The Collective Unconscious and The Leontocephalus

Download as doc, pdf, or txt
Download as doc, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 4

The Collective Unconscious and the Leontocephalus:

A Rejoinder to Noll
Greg Mogenson
Letter to the Editor: Spring 56: A Journal of Archetype and Culture, Fall 1994, pp.
132-137. Slightly revised, 2002. All rights reserved

In

his paper, "Jung the Leontocephalus," 1 Richard Noll examines


several of Jung's key inner experiences, experiences which, according to
Noll, confirmed in Jung his conviction of the existence of a collective
unconscious. By comparing these experiences with recent scholarly
accounts of the Mithraic mysteries to which Jung felt his experiences to
correspond, Noll demonstrates how overdetermined Jung's imagery was by
the once definitive, but now out-dated, scholarly accounts of his day. This,
for Noll, plus the fact that Jung may well have erred in his assertion that the
vision of the "Solar Phallus Man" could not possibly have been influenced by
scholarly accounts of the text of an ancient magical papyrus of remarkably
similar content, suggests that the collective unconscious may exist "only on
the shelves of Jung's personal library."
In what follows, we will take issue with Noll on a number of points.
1) As Noll points out, Jung acknowledged to the audience of his 1925
seminar that the material he was putting before them from his active
imaginations was strongly influenced by his reading of scholarly works on
mythology, the details of his imaginings being a "condensation" of it. If he
erred in his assumption that the "Solar Phallus Man" could not possibly have
been influenced by material he had once known consciously, Jung was not
making that error with regard to himself in this seminar. Jung knew that the
high correlation between the specific details of his fantasy images and the
details, such as they were then known, of Mithraic mysteries pointed, not to
the collective unconscious, but to his own erudition. It was not the
parrellism of the imagery that was of archetypal significance, but his living
experience of its numinous power. It was the fact that he experienced an
initiation and felt himself to be transformed that was important, not his
having been transfigured into the Lion-headed deity, Leontocephalus.
Archetypes, as Jung repeatedly stressed, are not "inherited ideas but
inherited possibilities [to form] ideas" (CW 9i:136) and, as such, they "have
at first no specific content[,] their specific content only appear[ing] in the
course of the individual's life, when personal experience is taken up in
precisely these forms"(CW 11:845). The knowledge of Mythraic initiation
that Jung had gained from his mythological studies provided the "specific
content" of his experience, not the formal possibility of the experience itself.
Presumably the specific content could have been different had he been as
preoccupied with other mysteries or had he read, as Noll has, the most
recent scholarship on Mithraism, without thereby altering that his
experience was an archetypal experience of initiation. Jung was immersed
in mythology and Mithraism in the same way that Einstein was immersed in
mathematical equations and Kekule in the mystery of the carbon molecule.
Just as their dreams and fantasies played a creative role in conceptualizing
solutions to their respective dilemmas, so Jung's active imagination was
decisive, not as an occult contribution to the archaeology of actual

Mithraism, but to our understanding of the transformative power of the


initiatory archetype.
2) It is a fallacy to suppose, as Noll seems to, that out-dated
scholarshipeven if patently erroneous from a historical point of view, is
any less archetypal than contemporary researchno matter how correct.
Freud, in Larmarckian fashion, may have seen archaic vestiges in modern
dreams as being derived from the literal events in the primordial family;
Jung's notion of the archetype, however, is not so literal. The archetypal
order is ahistorical, "above" time, in illo tempore as Wolfgang Giegerich has
reminded us.2 Even if we had a definitive picture of the Mithraic mysteries
this picture would only reflect the grappling of the initiates of that time with
the archetype to which their mysteries were transparent. The scholarship of
Jung's day and today, likewise, enact the same archetype. In fact, the work
of Cumont which Jung followed, standing in a similar relation to the facts of
actual Mithraism as alchemy stands to modern chemistry, may have been
just as deeply in touch with the archetypes that structured those mysteries
despite the fact that they got the mysteries wrong. Facts are not the bottom
line, fantasies are. And it is in this sense that Jung can claim to have
experienced the Mithraic transformation. As Plutarch put it, " the highest
of our initiations here below is only the dream of that true vision and
initiation; and the discourses [scl., delivered in the mysteries] have been
carefully devised to awaken the memory of the sublime things above, or
else no purpose."
3) After demonstrating that the vision of the schizophrenic patient
which Jung often cited as independent evidence of the collective
unconscious could have been derived from scholarly writings available at the
time, Noll inflates the significance of this finding by quoting Sonu
Shamadansi's view that this patient "carries on his shoulders the weight and
burden of proof of the Collective Unconscious." While Noll certainly makes a
contribution in establishing the possibility that the patient may have had
previous conscious knowledge of the material in his vision, and while this
patient's back may be broken by the cumulative weight of Noll's and
Shamadansi's findings, Jung did have other evidence of a collective
unconscious. One thinks most immediately of the evidential value he felt
children's dreams provided. In "Approaching the Unconscious," Jung
presents the archetypal dreams of a young girl whose pending death he was
able to predict on the basis of eschatological images contained in her
dreams (CW 18: 525-539).
4) Noll writes that "cryptomnesia has always been the "shadow" of
the collective unconscious, and this was a fact that haunted Jung." While
Jung's writings on cryptomnesia, especially his later ones, do seem to be
written defensively, in anticipation of a potential source of criticism, I think
that we must also consider that a sincere interest in cryptomnesia on Jung's
part played an important part in the development of the archetype concept.
Again, as I discussed above, inasmuch as the definition of the archetype
stresses form, not content, the concept of a collective unconscious does not
depend on a one to one correspondence between individually generatedfantasy material and archaeological data. Contrary to Noll, I would argue
that it was precisely Jung's acknowledgement of the role of cryptomnesia

that prevented him from literally identifying himself with the Lion-headed
God of the Mithraic mysteries who he became in active imagination. Jung's
interest was in the experience, its form and transformative significance, not
in its Mithraic content per se.
5) It is unfortunate that Jung cited the spectacular example of the
Solar Phallus Man so frequently, for in doing so he may have unwittingly
seemed to set a precedent of evidence which was too stringent and too
literal to reflect the finer points of archetypal theory. To my mind, Jung's
amplification of the young man's dreams and visions in "Individual Dream
Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy" provides stronger evidence of the
archetypes of the collective unconscious because Jung is here more subtlety
focused on form, rather than content. The young man's dreams and visions
do not literally correspond to alchemy in the manner in which Jung's
fantasies corresponded to his Mithraic studies. The juxtaposition of the two
merely throws the common pattern playing through both into relief. In
reading this work we realize that although alchemy provides a particularly
rich source of amplifications, other amplificatory material could also have
been used. Surely "Individual Dream Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy" as
well as other works such as "The Visions Seminars," "A Study in the Process
of Individuation" etc., lighten the burden which Noll and Shamadansi would
have Solar Phallus Man bear.
6) Noll describes his paper as partaking of a new current in Jungian
scholarship, a current that moves from "idealization to humanization or
from hagiography to critical history." While such an effort can only be
welcomed as long overdue, I believe Noll oversteps his mandate when
applying his very interesting findings to Jung's theories. Just as the poet as
poet cannot be reduced to the banalities of the man as a man, so too for a
psychological theorist. The validity of a theory is not a function of its
author's history, but of its applicability to the phenomena that it seeks to
explain. This applicability, especially with regard to a hypothesis such as the
collective unconscious, can never be evaluated by personalistic historical
analysis, Jung's statement that all psychological theories, his own included,
have the character of a subjective confession notwithstanding. On this last
point, let us recall that Jung defined his psychology as a subjective
confession long before his confessional memoirs were conceived. Just as he
argued that it was not Goethe who created Faust, but Faust who created
Goethe, so we may argue that Jung was created by the ideas and theories
which we attribute to him and that if this is not appreciated both the man
and the work with be misperceived.
7) Noll makes much of the fact that Jung "followed the standard
position of his day and interpreted Mithra as a "solar deity," while recent
scholarship "suggests and even greater role for Mithras: that of
kosmokrater, ruler of the entire cosmos (p. 28). While Noll is doubtless
correct in his analysis of the influence of Jung's reading on his fantasies, I
think that Jung's Mithras was also something more than a solar deity. As an
archetypal image, the figure of Jung's imaginings pointed beyond itself to a
conceptual kosmokrater, the concept of the collective unconscious. This
concept, not the Mithra Leontocephalus, was Jung's God-term. This, I
believe, is an important point. The concept of the collective unconscious,

inasmuch as it is also a God-term or God-image, contains, as it were, the


evidence of its own validity. We don't need Solar Phallus Men and Magical
Papyrus. We don't need to rule out cryptomnesia and furnish proof. The
concept of the collective unconscious is itself an archetypal fantasy. All
peoples in all times and place have imagined gods. As Jung pointed out this
is just as true in our own day of "isms."
As for myself, I like to link all this to narcissism, for I believe that
narcissism, or as Jung called it, the self, has a predisposing essence and
suprapersonal reach which mankind has always represented to himself as
God(s). Put less reductively, narcissism mythologizes itself in terms of
God(s) because it is, to quote Shelley, "the interpenetration of a diviner
nature through our own." Of course, in ascribing this meaning to narcissism
I am merely introducing yet another psychologistic God-term.
One grounds upon which the concept of the collective unconscious
may nevertheless by criticized is that it is an abstract God or "God of Gods"
and, as such, an impossibly higher order concept, illegitimately ontologized
to be the realm of the others. On this point, and in conclusion, let us recall
Nietzsche's account of how the gods laughed themselves to death when
they heard the monotheistic pretensions of one of their number:
For the old gods, after all, things came to an end long ago;
and verily, they had a good gay godlike end. They did not end
in a "twilight, though this lie is told. Instead: one day they
laughed themselves to death. That happened when the most
godless word issued from one of the gods themselvesthe
world: "There is one god. Thou shalt have no other god
before me!" An old grimbeard of a god, a jealous one, thus
forgot himself. And then all the gods laughed and rocked on
their chairs and cried, "Is not just this godlike that there are
gods but no God?"3
Notes
Richard Noll, "Jung the Leontocephalus," Spring 53: A Journal of
Archetype and Culture (Putnam, CT: Spring Journal, 1992), pp. 12-60.
1

Wolfgang Giegerich, "Ontogeny = Phylogeny: A Fundamental


Critique of Erich Neumann's Analytical Psychology," Spring 1975: An Annual
of Archetypal Psychology and Jungian Thought (Dallas: Spring Publications,
1975).
2

Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra,


Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 182.
3

trans.

Walter

You might also like