wp148 2016

Depar tment of Economic & Social Af fairs
DESA Working Paper No. 148

ST/ESA/2016/DWP/148
February 2016
Public-Private Partnerships and

the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development: Fit for purpose?
Jomo KS, Anis Chowdhury, Krishnan Sharma, Daniel Platz1
ABSTRACT
In light of a cautious emphasis given to public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a mechanism to
finance infrastructure projects and highlighting the need for capacity building and knowledge
sharing at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa,
this paper reviews the extant literature on the subject and identifies areas requiring better understanding and institutional innovation for ensuring value for money, minimizing contingent
fiscal risk and improving accountability. An institutional capacity to create, manage and evaluate PPPs is essential to ensure that they become an effective instrument of delivery of important
services, such as infrastructure. There is also a need for a common definition of PPPs and
internationally accepted guidelines, including uniform accounting and reporting standards.
JEL Classification: H41, H54, L32, L33, O18
Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships, value for money, infrastructure, Addis Ababa Action
Agenda, sustainable development
Jomo was an Assistant Secretary General in the United Nations system responsible for economic research during 2005-2015.; Chowdhury (Chief, Multi-Stakeholder Engagement & Outreach, Financing for Development
Office, UN-DESA); Sharma (Senior Economic Affairs Officer, Financing for Development Office, UN-DESA);
Platz (Economic Affairs Officer, Financing for Development Office, UN-DESA); corresponding author: Anis
Chowdhury ([email protected]; [email protected]). Thanks to colleagues at the Financing for
Development Office of UN-DESA and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. Thanks also to Alexander Kucharski for his excellent support in gathering data and producing figure charts and to Jie Wei for
drawing the flow charts. However, the usual caveats apply.
CONTENTS
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. PPPs: A brief history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. What are PPPs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. PPPs in Infrastructure: Trends in developing countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Key issues underpinning the performance of PPPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. The key components of an enabling institutional framework for PPPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Towards common guidelines for effective PPPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Annex 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Annex 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
UN/DESA Working Papers are preliminary documents

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desa/papers/ to stimulate discussion and critical comment.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United
Nations Secretariat. The designations and terminology
employed may not conform to United Nations practice
and do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever
on the part of the Organization.
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e-mail: [email protected]
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Public-Private Partnerships and the 2030 Agenda

for Sustainable Development: Fit for purpose?
1 Introduction
The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) of the
recently concluded Third International Conference
on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa, 13-16
July 2015) recognizes that both public and private
investment have key roles to play in infrastructure
financing, including through () public private
partnerships (paragraph 48, AAAA). However, the
AAAA also highlights the need to build capacity
to enter into PPPs, including as regards planning,
contract negotiation, management, accounting and
budgeting for contingent liabilities. It further stresses the need to share risks and reward fairly, include
clear accountability mechanisms and meet social
and environmental standards.
While the AAAA highlights PPPs as a potential
source for infrastructure investment, the language
was carefully negotiated to take into account lessons learned from past PPPs. The emphasis on the
need for fair risk-sharing and accountability is a
response to the concerns of governments as well as
many civil society organizations and public sector
unions regarding the public sector costs and risks associated with many PPPs. Consequently, the AAAA
confirms the need for private and public partners to
be thoughtful in the design and implementation of
PPPs to prevent pitfalls from the past, especially in
light of the challenges related to the implementation of the ambitious 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development.
However, some experts have argued that such pitfalls are unavoidable. They hold the view that PPPs
simply do not work because of the incongruence
of objectives of the public and private sectors. For
example, Loxley and Loxley (2010), after a series
of thorough and exhaustive case studies of PPPs in
Canada involving schools, bridges and water treatment plants to social services and hospital food concluded that the claims of reduced cost and efficient
delivery of services through PPPs to save tax payers
money and benefit consumers were mostly empty
and labelled them as ideological assertions. They
found that PPP projects were more costly to build
and finance, provided poorer quality services and
were less accessible compared to publicly built and
operated projects. Moreover, many essential services
were less accountable to citizens when private corporations were involved. The study also found that the
chief motive for the public sector to pursue PPPs in
Canada was to get the projects off book and to give
the appearance of lower debt levels. By quoting from
a report of the rating agency Standard and Poors,
which found that investors in PPPs face a relatively
benign risk and that penalty clauses for non-delivery by private partners are less than rigorous, the
study questioned whether risk was really being transferred to the private partners in these projects.
Whitfield (2010) provided a survey of PPPs around
the world, showing how the model has been adapted
to the economic, political and legal environments
of different countries in Europe, North America,
Australia, Russia, China, India and Brazil. It also
examined the growing secondary market in PPP investments, buying and selling schools and hospitals
like commodities in a global supermarket (p. 183)
as well as the increasing number of PPP failures, usually as a result of investors miscalculations; states
pick up the tab when they walk away. It found cases
of deceptive techniques of assessing value for money
(VfM) and manipulations of risk transfer so that
PPPs appear to out-perform traditional public provision. Most importantly, Whitfield claimed that PPPs
undermine democracy by systematically reducing
the responsibility, capability, and power of the state.
D E S A W O R K I N G PA PER N O. 14 8
As stated in Hall (2015, p.3), private sector corporations must maximise profits if they are to survive.
This is fundamentally incompatible with protecting
the environment and ensuring universal access to
quality public services.
While this may be seen as an extreme view, many
observers (e.g. Harris 2003; Cavelty and Suter 2009;
Bain 2009) believe that PPPs are not a simple panacea or a silver bullet to fill the huge financial gap in
infrastructure investment. For example, evaluations
done by the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and European Investment Bank (EIB)
the organizations normally promoting PPPs have
found a number of cases where PPPs did not yield
the expected outcome and resulted in a significant
rise in government fiscal liabilities.2
In light of the above, this paper will discuss recent
findings on the effectiveness of PPPs and reflect on
their suitability as a key vehicle to implement the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as well
as the AAAA. The paper begins with a brief history
of PPPs followed by a discussion of the concept of
PPPs and trends in infrastructure PPPs in developing countries. It then provides a synthesis of findings
on the performance of PPPs followed by an analysis of the key issues underpinning successful PPPs,
namely those that result in Value for Money in its
broadest sense. The paper also outlines a broad enabling institutional framework for PPPs and reflects
on recent efforts to develop common guidelines for
successful PPPs. Lastly, it puts forward concrete
recommendations on how such guidelines could be
strengthened in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
2 PPPs: A brief history

Public-private partnerships are not new. As a matter of fact, concessions, the most common form of
PPPs where the private sector exclusively operates,
2
See Akitoby et al, 2007; Hemming, et al, 2006; Bain,

2009.
maintains and carries out the development of infrastructure or provides services of general economic
interest date back thousands of years. During the
time of the Roman Empire, concessions served as
legal instruments for road construction, public baths
and the running of markets. Other famous examples
include medieval Europe, where as early as 1438, a
French nobleman named Luis de Bernam was granted a river concession to charge the fees for goods
transported on the Rhine.3 Examples abound since
the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth century
with many infrastructure facilities (water channels,
roads, railways) in Europe and later in America,
China and Japan privately funded under concession
contracts.
While the practice has been around for millennia,
the term Private-Public Partnership or PPP was
coined and popularized in the 1970s, when neo-liberal ideas began questioning the previously dominant
Keynesian paradigm and the role of the state in the
context of poor economic performance. Instead of
ascribing poor economic performance to the failures
or inadequacies of the market, government failure or
inefficiency was blamed. 4 New ideas, such as New
Public Management (NPM), became the new vogue.
In this context, PPPs were often invoked as alternatives to bureaucratic public services and inefficient
state owned enterprises, often for the promotion of
privatization (Cavelty and Sute 2009). It was argued
that handing over public tasks to private actors, (i.e.,
to privatize them, or to contract them out, or at
least to carry them out in partnership with private
businesses) was the main means to downsize the role
of the state, to enhance the efficiency of the public
administration and public service provision, and to
reverse previously alleged crowding out of the private
sector by state owned enterprises (see, Savas 1982).
3
See, for example, Bezanon, 2004.
For more on the impact of monetarist and neoclassical theories on PPPs in the 1970s, see for example: Gomes, 1990,
p. 170.
P U B L I C - P R I VAT E PA R T N E R S H I P S A N D T H E 2 0 3 0 A G E N D A F O R
S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E L O P M E N T: F I T F O R P U R P O S E ?
Initially, PPPs involved urban construction projects

to facilitate joint development and renewal of problematic urban zones (Budus and Grning 2004).
The modern version of PPPs whereby the private
company is paid by the government rather than by
consumers evolved in the UK in the 1980s ostensibly to enable the government to develop infrastructure while adhering to strict borrowing limits or fiscal
rules to address rising public debt. PPPs were seen as
mobilizing private finance for public ends, under the
rubric of the private finance initiative (PFI). Over
time, the concept of PPPs expanded to include joint
technology or ecological projects, as well as partnerships in the area of education, health services, and
prison incarceration (see, Vaillancourt 2000). It has
become an extremely heterogeneous concept and,
according to the critics (e.g. Linder 2000), it has
now evolved into a catcha ll label for all possible new
or known forms of collaboration between the public
administration and the private sector.
3 What are PPPs?

The goal of PPPs is to exploit synergies in the joint
innovative use of resources and in the application of
management knowledge, with optimal attainment
of the goals of all parties involved, where these goals
could not be attained to the same extent without
the other parties (see Jomo and Chowdhury 2009;
Linder and Vaillancourt 2000). However, as the
OECD (2012) highlighted: there is no widely recognised definition of PPPs and related accounting
framework. Eurostat, IASB, IMF, IFRS and others
work with different definitions. Similarly, the IMF
(2004) noted: There is no clear agreement on what
does and what does not constitute a PPP The term
PPP is sometimes used to describe a wider range of
arrangements.
Annex 1 provides definitions of PPPs by selected
international organizations and the private sector,
including academics. Callan and Davies (2013, p. 6)
observed, it is a problem that the term public-private partnership is so bewilderingly catholic. Its
meaning needs to be broken down in some way in

order to permit sensible discussion.
As can be seen from Annex 1, not only different institutions promoting PPPs differ in their definition
of PPPs, but also countries are using their own definitions in national laws and policies. Although there
are some common elements, authors do not use the
same language and include the same characteristics
in defining PPPs. According to Romero (2015, p.
12), The vast literature on PPPs reveals at least up to
25 different types of PPPs. Table 1 summarizes various conceptualizations of PPPs by different authors
as well their implied dimensions.
The lack of definitional clarity may result from the
fact that PPPs, according to Grimsey and Lewis
(2005, p. 346), fill a space between traditionally procured government projects and full privatisation.5 In addition to PPP contracts, the space
between traditional procurement and full-scale
privatization may include short-term management
and outsourcing contracts, concession contracts and
joint ventures between the public and private sectors.
In practice, the definition of PPPs varies depending
on the degree of ownership of assets and capital expenditure by the private partners. For example, in
the case of management contracts, the private partners have very limited or no capital expenditure. On
the other hand, in the case of a Design, Build, Own,
Operate (BOOT) contract, the private partners are
responsible for the design, building, operation and
financing of a capital asset. In such a PPP, private
partners receive payment from either the government
(at regular intervals) or user charges, or both for delivering the services. Thus, there can be many variants
of PPP schemes depending on the separation of asset
ownership and risk-bearing between the public and
private sector actors (Roehrich, et al. 2014). Figure 1
presents variations of PPPs in terms of distribution
of responsibilities between the public and private
sectors, asset ownership and the associated degree of
5
Quoted in OECD (2008, p. 16)
Table 1
Differing conceptualizations of public-private partnerships
Definition
Dimensions
An arrangement between two or more entities that enables

them to work cooperatively towards shared or compatible
objectives and in which there is some degree of shared
authority and responsibility, joint investment of resources,
shared risk taking, and mutual benefit (HM Treasury 1998)
Inter-organizational relationship;
Cooperation;
Shared objectives;
Joint investments;
Risk sharing
Public-private partnerships are on-going agreements between

government and private sector organizations in which the
private organization participates in the decision-making and
production of a public good or service that has traditionally
been provided by the public sector and in which the private
sector shares the risk of that production (Forrer et al. 2010).
Risk sharing
Inter-organizational relationship
A legally-binding contract between government and business

for the provision of assets and the delivery of services that
allocates responsibilities and business risks among the various
partners (Partnerships British Columbia, 2003)
Contractual governance;
Risk allocation
The main characteristic of a PPP, compared with the traditional

approach to the provision of infrastructure, is that it bundles
investment and service provision in a single long term contract.
For the duration of the contract, which can be as long as twenty
or thirty years, the concessionaire will manage and control
the assets, usually in exchange for user fees, which are its
compensation for the investment and other costs. (Engel et al.,
2008)
Bundling
Service provision
Long-term contract
Partnerships which include contractual arrangements, alliances,

cooperative agreements, and collaborative activities used
for policy development, program support and delivery of
government programs and services (Osborne 2000)
Contractual governance;
Inter-organizational relationship
A relationship that consists of shared and/or compatible

objectives and an acknowledged distribution of specific roles
and responsibilities among the participants which can be formal
or informal, contractual or voluntary, between two or more
parties. The implication is that there is a cooperative investment
of resources and therefore joint risk-taking, sharing of authority,
and benefits for all partners (Lewis 2002)
Shared objectives;
Mutual investments
Risk sharing
Benefit sharing
A relationship involving the sharing of power, work, support

and/or information with others for the achievements of joint
goals and/or mutual benefits (Kernaghan 1993)
Cooperation;
Power and information sharing
Shared objectives
Source: Roehrich et al (2014)
public sector risk. It is important to note that the

chart does not say anything about the relationship
between different PPP contracts and their value for
money (VfM), which will be discussed later. For example, while greater private sector responsibility will
reduce public sector risk exposure by default, a badly
designed PPP of any type can carry significant risks
for the public in terms of reduced coverage, poor
quality of service, or contingent fiscal liabilities.

Figure 1 also proposes to distinguish between core
PPPs and related arrangement. Core attributes
for PPPs have the following characteristics (World
Bank, 2012):
a. A long-term agreement between a government
entity and a private company, under which the
private company provides or contributes to the

provision of a public service.
b. The private company receives a revenue stream
which may be from government budget allocations, from user charges, or a combination of the
twothat is dependent on the availability and
quality of the contracted service. The agreement
therefore transfers risk from the government
entity to the private company, including service
availability or demand risk.
existing assets; or providing debt or equity finance

to cover capital expenditures. The government
may also provide various forms of guarantee that
enable risk to be shared effectively between the
government and the private company.
e. At the end of the PPP contract the associated
assets revert to government ownership.
c. The private company must generally make an investment in the venture, even if it is limited, e.g.,
to working capital.
Cross-industry studies also capture the variants in

PPP arrangements including by sectors, project sizes
and ownership structures. According to Roehrich et
al (2014, p. 113), Perhaps inevitably this diversity
has meant that the specific definition and type of
PPP project is often variable and sometimes unclear.
d. In addition to budget allocations, the government may make further contributions, such as:
providing or enabling access to land; contributing
The wide range of contractual arrangements paired

with the lack of clarity and variations in definition
make it difficult to generalize findings about PPPs.
Figure 1
Variations of PPPs and distribution of risk
Sources: Based on World Bank (2012) and Roehrich et al (2014)
This is compounded by the paucity of studies or

evaluation of PPPs in developing countries. To date
the predominant countries for PPP research have
been the USA and UK (63% of the total PPP-related publications) with some recent studies focusing
on Australia, Netherlands and Germany (Roehrich
et al. 2014, p. 113). The study of partnerships between official aid agencies and business or blended
finance is even rarer as this is a very recent development (see Box 1).
4 PPPs in Infrastructure: Trends

in developing countries
As can be seen from Figure 2, there has been a sharp
rise in the private sectors participation in infrastructure during the 1990s, peaking in 1998. After
declines for 2 years, both the number and amount
rose again for more than a decade until 2012. The
average size of projects increased from $182 million

in 2003 to $322 million in 2013, but peaked in 2010
at $410 million (World Bank, 2014a). As observed
by Flyvbjerg (2014), this is a sign of the growing
trend in megaprojects in infrastructure.
However, it is important to note that private finance
provides a small portion of aggregate infrastructure
investment in the developing world. According to
the IMF (World Economic Outlook, October 2014,
p. 79, fn 9), public infrastructure investment still
dwarfs private, as infrastructure investment via public private partnerships is still less than a tenth of
public investment in advanced economies and less
than a quarter of public investment in emerging market and developing economies. The World Bank has
also indicated a similar pattern for the last decade in
developing countries: private capital has contributed between 15 and 20 per cent of total investment in
infrastructure (World Bank 2014b, p. 2).
Figure 2
Private participation in infrastructure projects and investment commitments, 1990 2014
Source: World Bank, Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Database (http://ppi.worldbank.org/
Box 1
Blended Finance- PPPs with Donors
Much like PPPs the concept of blended finance is not clearly defined. For example, a United
Nations expert group suggests a broad definition with blended finance encompassing a large
portfolio of potential instruments, including instruments provided by DFIs [development finance
institutions] to leverage private finance () as well as traditional public private partnerships
and structured public-private funds and innovative implementing partnerships between a wide
range of stakeholders (United Nations, 2014, p. 37). OECD and the World Economic Forum
(OECD-WEF 2015, p. 8) refer to blended finance in a more narrow sense as the strategic use
of development finance and philanthropic funds to mobilize private capital flows to emerging
and frontier markets. Donors are increasingly following the latter concept and moving towards
channelling aid money through the private sector in the hope that it can leverage large sums of
private sector financing. However, Callan and Davies (2013) point out a triple deficit in this donor
strategy. First, the term partnership is used to cover a bewildering array of arrangements, such
that it is almost a semantic cipher. Second, there is little information available on just how specific
partnerships are built and implemented. Third, there is as little, or less, information on which
partnerships have achieved substantial development impacts, and how. The resultant void tends
to attract critics, who see a hidden agenda to help multinational corporations gain a stranglehold
over global supply chains, or at least to substitute private finance for official aid, which has declined since 2010 as a percentage of donor GNI. Callan and Davies find no comprehensive policy
framework for business engagement; nor is there any explicit set of principles to guide decisions on
the allocation of aid funds to business partnerships (p.2). Callan and Davis also note that donors
tend somewhat to favour corporations headquartered in, or identified with, their own countries.
Thus, this new strategy can give rise to a perception that public-private partnerships are vehicles
for the pursuit of donor countries own international trade and investment promotion agendas (p.
3). Critics also caution that failed experiences at home are not taken into account in the donor
push for PPPs in developing countries. For example, the OECD (Miyamoto and Biousse 2014, p.
31) states donor countries that have domestic experience in private participation in infrastructure
should take them into accountsuccess and failureswhen promoting private participation in
developing country infrastructure. This applies to countries including Spain and Portugal where
the extensive use of PPPs led to overinvestment in domestic infrastructure, contributing to the
countries financial crises. (...) If certain modalities are hugely unsuccessful in OECD countries,
they are unlikely to succeed in less developed countries where cost recovery is more difficult.

Moreover, the claim that modest donor involvement through blended finance can leverage
large quantities of private investment amounts in developing countries seems questionable. How
could incremental reductions in required returns (e.g., through small subsidies or guarantees) make
a large number of projects commercially viable, when the private sector consistently points out that
the real constraint on investment is the lack of bankable projects? Consequently, the potential for
blended finance or leveraging private sector resources through ODA may be overstated. If this is
the case, then capacity building for project development deserves greater attention from donors
than blended finance.
Figure 3a shows that such private sector participation in infrastructure is primarily in upper middle-income countries. The low-income countries
did not attract much private sector investment,
and there has been a sharp decline in the lower
middle-income countries since 2010. Cumulative
private investment over the period 1990-2014 in
low-income countries was only $61 billion compared to about $1.6 trillion in upper middle-income countries (fig. 3b). In general, PPPs tend to
be more common in large and developed markets
to allow for a faster recovery of costs and more secure revenues. This implies a selective bias in PPPs,
known as cream-skimming, which also occurs
within countries, with investment directed towards affluent urban areas. Econometric study of
the IMF (see Mona, Ruhashyankiko and Yehoue,
2006) also confimred this selection bias. It found
that after adjusting for population, PPP concentration was more likely in larger markets with greater
consumer demand and macroeconomic stability.
As a region, Latin America received the largest

share of private infrastructure investment $937
billion out of total of around $2.4 trillion followed by East Asia and Pacific ($402 billion) and
South Asia ($395 billion). In fact, Latin America
drove the PPP growth in the early-1990s. However, PPP activities in the region remained flat since
the mid-1990s due to several factors, including the
Argentinian currency crisis and a series of project
failures.6 PPP activities surged in South and East
Asia and the Pacific since the early 2000s.
Consistent with the selection bais as revealed in
the PPPs distribution in developing countries by
income groups, Sub-Saharan Africa which lags
infrastructure development the most and where
23 of the 36 low-income countries are located
attracted only $154 billion of infrastucture investment from the private sector (fig 4a). Figure 4b
presents the total number of infrastructure projects
participated in by the private sector. Out of a total
of 6,449 infrastructure projects with the private
Figure 3a
Private participation in infrastructure projects in different categories of developing countries
Source: As in Figure 2
6
See Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015) for discussion of

these factors.
Figure 3b
Total investment commitments in USD billions by income group (1990-2014)
Figure 4a
Total investment commitments in USD bilions by region (1990-2014)
Figure 4b
Total number of projects finalized by region (1990-2014)
10
Figure 5a
Total investment commitments in USD billions by subsector (1990-2014)
Figure 5b
Total number of projects finalized by subsector (1990-2014)
sector involements during the 1990-2014 period,

1,964 were implemented in Latin America and the
Carribean, 1,842 in East Asia and the Pacific region
and 1,842 in South Asia. In contrast, there were only
502 infrastructure projects finalized in Sub-Saharan
Africa with private sector participation.7
Figure 5a shows that the telecommunications subsector received the highest amount of investment
(about $1 trillion) from the private sector during the
1990-2014 period, followed by electricity ($744 billion) and roads sub-sector ($243 billion). However,
11
the highest number of projects with private sector

participation occurred in electricity generation (2718
projects) compared to only 861 telecommunications
projects and 917 roads projects.
Figures 6a and 6b present total infrastructure investment with private sector involvement by type.
It can be seen from figure 6a that build operate
and transfer is the most preferred mode of infrastructure investment in partnership with the private
sector. Figure 6b reveals greenfield investments
dominance, while management and lease has been
the least attractive.
Figure 6a
Total investment commitments in USD billions (left-axis, blue bars) and number of projects by PPI Type
(right-axis, red scatters) 1990-2014
7
As pointed out by Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015,

p 341), This pattern suggests that countries that may need
basic infrastructure the most are less likely to engage in
PPPs.
12
Figure 6b
Share of total investment commitments in USD billions (left graph) and number of projects
(right graph) by PPI type
5 Key issues underpinning the

performance of PPPs
From a public policy perspective, the prime objective
of a PPP is that it should result in an improvement
in the quality and efficiency of a given service to the
citizen. At the same time, it would have the benefit
of attracting private resources into public services,
thereby allowing public money to be diverted into
other critical areas and alleviating long-term pressures on public finances. As this section illustrates,
these gains have in many instances not been realized
and the performance and viability of PPPs varies
greatly across activities and sectors. To ensure PPPs
are an effective instrument of delivery of important
services, such as infrastructure, it is critical that
countries have an institutional capacity to create,
manage and evaluate PPPs, especially in relation to
other possible sources of funding. For a number of
developing countries, this would require assistance
from the international community in the form of
technical support and capacity building.
a. Assessing the value for money

of PPPs
In order to be justifiable, a PPP must provide value
for money (VfM). This term needs to be understood
in the broadest possible sense. At a fundamental

level, VfM would take into account the cost of a
PPP, as well as the quality of service; for a PPP to
be justified, it would need to compare favourably to
how public sector provision would have performed
on these criteria. However, the terms cost and
quality of service require interpretation in a broader
sense with the former taking into account not just
the financing, transactions and operational costs of
a project, but also its longer-term fiscal implications
(including the risks of any contingency liabilities)
and the latter taking due note of efficiency gains, as
well as the social, economic and environmental objectives embodied in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Elements of costs
The cost of a project would need to be assessed over
its lifetime, taking into account the entire gamut
of expenses linked to financing, construction and
transactions related to tendering, negotiations and
monitoring projects. In this regard, the evidence
provided by various academic researchers and international organizations suggests that PPPs have often
tended to be more expensive than the alternative of
public procurement.
To elaborate, private sector borrowing costs often

tend to be higher than those of their public counterparts (with sovereigns in particular being able
to obtain finance on more favourable terms). This
is illustrated in studies by Romero (2015) and Hall
(2015) which, for example, cite a 2015 review by the
UKs National Audit Office (NAO) showing the effective interest rate of all private finance deals (7%
8%) to be double that of all government borrowing
(3%4%), implying a far greater burden on the
public purse than if the government had borrowed
from private banks or issued bonds directly. At the
same time, PPPs are typically very complex to tender
and negotiate and this, together with the fact that
they are frequently renegotiated, has often entailed
higher transactions costs. According to Hall (2015),
the transactions costs of tendering and monitoring
PPPs add 10-20 per cent to their costs, while the cost
of construction is higher under a PPP because the
financiers require a turnkey contract, which is about
25 per cent more expensive. The author argues that
this is the case in both higher income and developing countries alike.
The above findings of academic researchers are generally consistent with the internal (staff research and
independent) evaluations of various institutions or
organizations which promote PPPs. For example,
a European Investment Bank (Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith and Vlil 2006, p. 2) report, which compares
the cost of 227 new road sections across 15 European
countries of which 65 were PPPs, estimate that the
ex-ante cost of a PPP road to be, on average, 24%
more expensive than a traditionally procured road.
To these costs must be added the potential risks,
or contingent fiscal liabilities, relating to PPPs. In
particular, infrastructure projects are associated with
various types of risks. These include construction
risks (e.g., design problems, cost and time over-run);
financial risks (e.g., interest rate and exchange rate
variations); availability risks (e.g., equipment performance, quality of service); demand risks (variations
in the need/use of the service) and residual risks
(future value of the project when transferred to the
government). The principle underlying a PPP is that
13
such risks which are best managed by the private

partner should be allocated to the private partner.
However, assessing risk transfer is difficult given the
multitude of risks to which PPPs are exposed and the
complexity of PPP contracts. If the risk assumed by
the private sector partner were to be over-priced, it
would increase the cost of the service to the consumer, making PPPs unviable. The IMF has warned that
governments may sometimes exaggerate the true value of risk transfer, leading to an overpricing of risk
that raises the cost of PPPs relative to direct public
investment. On the other hand, quite often the risk
assumed by the private partner is under-priced and
governments are forced to extend a guarantee to cover the price differential. In doing so, governments
can be left bearing an unduly large share of the risk
involved in a PPP and facing potentially large fiscal
costs over the medium term.
Overall, analyses by both the IMF and World
Bank have expressed concerns regarding perverse
incentives on the part of governments to treat PPP
contingent liabilities as off balance sheet, which
in turn undermines sound fiscal management. According to Romero (2015), the historical experience
of several countries in the developed and developing
world shows that PPPs can pose a huge financial risk
to the public sector. The author cites the much-discussed case of recently built hospital in Lesotho to
provide an illustrative example of how a seemingly
successful PPP (based on traditional project development criteria) may have negative impacts on the
countrys non-transparent contingent fiscal liabilities, and hence on overall social development efforts.
The newly-built, 425-bed hospital was the result of
a public-private partnership, facilitated by the IFC.
A recent study (McIntosh et al. 2015, p. 960) of the
project, using quantitative measures that reflected
capacity, utilization, clinical quality, and patient
outcomes, calls the project successful and generally
concludes that health care public-private partnerships may improve hospital performance in developing countries and that changes in management and
leadership practices might account for differences in
clinical outcomes. However, referring to the very
14
same project, an Oxfam study (2014) asserts that the

hospital threatens to bankrupt the impoverished African countrys health budget, since more than half
the countrys entire health budget (51%) is being
spent on payments to the private consortium that
built and runs the hospital in the capital. The PPP
hospital cost US$67 million per year at least three
times what the old public hospital would have cost
today, and it consumed more than half of the total
government health budget.
The Lesotho hospital case highlights the need to improve the impact assessment of PPPs on sustainable
development in the longer term. It also emphasizes
the need for caution when replicating seemingly successful PPPs in different contexts. Indeed, the Lesotho hospital was inspired by the Alzira model a hospital PPP in the Spanish town of Alzira that has been
labeled a success case and has inspired other (often
less successful) PPPs in Spain, Portugal, as well as in
developing countries. However, as noted by Acerete
et al. (2014), Alziras success was not the result of a
true PPP, but rather that of a deeply rooted political
partnership between the regional government and its
regional savings banks. Where private sector partners are not bound to the public sector by such close
political relationships, risk transfer and affordability
are likely to become issues that may very well jeopardize the viability of the project in the long term.
Quality of service
Given concerns regarding the actual and potential
costs of PPPs, it is important that these are offset by
gains in quality of service provision, including its efficiency, coverage and development impact. Indeed,
the main rationale to enter a PPP agreement is the
possible improvement in service delivery and efficiency by the private partner relative to what traditional procurement can offer. The evidence however
suggests that this outcome is not always realized.
According to OECD (2008), studies in the UK
and Australia found that PPP projects compared
favourably with publicly procured ones in terms of
indicators such as performance, completion on time
and profitability. However, the OECD cautions that
governments may have cherry picked their best projects for delivery through PPPs; had these projects
been delivered through public procurement, their
performance may have been just as good. Other
studies, such as that by Romero (2015), argue that
evidence of efficiency gains is not convincing. In
most cases, efficiency gains depend on the sector, the
type and size of projects, the contractual agreement
between public and private partners, and the country context in terms of regulatory environment and
governance. For instance, based on a review of extant
literature on the performance of PPPs in the health
sector Roehrich et al. (2014, p. 113) highlights that
while the review does not offer a coherent picture of
PPP outcomes with regards to its benefits and disadvantages, there are a significant number of studies
raising concerns over PPP performance: it may stifle
improvements because of limited contractor capacity
compared to project size, that transaction costs are
too high throughout the project life-cycle, there is
limited integration between clinical service models
and infrastructure design and delivery, and limited
innovation in new-build healthcare PPPs .
The inconclusive nature of the evidence on the performance of PPPs is exemplified by World Bank research (Gassner, Popov and Pushak 2009) on private
participation in electricity and water in developing
countries which pointed to an increase in efficiency
gains but also a shortfall in investment by the private
sector and a failure to lower prices for the consumer.
Given the young regulatory environments in developing countries, which often lack sufficient capacity
for supervising public-private contracts (p. 5), the
authors suggest that a plausible explanation for this
could be that the private sector operators reaped the
gains in savings in the form of higher profits without
passing on benefits to the consumer. Harris (2003),
researching for the World Bank, offers another plausible explanation for efficiency gains failing to translate into lower prices in a number of instances. Given
prices were already kept a long way below costs by
governments for political and social reasons, cost efficiency gains were not sufficient to prevent constant
or rising prices in many cases (Harris 2003, p. 13).
This suggests that efficiency gains on their own may

provide only partial information on the broader welfare benefits of a project. Especially in the context
of developing countries, there is also an important
requirement to assess performance in terms of indicators such as impact on poverty, inequality and
sustainable development. Evaluations within international organizations are less than fully affirmative
about PPP contributions to the aspects of sustainable development or impacts on poverty, gender and
environment. In its most recent evaluation of the
World Banks involvement in PPPs, the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG 2014, p. ix) states that
PPPs between 2002 and 2012 were largely successful
according to the development outcome rating of
project evaluations. However, such evaluations may
still be too limited in scope when assessing whether
PPPs promote sustainable development. The report
further recognizes this challenge and highlights
the need to shed more light on important aspects
of public service delivery - for instance, access,
pro-poor aspects, and quality of service delivery.
There is not a single project with data available for
all of the above-mentioned dimensions and those
on and pro-poor and fiscal effects are particularly
sparse. Consequently, governments cannot assess
how far PPPs benefited the poor, and advice on how
to manage fiscal implications from PPPs can and is
rarely given. Another important issue is the lack of
long-term evaluation. The study assessed the longterm performance of only 1.6 per cent of PPPs that
the WBG supported.8 Similarly, an IFC literature
review on the gender impact of PPPs concludes that,
despite policy level commitment, there is very little
evidence of infrastructure projects taking conscious
action on gender.
8
The IEG measured the long-term impact of 22 out of 1396

projects. (The IFC invested in 176 PPPs; MIGA supported
81 PPP projects, IFC PPP Advisory Services completed 140
transactions. The IBRD/IDA approved 353 lending and
partial risk guarantee projects. This was complemented by
112 capacity building activities of the World Bank Institute
(WBI) and 683 trust fund-supported advisory activities by
the PPIAF.)
15
Authors like Romero (2015) and Hall (2015) also

outline the challenges faced by PPPs in contributing
to development outcomes. According to Romero
(2015), the impact of PPPs on development outcomes is mixed and varies greatly across sectors. One
possible reason for this could be due to the fact that
PPP projects need to be commercially viable in order
to attract private sector participation. This may in
a number of instances exclude social infrastructure
projects that have high developmental returns but
financial returns that compare unfavourably with
competing ventures and therefore fail to entice private sector interest. Moreover, while in some cases
private participation results in improvements in service delivery, private companies have a greater incentive to strip out any elements of a service that might
reduce their potential profits, including cutting jobs.
Hall (2015) argues that PPPs select a small number
of the most profitable projects, and persuade governments to prioritize spending on these projects, even
if this distorts the development of public services.
In Africa, for example, they finance high-tech hospitals in a few urban centres where there are enough
wealthy people to support private medicine, but not
the universal networks of clinics or the salaries of staff
needed to provide healthcare for the poor. Similarly,
in the case of urban infrastructure, a World Bank
research paper (Annez 2006, p. 22) concluded: PPI
[private participation in infrastructure] is inherently
limited in scope for financing urban infrastructure
for the wide array of non-commercial infrastructure
services cities need Local governments need good
sources of public finance to fund those services, and
some form of government borrowing is needed for
major investments in these areas to avoid inter-generational inequities.
Overall Impact
Overall, the evidence suggests that PPPs have often
public procurement while in a number of instances
they have failed to deliver the envisaged gains in
quality of service provision, including its efficiency,
coverage and development impact. Their impact
moreover varies across sectors. Most research findings
16
indicate that PPPs are better suited for economic infrastructures such as transport and electricity, where
better quality infrastructure can reduce cost at the
operational stage and impact on the level of service
and where demand is relatively stable and easy to
forecast. They are however less likely to deliver efficiency gains in the social sector such as hospitals and
schools, where service quality is mainly determined
by human capital investment, and demand evolves
quickly over time. For instance, Joseph (2014, p. 6)
concludes that PPPs in the health sector, especially
involving philanthropies and donors, can be characterized as a double-edged sword. Although they are
able to provide large amounts of money, they do not
allow for a holistic view of the healthcare concerns
faced by a country.
After a systematic review of a large body of literature on PPPs in developing countries, the Evaluation
Department of the Government of the Netherlands,
(2013), concluded that (i) the evidence base on PPP
evaluations is still scarce and hardly relies on sound
and robust empirical counterfactual analysis; (ii) reported effects of PPPs are rather positive at output
level, but also weak, mixed and negative effects are
registered in several occasions; and (iii) the evidence
of some development outcomes and effectiveness is
rather weak.
Thus, it is unsurprising that PPPs have yet to become
a major catalyst of investment in key sectors for sustainable development. According to Hall (2015),
even in countries which make most use of PPPs,
such as UK and Australia, they only account for
about 15 per cent of all infrastructure investments;
for most OECD countries the proportion is less
than 5 per cent and, within Europe, PPPs represent
little more than 5 per cent of all infrastructure investment. Even in those sectors such as economic
infrastructure where PPPs may be considered more
viable, but where evidence suggests they have not
always been an unqualified success, their efficacy is
dependent upon a number of interrelated conditions
that, as will be explained below, can be viewed as essential elements of a broader institutional framework
for PPPs.
At this juncture, it would be useful to refer to two

very insightful observations by Trebilcock and
Rosenstock (2015, pp 342-343): (i) The notion that
PPPs effectively permit a government to build infrastructure where it would otherwise lack the fiscal
capacity must be viewed cautiously as it may invoke
fallacious reasoning. Where the government permits
a project to be delivered by a private proponent, and
the proponent earns a return by charging user fees,
the state foregoes the future revenue stream. This
delivery method thus comes with a cost. (ii) The
suggestion that PPPs can circumvent government
fiscal constraints may also be based on problematic
accounting practices. PPP arrangements, where the
state pays a private proponent to deliver the project
over the life of the contract (rather than user fees),
creates a long-term liability on the stateClearly, masking government liabilities does not reduce
them, nor is it transparent .
6 The key components of

an enabling institutional
framework for PPPs
For PPPs to become an effective instrument through
improvements in service delivery, efficiency and development impact over and above those attainable
through public procurement, it is important that
the public sector is able to: i) correctly identify and
select projects where PPPs would be viable, ii) structure contracts to ensure an appropriate pricing and
transfer of risks to private partners, iii) establish a
comprehensive and transparent fiscal accounting
and reporting standard for PPPs, and iv) establish
legal, regulatory and monitoring frameworks that
ensure appropriately pricing and quality of service.
In other words, it is necessary that countries have
in place the institutional capacity to create, manage, evaluate and monitor PPPs (see Figure 7 for
conceptualization).
Taken as a whole, an institutional framework that
endows countries with the above four interrelated capacities should have the benefit of ensuring
that PPPs are undertaken for the right reason, i.e.
ensuring an improvement in the quality and cost

efficiency of a given infrastructure service to the citizen and not as a vehicle for off budget activities.
They are also necessary for making certain that efficiency improvements are measurable and monitored
and, broadly speaking, facilitating good governance
in the administering of the PPP.
The process of selecting and implementing PPPs is
important and should be undertaken on a sound
cost-benefit analysis, avoiding any bias in favour of
them because they involve private finance. Overcoming planning and project selection problems
is critical for reducing the final cost of the project.
17
The World Bank PPP Reference Guide observes that

many infrastructure projects fail due to problems
in the planning and selection process: the analysis
underpinning project selection is often flawed, so
projects that appeared to be cost-benefit justified
turn out not to be so in practice. Benefits are often
overestimated, resulting in projects that are larger or
more complex than is justified by demand for services, while costs are often underestimated. According
to the study by Romero (2015), PPPs can suffer from
an optimism bias, as a strategic overestimation of
demand is common practice. This happens due to
Figure 7
Key components of an enabling institutional framework for PPPs
18
weaker incentives for rigorous analysis on both the

private and the public sector sides.
Indeed, flaws in the project selections can distort the
development of public services as PPPs are likely to
focus on the most profitable projects. As mentioned
earlier, the classic case of such distortions is found in
the health sector in Africa where high-tech hospitals
in a few urban centres were financed through PPPs
even though there are plentiful of wealthy people
to support fully owned private hospitals. Thus, the
need for universal networks of clinics was ignored.
Similarly, in Europe, PPPs often finance some lucrative toll roads on existing busy routes, but not
the extension of toll-free roads to improve rural or
semi-urban areas.
The setting in train of a credible, transparent and
competitive process for the planning and selection of
PPPs needs to be accompanied by the structuring of
contracts that appropriately price and transfer risks
to the private partner. Achieving value for money depends on the ability of the public and private actors
to identify, allocate and price risks appropriately. In
particular, adequate risk transfer from the government to the private sector is a key requirement if PPPs
are to deliver high-quality and cost-effective services
to consumers and the government (IMF 2004). Effective transfer of risk, in turn, depends on sufficient
competition in both the bidding process and service
delivery (OECD 2008). It would also benefit from
the establishment of a transparent and comprehensive fiscal accounting and reporting standard for
PPPs that would serve to counter perverse incentives
that may lead governments to exaggerate or understate the true value of risk transfer.
By ensuring a transparent and credible evaluation of
risks, a comprehensive fiscal accounting and reporting standard would also allow for comprehensive
disclosure of all risks, including contingent fiscal
liabilities, and thereby enhance the effectiveness of
the overall process of selecting and implementing
projects. As explained earlier, the fiscal implications
of PPPs can arise from non-transparent contingent
liabilities (or risk of debts in the future) and can
be huge. If a project fails and this has not been

infrequent the costs are shouldered by the public
sector, which has to rescue the PPP project, or even
the company, which results in private debts being
shifted to the public sector.
Clear fiscal accounting and disclosure of risks would
ultimately serve to ensure efficiency gains and value
for money by discouraging governments from placing PPP projects off budget and ensuring transparency surrounding the medium to long term implications of the project. However, as mentioned later,
there are still no uniform accounting and reporting
guideline for PPPs. This is likely to become increasingly problematic as developing countries throughout the world seek to define their own accounting
standards for dealing with PPPs. To complicate
matters further, practices such as the Eurostat rule
adopted in Europe on the criteria to be used to assess
risk transfer favour the off-balance sheet accounting
of PPPs, which in turn sets a wrong precedent for
developing countries not least since a number of
European institutions and governments advice on
and promote PPPs through their development and
investment policies.
Finally, an institutional framework for PPPs should
also feature legal, regulatory and monitoring frameworks that allow for the enforcement of contracts,
as well as appropriate pricing and quality of service.
An enabling legal and regulatory framework would
need to ensure a competitive environment during the
bidding process and, where possible, service delivery
in order to ensure an effective quality of service and
allocation of risks. In particular, the broader welfare
benefits of projects should be taken into account, including social externalities and the implications for
sustainable development. In the case of infrastructure, most projects are natural monopolies that call
for external regulation. In such cases, independent
and professional regulatory authorities are needed
to oversee and monitor the functioning of PPPs
(Sarma 2006).
Overall, by strengthening transparency and
public scrutiny, and by safeguarding the public
interest, an enabling institutional framework with

the above-mentioned four interrelated capacities
would also serve to reinforce democratic accountability and popular acceptance of PPPs. This has been
missing in a number of cases and the study by Romero (2015) illustrates that the lack of transparency
and stakeholder participation in some PPP projects
has triggered community opposition and unrest. In
Peru, for instance, there have been some agreements
reached with indigenous communities, but there
are also cases where communities have demanded,
through mass demonstrations, an open and transparent process of public consultation.
On the whole, efforts to establish an enabling institutional framework for PPPs would require technical assistance and capacity building on the part
of the international community in all these areas.
It is also necessary to help governments develop the
skills needed to manage a PPP programme, and in
particular to refine their project appraisal and prioritization. A specific area where global action would
be helpful is in the discussion of an internationally
accepted accounting and reporting standard which,
as mentioned above, can promote transparency
about fiscal consequences of PPPs and, in the process, make increased efficiency rather than a desire to
meet fiscal targets the main motives for using PPPs.
According to IMF (2006), until a common international accounting standard for PPPs emerges, there
remains a substantial risk that, in designing PPPs,
value for money considerations are traded off against
other considerations. This would both defeat the objective of using PPPs for efficiency gains and disguise
the medium to long term implications of many PPPs
for public finances.
Indeed, all the above issues including consideration
of internationally accepted guidelines should be an
integral part of future endeavours by the international community committed to hold inclusive,
open and transparent discussion on guidelines for
public-private partnerships, to share lessons learned
through regional and global fora.
19
7 Towards common guidelines

for effective PPPs
Over the past decade, efforts towards the development of more general sets of guidelines for PPP contracts have been made at different fora and at different levels. At the national level, some countries with
well-developed programs such as the UK, South
Africa, Australia and Chile, have made efforts to introduce more transparent accounting and reporting
practices for PPPs. Other organizations such as the
OECD, the European Commission, the IMF, the
World Bank and Regional Commissions of the UN
have issued guidelines and recommendations on the
introduction of more transparent accounting and reporting practices for PPPs. As an example, the World
Bank Group publishes a guidelines framework for
the disclosure and contractual arrangements of
PPPs. The Regional Economic Commissions of the
UN have developed guidelines for promoting good
governance for PPPs (ECE, 2008; ESCAP 2011).9
In the area of accounting for PPPs, International
Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) has
put forward international standards. In the field
of budgeting for PPPs in particular, international
standards have been promoted through IMFs Fiscal
Transparency Code and OECD Principles for Public
Governance of PPPs. At the same time, fiscal treatments of PPPs continue to vary across countries. For
example, some countries such as Australia and the
United Kingdom follow accounting standards based
on IPSAS and recognize typical government-funded
PPPs on their accounting balance sheets. But many
other governments do not currently recognize PPPs
9
Since June 2014 UNECE has been working on developing

PPP standards by sectors. It has already drafted health care
PPP standards with more sectors in the pipeline (railways,
roads, and water and sanitation). Although the health care
standards focus on key areas, such as policy and legislative
framework, and economic context and affordability, the
approach of each section is rather general and only a vague
reference to accounting standards is included. This process
could perhaps be further strengthened and become more
impactful if it drew on existing multi-stakeholder fora
within the follow-up to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda
and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
20
on their balance sheets or treat investment in PPPs as

public investment in fiscal data. Some present fiscal
data only on a cash basis and do not have a balance
sheet prepared according to any particular standard.
The IMF is currently piloting a PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Model (P-FRAM) to help developing countries assess the potential fiscal costs and risks arising
from PPP projects. It is important that information
from this project, including that relating to data on
contingent liabilities, is disclosed in a timely manner
to provide effective guidelines to policy makers.
The commitment of world leaders in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA, paragraph 48) to hold
inclusive, open and transparent discussion when
developing and adopting guidelines and documentation for the use of PPPs, and to build a knowledge
base and share lessons learned through regional and
global forums is an important step to bring these
various strands of work together and develop a more
systematic approach towards the development of
guidelines for PPPs. However, as long as there is
no agreed upon definition of PPPs, even in a broad
sense, guidelines will necessarily fall short of developing a commonly accepted and understood set of
criteria used to determine measurement, recognition, presentation, and disclosure of material items
(in particular risks and fiscal implications) related to
the implementation of a PPP. Agreeing on a broad
definition of PPPs would therefore be a natural point
to initiate these discussions.
In the meantime, the G20 finance ministers have
provided another important input into the global
discourse on PPPs by welcoming the WBG PPP
Guidelines and the OECD/WBG PPP Project
Checklist.10 The OECD/WBG PPP Project Checklist puts forward a concise questionnaire on a wide
range of issues, including on the process for accounting treatment of PPPs in terms of classification as onor off balance sheet assets/liabilities. In addition to
the previously mentioned Framework for Disclosure
10
G20 meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 4-5 September 2015, Ankara, Turkey.
for PPP Projects and recommended PPP contractual

provisions, the WBG PPP Guidelines comprises a
comprehensive Infrastructure Prioritization Toolkit,
a Report on Recommended PPP Contractual Provisions and a report on Partnering to Build a Better
World: MDBs Common Approaches to Supporting Infrastructure Development. While a careful
consideration of the recommendations contained in
these documents is beyond the scope of this paper, a
cursory look suggests that there are certain proposals
(among many sensible ones) that could benefit from
a broader and more inclusive dialogue as envisaged
in the AAAA.
Example, as pointed out by Shrybman and Sinclair
(2015), the report on Recommended PPP Contractual Provisions contains proposals that fail to take
into account the lessons from failed PPPs, especially
with respect to the allocation of risk between the
public and private partner. The proposal that certain
risks, which are outside the control of the public
sector such as labour protests are assigned to the
government merits further critical debate. At the
same time, it is questionable why the public sector
should compensate the private sector for costs associated with regulations that may be essential to achieving the SDGs (e.g., the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions, measures to protect public health).
Indeed, if PPPs are to be used as a major vehicle to
achieve a certain set of SDGs, such as those related
to infrastructure and economic growth, contractual
arrangements for projects should not penalize the
public sector for putting in place policy frameworks
that help achieve other goals.
Moreover, certain provisions may reduce incentives
for the private sector to ensure optimal performance
on their part, such as the recommended policy that
the contracting partner, i.e., the public sector, covers 80-85 per cent of the outstanding senior debt of
the private partner in the event the private partner
defaults. On the other hand, such a generous guarantee would only make sense if it would significantly
reduce funding cost for the public sector to a level
that would be comparable to government borrowing
rates. Yet, this is not the case due to the higher costs
of private sector borrowing and the high tendering,
transaction and negotiation costs of PPPs as discussed earlier.
It is also interesting to note, that the guidelines suggest that if a dispute cannot be resolved between the
contracting authority and the private partner, the dispute shall move to international arbitration and that
all international arbitration shall take place under
the arbitration rules of the International Chamber
of Commerce. This raises questions on two counts:
Why cannot the dispute be resolved through the
host states domestic courts rather than international
arbitration? Numerous studies have pointed to the
flaws in current international arbitration processes.
So it is not clear that these rules are preferable over
domestic frameworks and regulations for arbitration.
Second, why is a one size fits all set of arbitration
rules, proposed, despite the common view that the
choice of a particular set of arbitration rules in preference to others may have a significant impact in
terms of costs and duration of the process?11 Moreover, the ICC rules are among the least used international arbitration rules, which makes it curious that
they are recommended as the standard framework
for investor-state disputes related to PPPs.12
The WB framework for disclosure provides a useful
tool for stakeholders to strengthen transparency in
PPPs. However, as pointed out by Aizawa (2015),
provisions could be even more ambitious, especially in light of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
11
There are several other widely recognized arbitration rules,

like the International Trade Law Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL Rules), the rules of the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
12
Of the 42 new known disputes in 2014, 33 were filed with

the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (of which three cases were under the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules), six under the arbitration rules
of UNCITRAL, 15 two under the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (SCC) and one under the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration rules. These numbers
are roughly in line with overall historical statistics. See
UNCTAD, 2015, Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS, IAA
Issues note, No.1.
21
Development and the AAAA. First, provisions

should go beyond country-level PPP disclosure to
fully understand the regulatory requirements related to cross border PPPs, such as large-scale infrastructure projects like roads or pipelines. Second,
the guidelines are an important start, but could go
further in advocating key principles for harmonized
PPP disclosure, with a clear statement of a presumption in favour of transparency. Third, cross-sectoral
experience provides important lessons that could be
taken into account in the disclosure framework. A
closer look at public disclosure initiatives like the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
Publish What You Pay or the Open Contracting
Partnership, may further promote integrity, transparency, and accountability in PPPs. Fourth, greater
efforts are needed to advocate for a common platform for PPP disclosure. Many infrastructure facilities and financial institutions have made important
strides in pushing disclosure practices of the private
sector on key aspects of how PPPs generate value
for money. Yet, standards differ across institutions.
Stakeholders should come together to agree on common standards that include and build on the most
ambitious existing provisions for disclosure. Lastly,
a fourth P People- should complement the focus
on the financial and commercial disclosure practices
of the implementing partners. People affected by or
living in close proximity of major PPPs should be
fully enlightened as to the potential welfare implications of any new project (Aizawa, 2015).
Overall, we therefore propose to re-evaluate existing
guidelines in light of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including its Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the AAAA. The broad
challenge would be to frame contractual guidelines
in such a way that the PPPs would lead to value for
money for the implementing parties and the public
at large, and not put undue constraints on governments and other stakeholders in their endeavours to
pursue and promote national policies and interventions in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development.
22
8 Conclusion
The purpose of the paper was to discuss the existing and future potential of PPPs in helping achieve
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and
the Addis Abba Action Agenda, in particular in the
area of infrastructure investment. PPPs have recently
undergone somewhat of a renaissance in the international policy discourse with many countries and
organizations pointing to their potential to generate
new resources and increase efficiency for public service provision.
However, the evidence suggests that PPPs have often
public procurement while in a number of instances
they have failed to deliver the envisaged gains in
quality of service provision, including its efficiency,
coverage and development impact. In other words,
they have failed to yield value for money in its
broadest sense taking into account not just the financial costs and efficiency gains deriving from a project
but also its longer-term fiscal implications (including
the risks of any contingency liabilities) as well as the
broader welfare benefits for society such as the impact on poverty and sustainable development.
The impact of PPPs moreover varies across sectors.
Research findings indicate that PPPs are generally
better suited for economic infrastructures such as
transport and electricity, where demand is relatively steady and the impact on service quality easy to
assess, and where better quality infrastructure can
lower cost at the operational stage. However, they
are less likely to deliver efficiency gains in the social
sector such as hospitals and schools where access and
equity are major concerns.
Despite a recent rise in the private sectors participation in infrastructure finance in developing
countries, especially in electricity and telecommunications, private finance continues to provide just a
small portion of aggregate infrastructure investment
in the developing world. If PPPs are to be scaled
up, there has to be sound understanding as to their
ultimate purpose, namely to add value for money,

i.e. to improve the coverage, access, quality and efficiency of a given service to the citizen. A commonly
accepted definition of PPPs, something that is still
sorely lacking, should be firmly anchored in such an
understanding.
For PPPs to become an effective instrument for financing key economic infrastructure projects, it is
necessary that countries have in place the institutional capacity to create, manage and evaluate PPPs.
For a number of developing countries, this would
require assistance from the international community
in the form of technical support and capacity building. In this connection, the paper further argues that
donor support for public sector capacity building in
developing countries may be better spent than the
current trend of blended finance, which frequently
channels aid money directly to the private sector,
including for PPPs
Finally, we stress the need for further work on developing international guidelines for PPPs, as called
for in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda13. Many important initiatives are underway but they could be
significantly strengthened if they were discussed in a
more inclusive multi-stakeholder setting, such as the
follow up process to the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, that would
involve UN Member States, civil society, the private
sector and other stakeholders. The UN, as the most
legitimate international forum for international policy-making, can play a key role in forging these new
guidelines for PPPs, which should fully support the
implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development.
13
See United Nations Addis Ababa Action Agenda, Para 48:

We also commit to holding inclusive, open and transparent
discussion when developing and adopting guidelines and
documentation for the use of public-private partnerships,
and to build a knowledge base and share lessons learned
through regional and global forums.
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26
Annex 1
Definitions of PPPs
European Investment Bank (EIB, 2004, p.2):
public-private partnership is a generic term for
the relationships formed between the private sector
and public bodies often with the aim of introducing
private sector resources and/or expertise in order to
help provide and deliver public sector assets and services. The term PPP is thus used to describe a wide
variety of working arrangements from loose, informal and strategic partnerships, to design-build-finance-and-operate (DBFO) type service contracts
and formal joint venture companies. EIB (2005, p.
3) provides a working definition, a PPP [is] defined
to be the private-sector construction and operation
of infrastructure (including Concessions) which
would otherwise have been provided by the public
sector.
European Commission (EC, 2004): the term
public-private partnership, in general, refers to
forms of co-operation between public authorities
and the world of business which aim to ensure the
funding, construction, renovation, management and
maintenance of an infrastructure of the provision of
a service.
International Monetary Fund (Hemming & Staff
team 2006, p. 1; Hemming, 2006, p. 3): Public-private partnerships (PPPs) refer to arrangements under
which the private sector supplies infrastructure assets and infrastructure-based services that traditionally have been provided by the government. PPPs
are used for a wide range of economic and social
infrastructure projects, but they are mainly used to
build and operate roads, bridges and tunnels, light
rail networks, airports and air traffic control systems, prisons, water and sanitation plants, hospitals,
schools, and public buildings. A typical PPP takes
the form of a design-build-finance-operate (DBFO)
scheme. Under such a scheme, the government specifies the services it wants the private sector to deliver,
and then the private partner designs and builds an
asset specifically for that purpose, finances its construction, and subsequently operates the asset (i.e.,
provides the services deriving from it).
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2008, p. 12): A PPP is defined
as an agreement between the government and one
or more private partners (which may include the
operators and the financers) according to which the
private partners deliver the service in such a manner
that the service delivery objectives of the government
are aligned with the profit objectives of the private
partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment
depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private
partners. Despite many similarities between them,
this OECD study also makes distinction between
PPPs and concessions based on the amount of risk
carried by the private provider and the main source
of income of the private provider (i.e. user charges
and fees paid by the government).
World Bank Institute (2012, p. 11): A PPP is a
long-term contract between a private party and a
government agency, for providing a public asset or
service, in which the private party bears significant
risk and management responsibility.
India: An arrangement between a government or
statutory entity or government owned entity on one
side and a private sector entity on the other, for the
provision of public assets and/ or related services for
public benefit, through investments being made by
and/ or management undertaken by the private sector entity for a specified time period, where there is
a substantial risk sharing with the private sector and
the private sector receives performance linked payments that conform (or are benchmarked) to specified, pre-determined and measurable performance
standards.
Peru: A PPP is a modality of private investment
participation that involves expertise, knowledge,
equipment, technology and distribution of risks

and resources, preferable private, with the purpose
of creating, developing, improving, operating or
maintaining public infrastructure or providing public services and/or provides services related to those
required by the State, also to develop projects of applied research and/or technological innovation.
South Africa: PPP is a contract between a public
sector institution/municipality and a private party,
in which the private party assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risk in the design,
financing, building and operation of a project.14
Tanzania: PPP is an arrangement between public
sector and private sector entities whereby the private
entities renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/
or manage a facility in whole or in part in accordance with output specifications. The private entity
assumes the associated risks for a significant period
of time and in return, receives benefits/financial
remunerations according to agreed terms; which
can be in the form of tariffs or user charges. PPP is
therefore a cooperative venture built on the expertise
of each partner that best meets clearly defined public
needs through the most appropriate allocation of
resources, risks and rewards.15
Netherlands: A form of cooperation between government and business (in many cases also involving
NGOs, trade unions, and/or knowledge institutions)
in which they agree to work together to reach a
common goal or carry out a specific task, jointly assuming the risks and responsibility and sharing their
resources and competences.16
United Kingdom: PPPs are arrangements typified
by joint working between the public and private sectors. In their broadest sense they can cover all types
of collaboration across the private-public sector
interface involving collaborative working together

and risk sharing to deliver policies, services and infrastructure. The most common type of PPP in the
UK is the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which is
an arrangement whereby the public sector contracts
to purchase services, usually derived from an investment in assets, from the private sector on a long-term
basis, often between 15 to 30 years.17
Standard and Poors (2005): A PPP is any mediumto long-term relationship between the public and
private sectors, involving the sharing of risks and
rewards of multisector skills, expertise and finance
to deliver desired policy outcomes.
Bain (2009, p. i): A PPP is an alternative approach to
traditional public sector procurement. Under a typical PPP, the private sector designs, builds, finances,
operates and maintains infrastructure (such as roads
or schools) in return for performance-related payments from government agencies (promoters) and/
or the right to charge users for services. Importantly,
the public sector passes project risk to the private sector where, in theory, it can be better managed thus
providing value-for-money.
Mackenzie Nicholson (2010, p. 2): A PPP is a relationship between public and private entities that are
responsible for the delivery of an infrastructure asset
and/or associated services (servicing, operations, and
maintenance). Through this relationship there is a
transfer of risk from the public to the private sector.
Generally, there is a payment mechanism between
the public and private sector based on revenue from
services and usually ownership is then transferred to
the public sector at the end of the contract.
14 Republic
of South Africa, National Treasury website.

http://www.ppp.gov.za/Pages/whatisppp.aspx
15 Tanzania
National Public Private Partnership policy:

http://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/ppp_
policy_sw.pdf
16
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. (2013).
27
17
UK Treasury. (2008)
28
Annex 2
World Banks Private Participation in Infrastructure

(PPI) Database
The World Banks Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Database records contractual arrangements with and without investments in which
private parties assume operating risks in low- and
middle-income countries.18 The Database covers
infrastructure projects that meet three criteria:
Projects that are owned or managed by private

companies in low- and middle-income countries.
Private parties have at least a 25% participation
in the project contract, except for divestitures,
which are included with at least 5% of equity
owned by private parties.
Projects that directly or indirectly serve the

public -- captive facilities (such as cogeneration
power plants and private telecommunications
networks) are excluded unless a significant share

of output (20%) is sold to serve the public under
a contract with a utility.
Projects are considered to have private participation

if a private company or investor bears a share of the
projects operating risk. That is, a private sponsor is
at least partially responsible for operating cost and
associated risks. This could be by either having the
rights to operate alone or in association with a public
entity or owning an equity share in the project. The
Database classifies private infrastructure projects in
four categories:
Concessions (or management and operation contracts

with major private capital commitments)
Build, rehabilitate, operate and transfer
Full
Rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer
Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer
Management and lease contracts
Projects that reached financial closure after 1983

(database coverage currently extends to 2012).
Greenfield projects
Build, lease and transfer
Build, operate and transfer
Build, own and operate
Merchant
Rental
Divestitures
Lease contract
Full
Management contract
Partial
18
However, figures on PPPs should be treated with caution

as different definitions of PPP result in confusing reporting
practices. Therefore, figures should be read as a useful indication of global trends and not as a basis for an extensive
quantitative analysis.

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Depar tment of Economic & Social Af fairs

DESA Working Paper No. 148

Public-Private Partnerships and

Agenda, sustainable development

UN/DESA Working Papers are preliminary documents

Public-Private Partnerships and the 2030 Agenda

2 PPPs: A brief history

See Akitoby et al, 2007; Hemming, et al, 2006; Bain,

See, for example, Bezanon, 2004.

Initially, PPPs involved urban construction projects

3 What are PPPs?

meaning needs to be broken down in some way in

Quoted in OECD (2008, p. 16)

An arrangement between two or more entities that enables

Public-private partnerships are on-going agreements between

A legally-binding contract between government and business

The main characteristic of a PPP, compared with the traditional

Partnerships which include contractual arrangements, alliances,

A relationship that consists of shared and/or compatible

A relationship involving the sharing of power, work, support

Source: Roehrich et al (2014)

public sector risk. It is important to note that the

quality of service, or contingent fiscal liabilities.

private company provides or contributes to the

existing assets; or providing debt or equity finance

Cross-industry studies also capture the variants in

The wide range of contractual arrangements paired

Sources: Based on World Bank (2012) and Roehrich et al (2014)

This is compounded by the paucity of studies or

4 PPPs in Infrastructure: Trends

average size of projects increased from $182 million

Source: World Bank, Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Database (http://ppi.worldbank.org/

As a region, Latin America received the largest

See Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015) for discussion of

sector involements during the 1990-2014 period,

the highest number of projects with private sector

As pointed out by Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015,

5 Key issues underpinning the

a. Assessing the value for money

in the broadest possible sense. At a fundamental

To elaborate, private sector borrowing costs often

such risks which are best managed by the private

same project, an Oxfam study (2014) asserts that the

This suggests that efficiency gains on their own may

The IEG measured the long-term impact of 22 out of 1396

Authors like Romero (2015) and Hall (2015) also

At this juncture, it would be useful to refer to two

6 The key components of

ensuring an improvement in the quality and cost

The World Bank PPP Reference Guide observes that

weaker incentives for rigorous analysis on both the

be huge. If a project fails and this has not been

interest, an enabling institutional framework with

7 Towards common guidelines

Since June 2014 UNECE has been working on developing

on their balance sheets or treat investment in PPPs as

for PPP Projects and recommended PPP contractual

There are several other widely recognized arbitration rules,

Of the 42 new known disputes in 2014, 33 were filed with