commissioner
Interview Notes
Listed below is the information gathered from the interview participants.
19th Judicial District Court
The representative from the 19th Judicial Court provided the Loop Capital team an overview
of the arresting and bond hearing process. Judges set bonds four or five times a day; bonds
are set using defendant demographic and criminal information provided by the Bail Bond
Program. Arrestees will typically receive a bond on the day they are arrested, with a hearing
conducted within 72 hours of arrest. The District Attorney will receive a copy of the police
report within 24 days of arrest. By law, each defendant must be charged within 60 days of
arrest, and arraigned within 90 days of arrest.
One concern of the 19th Judicial Court representative is the volume at which people are
arrested, making bail and bond decisions more difficult for judges and commissioners.
Misdemeanors are the biggest clog to the docket. Without a probation department, or any
pre-trial services available to defendants, all arrestees must go through the court system
which further exacerbates the high volume.
Bond decisions
are difficult due
to arrest volume,
lack of probation
alternatives and
the absence of
pretrial services.
The Judge also expressed concern regarding the lack of communication between the various
actors that affect a defendants journey through the criminal justice system, including
coordination among the judges themselves.
The Judge was generally supportive of implementing electronic monitoring and pre-trial
release programs as long as the programs are managed by the Parish to avoid any misuse or
abuse.
Mental health
programs are
needed to treat
inmates; postrelease programs
are needed to
reduce the
recidivism rate.
The Prison representative indicated that there needs to be more mental health services at the
prison aside from the diversion program recommended by Health Management Associates,
as this diversion program will not have the capacity to treat all current inmates who are in
need of mental health services. The representative also suggested that there should be
programs to assist inmates once they are released to reduce the recidivism rate.
The Department
has actively
reduced its use of
the Parish Prison
by 25% for City
court arrests and
11% for District
court arrests
between 2013 and
2015.
Better
communication
between judges
and different
agencies within
the criminal
justice
community could
promote faster
justice.
Currently, all interviews take place within the booking area, which is loud and distracting.
The representative suggested that all interviews should be conducted in a quieter place where
the arrestee can better represent himself.
Public Defender
The representative from the Baton Rouge Public Defender indicated that while public
defenders are appointed within 72 hours of arrest, they are not truly engaged with the
defendants case for another 30 to 60 days. The representative supports changes that would
allow the public defender to be appointed at the bond hearing in order to best advocate for
the defendants release, protest the bond that was set, and start working on the defendants
case. The representative also supported the implementation of Parish-sponsored electronic
monitoring to allow more people who should be released to stay out of jail.
The representative noted that the District Attorney typically receives police reports 30 days
after arrest, which significantly slows the criminal justice process as the defendant is
essentially waiting (whether in jail or out on bond) until the District Attorney can start
processing their case. Bond decisions can be changed, which is where the Public Defender
can add the most value. The District Attorney also typically takes all of the legally available
time to charge someone, meaning that misdemeanor offenders can be in jail for up to 45 days
before being charged. There have also been cases where the prosecutor decides not to move
forward on a case and lets the defendant out of jail after weeks of being locked up.
If engaged at the
bond hearing, the
Public Defender
adds the most
value as he can
advocate for a
defendants
release, protest
the bond set, and
begin working on
the case.
The representative supports the implementation of a pre-trial risk assessment tool as long as
the arrestee has an advocate to question the assessment as a balance. The representative
stressed the importance of mental health care and treatment in the criminal justice system;
defendants who are charged with a misdemeanor do not receive a mental health review or
treatment through the current system. Only those charged with felony crimes will receive
such a review and treatment.
2.
Process Analysis
Overview. Through the interview and research process, Loop Capital was able to define specific steps in the Baton Rouge
criminal justice process and provide average times between each step in the process. The flow chart presented in Figure 6
presented an overview of the criminal justice timeline, with marked days from arrest. Please note that our analysis includes
only information pertaining to District courts and not City court. Please also note that the data excludes information from the
More
bookings
occur in the
middle of the
week than at
the end of the
week. Also,
less booking
occur on
weekends
than during
the week.
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
Bookings
2014
2015
Releases
4,000
2,000
0
0
10
11
Bookings
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Releases
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Bookings
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Sunday
Releases
10
Booking Trends. Per the charts presented in Figure 5, bookings began declining at the Parish Prison in 2013, as evidenced by
the upper left-hand graph, with similar declines noted in both categories of crimes (as presented in the graph on the upperright hand corner). The overall decline in bookings beginning in 2013 was led by decreases in bookings for blacks, a trend
that appears to be continuing. Violent crimes peaked in 2014, and have since begun to decline.
Bookings by Year
25,000
16,000
14,000
20,000
12,000
15,000
10,000
8,000
10,000
6,000
4,000
5,000
2,000
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2010
2011
2012
Black
White
2013
Other
2014
2015
2014
2015
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
Violent
6%
6,000
2010
2011
Felony
2012
2013
Misdemeanor
Bond Set. City and Parish law requires that all offenders receive a bond within 72 hours of arrest. Offenders who were
arrested on City charges will have a bond set within a few hours of the completion of their booking, as City charges are all on
a bond schedule (which was last set in September of 2010). Those charged with District crimes will need to await a judge or
commissioner to make the final call on their bond, and will typically receive their bond amount over a TV callout system
within the Prison.
Completion of Police Reports. The amount of time it takes for a police report to be completed depends wholly on the
arresting agency. While the Baton Rouge City Police typically complete their police reports within one to two days after an
arrest, other agencies can take up to thirty days after an arrest to complete their reports. Those reports are then sent to the
District Attorney and the Public Defender (if the offender has opted to use the services of the Public Defender).
Counsel Appointment. Public Defenders are typically appointed within 72 hours of arrest, as the judge or commission
who provides the bond hearing has to inquire as to the offenders counsel. Usually, however, defendants do not meet with the
Public Defender until approximately 30 to 60 days after arrest.
District Attorney Receives Police Reports. The District Attorney normally receives reports from the arresting agency
anywhere between 14 and 120 days after arrest.
Indictment, Arraignment, Trial and Sentencing. Once the police reports are received by the District Attorney, the
offender is charged within 60 days of arrest, and arraigned within 75 days of arrest. Misdemeanor trials and sentencing
typically occur within 270 days of arrest, whereas felony trials and sentencing typically occur within approximately 730 days
of arrest.
11
Arrest
Booking /
Processing
Bond Set /
Public
Defender
Appointed
1-2
days
30 days
Public
Defender
Engaged
14-120
days
DA Receives
Report from
Arresting
Agency
60 days
Point of
Contact with
Law
Enforcement
Indicted/
Billed
Released
75 days
Arraignment
Summons
Misdemeanor:
180-270 days
Felony:
365-730 days
Trial and
Sentencing
50
100
150
200
250
300
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
12
Judge Data. As with all other criminal justice systems, the City and Parishs court system plays an integral role in the Prison
population and more general criminal justice processes. Loop Capital was provided court data for 86,505 current and
previous inmates to analyze. However, 19,097 of these records did not come with a State ID to tie them to the original data,
and 39,532 records presented duplicated State ID, which compromised their records. Another 2,262 records did not match to
the original data set provided, and four records presented with unusual court IDs. This left 25,610 records available for
analysis. The following tables and graphs present an overview of the data provided broken out by court number. Please note
that court-specific data is comprised of raw data, and does not account for the types of cases handled by each court.
Court
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Court
Felony
Misdemeanor
Grand Total
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
64.54
71.82
68.93
53.43
61.30
66.59
63.32
70.22
33.53
38.14
35.77
35.60
35.93
40.95
30.79
45.61
53.00
60.29
57.08
46.74
51.64
57.20
51.38
62.25
Observations
Arrest to Prosecute date is days elapsed between arrest and formal prosecution.
Prosecute to Final is days elapsed between prosecution and final disposition (case ends).
ALOS data represents time in jail, or difference between booking and release date, and stands for
average length of stay.
Court 4 has overall lowest ALOS, including lowest ALOS for felony and non-violent crimes; and
lowest days arrest to prosecution. This could be a model for other courts if underlying reasons are
found.
Courts appear to be improving in efficiencies. Taking a model case such as Court 4, determining
underlying causes for low ALOS and arrest to prosecution, then applying that model to other courts
to achieve greater efficiencies.
ALOS - Violent Crimes
Observations
Court
NonViolent
Violent
Total
51.20
74.77
53.00
58.97
76.01
60.29
56.97
58.55
57.08
44.82
66.20
46.74
49.54
74.59
51.64
55.85
73.01
57.20
48.99
81.49
51.38
62.22
62.62
62.25
13
Days
60
50
40
30
20
2010
2011
2012
2013
4
2014
7
2015
Observations
Both ALOS and Days from Prosecution to End have been on a generally downward trend since 2010
In 2015, Court 3 had the lowest ALOS as well as the lowest Days from Prosecution to End
In 2015, Court 8 had the highest ALOS and highest Days from Prosecution to End
Days
300
250
200
150
100
2010
2011
1
2012
2
2013
5
2014
7
2015
14
19
10
8
1269
10
14
1
3
318
1
1507
512
591
2
1
1
1797
537
515
31
1
2
Court
4
Observations
5
1
7
3
10
9
12
1
23
11
9
15
1
23
11
13
520
1
1
8
184
27
116
20
270
9
284
18
99
3
1
1177
877
1185
14
3
1
2030
359
679
2
1
2137
293
717
15
2
1
1295
551
256
15
4
2
2
1
1687
288
498
20
1705
469
455
4
1
1
1
Court #7 has a
significantly lower ALOS
for misdemeanor offenses
compared to other courts.
While this may be a
function of population
demographics or crime
types, determining the
underlying cause could
help provide insights on
efficient handling of these
matters.
1269
1200
1000
800
600
520
400
318
270
184
200
284
116
99
0
1
Source: East Baton Rouge Parish Prison; East Baton Rouge District Attorneys Office
15
Key Drivers at Each Step of the Process. Each step of the criminal justice process should be driven by active thought
and consideration regarding how to reduce the amount of time defendants spend in jail, particularly prior to their
sentencing. The below chart clarifies the drivers behind each step of the criminal justice process.
Pre-Arrest
Diversion
Arresting
Process
First
Appearance /
Pretrial
Decision
Pretrial
Detention
Classification
Sentencing
Post-Release
Initial Contact and Arrest. The use of citations and summons in place of arrests could have a significant impact on the
Parish Prison population. The decision to utilize a summons or citation versus arresting an offender should be determined by
the offenders danger to the community and to himself. Defendants accused of committing non-violent misdemeanors,
especially those for whom this is a first offense, should be provided a summons with a directive to appear in court for a
hearing in order to allow them to remain out of jail. There are many benefits to this system aside from reducing the prison
population; individuals who are given a summons instead of being arrested are allowed to remain active and productive
members of society. As an example, between 2010 and 2015 New Orleans was able to reduce its average daily jail population
by 67% through a variety of measures, including issuing a summons for disturbing the peace or marijuana possession. Prior
to this, 70% of these individuals were arrested; now 70% are released (Strategic Framework for Marion County Jail
Population Analysis, 2015). The department and other arresting agencies should consider other enforcement actions that
help reduce the Prison population but that also maintain a standard of community safety.
Arresting Process. It is important to note the successes of many counties and local jurisdictions which have implemented
diversion programs. Specifically, Bexar County (TX) built a center for detox and inpatient care to divert non-felony mental
health and substance abuse cases from the justice system, contributing to a $50 million savings over five years. (The
Perryman Group, 2015) Additionally, Kings County (NY) achieved success at lower overall cost, and avoided cost for foster
care, for women with children sentenced to support housing with treatment (Strategic Framework for Marion County Jail
Population Analysis, 2015).
16
First Appearance and Pretrial Decisions. It is imperative that the Parish Prison screen defendants for indigence to
ensure that no defendant is being held in the Prison simply because he or she is unable to afford bond. The only defendants
who should be held prior to trial should be those who pose a danger to the community or a flight risk. Holding defendants in
jail because they are unable to afford their bond not only strains the budget of the Prison, but can also have deep and long
lasting effects on the defendant, including extending an individuals relationship with the criminal justice system, loss of job
and/or housing and preventing the defendant from getting any necessary treatment for mental illness or substance abuse
(Eaglin & Solomon, 2015). Research shows that low-risk defendants who are detained until their trial were 27% more likely
to recidivate within 12 months than low-risk defendants who were released (Eaglin & Solomon, 2015). The longer defendants
are held, the larger the impact on pretrial failure. Low-risk defendants detained for just two to three days were 39% more
likely to be arrested than those who were released on the first day (Eaglin & Solomon, 2015). Those held between four and
seven days were 50% more likely to be arrested, and those held eight to 14 days were 56% more likely to be arrested (Eaglin &
Solomon, 2015).
Studies have also shown the success that local jurisdictions have when implementing systems that remind defendants of their
court date. For example, Cocinino County (AZ) found that about 23% of their jail population were defendants who were
detained for failing to appear at scheduled court dates in 2006 (Subramanian, Delaney, Roberts, Fishman, & McGarry, 2015).
The County tested several court reminder systems for defendants who received citations in the field. The failure to appear
rate was reduced from 25% in the control group to 6% in the reminder group when the caller spoke directly to the defendant,
15% when a message was left with another person, and 21% when a message was left on an answering service (Subramanian,
Delaney, Roberts, Fishman, & McGarry, 2015). In this and other areas, research shows that tailoring release conditions to a
defendants circumstances both facilitates release and increases success during the pretrial period (Subramanian, Delaney,
Roberts, Fishman, & McGarry, 2015). Several communities are now using text reminder systems.
Pretrial Detention. In order to ensure each defendant is being held based on his danger to the community or flight risk, as
well as to prevent anyone from getting lost in the system, detention decisions should be revisited while the defendant awaits
trial. Alongside the Parish Prison, the court system needs to keep track of defendants it sends to the Prison, and regularly
evaluate whether or not the defendant should remain in the Prison until his trial. In order to accomplish this, the judges need
to be able to communicate more effectively between themselves, but also with the Parish Prison. The implementation of a
system that alerts both the Prison and the defendants judge at regular intervals as a reminder to review the defendants case
would be most helpful.
This system could also help in assigning cases to each judge; if the system could recognize when a defendant already has an
open case with one judge, and the defendant is arrested again on a separate charge, the system should automatically assign
that case to the same judge in order to efficiently move the defendant through the criminal justice system. Assignment to
multiple judges results in an increase the average length of stay in the Prison given the fact that the defendant must appear
before each judge when he or she is on rotation. A system by which this process is automated would greatly enhance both the
dockets of each judge (as the system could also recognize when one judge has a larger docket than others and assign cases
based on size of each docket and the defendants previous charges) as well as the inmates interaction with the criminal
justice system.
In addition, the Courts could consider, as many other jurisdictions do, the appointment of a magistrate or commissioner with
authority to look at a list of those being detained in the Prison on relatively minor offenses and schedule them for bond or
plea reviews on a weekly basis. In such a plan pursuant to agreed upon criteria these offenders would appear before the
magistrate with public defender and district attorney representatives to evaluate the basis for pretrial detention and allow for
expedited pleas as well.
Sentencing. Implementing a probation program could also significantly impact the Parish Prisons population by keeping
non-violent offenders out of jail. Aside from defendants being able to be sentenced to supervision, the Parish could also
benefit if a defendant is willing to accept a plea deal that allows them to remain out of jail on supervision, by cutting down on
the time the defendant would have stayed in jail awaiting their trial. Adopting electronic monitoring and community service
work, especially if it is sponsored by the City or Parish, would also help in keeping defendants out of jail both pretrial and
after sentencing. Current alternatives in large part depend on the offenders ability to pay for the services which results in
those who would be eligible for this programming being unable to afford it and staying in jail, a more costly alternative for
17
Diversion Programs
Overview. The past decade has seen local jails and prison become the de facto destination for the mentally ill as budget cuts
and austerity programs continue to curb publicly available mental health services. Data from 2014 shows that almost twothirds of jail inmates had mental health problems and almost the same percent (68%) suffered from substance abuse
problems (Murphy & Barr, 2015). Not only do offenders who suffer from mental illness fail to receive the treatment they
need, but they also become much more likely to remain in the system than non-mentally ill offenders. Data from Orange
County, FL, details the average stay of an inmate to be 26 days, whereas mentally ill inmates stay 51 days on average (Murphy
& Barr, 2015). Mentally ill inmates in New Yorks Rikers Island jail stay on average 215 days, an increase of 173 days in
comparison to their non-mentally ill counterparts (Murphy & Barr, 2015).
The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) estimates that 9.6 million Americans, or 4.1% of the population,
suffered from a serious mental illness in 2012 (The Perryman Group, 2015). Relative to the national average, Louisiana has a
slightly higher prevalence of mental illness with 4.2% of the States population experiencing serious mental illness (The
Perryman Group, 2015). The average percentage of Louisiana adults with any mental illness (20.1%) was also higher than the
national average (18.6%) (The Perryman Group, 2015).
Predictably, mental illness is even more prevalent within state and local jails and prisons. The most recent data from the
Bureau of Justice showed that more than half of the prison and jail inmates in the United States had a recent history or
showed symptoms of a mental health problem (The Perryman Group, 2015). Specifically, 56% of state prisoners and 64% of
18
local jail inmates showed a history of mental illness in 2006 (The Perryman Group, 2015). However, only 24% of state
prisoners and 21% of local jail inmates reported a recent history of mental health problems, as measured by whether an
inmate was told by a mental health professional that he had a disorder, used prescribed medication, or received professional
mental health therapy due to a mental health problem (The Perryman Group, 2015).
Case Study. Jail diversion programs that focus on mental health and substance abuse have seen great success throughout
the country. One case study that our research has indicated as one of the most successful programs is that of Bexar County,
Texas, which was developed to assist individuals diagnosed with major depression, schizophrenia, or bipolar disorder who
have been accused of committing a certain class of misdemeanor or less to avoid jail time (The Perryman Group, 2015).
Funding for the program comes from a combination of federal, state and local funding, as well as from Medicaid, Medicare
and contributions from various health organizations.
What makes the Bexar County model so powerful and effective is the fact that the program contains several points of
diversion, including pre-booking and post-booking diversion programs. The pre-booking diversion program relies on police
dispatch reaching out to officers who are specially trained to handle situations with mentally ill offenders, who will intervene
with a suspect exhibiting behavioral problems. The officer also has access to a Deputy Mobile Outreach Team in which
trained county sheriff officers may be accompanied by mental health professionals to provide further assistance to the
officer (Cowell, Aldridge, Broner, & Hinde, 2008). Once the offender is in custody, he will be escorted by the officer for a prebooking mental health screening at the Crisis Care Center, where arresting officers will search the offenders criminal history
and perform a more in-depth psychiatric assessment. The below figure presents the three phases of diversion in the Bexar
County system.
Booking
Court
Jail
Release
Prison
Diversionary Programs
Prevention of
Arrest
Diversion
before
Booking
Pre-Trial
Services
Jail
Diversion
Outpatient
Services
Diversion
before
Adjudication Magistration
The Bexar
County
Diversion
Program is
both
adaptive
and flexible
regarding
the
changing
needs of the
community.
Source: Blueprint for Success: The Bexar County Model; How to Set Up a Jail Diversion Program in Your Community
Another diversion point in the Bexar County model is the post-booking bond. Once an offender has been booked, he could
potentially be offered a bond with mental health conditions. Offenders can be deemed eligible for a post-booking bond either
in court or at the jail, where nurses are on hand to identify those who are eligible.
The third and final point at which an offender may be diverted from jail is through the post-booking mental health docket,
which occurs once a week and focuses solely on persons with mental illness. Eligibility for a post-booking mental health
docket can be determined through on-going monitoring, which includes a check to see if the offender has ever utilized mental
health services in the State of Texas.
Once diverted, the offender is referred to a mental health treatment facility.
19
Total direct cost savings resulting from the diversion programs exceed $50 million over a five-year period, with a decidedly
upward trend over time. These savings are realized through a variety of channels, including:
Reduced use of the emergency room for injured prisoners, public inebriates, and the mentally ill
Health Management Associates Engagement. The City and Parish can benefit from the implementation of a mental
health diversion program. As presented by the Perryman Group in a July 2015 report commissioned by the City and Parish,
there are direct cost savings to be realized by the City and Parish as individuals receive needed treatment for mental
disorders through the crisis care continuum rather than spending time in jail (The Perryman Group, 2015). The Perryman
Group found direct cost savings to be $54.9 million in total over the first 10 years of the mental health diversion program,
with the potential for even more savings as these savings are spent for other goods and services. To this end, the City and
Parish has engaged Health Management Associates (HMA) to review the City and Parishs mental health population and
how the lack of mental services affects the prison population. HMA is in the process of completing their final report, but
HMAs senior staff has confirmed that their report will be recommending the implementation of a mental health pre-trial
diversion program, which will also work to serve those with alcohol and substance abuse problems.
Prevention of Arrest. Arresting agencies that utilize the Parish Prison should attempt to align the goals of their
organization with those of the Parish Prison, specifically in regards to preventing arrests, in order for the Prison to realize a
decrease in its population. For example, Baton Rouge City Police Department (the Department) has made a concerted
effort over the past few years to reduce their reliance on the Parish Prison. According to Department data, City court
summons and arrests dropped by 25% between 2013 and 2015 and District court arrests dropped by 11% over the same time
period. The Department was able to achieve these figures despite the fact that calls for service decreased by only 3% over that
same time period. Figure 4 chart illustrates the decline in City and District summons and arrests between 2013 and 2015.
Figure 11 Baton Rouge City Police Department Arrest and Summons Reductions, 2013 - 2015
All arresting
agencies need
to align their
goals to that of
the Prison in
order to
reduce the
number of
arrests and
therefore the
population of
the Parish
Prison.
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
2013
2014
City Court Summons and Arrests
2015
District Court Arrests
20
Diversion before Booking. More often than not, a defendants access to money will be the determining factor as to
whether or not he sits in jail before trial (The Pretrial Justice Institute, 2012). This results in many defendants staying in jail
awaiting trial, regardless of their flight risk or danger to society, because they are not able to access the funds needed to pay
their bond. In fact, some scholars partially attribute the immense growth in local jail and prison populations to an increase in
the use of money bonds (The Pretrial Justice Institute, 2012). A multijurisdictional study completed in 2010 identified over
11,000 defendants who were charged with misdemeanor offenses in a one-year period who sat in jail until their cases were
disposed of because they could not access $100 or less for their bond (The Pretrial Justice Institute, 2012).
Upon arrest, an offender can either be released on his own recognizance, without any financial conditions, offered a money
bond, or be held without bond. The bond decision is based on the defendants likelihood of appearing in court and whether
the person is a threat to public safety. In many jurisdictions, setting a money bond amount is used as a proxy for this
analysis. Ideally, the bond ensures that the defendant will appear in court and will not engage in criminal activity.
There are many inherent risks in this system, the most potent of which being that over-reliance on the money bond system
ensures that the poor remain behind bars regardless of their flight risk or danger to the community as they are less likely to
be able to afford even lower bonds. The concentration of poverty in minority communities can aggravate the racial effects of
this process.
The money bond system is, however, not without its merits. For overworked and under-resourced court and criminal justice
systems, the money bond allows officials to quickly and effectively move people through the criminal justice process
depending on their current and previous charges. Bond schedules can move the defendant in and out of jail even more
quickly, if he can afford the bond. However, in order to avoid the substantial downfalls of a pure money bond system, bond
decisions and bond schedules must be informed by data-driven analysis that can assist judges and other officials in making
sound and consistent bond decisions.
Pre-Trial Risk Assessment. To dilute the challenges of over-reliance on the money bond system, local jurisdictions
around the country have implemented pre-trial risk assessment tools. A pre-trial risk assessment is an instrument that relies
on data collected within the jurisdiction regarding previous offenders and their behavior, and uses that data to predict the
likelihood that a defendant may fail to appear for court hearings or be arrested on a new charge prior to the completion of
their case. Pre-trial risk assessment tools provide suggested bond amounts based on this data to guide judges and other
officials in their bail and bond decisions. These tools weigh a number of factors, usually including static factors (which
cannot change, such as criminal history) and dynamic factors (which can change, such as drug and alcohol dependence,
mental health, community ties and employment). A sample pre-trial risk assessment tool has been provided in Appendix A.
Case Study. On July 1, 2012, Mesa County (CO) implemented evidence-based pre-trial reforms with technical assistance
from the National Institute of Corrections. To implement the reforms, Mesa County formed a Pretrial Committee which
included judges, public defenders, district attorneys, private defense lawyers, pretrial services officials, Mesa County jail
officials and victim advocates to specifically focus on the area of evidence-based decision making in the local criminal justice
system (Bishop, 2015).
Prior to implementing pre-trial reforms, Mesa County utilized a traditional system, in which defendants were arrested and
booked into the jail, and bonded out only if they could afford their bond or make use of a commercial surety bondsman.
Defendants release from jail depended on their ability to post the money bond 76% of the time, while 24% of the time they
were being released from on their own recognizance (Bishop, 2015).
In 2010, Mesa County was chosen by the National Institute of Corrections to receive technical assistance in analyzing their
current practices and in making evidence-based upgrades to their system. This assistance did not come with additional
funding, however, and the assistance is largely available to any jurisdiction who desires to implement evidence-based
practices (Bishop, 2015). (Please refer to nicic.gov for more information.)
An analysis of Mesa Countys practices revealed a lack of evidence-based decision-making throughout the pre-trial process.
The Countys pre-trial services were not based on risk, but rather on crime class. The systems bond schedule was also based
on crime class alone with arbitrary money amounts assigned to various crime types. The Countys response to violations was
not based on best practices, but rather on local tradition. There was no adequate statistical tracking of pre-trial outcomes.
21
Since Mesa County had no mechanism to determine empirical risk, it was unknown how many lower risk individuals charged
with lower level crimes were being held for an indeterminate amount of time simply because they didnt have a few hundred
dollars. A comment was made by the jail commander that he held one inmate in jail for three months on a $100 bond for a
misdemeanor crime and that this was a common occurrence in the jail (Bishop, 2015).
To address these issues, the County first defined their project goals, which included developing a collaborative vision
statement for pre-trial practice, identifying and implementing an evidence-based pre-trial assessment tool, developing
evidence-based bond guidelines to replace the existing money bond schedule, implementing a response to violations system
that is consistent with best practices in this area, and developing an advance data tracking system to measure outcomes with
regular statistical updates.
The County then identified the necessary resources to achieve their project goals. After determining that their local
government already had the resources to realize their project goals, the County then established a functional leadership
group that included key stakeholders such as the Chief Judge, the District Attorney, the head of the Public Defenders Office,
private defense lawyers, the Police Chief, the Sherriff, the Probation Chief and other key leaders to review the progress of the
project goals, as well as the work groups product. The work group, which included more ground-level members and
technical experts of the criminal justice system, was then appointed to form the basis of pre-trial justice reform.
The leadership group was also tasked with identifying a collaborative pretrial vision statement, which involved extensive
research by the group to determine the goals of the pre-trial justice system. The vision statement laid the foundation for
accomplishing subsequent goals, as well as getting the various factions of the leadership committee on the same page.
Next, data targets were identified, which included the following:
Safety rate outcomes: the rate at which defendants released with or without conditions in the community are
charged with a new misdemeanor or felony while on bond
Release rates: the rate at which defendants are released from jail by empirical risk level and type of bond granted
The final steps of the implementation process revolved around the details and logistics of adopting an empirically-based pretrial risk assessment. These steps were specific to the issues that plagued the Mesa County criminal justice system, as well as
the data collected during the previous steps, but included employment of both a pre-trial risk assessment tool as well as a
methodology by which the tool should be utilized. The County went even further to replace their existing money bond
schedule with evidence-based bond guidelines, which removed money as the primary decision-maker regarding who is in or
out of jail. The professional judgement of Mesa County judges, combined with empirical risk factors, has become the new
decision-maker regarding the jail population.
In order to ensure a sustained implementation of these practices, Mesa County requested that stakeholders from each
constituency who were part of building the project and planning for implementation be involved in the training and on-going
coaching and mentoring plans.
As a result of this two-year process, Mesa County has seen a decrease in the pre-trial jail population without a negative effect
on public safety rates. Personal recognizance bonds have doubled in Mesa County, while there has also been an increase in
high cash bonds used to hold more dangerous defendants. Approximately 80% of the Countys jail population is now in the
higher risk categories on their pre-trial risk assessment, which has created challenges for the jail in managing higher risk
individuals but is a key outcome (Bishop, 2015). Lower risk defendants are rarely being held in jail just because they cant
buy their way out. Judges are making more targeted hold/release decisions based on empirical information, which Mesa
County identified as more a legal and rational approach to making pre-trial release decisions. The below figure presents the
effect of the pre-trial risk assessment tool on the number of jail beds (Bishop, 2015).
22
Figure 12 Mesa County Pre-Trial Risk Assessment Tool Effect on Jail Beds
As of December 2014,
the pretrial jail
population has
decreased by 27%, and
the pretrial community
supervision population
has increased by 24%
since the pretrial risk
assessment tool has
been implemented.
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Electronic Monitoring. Many local jurisdictions make use of electronic monitoring, which effectively keeps defendants
who are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community out of jail but still under supervision. For example, while MiamiDade County (FL) has an electronic monitoring program sponsored by the County, where they see real savings is using the
program as a threat for released defendants rather than using it as a primary course of action. To be clear, when a defendant
is released prior to trial, the County makes clear that the defendant will be put on electronic supervision should they violate
the terms of their release.
Diversion before Trial. The final point in the criminal justice process when a diversion could occur is before the
defendant goes on trial. Although it requires a larger commitment from the City and Parish and the court system, a
magistrate court could be implemented that allows for the Parish Prison to be emptied of prisoners awaiting trial who would
prefer to take a deal. A magistrate court would also provide an opportunity for judges dockets and the general Prison
population to be reviewed at a regular interval to ensure that no one is falling through the cracks in the justice system and
remaining in jail for reasons that are illegal or unethical. The magistrate court could also provide bond hearings and attorney
assignments when judges and/or commissioners are unavailable.
4.
Cost Analysis
4x More
Costs
735,601 Inmates
$22.2
Billion
2011
Overview. Each year, jails are one of the most significant public safety expenses of a
community (Henrichson, Rinaldi, & Delaney, 2015). The larger the jail population, the
more each community pays for staff, intake, diagnostic and release, in addition to costs for
basic necessities such as clothing, food and healthcare. Rising inmate populations lead to
rising costs of jail employees. Since 1983, there has been one jail employee for every 3.3
inmates, with only nominal changes to this proportion since then (Henrichson, Rinaldi, &
Delaney, 2015). These costs may not include jail employee benefits, health care, and
education programs for the incarcerated (Henrichson, Rinaldi, & Delaney, 2015).
1993
Measuring a Jails Cost. In February 2015, the Vera Institute of Justice attempted to 223,551 Inmates
$5.7
Billion
determine how much jails actually cost the community in which they reside by surveying
35 local jails around the country. The survey captured all of the costs incurred to run a jail,
as well as the extent to which those costs were included in the jails budget or were paid by another department. The survey
also asked about the sources of revenue that supported the jails expenses, to document the extent to which jail costs were
paid with county, state or federal dollars, or other sources.
23
The 35 jail jurisdictions that returned the surveys represent small, medium and large jails in 18 states from every region in
the country. Combined, the surveyed jurisdictions have an average daily population of 64,920, representing approximately
9% of all people incarcerated in the nations jails (Henrichson, Rinaldi, & Delaney, 2015).
The most potent insight to come from these surveys was that the
largest jail costs are those associated with personnel. Because these
expenses are driven by jail population, jurisdictions that wish to
lower their costs must take sustainable steps to reduce the number of
people they incarcerate (Henrichson, Rinaldi, & Delaney, 2015). The
accompanying graphic presents a breakdown of total reported costs
from the surveys. It is important to note that Employee Costs include
salaries, fringe benefits and pension contributions; Capital Costs
include capital expenditures and debt service; and All Other Costs
include non-personnel expenses such as contracts, supplies and
utilities (Henrichson, Rinaldi, & Delaney, 2015).
Capital Costs
5%
All Other
Costs
21%
Total
Employee
Costs
74%
Another insight from the surveys was that every jurisdiction that responded indicated that at least a portion of total jail costs
was paid by another government agency ranging from approximately 1% to more than 53% of total costs (Henrichson,
Rinaldi, & Delaney, 2015). These outside costs typically fall into six categories: employee benefits, inmate health care, capital
costs, administrative costs, legal judgments and claims and inmate programming and other costs. Vera found that employee
benefits and inmate health care made up the largest share of jail costs that were typically outside jail budgets, with employee
benefits averaging more than 20% of total jail spending and inmate health care averaging approximately 10%, although
health care costs were higher in large cities (Henrichson, Rinaldi, & Delaney, 2015).
Case Study. The following case study illustrates exactly how inmate populations drive costs. Johnson County, KS, and
Bernalillo County, NM, are relatively the same size. However, jail is more expensive in Johnson County, with the community
paying $191.95 per inmate per day compared to $85.63 per inmate per day in Bernalillo County (Henrichson, Rinaldi, &
Delaney, 2015). This is because Johnson County has a lower staffing ratio and higher salaries; the average officer working in
the jail makes approximately $94k per year and monitors 1.4 inmates, whereas his Bernalillo County counterpart makes
approximately $54k per year and monitors 4.1 inmates (Henrichson, Rinaldi, & Delaney, 2015). However, Johnson County
has a lower incarcerated population, with 693 inmates (or 121 per 100,000) compared to 2,496 inmates (or 369 per 100,000)
in Bernalillo County (Henrichson, Rinaldi, & Delaney, 2015). Therefore, taxpayers in Johnson County spend less on the jail;
Johnson County has a total annual cost of $49 million (or $82 per resident) while Bernalillo County spends $78 million per
year (or $113 per resident) on its jail.
This case study becomes particularly significant when considering that despite jail being more expensive in Johnson County,
taxpayers pay less there because the inmate population is so low, thus highlighting how much each jurisdiction could save by
taking steps to reduce its inmate population.
City and Parish Costs. In 2015, the City and Parish paid
more, on average, for out-of-Parish prisoners than in-Parish
prisoners. The accompanying table presents relevant 2015
costs regarding the Parish Prison.
1,514
600
2,114
$10,596,140.22
$5,664,696.61
$19.18
$25.87
24
projected). Note that these are major costs, and do not include costs of the East Baton Rouge Sherriff.
$ Millions
12%
10%
10
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
-2%
-4%
Costs
% Change
-6%
2010
8,279,611
2011
8,945,064
8.04%
2012
8,556,531
-4.34%
2013
9,085,909
6.19%
2014
10,038,914
10.49%
2015
10,596,140
5.55%
$ Millions
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
1
Costs
% Change
-20%
2010
2,903,751
2011
4,552,355
56.77%
2012
6,912,044
51.83%
2013
5,700,414
-17.53%
2014
5,727,206
0.47%
2015
5,664,697
-1.09%
-30%
Daily Costs. Using the average in-Parish 2015 per prisoner per day cost of $19.18, and the provided out-of-Parish per
prisoner per day cost of $25.87, we have compiled the below in-Parish and out-of-Parish daily costs by number of days and
number of prisoners. Of particular note is that the City and Parish spends about $6,500 per prisoner per year on in-Parish
prisoners, and $9,125 per prisoner per year on out-of-Parish prisoners, thus highlighting why it is imperative that the City
and Parish and each part of the criminal justice system work to reduce the amount of prisoners sent out of Parish.
25
30
60
90
19.18
575.34
1,150.67
1,726.01
25
479.45
14,383.41
28,766.83
50
958.89
28,766.83
57,533.65
75
1,438.34
43,150.24
100
1,917.79
200
3,835.58
300
5,753.37
400
7,671.15
500
600
700
13,424.52
180
270
365
3,452.02
5,178.03
6,999.93
43,150.24
86,300.48
129,450.71
174,998.19
86,300.48
172,600.95
258,901.43
349,996.37
86,300.48
129,450.71
258,901.43
388,352.14
524,994.56
57,533.65
115,067.30
172,600.95
345,201.90
517,802.85
699,992.75
115,067.30
230,134.60
345,201.90
690,403.81
1,035,605.71
1,399,985.50
172,600.95
345,201.90
517,802.85
1,035,605.71
1,553,408.56
2,099,978.24
230,134.60
460,269.20
690,403.81
1,380,807.61
2,071,211.42
2,799,970.99
9,588.94
287,668.25
575,336.51
863,004.76
1,726,009.52
2,589,014.27
3,499,963.74
11,506.73
345,201.90
690,403.81
1,035,605.71
2,071,211.42
3,106,817.13
4,199,956.49
402,735.55
805,471.11
1,208,206.66
2,416,413.32
3,624,619.98
4,899,949.23
A reduction of
300 in-Parish
inmates over
three months
would save the
City and Parish
over $500k.
Similar savings
could be
realized by
reducing the
out-of-Parish
population by
75 inmates over
nine months.
Days
No. of Prisoners
30
60
90
180
270
365
25.87
775.99
1,551.97
2,327.96
4,655.92
6,983.87
9,441.16
25
646.65
19,399.65
38,799.29
58,198.94
116,397.88
174,596.81
236,029.03
50
1,293.31
38,799.29
77,598.58
116,397.88
232,795.75
349,193.63
472,058.05
708,087.08
75
1,939.96
58,198.94
116,397.88
174,596.81
349,193.63
523,790.44
100
2,586.62
77,598.58
155,197.17
232,795.75
465,591.50
698,387.25
944,116.10
200
5,173.24
155,197.17
310,394.33
465,591.50
931,183.00
1,396,774.51
1,888,232.20
300
7,759.86
232,795.75
465,591.50
698,387.25
1,396,774.51
2,095,161.76
2,832,348.31
400
10,346.48
310,394.33
620,788.67
931,183.00
1,862,366.01
2,793,549.01
3,776,464.41
500
12,933.10
387,992.92
775,985.84
1,163,978.76
2,327,957.51
3,491,936.27
4,720,580.51
600
15,519.72
465,591.50
931,183.00
1,396,774.51
2,793,549.01
4,190,323.52
5,664,696.61
700
18,106.34
543,190.09
1,086,380.17
1,629,570.26
3,259,140.52
4,888,710.77
6,608,812.71
Prison Population Analysis. The Parish Prison provided Loop Capital with historical Prison population data, which we
have analyzed along with the annual in-Parish Prison costs. The most useful insight to come from this analysis is that while
the prison population has, on average, declined by 1.40% over the past five years, the average daily cost per prisoner has
increased by 6.84%. The Prisons average population since 2010 is 1,557, and the average daily cost per prisoner $16.32. The
average daily cost per prisoner has been on a steady increase since 2010, with the Prison paying an average of $13.91 per
prisoner in 2010 to $19.18 per prisoner in 2015. Figure 15 presents further details regarding the Prisons historical
population and costs.
26
1,631
2012
2013
2014
1,605
1,506
1,583
1,505
1,514
1,557
-1.57%
-6.21%
5.15%
-4.96%
0.61%
-1.40%
8,279,610.72
8,945,064.34
8,556,531.34
9,085,908.81
10,038,914.48
10,596,140.22
9,250,362
13.91
15.27
15.57
15.72
18.28
19.18
16.32
7.89%
6.68%
6.49%
7.39%
5.74%
6.84%
2011
5,076.66
5,572.38
0.02%
5,683.20
5,739.37
0.02%
0.02%
6,672.59
0.02%
6,999.93
0.02%
5,957
0.02%
5.
Conclusion
In the preceding report, Loop Capital has detailed specific measures and initiatives implemented by local jurisdictions
around the country to realize cost savings as they relate to the criminal justice process. The goal of our effort was to identify
systemic reforms that could enhance justice while at the same time reducing the size of a future jail. The reductions, of
course, not only affect the capital costs of a new building but carry with it very large implications on the twenty-year NPV of
operating additional jail beds. We found the insights and candor of the officials in the Parish valuable, highly professional
and immensely helpful.
The challenges facing Baton Rouge of course are not unique. Local governments across the country grapple with costs, crime
and a broad national rethinking about the social costs of pretrial incarceration. Although each of the jurisdictions illustrated
throughout this report materialized solutions specific to its community, each one has the same foundation that bolsters its
success: a coordinated effort among all of its criminal justice agencies to achieve a common goal driven by clear performance
metrics. In each of the exemplars we reference, the jurisdiction both identified specific goals and enhanced communication
essential to achieving lower prison populations and thus greater cost savings. In Baton Rouge setting clear objectives and
comprehensive communication may be achieved through shared technologies, which could be especially helpful in both
managing and balancing judges dockets, assigning cases and tracking defendants and inmates throughout their journey
through the criminal justice system. Data analysis is a crucial piece to tracking and developing goals, and helps the criminal
justice community remain responsible and accountable to the people they serve.
In conjunction with a decision on a new Prison, the following recommendations should be considered:
1.
Arrest or Summons: The City and Parish should make more use of summons in lieu of arrest. The City of Baton
Rouge Police Department has been a leader in this regard and its training and policies should be extended to other
departments that utilize the Prison. The monitoring and training of such use by individual officers will produce
further benefits.
2.
Pre-Trial Services: The new prison should include better organized and more space for such services. Pre-trial
assessments with a more comprehensive and formal matrix, bolstered by up-to-date systems that can verify certain
data elements will result in better initial bond settings and fewer individuals kept in the jail simply because they are
unable to afford bail. For example, the City of Chicago utilizes a risk assessment test to determine if an offender
should be treated for drug abuse or is in need of other social services to avoid having the defendant enter the
criminal justice system. The Chicago program boasts a 60% success rate, with those who fail the program being sent
to court. Pre-trial services could also help in tracking those who are arrested and serve time more frequently than
the rest of the population, and target this population to better understand the source of their re-offenses and
perhaps prevent them from being re-arrested.
3.
Probation: A formal Probation Department will provide alternatives to incarceration in pre- and post-trial
environments. The cost of electronic monitoring is substantially less than incarceration; yet only those offenders
27
who can afford to pay for their monitoring are eligible to receive it. This results in nonviolent minor and poor
offenders kept in jail at higher taxpayer expense. Probation monitoring of offenders will reduce expenses compared
to jail for offenders who can be safely released without electronic monitoring options as well.
4.
Magistrate Court: The Parish should consider certain services to be offered by the Court as a system instead of by
each judge. For example, a magistrate-type court to set initial bonds located in the new prison would more
efficiently reduce the prison population by simply reducing delays. Such a court could also receive en banc authority
to meet, for example, on Fridays to take up the case of minor offenders still in jail awaiting court settings. For
example, New York City has a magistrate court that allows for all misdemeanors to be arraigned within 24 hours
and all felonies to be indicted within six days.
5.
Mental Health and Public Intoxication Options: Increasing these options to include a place other than the jail to
take non-criminal persons acting out and in need of such services would not only assist the individuals, it would
shift costs to Medicaid for treatment and sharply reduce the intake costs to the Parish. For example, Cook Countys
takes a few minutes to interview inmates regarding their mental health history during the booking process to
determine if they should be diverted to a mental health treatment program.
6.
Charging Times: The time period it takes to file a police report greatly exceeds national best practices, driven both
by custom and the lack of an electronic system. Reducing such time from 21 days to a day is possible with a resulting
ripple impact throughout the system.
7.
Case Load Management: Just as in other systems some courts have longer periods for disposition than others. These
variations can be driven by public defender or DA workloads, the judges practices or the nature of the offense.
There are dashboards that would allow an official or organization like a criminal justice coordinating council and
presiding judge to make management decisions that would speed dockets and save time and prison days. Expedited
case management has proven quite successful in other jurisdictions, assisting in the rapid processing of minor
offenders who otherwise may become more serious criminals while incarcerated even while increasing costs for
taxpayers.
8.
Monitoring Reforms: A formal criminal justice coordinating council of senior officials should meet regularly to
monitor reforms and metrics concerning the above. The City and Parish should investigate possible technological
solutions that would better connect the various criminal justice agencies and collect data on defendants, as well as
past and present inmates.
Diversion programs have become a pre-eminent method by which local jurisdictions have achieved lower jail and prison
populations while still keeping their communities safe and providing necessary medical, social and mental health treatment
for those in need. These programs typically use data collected by the criminal justice community to discover qualified
defendants who may benefit from a diversion program, benefitting qualified offenders who have become entangled in the
criminal justice system via a mental illness, substance abuse or other social factors, allowing these individuals to minimize
their time in jail. Research has proven that the less time an individual spends in jail, the less likely they are to reoffend, which
allows jurisdictions to not only realize savings from reducing their jail population today, but also future cost savings from
preventing a higher jail population moving forward. The City and Parish would greatly benefit from implementing a
diversion program, via a pre-trial risk assessment tool, mental health and substance abuse screenings, and the use of
electronic monitoring. Once the programs have been enforced, defendants should be monitored and evaluated at each step of
the criminal justice process to ensure that he or she cannot benefit from a diversion program.
Loop Capital also recognizes that there are a number of process improvements that the City and Parish could implement
which would produce faster justice. Arresting agencies should make better use of summons and citations for non-violent and
first-time offenders in order to allow defendants to be processed through the criminal justice system faster while remaining
out of jail. The implementation of a magistrate court, to be utilized to control overflow and during off-hours, could ensure
that no defendant stays behind bars longer than necessary. Court assignment smoothing via the implementation of a shared
technological solution to manage the downtime before a defendant goes on trial would both help defendants move through
the court system faster and ensure that no judges docket is significantly larger than the others. Comprehensive pre-trial
28
bond services could ensure that no defendant is sitting in jail simply because he cannot pay the bond assigned. Engaging the
public defender or a private lawyer, if opted for by the defendant, at the setting of the bond, rather than weeks after arrest,
would give counsel the opportunity to lobby the court for a lower bond, and allow counsel to begin working the case as soon
as possible.
Clearly many of these recommendations will cost money even while reducing other expenses, but the City and Parish should
consider all-in costs of criminal justice. More debt for a larger prison generates the need for more correction officers which
drives up annual operating costs. The purpose of this study is to suggest that funds invested in operational efficiencies will
save much more in the hard costs associated with incarceration and related personnel and medical costs, as well as future
operational savings.
All of these measures, save the addition of extra space for pre-trial services, can be taken prior to the construction of a new
Parish Prison, and should be implemented before planning for the new Prison so as to better understand how many inmates
the new Prison should house.
These and other process improvements could result in significant savings for the City and Parish. The below tables provide
estimated scenarios at each step in the process and break down exactly how much the City and Parish could save by
implementing these suggestions. The first table, Potential Savings for Diversion Programs, assumes that the City and Parish
can make use of each type of diversion program for at least 100 potential inmates, saving a total of $5.665 million over one
year and over $113.294 million over 20 years. Loop Capital assumes 100 inmates could be diverted given the various
diversion programs based on the estimated number of out-of-Parish prisoners, in an effort to remove the out-of-Parish
prison population all together. The cost per day per prisoner figure, $25.87, was calculated based on an estimated out-ofParish prison population of 600 inmates, and the 2015 out-of-Parish prison costs provided by the City of Baton Rouge
Finance Department.
Cost per
Day per
Inmate*
$
25.87
Prison Days
Per Year
Number of
Inmates
Potential Annual
Cost S avings
Potential Cost
Net Present
S avings over 20
Value S avings
Years
$ 18,882,322.03 $ 13,887,794.36
365
100 $
944,116.10
Pre-Trial Diversion
25.87
365
100
944,116.10
18,882,322.03
13,887,794.36
Probation
25.87
365
100
944,116.10
18,882,322.03
13,887,794.36
M agistrate Court
25.87
365
100
944,116.10
18,882,322.03
13,887,794.36
25.87
365
100
944,116.10
18,882,322.03
13,887,794.36
Case M anagement
25.87
365
100
Total
944,116.10
18,882,322.03
13,887,794.36
5,664,696.61
$ 113,293,932.20
$ 83,326,766.15
The second table, Potential Savings for Process Improvements, looks at the 2015 in-Parish and out-of-Parish prison
population and applies those numbers to the possible savings realized through process improvements. The cost per day per
prisoner figure in this chart, $21.08, was calculated using a weighted average of the in-Parish and out-of-Parish prison
populations, as both populations will be effected by process improvements within the City and Parish system. Loop Capital
recognizes that over 18,000 inmates were booked in 2015, but because costs specifically related to the booking process were
not identified in the data received, we have conservatively assumed that only the total 2015 in-Parish and out-of-Parish
populations would be affected by booking process improvements. In total, if the City and Parish were to implement all
suggested process improvements, average prison time can be shaved down by 80 days for misdemeanor defendants, and by
110 days for felony defendants. Days saved include sequential processes, and not processes that occur concurrently.
Please note that Loop Capital did not investigate specific court processes; days saved during trial and sentencing are based on
29
anecdotal data provided during interviews with representatives from the Baton Rouge criminal justice community and
should only serve as a basis for further investigation into how the court system affects the greater goals of the Parish Prison.
Process
Booking
$ 21.08
21.08
28
21.08
Indicted / Billed
21.08
Arraignment
Potential Cost
Savings over 20
Years
891,110.14
655,404.26
26
2,114
1,158,443.18
23,168,863.63
17,040,510.86
28
26
2,114
1,158,443.18
23,168,863.63
17,040,510.86
30
14
10
2,114
445,555.07
8,911,101.40
6,554,042.64
21.08
14
13
2,114
579,221.59
11,584,431.82
8,520,255.43
21.08
60
30
30
1,375
869,507.67
17,390,153.48
12,790,316.52
21.08
120
60
60
739
934,315.07
18,686,301.42
13,743,622.79
$ 5,190,041.28
$ 103,800,825.53
Misdemeanor: 80
Felony: 110
Total
76,344,663.37
The below chart details how many days Loop Capital recommends for each step in the process (from arrest).
Arrest
1 day or
less
Booking /
Processing
2 days
Bond Set /
Public
Defender
Engaged
2 days
DA Receives
Report from
Arresting
Agency
17 days
Released
Indicted/
Billed
18 days
Point of
Contact with
Law
Enforcement
Summons
Arraignment
Misdemeanor:
60 days
Citation
Offender
Pays
Citation
Felony:
90 days
Trial and
Sentencing
30
APPENDIX
A. Kentucky Pre-Trial Risk Assessment Tool
31
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REFERENCES
A. Kentucky Pre-T ria l Risk Asse ssment Tool
32
References
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CGL & GraceHebert Architects, APAC. (2014). East Baton Rouge Parish | Jail Needs Assessment. Baton Rouge: GraceHebert
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Cowell, A. J., Aldridge, A., Broner, N., & Hinde, J. M. (2008). A Cost Analysis of the Bexar County, Texas, Jail Diversion
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Eaglin, J., & Solomon, D. (2015). Reducing Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Jails: Recommendations for Local Practice.
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Henrichson, C., Rinaldi, J., & Delaney, R. (2015). The Price of Jails: Measuring the Taxpayer Cost of Local Incarceration.
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Murphy, K., & Barr, C. (2015). Overincarceration of People with Mental Illness: Pretrial Diversion Across the Country and
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Jails in America. New York: Vera Institute of Justice.
The Perryman Group. (2015). The Potential Eocnomic and Fiscal Impacts of a Jail Diversion Program and Restoration
Center for Mental Health and Related Disorders in Baton Rouge. Waco: The Perryman Group.
The Pretrial Justice Institute. (2012). Rational and Transparent Bail Decision Making: Moving from a Cash-Based to a
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33