EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-50444. August 31, 1987.]

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his
capacity as General Manager of the National Housing
Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as
Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES EXERCISE AND PERFORM
ADJUDICATORY POWERS AND FUNCTION. It is by now commonplace learning
that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers
and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or
quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well
recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence
and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of
complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the
dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. (See Spouses
Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs. Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., G.R. No.
63558, May 19, 1987).
2. ID.; ID.; QUANTUM OF JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS DEFINED IN ITS
ENABLING ACT. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers
which an administrative agency may exercise is dened in the enabling act of
such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such agency.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY. The extent to which the NHA
has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to
the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Decree." Section 3 of this statute provides as follows:
"National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in
accordance with the provisions of this decree." (Emphasis supplied)
4. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; POWER TO RESCIND AVAILABLE
ONLY TO INJURED PARTY; CASE AT BAR. Having failed to comply with its
contractual obligation to complete certain specied improvements in the
subdivision within the specied period of two years from the date of the
execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its
options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither rescind
the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the private
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respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed, under the general Civil Law, in view
of petitioner's breach of its contract with private respondent, it is the latter who
is vested with the option either to rescind the contract and receive
reimbursement of all installment payments (with legal interest) made for the
purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to suspend payment of further
purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had fullled its
obligations to the buyer. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private
respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of
petitioner.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; MOTIONS; DUE PROCESS; PRINCIPLE NOT VIOLATED WHERE
PARTY WAS GIVEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ITS SIDE AND TO BE
HEARD. We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the right to
due process. This assertion lacks substance. The record shows that a copy of the
order denying the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the complaint
for the morning of 6 March 1978, was duly served on counsel for petitioner, as
evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy indicating that
such service had been eected. But even if it be assumed, arguendo, that such
notice had not been served on the petitioner, nevertheless the latter was not
deprived of due process, for what the fundamental law abhors is not the absence
of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. In the
instant case, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side and to be
heard on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion to
dismiss; the claim of denial of due process must hence sound even more hollow.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS' DECREE
(PD 957); SALE OF LOTS IN INSTALLMENT BASIS; ORIGINAL PERIOD OF PAYMENT
DEEMED EXTENDED. To permit Antipolo Realty to collect the disputed amount
in a lump sum after it had defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, would
tend to defeat the purpose of the authorization to lot buyers to suspend
installment payments. As the NHA resolution pointed out, "[s]uch must be the
case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments." Upon the other
hand, to condone the entire amount that would have become due would be an
excessively harsh penalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust
enrichment of the private respondent at the expense of the petitioner.
DECISION
FELICIANO, J :
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By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired

prospective and benecial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa
Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty
Corporation.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to
private respondent Virgilio Yuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of
Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent
of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's
obligations under the original contract, including payment of his predecessor's
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installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the

subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the
Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to,
and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment
payments falling due thereafter Clause 17 reads:
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"Clause 17. SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the beauty of the

subdivision in line with the modern trend of urban development, the
SELLER hereby obligates itself to provide the subdivision with:
a) Concrete curbs and gutters
b) Underground drainage system
c) Asphalt paved roads
d) Independent water system
e) Electrical installation with concrete posts.
f) Landscaping and concrete sidewalks
g) Developed park or amphitheatre
h) 24-hour security guard service.
These improvements shall be complete within a period of two (2) years
from date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER shall permit the BUYER
to suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest
charges until such time that such improvements shall have been
completed." 1

On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private

respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision
had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the
monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would
conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the
representation in the notice.
In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its
request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing the
decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976
in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes,
respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its
commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell, executed by and
between the lot buyers and the respondent." In addition, a formal demand was
made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73,
representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the
period while the improvements were being completed i.e., between
September 1972 and October 1976.
LLjur

Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly
installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo
Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture
of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.
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Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson brought his dispute
with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA through a letter-complaint
dated 10 May 1977 which complaint was docketed in NHA as Case No. 2123.
Antipolo Realty led a Motion to Dismiss which was heard on 2 September 1977.
Antipolo Realty, without presenting any evidence, moved for the consolidation of
Case No. 2123 with several other cases led against it by other subdivision lot
buyers, then pending before the NHA. In an Order issued on 7 February 1978, the
NHA denied the motion to dismiss and scheduled Case No. 2123 for hearing.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the
reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under the following conditions:
"1) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a
statement of account for the monthly amortizations from November
1976 to the present;
2) No penalty interest shall be charged for the period from November
1976 to the date of the statement of account; and
3) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay the arrears shown in
the statement of account." 2

Antipolo Realty led a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had been
denied due process of law since it had not been served with notice of the
scheduled hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's
complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint
involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell.
The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 by respondent NHA
General Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear
and decide the Yuson complaint. He also found that Antipolo Realty had in fact
been served with notice of the date of the hearing, but that its counsel had failed
to attend the hearing. 3 The case was submitted for decision, and eventually
decided, solely on the evidence presented by the complainant.

On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this Court with a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which was
docketed as G.R. No. L-49051. Once more, the jurisdiction of the NHA was
assailed. Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell, it
could validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a consequence
thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by the latter. 4
This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11 December 1978,
"without prejudice to petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy." 5 A
motion for reconsideration was denied on 29 January 1979.
Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the Oce
of the President which, on 9 March 1979, dismissed the same through public
respondent Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave. 6
In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts that, in hearing the
complaint of private respondent Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the
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Contract to Sell between the parties, the NHA had not only acted on a matter
beyond its competence, but had also, in eect, assumed the performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not authorized to perform.
Cdpr

We nd the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit.

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise
and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only.
Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative
agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor
Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, 7 basically because
the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential
in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of
a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained
crowded and clogged. In Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs. Hon.
Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., 8 the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee,
said:
"In the fties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction
in administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve
specialized disputes in the eld of labor (as in corporations, public
transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the
Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution of labor-management
controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to
be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court
held that under the 'sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered' (Pambujan Sur United
Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954]).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review
in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable.
Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that 'between the power lodged in an
administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to
refer it to the former. "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the
view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocably, the choice
should fall on [an administrative agency]" ' (NFL v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419,
428, citing precedents). The Court in the earlier case of Ebon vs. De
Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]), noted that the lawmaking authority, in
restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all
kinds of damages in labor cases, as against the previous P.D. amendment
splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts, 'evidently, . . . had
second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the
jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would
mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible
conicting ndings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the

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same claim.'"

In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing
Authority, et al., 9 Mr. Justice Gutierrez, speaking for the Court, observed that:
"There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction
in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling
within the agency's special expertise. The very denition of an
administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers.
The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to
administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of
administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and
speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by
regular courts."

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an

administrative agency may exercise is dened in the enabling act of such agency.
In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such
powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency. 10 In the exercise of such powers, the agency
concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the
rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of
administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial
function, exercisable only by our regular courts.
prcd

Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority
must be determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957,
known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree." 11 Section 3 of
this statute provides as follows:
"National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in
accordance with the provisions of this decree." (Emphasis supplied)

The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged
in the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the
statute which provide:
"WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems
and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and
safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling
and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to
the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real
estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to dierent
innocent purchasers for value ." (Emphasis supplied)

Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 claried and spelled out the quasi-judicial
dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite
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specic terms:
"SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims led by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman;, and
C. Cases involving specic performance of contractual and statutory
obligations led by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman." (Emphasis
supplied.)

The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the
instant case are found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which
reads:
"Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by
a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he
contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer
when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from
further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop
the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans
and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at
his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization
and interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at
the legal rate." (Emphasis supplied.)

Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain

specied improvements in the subdivision within the specied period of two
years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was
not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence,
petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment
payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed,
under the general Civil Law, 13 in view of petitioner's breach of its contract
with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the option either to
rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of all installment payments
(with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question,
or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as the
petitioner had fullled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was therefore
correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could
not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.
cdrep

Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or
act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract
to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical
consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not
entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question that
under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine
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and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and
under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations
thereunder are faithfully performed.
We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the right to due process.
This assertion lacks substance. The record shows that a copy of the order denying
the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the complaint for the
morning of 6 March 1978, was duly served on counsel for petitioner, as
evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy indicating that
such service had been eected. 14 But even if it be assumed, arguendo, that such
notice had not been served on the petitioner, nevertheless the latter was not
deprived of due process, for what the fundamental law abhors is not the absence
of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 15 In
the instant case, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side and
to be heard on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion to
dismiss; the claim of denial of due process must hence sound even more hollow.
16
We turn nally to the question of the amount of P16,994.73 which petitioner
insists had accrued during the period from September 1972 to October 1976,
when private respondent had suspended payment of his monthly installments on
his chosen subdivision lot. The NHA in its 9 March 1978 resolution ruled that the
regular monthly installments under the Contract to Sell did not accrue during the
September 1972 October 1976 period:
"[R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspend payment of his
monthly installments until the improvements in the subdivision shall have
been completed. Respondent informed complainant on November 1976
that the improvement 6 have been completed. Monthly installments
during the period of suspension of payment did not become due and
demandable. Neither did they accrue. Such must be the case, otherwise,
there is no sense in suspending payments. If the suspension is lifted the
debtor shall resume payments but never did he incur any arrears.
Such being the case, the demand of respondent for complainant to pay
the arrears due during the period of suspension of payment is null and
void. Consequently, the notice of cancellation based on the refusal to pay
the arrears that were not due and demandable is also null and void." 17

The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need of clarication and
amplication. The NHA correctly held that no installment payments should be
considered as having accrued during the period of suspension of payments.
Clearly, the critical issue is what happens to the installment payments which
would have accrued and fallen due during the period of suspension had no default
on the part of the petitioner intervened. To our mind, the NHA resolution is most
appropriately read as directing that the original period of payment in the
Contract to Sell must be deemed extended by a period of time equal to the
period of suspension (i.e., by four (4) years and two (2) months) during which
extended time (tacked on to the original contract period) private respondent
buyer must continue to pay the monthly installment payments until the entire
original contract price shall have been paid. We think that such is the intent of
the NHA resolution which directed that "[i]f the suspension is lifted, the debtor
shall resume payments" and that such is the most equitable and just reading that
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may be given to the NHA resolution. To permit Antipolo Realty to collect the
disputed amount in a lump sum after it had defaulted on its obligations to its lot
buyers, would tend to defeat the purpose of the authorization (under Sec. 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 957, supra) to lot buyers to suspend installment
payments. As the NHA resolution pointed out, "[s]uch must be the case,
otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments." Upon the other hand, to
condone the entire amount that would have become due would be an excessively
harsh penalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust enrichment of
the private respondent at the expense of the petitioner. It should be recalled that
the latter had already fullled, albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers
under their Contracts to Sell. At the same time, the lot buyer should not be
regarded as delinquent and as such charged penalty interest. The suspension of
installment payments was attributable to the petitioner, not the private
respondent. The tacking on of the period of suspension to the end of the original
period precisely prevents default on the part of the lot buyer. In the words of the
NHA resolution, "never would [the buyer] incur any arrears."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHA decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and claried as providing for the lengthening
of the original contract period for payment of installments under the Contract to
Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months, during which extended time private
respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly installment payments until
the entire original contract price shall have been paid. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidden, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 26-29, Annex "D" of Petition.

2. Rollo, p. 20, Annex "A" of Petition.
3. Ibid., pp. 21-22, Annex "B" of Petition.
4. Clause 7 provides: "In case the BUYER fails to satisfy any monthly installments, or
any other payments herein agreed upon, he is granted a month of grace within
which to make the retarded payment, it is understood, however, that should the
month of grace herein granted to the BUYER expire, without the payments
corresponding to both months having been satised, an interest of 12% per
annum will be charged on the amounts he should have paid; it is understood
further, that should a period of 60 days elapse, to begin from the expiration of
the month of grace herein mentioned, and the BUYER has not paid all the
amounts he should have paid, with the corresponding interest, up to that date,
the SELLER has the right to declare this contract cancelled, ex parte, and of no
eect, and as consequence thereof, the SELLER may dispose of the parcel or
parcels of land covered by this contract, without notice to the BUYER, in favor
of other persons, as if this contract had never been entered into. In case of
such cancellation of this contract, all the amounts paid in accordance with this
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agreement, together with all the improvements made on the premises, shall be
considered as rents and charges paid for the use and occupation of the abovementioned premises, and as payment for the damages suered by failure of the
BUYER to fulll his part of this agreement, and the BUYER hereby renounces all
his right to demand or reclaim the return of the same and obliges himself to
peacefully and immediately vacate the premises and deliver the same to the
SELLER without delay."
5. Rollo of G.R. No. 49051, p. 63.
6. Rollo, pp. 23-25, Annex "C" of Petition.
7. See, e.g., National Federation of Labor v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419 (1984) and Philex
Mining Corporation v. Reyes, 118 SCRA 602 (1982).
8. G.R. No. L-63558, promulgated 19 May 1987; underscoring supplied.
9. G.R. No. L-48672, promulgated 31 July 1987; underscoring supplied.
10. See, in this connection, DMRC Enterprises v. Este del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc.,
132 SCRA 293 (1984); Union Glass and Container Corporation v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 126 SCRA 31 (1983);and Philex Mining Corporation v.
Reyes, supra.
11. Promulgated on 12 July 1976.
12. Promulgated on 2 April 1978.
13. Articles 1191 and 1169, Civil Code.
14. Rollo of G. R. No. 49051, p. 58; Annex "A " of Comment.
15. Manuel v. Villena, 37 SCRA 745 (1971) and Asprec v. Itchon, 16 SCRA 921 (1966).
16. See, BLTB Co. v. Cadiao, 22 SCRA 987 (1968).
17. Rollo, p. 20; underscoring supplied.

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