ASSOCIATED BANK, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and LORENZO SARMIENTO

JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 123793. June 29, 1998.]
SYNOPSIS
After the merger of Associated Banking Corporation (ABC) and Citizens Bank and Trust
Company (CBTC), the private respondent executed in favor of Associated Bank a promissory
note whereby respondent undertook to pay the bank the sum of P2,500,000.00. The merger
agreement provided that all references to CBTC shall be deemed for all intents and purposes
references to the surviving bank, ABC, as if such references were direct references to ABC.
When private respondent failed to pay the remaining balance, Associated Bank, the surviving
corporation, sued for collection. Private respondent denied the pertinent allegations in the
complaint and alleged that the complaint states no cause of action because the promissory note
was executed in favor of CBTC, not the Associated Bank. Private respondent was declared as
in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference and petitioner presented its evidence
ex-parte. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment ordering private respondent to pay the
bank his remaining balance plus interests and attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
held that petitioner, which was not privy to the transaction, had no cause of action against
private respondent and that the earlier merger between the two banks could not have vested
petitioner with any interest arising from the promissory note executed in favor of CBTC after
such merger. Hence, this recourse.
The Supreme Court held that the fact that the promissory note was executed after the effectivity
of the merger does not militate against the petitioner where the agreement clearly provides that
all contracts entered into in the name of CBTC shall be understood as pertaining to the surviving
bank; that the merger provision being clear, plain and free of ambiguity, the same must be given
its literal meaning; and that to let the private respondent enjoy the fruits of his loan without
liability is unfair and unsconscionable, amounting to unjust enrichment.
SYLLABUS
1.
MERCANTILE LAW; CORPORATIONS; MERGER; EFFECT. Ordinarily, in the merger
of two or more existing corporations, one of the combining corporations survives and continues
the combined business, while the rest are dissolved and all their rights, properties and liabilities
are acquired by the surviving corporation. Although there is a dissolution of the absorbed
corporations, there is no winding up of their affairs or liquidation of their assets, because the
surviving corporation automatically acquires all their rights, privileges and powers, as well as
their liabilities.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID., EFFECTIVITY THEREOF DETERMINED BY DATE OF SEC'S ISSUANCE
OF CERTIFICATE OF MERGER. The merger, however, does not become effective upon the
mere agreement of the constituent corporations. The procedure to be followed is prescribed
under the Corporation Code. Section 79 of said Code requires the approval by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the articles of merger which, in turn, must have been duly
approved by a majority of the respective stockholders of the constituent corporations. The same
provision further states that the merger shall be effective only upon the issuance by the SEC of
a certificate of merger.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; AGREEMENT PROVIDING THAT ALL CONTRACTS, IRRESPECTIVE OF
DATE OF EXECUTION, ENTERED INTO BY ABSORBED BANK, SHALL PERTAIN TO

SURVIVING BANK EMPOWERS SERVING BANK TO COLLECT OBLIGATIONS DUE TO

ABSORBED BANK; CASE AT BAR. The fact that the promissory note was executed after the
effectivity date of the merger does not militate against petitioner. The agreement itself clearly
provides that all contracts irrespective of the date of execution entered into in the name of
CBTC shall be understood as pertaining to the surviving bank, herein petitioner. Since, in
contrast to the earlier aforequoted provision, the latter clause no longer specifically refers only to
contracts existing at the time of the merger, no distinction clause must have been deliberately
included in the agreement in order to protect the interests of the combining banks; specifically,
to avoid giving the merger agreement a farcical interpretation aimed at evading fulfillment of a
due obligation. Thus, although the subject promissory note names CBTC as the payee, the
reference to CBTC in the note shall be construed, under the very provisions of the merger
agreement, as a reference to petitioner bank, as if such reference [was a] direct reference to the
latter for all intents and purposes. No other construction can be given to the unequivocal
stipulation. Being clear, plain and free of ambiguity, the provision must be given its literal
meaning and applied without a convoluted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. In
light of the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioner has a valid cause of action against private
respondent. Clearly, the failure of private respondent to honor his obligation under the
promissory note constitutes a violation of petitioners right to collect the proceeds of the loan it
extended to the former.
4.
CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; COLLECTION OF SUM OF MONEY
BASED ON WRITTEN CONTRACT PRESCRIBES IN TEN (10) YEARS; CASE AT BAR.
Petitioner's suit for collection of a sum of money was based on a written contract and prescribes
after ten years from the time its right of action arose. Sarmiento's obligation under the
promissory note became due and demandable on March 6, 1978. Petitioner's complaint was
instituted on August 22, 1985, before the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period. Definitely,
petitioner still had every right to commence suit against the payor/obligor, the private respondent
herein.
5.
REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LACHES; APPLIED TO AVOID INEQUITABLE SITUATION
OR INJUSTICE; INAPPLICABLE WHERE CLAIM WAS FILED WITHIN PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD. Neither is petitioner's action barred by laches. The principle of laches is a creation
of equity, which is applied not to penalize neglect or failure to assert a right within a reasonable
time, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation or in an injustice. To require private respondent to pay the remaining balance of his
loan is certainly not inequitable or unjust. What would be manifestly unjust and inequitable is his
contention that CBTC is the proper party to proceed against him despite the fact, which he
himself asserts, that CBTC's corporate personality has been dissolved by virtue of its merger
with petitioner. To hold that no payee/obligee exists and to let private respondent enjoy the fruits
of his loan without liability is surely most unfair and unconscionable, amounting to unjust
enrichment at the expense of petitioner. Besides, this Court has held that the doctrine of laches
is inapplicable where the claim was filed within the prescriptive period set forth under the law.
6.
CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; STIPULATION POUR AUTRUI;
CONSTRUED. A stipulation pour autrui is one in favor of a third person who may demand its
fulfillment, provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. An
incidental benefit or interest, which another person gains, is not sufficient. The contracting
parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.

7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. Florentino vs. Encarnacion, Sr. enumerates the requisites
for such contract: (1) the stipulation in favor of a third person must be a part of the contract, and
not the contract itself; (2) the favorable stipulation should not be conditioned or compensated by
any kind of obligation; and (3) neither of the contracting parties bears the legal representation or
authorization of the third party. The "fairest test" in determining whether the third person's
interest in a contract is a stipulation pour autrui or merely an incidental interest is to examine the
intention of the parties as disclosed by their contract.
8.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RES IPSA LOQUITUR BAR. Private respondent also
claims that he received no consideration for the promissory note and, in support thereof, cites
petitioner's failure to submit any proof of his loan application and of his actual receipt of the
amount loaned. These arguments deserve no merit. Res ipsa loquitur. The instrument, bearing
the signature of private respondent, speaks for itself. Respondent Sarmiento has not questioned
the genuineness and due execution thereof. No further proof is necessary to show that he
undertook to pay P2,500.000, plus interest, to petitioner bank on or before March 6, 1978. This
he failed to do, as testified to by petitioner's accountant. The latter presented before the trial
court private respondent's statement of account as of September 30, 1986, showing an
outstanding balance of P4,689,413.63 after deducting P1,000,000.00 paid seven months earlier.
9.
ID.; ID.; PARTIAL PAYMENT, AN EXPRESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF OBLIGATION.
Furthermore such partial payment is equivalent to an express acknowledgment of his obligation.
Private respondent can no longer backtrack and deny his liability to petitioner bank. A person
cannot accept and reject the same instrument.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
In a merger, does the surviving corporation have a right to enforce a contract entered into by the
absorbed company subsequent to the date of the merger agreement, but prior to the issuance
of a certificate of merger by the Securities and Exchange Commission?
The Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 26465 promulgated on January 30, 1996,
which answered the above question in the negative. The challenged Decision reversed and set
aside the October 17, 1986 Decision in Civil Case No. 85-32243, promulgated by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, which disposed of the controversy in favor of herein petitioner
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Associated Bank. The
defendant Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr. is ordered to pay plaintiff:
1.

The amount of P4,689,413.63 with interest thereon at 14% per annum until fully paid;

2.

The amount of P200,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

3.

The costs of suit."

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals resolved the case in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from, dated October 17, 1986 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment rendered DISMISSING plaintiff-appellee's
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 85-32243. There is no pronouncement as to costs."
The Facts
The undisputed factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court and adopted by public
respondent, are as follows:
". . . [O]n or about September 16, 1975 Associated Banking Corporation and Citizens Bank and
Trust Company merged to form just one banking corporation known as Associated Citizens
Bank, the surviving bank. On or about March 10, 1981, the Associated Citizens Bank changed
its corporate name to Associated Bank by virtue of the Amended Articles of Incorporation. On
September 7, 1977, the defendant executed in favor of Associated Bank a promissory note
whereby the former undertook to pay the latter the sum of P2,500,000.00 payable on or before
March 6, 1978. As per said promissory note, the defendant agreed to pay interest at 14% per
annum, 3% per annum in the form of liquidated damages, compounded interests, and attorney's
fees, in case of litigation equivalent to 10% of the amount due. The defendant, to date, still owes
plaintiff bank the amount of P2,250,000.00 exclusive of interest and other charges. Despite
repeated demands the defendant failed to pay the amount due.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . [T]he defendant denied all the pertinent allegations in the complaint and alleged as
affirmative and[/]or special defenses that the complaint states no valid cause of action; that the
plaintiff is not the proper party in interest because the promissory note was executed in favor of
Citizens Bank and Trust Company; that the promissory note does not accurately reflect the true
intention and agreement of the parties; that terms and conditions of the promissory note are
onerous and must be construed against the creditor-payee bank; that several partial payments
made in the promissory note are not properly applied; that the present action is premature; that
as compulsory counterclaim the defendant prays for attorney's fees, moral damages and
expenses of litigation.
On May 22, 1986, the defendant was declared as if in default for failure to appear at the PreTrial Conference despite due notice.
A Motion to Lift Order of Default and/or Reconsideration of Order dated May 22, 1986 was filed
by defendant's counsel which was denied by the Court in [an] order dated September 16, 1986
and the plaintiff was allowed to present its evidence before the Court ex-parte on October 16,
1986.
At the hearing before the Court ex-parte, Esteban C. Ocampo testified that . . . he is an
accountant of the Loans and Discount Department of the plaintiff bank; that as such, he
supervises the accounting section of the bank, he counterchecks all the transactions that
transpired during the day and is responsible for all the accounts and records and other things
that may[ ]be assigned to the Loans and Discount Department; that he knows the [D]efendant
Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr. because he has an outstanding loan with them as per their records; that
Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr. executed a promissory note No. TL-2649-77 dated September 7, 1977 in
the amount of P2,500,000.00 (Exhibit A); that Associated Banking Corporation and the Citizens
Bank and Trust Company merged to form one banking corporation known as the Associated

Citizens Bank and is now known as Associated Bank by virtue of its Amended Articles of
Incorporation; that there were partial payments made but not full; that the defendant has not
paid his obligation as evidenced by the latest statement of account (Exh. B); that as per
statement of account the outstanding obligation of the defendant is P5,689,413.63 less
P1,000,000.00 or P4,689,413.63 (Exh. B, B-1); that a demand letter dated June 6, 1985 was
sent by the bank thru its counsel (Exh. C) which was received by the defendant on November
12, 1985 (Exh. C, C-1, C-2, C-3); that the defendant paid only P1,000,000.00 which is reflected
in the Exhibit C."
Based on the evidence presented by petitioner, the trial court ordered Respondent Sarmiento to
pay the bank his remaining balance plus interests and attorney's fees. In his appeal, Sarmiento
assigned to the trial court several errors, namely:
"I
The [trial court] erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss appellee bank's complaint
on the ground of lack of cause of action and for being barred by prescription and laches.
II
The same lower court erred in admitting plaintiff-appellee bank's amended complaint
while defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss appellee bank's original complaint and
using/availing [itself of] the new additional allegations as bases in denial of said appellant's
motion and in the interpretation and application of the agreement of merger and Section 80 of
BP Blg. 68, Corporation Code of the Philippines.
III
The [trial court] erred and gravely abuse[d] its discretion in rendering the two as if in
default orders dated May 22, 1986 and September 16, 1986 and in not reconsidering the same
upon technical grounds which in effect subvert the best primordial interest of substantial justice
and equity.
IV
The court a quo erred in issuing the orders dated May 22, 1986 and September 16, 1986
declaring appellant as if in default due to non-appearance of appellant's attending counsel who
had resigned from the law firm and while the parties [were] negotiating for settlement of the
case and after a one million peso payment had in fact been paid to appellee bank for appellant's
account at the start of such negotiation on February 18, 1986 as act of earnest desire to settle
the obligation in good faith by the interested parties.
V
The lower court erred in according credence to appellee bank's Exhibit B statement of
account which had been merely requested by its counsel during the trial and bearing date of
September 30, 1986.
VI
The lower court erred in accepting and giving credence to appellee bank's 27-year-old
witness Esteban C. Ocampo as of the date he testified on October 16, 1986, and therefore, he
was merely an eighteen-year-old minor when appellant supposedly incurred the foisted
obligation under the subject PN No. TL-2649-77 dated September 7, 1977, Exhibit A of appellee
bank.
VII
The [trial court] erred in adopting appellee bank's Exhibit B dated September 30, 1986 in
its decision given in open court on October 17, 1986 which exacted eighteen percent (18%) per
annum on the foisted principal amount of P2.5 million when the subject PN, Exhibit A, stipulated
only fourteen percent (14%) per annum and which was actually prayed for in appellee bank's
original and amended complaints.

VIII
The appealed decision of the lower court erred in not considering at all appellant's
affirmative defenses that (1) the subject PN No. TL-2649-77 for P2.5 million dated September 7,
1977, is merely an accommodation pour autrui bereft of any actual consideration to appellant
himself and (2) the subject PN is a contract of adhesion, hence, [it] needs [to] be strictly
construed against appellee bank assuming for granted that it has the right to enforce and
seek collection thereof.
IX
The lower court should have at least allowed appellant the opportunity to present
countervailing evidence considering the huge amounts claimed by appellee bank (principal sum
of P2.5 million which including accrued interests, penalties and cost of litigation totaled
P4,689,413.63) and appellant's affirmative defenses pursuant to substantial justice and
equity."
The appellate court, however, found no need to tackle all the assigned errors and limited itself to
the question of "whether [herein petitioner had] established or proven a cause of action against
[herein private respondent]." Accordingly, Respondent Court held that the Associated Bank had
no cause of action against Lorenzo Sarmiento Jr., since said bank was not privy to the
promissory note executed by Sarmiento in favor of Citizens Bank and Trust Company (CBTC).
The court ruled that the earlier merger between the two banks could not have vested Associated
Bank with any interest arising from the promissory note executed in favor of CBTC after such
merger.
Thus, as earlier stated, Respondent Court set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed
the complaint. Petitioner now comes to us for a reversal of this ruling.
Issues
In its petition, petitioner cites the following "reasons":
"I
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and in declaring
that petitioner has no cause of action against respondent over the promissory note.
II
The Court of Appeals also erred in declaring that, since the promissory note was
executed in favor of Citizens Bank and Trust Company two years after the merger between
Associated Banking Corporation and Citizens Bank and Trust Company, respondent is not liable
to petitioner because there is no privity of contract between respondent and Associated Bank.
III
The Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that petitioner, despite the merger between
petitioner and Citizens Bank and Trust Company, is not a real party in interest insofar as the
promissory note executed in favor of the merger."
In a nutshell, the main issue is whether Associated Bank, the surviving corporation, may enforce
the promissory note made by private respondent in favor of CBTC, the absorbed company, after
the merger agreement had been signed.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Main Issue:
Associated Bank Assumed

All Rights of CBTC

Ordinarily, in the merger of two or more existing corporations, one of the combining corporations
survives and continues the combined business, while the rest are dissolved and all their rights,
properties and liabilities are acquired by the surviving corporation. Although there is a
dissolution of the absorbed corporations, there is no winding up of their affairs or liquidation of
their assets, because the surviving corporation automatically acquires all their rights, privileges
and powers, as well as their liabilities.
The merger, however, does not become effective upon the mere agreement of the constituent
corporations. The procedure to be followed is prescribed under the Corporation Code. 12a 12b
Section 79 of said Code requires the approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) of the articles of merger which, in turn, must have been duly approved by a majority of
the respective stockholders of the constituent corporations. The same provision further states
that the merger shall be effective only upon the issuance by the SEC of a certificate of merger.
The effectivity date of the merger is crucial for determining when the merged or absorbed
corporation ceases to exist; and when its rights, privileges, properties as well as liabilities pass
on to the surviving corporation.
Consistent with the aforementioned Section 79, the September 16, 1975 Agreement of Merger,
which Associated Banking Corporation (ABC) and Citizens Bank and Trust Company (CBTC)
entered into, provided that its effectivity "shall, for all intents and purposes, be the date when the
necessary papers to carry out this [m]erger shall have been approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission." As to the transfer of the properties of CBTC to ABC, the agreement
provides:
"10.
Upon effective date of the Merger, all rights, privileges, powers, immunities, franchises,
assets and property of [CBTC], whether real, personal or mixed, and including [CBTC's]
goodwill and tradename, and all debts due to [CBTC] on whatever act, and all other things in
action belonging to [CBTC] as of the effective date of the [m]erger shall be vested in [ABC], the
SURVIVING BANK, without need of further act or deed, unless by express requirements of law
or of a government agency, any separate or specific deed of conveyance to legally effect the
transfer or assignment of any kind of property [or] asset is required, in which case such
document or deed shall be executed accordingly; and all property, rights, privileges, powers,
immunities, franchises and all appointments, designations and nominations, and all other rights
and interests of [CBTC] as trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds,
guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, trustee of estates of persons mentally ill and in every
other fiduciary capacity, and all and every other interest of [CBTC] shall thereafter be effectually
the property of [ABC] as they were of [CBTC], and title to any real estate, whether by deed or
otherwise, vested in [CBTC] shall not revert or be in any way impaired by reason thereof;
provided, however, that all rights of creditors and all liens upon any property of [CBTC] shall be
preserved and unimpaired and all debts, liabilities, obligations, duties and undertakings of
[CBTC], whether contractual or otherwise, expressed or implied, actual or contingent, shall
henceforth attach to [ABC] which shall be responsible therefor and may be enforced against
[ABC] to the same extent as if the same debts liabilities, obligations, duties and undertakings
have been originally incurred or contracted by [ABC], subject, however, to all rights, privileges,
defenses, set-offs and counterclaims which [CBTC] has or might have and which shall pertain to
[ABC]."

The records do not show when the SEC approved the merger. Private respondent's theory is
that it took effect on the date of the execution of the agreement itself, which was September 16,
1975. Private respondent contends that, since he issued the promissory note to CBTC on
September 7, 1977 two years after the merger agreement had been executed CBTC could
not have conveyed or transferred to petitioner its interest in the said note, which was not yet in
existence at the time of the merger. Therefore, petitioner, the surviving bank, has no right to
enforce the promissory note on private respondent; such right properly pertains only to CBTC.
Assuming that the effectivity date of the merger was the date of its execution, we still cannot
agree that petitioner no longer has any interest in the promissory note. A closer perusal of the
merger agreement leads to a different conclusion. The provision quoted earlier has this other
clause:
"Upon the effective date of the [m]erger, all references to [CBTC] in any deed, documents, or
other papers of whatever kind or nature and wherever found shall be deemed for all intents and
purposes, references to [ABC], the SURVIVING BANK, as if such references were direct
references to [ABC]. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the fact that the promissory note was executed after the effectivity date of the merger
does not militate against petitioner. The agreement itself clearly provides that all contracts
irrespective of the date of execution entered into in the name of CBTC shall be understood
as pertaining to the surviving bank, herein petitioner. Since, in contrast to the earlier aforequoted
provision, the latter clause no longer specifically refers only to contracts existing at the time of
the merger, no distinction should be made. The clause must have been deliberately included in
the agreement in order to protect the interests of the combining banks; specifically, to avoid
giving the merger agreement a farcical interpretation aimed at evading fulfillment of a due
obligation.
Thus, although the subject promissory note names CBTC as the payee, the reference to CBTC
in the note shall be construed, under the very provisions of the merger agreement, as a
reference to petitioner bank, "as if such reference [was a] direct reference to" the latter "for all
intents and purposes."
No other construction can be given to the unequivocal stipulation. Being clear, plain and free of
ambiguity, the provision must be given its literal meaning and applied without a convoluted
interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum.
In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioner has a valid cause of action against
private respondent. Clearly, the failure of private respondent to honor his obligation under the
promissory note constitutes a violation of petitioner's right to collect the proceeds of the loan it
extended to the former.
Secondary Issues:
Prescription Laches, Contract
Pour Autrui, Lack of Consideration
No Prescription
or Laches

Private respondent's claim that the action has prescribed, pursuant to Article 1149 of the Civil
Code, is legally untenable. Petitioner's suit for collection of a sum of money was based on a
written contract and prescribes after ten years from the time its right of action arose. 19
Sarmiento's obligation under the promissory note became due and demandable on March 6,
1978. Petitioner's complaint was instituted on August 22, 1985, before the lapse of the ten-year
prescriptive period. Definitely, petitioner still had every right to commence suit against the
payor/obligor, the private respondent herein.
Neither is petitioner's action barred by laches. The principle of laches is a creation of equity,
which is applied not to penalize neglect or failure to assert a right within a reasonable time, but
rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or
in an injustice. To require private respondent to pay the remaining balance of his loan is
certainly not inequitable or unjust. What would be manifestly unjust and inequitable is his
contention that CBTC is the proper party to proceed against him despite the fact, which he
himself asserts, that CBTC's corporate personality has been dissolved by virtue of its merger
with petitioner. To hold that no payee/obligee exists and to let private respondent enjoy the fruits
of his loan without liability is surely most unfair and unconscionable, amounting to unjust
enrichment at the expense of petitioner. Besides, this Court has held that the doctrine of laches
is inapplicable where the claim was filed within the prescriptive period set forth under the law.
No Contract
Pour Autrui
Private respondent, while not denying that he executed the promissory note in the amount of
P2,500,000 in favor of CBTC, offers the alternative defense that said note was a contract Pour
autrui.
A stipulation pour autrui is one in favor of a third person who may demand its fulfillment,
provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. An incidental
benefit or interest, which another person gains, is not sufficient. The contracting parties must
have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
Florentino vs. Encarnacion Sr. enumerates the requisites for such contract: (1) the stipulation in
favor of a third person must be a part of the contract, and not the contract itself; (2) the
favorable stipulation should not be conditioned or compensated by any kind of obligation; and
(3) neither of the contracting parties bears the legal representation or authorization of the third
party. The "fairest test" in determining whether the third person's interest in a contract is a
stipulation pour autrui or merely an incidental interest is to examine the intention of the parties
as disclosed by their contract.
We carefully and thoroughly perused the promissory note, but found no stipulation at all that
would even resemble a provision in consideration of a third person. The instrument itself does
not disclose the purpose of the loan contract. It merely lays down the terms of payment and the
penalties incurred for failure to pay upon maturity. It is patently devoid of any indication that a
benefit or interest was thereby created in favor of a person other than the contracting parties. In
fact, in no part of the instrument is there any mention of a third party at all. Except for his
barefaced statement, no evidence was proffered by private respondent to support his argument.
Accordingly, his contention cannot be sustained. At any rate, if indeed the loan actually
benefited a third person who undertook to repay the bank, private respondent could have

availed himself of the legal remedy of a third-party complaint. That he made no effort to implead
such third person proves the hollowness of his arguments.
Consideration
Private respondent also claims that he received no consideration for the promissory note and, in
support thereof, cites petitioner's failure to submit any proof of his loan application and of his
actual receipt of the amount loaned. These arguments deserve no merit. Res ipsa loquitur. The
instrument, bearing the signature of private respondent, speaks for itself. Respondent
Sarmiento has not questioned the genuineness and due execution thereof. No further proof is
necessary to show that he undertook to pay P2,500,000, plus interest, to petitioner bank on or
before March 6, 1978. This he failed to do, as testified to by petitioner's accountant. The latter
presented before the trial court private respondent's statement of account as of September 30,
1986, showing an outstanding balance of P4,689,413.63 after deducting P1,000,000.00 paid
seven months earlier. Furthermore, such partial payment is equivalent to an express
acknowledgment of his obligation. Private respondent can no longer backtrack and deny his
liability to petitioner bank. "A person cannot accept and reject the same instrument."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and the
Decision of RTC-Manila, Branch 48, in Civil Case No. 26465 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.