1. CENTENERA VS.

SOTTO
G.R. No. L-49065 April 30, 1947
FACTS:
On June 20, 1940, Mariano Garchitorena file a motion praying that
subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd., marked as Annex E, be approved and
that it be decreed that certificates of title be issued in his name on lots
2,3, and 4 of the original plan Psu-66063 and upon lots 1,5,6,7, and 8 of
the subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd. The movant alleged that on May 14,
1931, a decision was rendered by the lower court granting Rita
Garchitorena as heiress of her father Andres, title over four lots, the same
described in her original application, subject to lien in favor of Mariano
Garchitorena and other creditors, with the exclusion of about 500 hectares
belonging to Ramon and Jose Alvarez, about 300 hectares of land of the
public domain, a portion of 18 hectares belonging to Hermogenes P. Obias
and another portion of 24 hectares of land of the public domain, with the
exception of 4 hectares belonging to Januario Alvarez, all said portions
being included in lot number 1. It is also alleged that after said judgment
was modified by the Supreme Court and some steps have been taken as a
result of said modification, lots 1,2,3 and 4 of land Psu-66063 were
adjudicated to Mariano Garchitorena in consideration of the amount of
P28,745.93 a deed of sale having been executed to said effect on
September 8, 1935, which was approved by the lower court on April 26,
1940, and that Mariano Garchitorena bought the 500 hectares of Ramon
and Jose Alvarez on April 27, 1939. Several persons appeared to oppose
the motion, but only three of them came to appeal against the lower
courts order dated June 28, 1941, decreeing the issuance of certificate of
titles in favor of Mariano Garchitorena on lots 2,3, and 4 of the original
plan Psu66063-Amd., and on lots, 1,6,and 7 of the same subdivision
plan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Land Court has jurisdiction over the issuance of the
certificate of title of the said lots.
HELD:

The jurisdiction of the Land Court extends no further than the inscription
of the land described in its final decree and the enforcement of that
decree, and that, even though the land described in the petition be found
by the court, as between the petitioner and the oppositor, to be the
property of the opponent, such land can not be inscribed in his name, the
Land Court having , as we have said , no jurisdiction or power to do so. It
naturally and necessarily follows that the opponent, if he desires the land
of which he claims ownership to be registered in accordance with law,
must begin a new proceeding in the Land Court for that purpose.
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2. ANGEL T. LIMJOCO vs INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO

FRAGANTE
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a
certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San
Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of
public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the
said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the
estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an
artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality
because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be
considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement
and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of
juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation
of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights

involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public
Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution
of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final
conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante
must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public
Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so
adjudged and decreed.

3. BARRIO VS DOLOR
G.R. No. 559 March 14, 1903
FACTS:
The plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants,
heirs of the late Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, of one-half of a sugar estate
and the stock thereon, which he claims to have purchased from the said
Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. In support of his contention as to the law of
the case he attached to the complaint a public instrument which appears
to have been executed by himself and Demonteverde, February 3, 1883,
in which, according to the plaintiff, a stipulation is made for a contract of
partnership for the operation of the said estate, and, furthermore, a
community, of ownership is established with respect to the estate in favor
of the two parties to this instrument. It does not appear that this
instrument has been recorded in the registry of property. Service of the
complaint having been had on the defendants, Dona Maria Pascuala Dolor
raised an incidental issue as
previous question, praying that the
instrument referred to be ruled out of evidence on the ground that it had
not been recorded in the registry of property, and that it be returned to
the plaintiff without leaving in the record any transcript or copy thereof of
extract therefrom, resting this contention upon rticle 389 of the Mortgage
Law. This motion was granted by the judge by order of the 24th of March,
1898, against which the plaintiff appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendants, as heirs of Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, can and
should be regarded as third persons for the purposes of the Mortgage Law.
HELD:

The defendants are not third persons with respect to the contract entered
into by their decedent, Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, in the instrument of
February 3, 1883, and they therefore cannot avail themselves of the
prohibition contained in article 389 of the Mortgage Law for the purpose of
opposing the admission of this instrument as evidence in the case,
because not recorded in the registry of property. This prohibition was
established solely and exclusively in favor of those who, within the
meaning of that law, are third persons. Were it otherwise, the position of
the defendants would be superior to that of the person whom they derived
their rights, because he, not being a third person, could not set up such an
exception. This would certainly be most illogical from a legal point of view,
in view of the fact that the heir is, above stated, a mere continuation of
the civil personality of his decedent.

4. SUILIONG & CO VS CHIO TAYSON

FACTS:
Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of
land, which was was inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city
of Manila. On March 27, 1903, she borrowed from Francisca Jose, the
intervener and appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency,
and turned over her title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as
security for the loan, but no entry touching the transaction was noted in
the land registry. Avelina Caballero died on the 5th day of June, 1903, and
thereafter Silvina Chio-Taysn, the defendant in this action, instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Manila an action, known, under the system of
civil procedure in existence prior to the adoption of the present code, as
an action for the declaration of heirship and on the 5th day of August
1903, following order declaring her to be the only and exclusive heir of
Avelina Caballero, deceased.On March 9, 1904, the registrar of deeds of
the city of Manila by virtue of order entered the inscriptions in the land
registry whereby the said Silvina Chio-Taysan is made to appear as the
owner of the land in question. On the 26th day of May 1904, the said
Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of P2,500 from the Fire and Marine
Insurance and Loan Co.,of which the plaintiff is the lawfully appointed
liquidator, and mortgaged the land in question as security for the payment

of loan. Therefter the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan instituted special

proceedings under the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure,
for the administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased. On the
16th day of October 1905, he was appointed administrator. On the 10th
day of October, 1906, the plaintiff in this action filed its complaint against
the defendant , Silvin Chio-Taysan, praying for judgment for the amount
loaned her as above set out, and the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the
land. The trial court enteree judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
both the defendant and the intervener in conformity with the prayer of the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether one or more heirs could be entitled to be recognized as the
owner or owners of the property of the deceased in an action for
declaration of heirship.

HELD:
A judgment in an action for the declaration of heirship in favor of one or
more heirs could not entitle such persons to be recognized as the owner
or owners of the property of the deceased on the same terms as such
property was held by the deceased, for it passes to the heir, under the
new civil code, burdened with all the debts of the deceased, his death
having created a lien thereon for the benefit of the creditor; and indeed an
examination of the proceedings prescribed in the new code of Civil
Procedure for the administration and distribution of the estates of
deceased persons leaves no room for doubt that those proceedings are
exclusive of all other judicial proceedings looking to that end, and
supersede the judicial proceeding for the declaration of heirship, as
recognized in the old procedure, atleast so far as the proceedings served
as a remedy whereby the right of specific persons to succeed to the rights
and obligations of the deceased as his heirs might be judicially
determined and enforced.

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5. LEDESMA VS MCLUCHIN
FACTS:
Lorenzo Mclachlin is indebted to 3rd person. But Lorenzo before he was
able to pay the debt, he died. But when he died, he had no property.
Theoretically, there should have been succession between Lorenzo and
Anna. So Anna should have inherited from Lorenzo. But because Lorenzo
had no properties, Anna did not inherit anything from Lorenzo.
ISSUE: Can the 3rd person claim from Anna?
HELD:
No. He cannot because Lorenzo did not transmit anything to Anna and the
inheritance is only to the extent of the value. So, for example, Lorenzo had
debts. The value of the inheritance should only be to the value of the
debts. But there was no property left.So the value of the inheritance is
zero. The debts cannot beenforced against Anna because Anna inherited
nothing. ARTICLE 777. The rights to the succession aretransmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.

6. USON VS DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:
Maria Uson plaintiff in this case was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda
who died leaving the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left
no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, the widow claims
that soon as her husband died, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario
took possession illegally of the said lands thus depriving her of their
possession and enjoyment.
Defendants defense centered on the fact that Uson and her husband
executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband

and wife and, in consideration of which Uson was given a parcel of land
and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that
may be left by her husband upon his death.
The lower court decided in favor of the legal wife. Defendant common-law
wife appealed.
ISSUES:
1. Does the legal wife have a right over the lands in litigation from the
moment of death of her husband?
2.Does the illegitimate children of the deceased and his common-law wife
have successional rights?
HELD:
1. YES.

future property her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the
deed of separation, CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED for the simple reason that
future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.
2. NO.
The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though
the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior
legislation ONLY IF NO VESTED RIGHTS ARE IMPAIRED.
Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband, the
new right recognized by the New Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate
children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment
of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
The Legal Wife wins this case.

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda,
former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case.
There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a commonlaw wife with whom she had four illegitimate children with the deceased.

_____________________________________________________________________
________________________7. JOKOSALEM VS RAFOLS

It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the
effectivity of the New Civil Code.

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted

from the moment of his death." The estate of the decedent would then be
held in co-ownership by the heir/s.

With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in

1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the
moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art777 NCC).

FACTS:

As the Court aptly said, "The property BELONGS TO THE HEIRS AT THE
MOMENT OF DEATH of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death".
From that moment, therefore,the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over
the lands in question became vested.
So.. the claim of the defendant that Maria Uson had relinquished her right
over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any

The land in question described in the appealed in the decision originally

belonged to Juan Melgar. When he died judicial administration of his
estate was commenced. During the pendency of the said administration,
that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of the deceased Juan
Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui, subject to
the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would
continue in possession of the land as lessee of the purchaser. On
December 12, 1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan
Melgar was made, and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana
Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed, in payment of professional fees, one-half

of the land in favor of the defendant-appellee Nicolasa Rafols, who,

entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been in possession
thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to
recover said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from
the other defendants, and while that case was pending, or about August 4,
1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to Generosa Teves,
the
herein
plaintiff-appellant.

HELD:
Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of
a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." The estate of the
decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heir/s. The co-heir or
co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property
subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted
to him in the division upon termination of the co-owership.
It results therefore that the sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro
Cui was valid, but it would be effective only as to the portion to be
adjudicated to the vendor upon the partition of the property left by her
deceased father Juan Melgar. And as on December 12, 1920, upon the
partition of said property, the land in question was adjudicated to Susana
Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter made in favor of Pedro
Cui was entirely confirmed.
Upon the confirmation of the sale of December 12, 1920 in favor of Pedro
Cui, the conveyance by Susana Melgar in favor of Nicolasa Rafols in 1921
could no longer be done. And even in the case of a double sale, where
neither of the purchasers has registered the sale, the first in possession
namely, Pedro Cui, should be referred. When the sale made in the latter's
favor was confirmed on December 12, 1920, Susana Melgar was in
possession of the land as lessee, and this possession should be considered
as that of Pedro Cui. The possession of Nicolas Rafols commenced in 1921
only,
wherefore,
it
is
subsequent
to
that
of
Pedro
Cui.

8. OSORIO VS OSORIO
Topic/Doctrine: THE DONATION CANNOT INCLUDE FUTURE PROPERTY
FACTS:

The plaintiff seeks to recover 610 shares of stock of "Ynchausti Steamship

Co." and the dividends corresponding to them, which were included in the
inventory of the properties of the deceased Da. Maria Petrona Reyes,
whose estate is administered by the defendant. The facts was D. Antonio
Osorio had formed with Ynchausti & Co., a joint account association for
the exploitation of the shipping business, he being the owner of one-third
of the company's capital. This capital amounted to P500,000, of which
P166,666.66, that is, one-third belonged to D. Antonio Osorio. Upon his
death, his heirs agreed to authorize the defendant Da. Tomasa Osorio,
then administratrix of the estate of the deceased, to present a project of
partition, and said administratrix inserted in the project with the consent
of all the heirs, among the properties which belonged to the widow Da.
Petrona Reyes, the sum of P94,000 as her part in the "share of the estate
in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co.," that is, a little over
P166,666.66, which was the share in said business of the deceased Osorio
during his lifetime. The project of partition was approved on May 10, 1915,
with the consent of the heirs, by the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
which had cognizance of the testamentary and administration proceedings
of the estate of the deceased Osorio.
On February 28, 1914, the widow of D. Antonio Osorio, Da. Petrona Reyes,
now also deceased, executed before the notary D. Florencio Gonzales Diez
a document of gift in favor of her son D. Leonardo Osorio, the plaintiff,
giving to him one-half of her share in the one-third part which belonged to
her husband in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., a donation which
was duly accepted by the donee D. Leonardo Osorio, who signed said
document with the plaintiff. On that date, February 28, 1914, the estate of
D. Antonio Osorio was not yet distributed among his heirs, and the donor
Da. Petrona Reyes in order to correct the error in said document, wherein
it was stated that said half was adjudicated to her as part of her conjugal
property, when the partition was yet being effected, executed another
document dated July 3, 1915, maintaining said donation in effect in the
sense that she ceded and donated to her son D. Leonardo Osorio, for the
same reasons stated in the document of February 28, 1914, all interest or
participation in said shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., which was
adjudicated to her in the division of the estate of D. Antonio Osorio, which
division was approved by the Court of First Instance of Cavite on May 10,
1915.
After the death of D. Antonio Osorio and before the distribution of the
estate, Ynchausti & Co. purchased the steamer Governor Forbes and

recognized the heirs of D. Antonio Osorio as having an interest to the

extent of one-third in the ownership and business of said steamer. It was
agreed upon by all the interested parties that the share of Da. Petrona
Reyes, widow of Osorio, in the vessel Governor Forbes, at the time of the
incorporation of "The Ynchausti Steamship Co." was P61,000, equivalent
to 610 shares of stock of said corporation. Said sum was deposited with
the Steamship Co. until the final settlement of the question that had
arisen between the heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes as to the ownership thereof
for, while the plaintiff alleges that, by virtue of the donation made in his
favor by Da. Petrona Reyes, he is the owner of said shares and of their
value which is P61,000; the defendant on the other hand contends that
said shares are not included in the donation in question and belong to the
heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes.
ISSUE:
Whether the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes in favor of the plaintiff
was valid under the law on succession particularly the future
inheritance/property.
HELD:
It is alleged that the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes is void because
she donated on February 28, 1914, a future property, such as the share in
the business of the deceased Osorio, which was adjudicated to her on May
10, 1915, and because in 1914 she did not have the right to all or part of
the share which her deceased husband had in the shipping business of
Ynchausti & Co.
According to article 635 of the Civil Code, the donation cannot include
future property. By future property is meant that of which the donor
cannot dispose at the time of the donation. This court believe the
concurring opinion of Manresa that the future properties, the donation of
which is prohibited by said article, are those belonging to others, which, as
such, cannot be the object of disposal by the donor; but the properties of
an existing inheritance, as those of the case at bar, cannot be considered
as another's property with relation to the heirs who through a fiction of
law continue the personality of the owner.

9. TINSAY VS YUSAY
Topic/Doctrine: PARTITION OF FUTURE INHERITANCE;
ESTOPPEL
FACTS:
Juan Yusay died leaving a widow, Juana Servando. After his death his
descendants made a partition by a private instrument of certain
lands, community property of his marriage to Juana Servando.
Though she took no part in the partition her interest in the land was
nevertheless distributed among the descendants. On the strength of
the partition the descendants, among them the appellants, went
into possession of the respective portions allotted to them in said
partition. Some years later the portions of the appellants were
registered in their names in a cadastral proceeding. Upon the
subsequent death of the widow, the appellants as heirs of the
widow claimed a share of her interest in the land. Held: (a) That, B
not being a party to the partition agreement, the agreement
standing alone was ineffective as to her interest in the property
partitioned; (b) that the partition of her interest among her heirs
before her death constituted a partition of a future inheritance and
was therefore invalid under the second paragraph of article 1271 of
the Civil Code; (c) that, nevertheless, if the appellants have
accepted the benefit of the partition agreement to the prejudice of
the other heirs and refuse to make restitution of the property
received by them by virtue of said agreement, they are estopped
from repudiating the agreement and from claiming an interest in the
property allotted to the other heirs.
HELD:

Held: (a) That, Juana Servando not being a party to the partition
agreement, the agreement standing alone was ineffective as to her
interest in the property partitioned; (b) that the partition of her
interest among her heirs before her death constituted a partition of
a future inheritance and was therefore invalid under the second
paragraph of article 1271 of the Civil Code; (c) that, nevertheless, if
the appellants have accepted the benefit of the partition agreement
to the prejudice of the other heirs and refuse to make restitution of
the property received by them by virtue of said agreement, they are
estopped from repudiating the agreement and from claiming an
interest in the property allotted to the other heirs.
10. LORENZO VS POSADAS
Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death.
FACTS:
Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, leaving a will and considerable
amount of real and personal properties. The will which was duly admitted
to probate, provides among other things, that all properties of the testator
shall pass to his nephew, Matthew Hanley. However, it also provides that
all real estate shall be placed un-der the management of the executors for
a period of ten years,after the expiration of which the properties shall be
given to the said Matthew Hanley. Plaintiff Lorenzo was appointed as
trustee. During plaintiffs incumbency astrustee, the defendant Collector
of Internal Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the
time of his death consisted of realty and personalty, assessed against the
estate an inheritance tax. The defendant prayed that the trustee be
ordered to pay the Government the inheritance tax together with the
penalties for delinquency in paying such tax. The trustee paid under
protest and however, he demanded that he be refunded for the amount
paid. The plaintiff contends that the inheritance tax should be based upon
the value of the estate at the expiration of the period of ten years after
which according to thetestators will, the property could be and was to be
delivered tothe instituted heir, and not upon the value thereof at the
timeof the death of the testator. The defendant overruled plaintiffs
protest
and
refused
to
refund
the
amount.

ISSUES:
1. When does the inheritance accrue?
2. Should the inheritance be computed on the basis of the value of the
estate at the time of thetestators death or on its value 10 years later?
HELD:
1. Invoking the provision of Art. 657 (now Art. 777) of the Civil Code, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, held: Whatever may be
the time when actual transmission of the inheritance takes place,
succession takes place in any event at the moment of the decedents
death. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax
accrued as of that date. The tax is upon transmission or the transfer or
devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his death. It is in
reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed ,to
receive, or take property by or under a will or the intestacy law, or deed,
grant, or gift to become operative at or after death. Thomas Hanley
having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.
2. Based of the value of the estate at the time of the testators death - If
death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to
impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if, upon the death of the
decedent, succession takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests
instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it
stood at the time of the decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent
contingency value of any subsequent increase or decrease in value. A
transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's
death, notwithstanding the postponement of the actual possession or
enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the
value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its
appreciation or depreciation.

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11. SEVERINA MARABILLES, ET AL., plaintiff and appellants,

vs. ALEJANDRO QUITO and AIDA QUITO, defendantsappellees
FACTS:
Plaintiffs instituted an action against defendants for recovery of parcel of
land located at Camarines Sur.
Instead of answering the complaint, the defendants filed a MTD on the
grounds that (1) the plaintiffs has no capacity to sue, (2) that the
complaint states no cause of action, and (3) that the action had
prescribed. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint with costs against the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA.
ISSUE:
1. WON the plaintiffs do not have legal capacity to sue
2. complaint states no cause of action
3. WON the action already prescribed?
HELD:
1.
The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been
judicially declared to be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this
jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property of a deceased
person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the
mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal
with it in precisely the same way in which the deceased could have dealt,
subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract may be
imposed upon the deceased himself (Suiliong & Co. vs. Marine Insurance
Co., Ltd., et al., 12 Phil., 13, 19). Thus, it has been held that "There is no
legal precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a
previous legal declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate on
those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the
legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising

out of a right which belonged to their ancestor" (Hernandez vs. Padua, 14

Phil., 194). A recent case wherein this principle was maintained is
Cabuyao vs. Gaagbay, 95 Phil., 614.
2. The rule is that, to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a
motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint should be
considered, 1 and considering the facts herein alleged, there is enough
ground to proceed with the case. Thus, it appears in the complaint that
Guadalupe Saralde is the wife of Alejandro Quito, the defendant, and as
said Guadalupe has already died, under the law, the husband and his
daughter Aida are the legal heirs. We have already said that in order that
an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous
judicial declaration of heirship is necessary. It was therefore a mistake to
dismiss the complaint on this ground.
3. While legally the registration of real property serves as a constructive
notice on which an action based on fraud may be predicated, however,
this cannot be invoked in the present case, for there is an averment in the
complaint that the issuance of such title has been accomplished by
defendant Alejandro Quito through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation
and not through a valid and voluntary transfer. It is a rule well settled that
the defense of prescription cannot be availed of when the purpose of the
action is to compel a trustee to convey the property registered in his
name for the benefit of the cestui que trust. 2 And when a person through
fraud succeeds in registering the property in his name, the law creates
what is called "constructive trust" in favor of the defrauded party and
grants to the latter a right to vindicate the property regardless of the
lapse of time. Thus, it has been held that "If a person obtains legal title to
property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the
title a so called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party"
(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil., 244, 249; See
also Bancairen, et al. vs. Diones, et al., 98 Phil., 122). It is clear that the
defense of prescription cannot be set up in this case.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, with costs against
appellees.

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12. MACARIO MACROHON ONG HAM vs. JUAN SAAVEDRA

Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSION; MIXED SUCCESSION.A person having
executed a will may die partially intestate. The rule of indivisibility of the
testator's will is not in force in this jurisdiction.
CONDITIONAL LEGACY; INTESTATE SUCCESSION.The conditional
legatee does not acquire the legacy, if the event on which it depends has
not occurred, in which case the legacy will pass to the persons named to
succeed the testator in accordance with the law, that is to say, legal or
intestate succession will take place as to that legacy.
SUBSTITUTION.When a will executed jointly by husband and wife
provides that in case of the death of the husband before the wife certain
relatives will inherit specified property, and if any of said relatives die
before the husband the survivor will inherit all, the acquisition of the
property by said relatives depends upon the husband's dying before the
wife, the last part of said testamentary provision being a substitution of
legatees in case some of them die before the husband.
Facts:
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, widower and executor of the joint last will
and testament of Victoriana Saavedra and himself, presented said will for
probate, which was ordered by the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga in
its decree of February 21, 1924.
This executor submitted a scheme of partition and distribution of the
property in accordance with the terms of the joint will, to which Juan
Saavedra and others filed an opposition. The executor rejoined insisting
upon the approval of the scheme and asking that the opposition of Juan
Saavedra and others be overruled.

On March 25, 1926, the parties submitted a statement of facts, which

reads as follows:
"1. That Victoriana Saavedra died in the municipality and Province of
Zamboanga, P. I., without descendants or ascendants, being at that time
married to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, both of them having executed a
joint will, which joint will has been duly admitted to probate in this court.
"2. That the only near relations of the said Victoriana Saavedra, with the
right to inherit her estate are her brothers Juan and Segundo Saavedra;
her nephews and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana
Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josef a Saavedra,
Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, in case that the said Victoriana
Saavedra died intestate, or did not dispose of her property in said will.
"3. That aside from the estate mentioned in the said last will and
testament, duly probated by this Honorable Court, there exists another
parcel of land, acquired by Ong Ham the year 1920, by purchase from Ong
Tah, and adjudicated to the said Ong Ham in Expediente No. 6 (Cadastral).
"Lot No. 3057, with the improvements thereon in favor of the persons
named below in the following proportions: Ong Ham, aged 65 years,
married to Victoriana Saavedra, 19/20 parts; Crispulo Macoto Cruz, of
legal age, 1/40 part; and Juan Mocoto, 1/40 part.
"4. That the interested parties in this proceeding herewith submit to this
Honorable Court the rights of the respective parties in this estate, in
accordance with the terms of this joint last will and testament of the
spouses, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and of Victoriana Saavedra,
deceased.
"5. That the parties representing Macario Macrohon Ong Ham admit that
he sold lots Nos. 34 and 35, of Expediente No. 8196, for the sum of
P1,900, believing in good faith that he could sell the same for his personal
uses.
"6. That the party representing Juan Saavedra, and the other relations
heretofore named hereby withdraw their opposition which they have
presented to the final account of the surviving spouse, Macario Macrohon

Ong Ham, and conform to the same, and ask that the Court approve the
said final account."
The lower court solving the question raised by the parties in their
agreement of facts, held that one-half of the property described in the will,
all of lot No. 3057, cadastral case No. 6; one-half of the cash balance of
the final account to be rendered by the executor, and half of the proceeds
of the sale of lots Nos. 34 and 35 of Proceeding No. 8196, belong to
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; and as it appears from the will quoted, as
well as from the agreement dated March 25, 1926, that Victoriana
Saavedra left no legitimate ascendants or descendants at the time of her
death, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, her widower, is, according to the
provisions of article 837 of the Civil Code, entitled to the usufruct of onehalf of the estate of the said Victoriana Saavedra, consisting of onehalf of
the property described in the will, excluding lots Nos. 817 and 768 of
proceeding No. 7880, given to Segunda Saavedra with the consent of
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; of one-half of the cash balance of the
executor's final account, and of half of the proceeds of the sale of lots Nos.
34 and 35 in proceeding No. 8196, and said estate is adjudicated as f
ollows: one-half of the same belongs in usuf ruct to the widower Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham, and the naked ownership of this half as well as the
full ownership of the other half is adjudicated to Victoriana Saavedra's
heirs, named in the said agreement dated March 25, 1926, in the following
manner: sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and
sixteenths of the other half in f ull ownership, -to Juan Saavedra;
sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and
sixteenths of the other half in full ownership, to Segunda Saavedra; and,
sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and
sixteenths of the other half in full ownership to Teofilo Saavedra, Manuela
Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra and
Josefa Saavedra, children of Mateo Saavedra, deceased brother of
Victoriana Saavedra, in equal parts; and to Encarnacion Carpio and Macra
Carpio, daughters of Petrona Saavedra, deceased sister of Victoriana
Saavedra, sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct
and sixteenths of the other half in full ownership, in equal parts.

"As regards lots Nos. 817 and 768 of proceeding No. 7880, given to
Segunda Saavedra, the court adjudicates the same to the said Segunda
Saavedra, in accordance with the clauses on lines 99-111 of the will.
"Finally, the court orders that the executor, after paying the inheritance
tax, distribute among Victoriana Saavedra's heirs named in the agreement
of March 25, 1926, the part belonging to each of them as hereinabove
stated, and after this delivery is made and the inheritance tax, if any, is
paid, this proceeding is to be considered closed ipso facto."
Counsel for the executor appealed from this decision and assigns in his
brief the following alleged errors as committed by the lower court:
"I. In holding in its auto, of November 26, 1926, that the deceased,
Victoriana Saavedra, died partially intestate, and did not dispose of all her'
property by the joint last will and testament executed by herself and her
husband, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and in not finding that under the
terms of the aforesaid joint will the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka
Jian, named therein, were entitled to receive her estate and participation
in the sixteen parcels of land devised under the said joint will, by the said
spouses.
"II. In holding that the brother and the sister of Victoriana Saavedra, by
name, Juan Saavedra and Segunda Saavedra, and her nephews and
nieces, by name, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuela Saavedra, Victoriano
Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra,
Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, her next of kin were entitled to
receive any part of her estate and participation in the said sixteen parcels
of land, devised to the above named legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka
Jian, under the terms of the said joint last will and testament."
According to this, there are three ways in which succession may be
effected: by the will of man, by the law, or by both at the same time. In
the first case the succession is called testamentary, because it is based on
the last will and testament, which is the orderly manifestation of the
testator's will; in the second, it is called legal, because it takes effect by
operation of the law; and the third is called mixed, because it partakes of
the character of both testamentary and legal succession.

Commenting on the third mode of effecting succession, Mr. Manresa says:

"The rule of indivisibility and incompatibility was transferred to our laws
from pure Romanism, and it remained in them until the XV Century, when
the law of the Ordenamiento previously cited repealed the maxim nemo
pro parte testatus pro parte intestatus decedere potest. This same repeal
is confirmed in paragraph 3 of the article under consideration (658), which
prescribes that it may also be effected partly by the will of man and partly
by operation of law, and in articles 764 and 912 above cited which call the
legal heirs to the enjoyment of the part of the inheritance not disposed of
by the testator in his will."
This is a refutation of the appellant's argument that no one who has
executed a will can die partly intestate. That the rule of indivisibility of the
testator's will invoked by the appellant does not hold good in this
jurisdiction, is shown, moreover, by articles 764 and 912 of the Civil Code.
According to the first of these articles, a will is valid even though it does
not contain any institution of an heir, or if such institution does not include
the entire estate, and even though the person instituted does not accept
the inheritance or is disqualified to inherit; according to the second, one of
the ways in which legal succession may take place is when the will does
not institute an heir to all or part of the property, or does not dispose of all
that belongs to the testator, in which case legal succession shall take
place only with respect to the property which the testator has not
disposed of.
Assuming that the joint will in question is valid, it follows that the
deceased Victoriana Saavedra specified therein that parcels 187 and 768
in proceeding No. 7880 be delivered as a legacy to her sister Segunda
Saavedra, the first parcel free of all liens and encumbrances, and the
second on the condition that the legatee devote the products of the same
to having masses said for the repose of the testatrix's soul. As to the
remaining sixteen parcels, the testatrix disposed of her part in them
conditionally, that is to say, in case her husband Macario Macrohon Ong
Hamdied before she did, said parcels were to be awarded to her husband's
nephews, or to either of them in case one should have died before the
said Macario Macrohon Ong Ham. The condition imposed in the will as
precedent to the vesting in the alleged legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka

Jian of the right to the legacy, not having been complied with, the trial
court found that the part of said property belonging to the testatrix should
be partitioned among the persons called on to succeed her under the law.
We are of the opinion that this finding is in accordance with the law, since,
under article 791 of the Civil Code, conditions imposed upon heirs and
legatees shall be governed by the rules established for conditional
obligations in all matters not provided for by this section (articles 790 to
805). And, in accordance with article 1114 of the Code, in conditional
obligations the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinction or loss of
those already acquired, shall depend upon the occurrence of the event
constituting the condition.
Another error assigned by the appellant consists in the trial court not
having found that, under the terms of the joint will, the legatees Ong Ka
Chiew and Ong Ka Jian were entitled to receive the testatrix's share in the
sixteen parcels of land mentioned in said will.
The part of the will invoked by the appellant, states:
"In case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana
Saavedra, we hereby order that the properties hereinafter described be
jointly given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, and should either of the
two die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we order that all the said
properties be given to the survivor."
The trial court, in interpreting this paragraph of the will in regard to
legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, reached the right conclusion, and
rightly, in our opinion, that it provides for the substitution of legatees in
case either of them should die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; and
that the acquisition by these legatees of any right to the property
described in the will depended on the condition that Macario Macrohon
Ong Ham died before Victoriana Saavedra.
The appellant also assigns as error the holding of the trial court that the
opponents, the brother, sister, nephews, and nieces of the testatrix, were
entitled to receive her share in the said sixteen parcels of land, given to
the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the said
joint will. Such a contention is untenable. As we have said, the acquisition

of right by the alleged legatees depends on the occurrence of the event

constituting the condition, that is, the death of Macario Macrohon Ong
Ham prior to that of his wife; and this condition not having been complied
with, the' said Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian have not acquired any right,
and therefore the testatrix's estate is to be divided among her heirs in
accordance with the law.
To the sixteen parcels of land to which reference is here made, that is,
those given to the nephews of the testator, should be added lot No. 838-A,
proceeding No. 7880, certificate 1257, which the testatrix had reserved to
herself (together with lots 817 and 768), in case she survived her husband
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham.
One-half of these seventeen parcels of land belong to the widower,
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and the trial court shall order the division of
the other half, that is, the estate of the deceased Victoriana Saavedra,
being onehalf of the conjugal property, between the widower and the
opponents, as provided for in articles 945, 948 and 953 of the Civil Code.
With this modification, the order appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects. So ordered.

judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of

the decedent's natural children.
ISSUE:
May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to
appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the deceased natural
father.
HELD:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy
lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of
a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. An action
for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be
exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in
the event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and
second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express
acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the
existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be
exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or his
ascendants.

13. CONDE VS ABAYA

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime
FACTS:
Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged
children by herein plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a
ascendant heir of her children, sued for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural
children of the deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the
defendant-appellant Roman Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered

14. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES VS ROSALES

FACTS:
Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato
and their 2 children Magna and Antonio. Another child, Carterio,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox, and his widow

Irenea, the petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an estimated gross
value of about P30,000.
In the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order declaring the
following individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate: Fortunato (husband), 1/4; Magna
(daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox (grandson), 1/4; and Antonio (son), 1/4.
Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the
surviving spouse of the late Carterio, son of the deceased, claiming that
she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox. The trial court denied her plea. Hence, this petition.

- By the same token, the provision of Art 999 does not support Irenea's
claim. The estate contemplated in the article is the estate of the deceased
spouse. The subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case
is that of the deceased Petra Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea. It is
from the estate of Petra that Macikequerox draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Art 981.
- Art 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by
law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father,
Carterio (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother,
Petra, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Irenea cannot
assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood
with her mother-in-law.

ISSUE:
WON the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from
the latter, her mother-in-law.
HELD:
NO.A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his/her parent-inlaw.Intestate or legal heirs are classified into 2 groups, namely, those who
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the CC or
by the right of representation provided for in Art 981 of the same law.
- The relevant provisions of the CC are Arts. 980, 981, 982 and 999. There
is no provision which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which
entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by
the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the
order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as
the final intestate heir. If the legislature intended to make the surviving
spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in
the Code.
- Irenea argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the
provisions of Art 887. The provision refers to the estate of the deceased
spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.

- Irenea also contends that at the time of the death of her husband, he
had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was
extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox who
succeeded from Petra by right of representation. He did not succeed from
his deceased father Carterio.

15. NERI VS ANTUKIN

ISSUE:

Topic/Doctrine: Institution of Heirs

Whether or not the will shall be cancelled in view of the omission of heirs.
Whether or not there was disinheritance.

FACTS:
This is a case where the testator AgripinoNeri in his will left all his property
by universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein
respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the herein
petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the
testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children
portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was
occupied by the respondents over which registration was denied for it
turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which
the respondents were indebted to their father.

HELD:
Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total
intestacy on the ground that testator left all his property by universal title
to the children by his second marriage, without expressly disinheriting the
children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had
given them already more shares in his property than those given to the
children by his second marriage.
Disinheritance made without a
statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in
so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.