PHI 105 (1/19/09)

An act is legal, if and only if, its permitted by the law.

This is not what determines if an act is morally right or wrong.
Ex.) Adultery, lying, historical example: Slavery.
Acts that are morally permissible but illegal. Examples?
Speeding late at night, little traffic no cameras. Smoking cannabis, which you grew yourself, in
the privacy of your own home.
Marrying someone of a different race in South Carolina prior to 1998.
Moral claims are distinct from prudential claims.
Morality is essentially tied to the welfare of others, whereas prudence is not.
Imprudent: Not wise. Lack of caution I practical affairs.
Prudent: careful and sensible; marked by sound judgment.
Sometimes its morally impermissible to do whats in your long-term best interest.
Examples:
Get refunded money for college, send all to Haiti.
**Moral claims are distinct from claims about etiquette.
I expect Doug not to pick his nose during class, but its not morally wrong.
Etiquette: Delineates expectations for social behavior according to contemporary conventional
norms within a society, social class, or group. (Wiki)
Examples of some norms of etiquette?
Morality, by contrast, delineates those actions for which we can rightly be held blameworthy
or praiseworthy.
Agents are necessarily blameworthy for freely and knowledgeably violating the requirements
of morality, but agents are not necessarily blameworthy for freely and knowledgeably
violating the requirements of etiquette.
Whether a person is blame worthy only depends on if we believe what they did was wrong.
What we have then is a disagreement of if what the person done is actually wrong or not.
Normative Ethics (and its three branches)
A theory of the Right: What makes an act right//wrong?
A theory of the right takes the following firm:
An act is morally permissible (or impermissible or obligatory or supererogatory (actions
that go beyond the call of duty)) if and only if, and because
Example: An act is morally impermissible if and only if, and because, it is forbidden by
God.
1/21/10
Normative Ethics (Cont.)
A Theory of the Good: What features of tings, events, or states of affairs make them good or
bad?
A Theory of Virtue: What character traits make a person virtuous or vicious?
Meta-Ethics:

Moral Language
Moral Metaphysics
Are their facts about whats right or wrong?
Moral Epistemology
Study of knowledge. How do we know what the facts are.
Moral Psychology
Whats the relationship between making a moral judgment and being able to act
accordingly?
Applied Ethics:
Is this or that particular type of action (e.g., abortion, capital punishment, affirmative action, etc.)
right or wrong?

Categories of Deontic Evaluation:

Morally Obligatory that which is required, that which it would be wrong to refrain from doing.
Morally right/permissible which is not prohibited.
Morally optional that which is neither required nor prohibited.

Supererogatory that which is above and beyond what is morally required; that which is
both morally optional and morally better than some other permissible alternative.
Ex.) Bring a sick friend soup. Buy from store but you spend all day making soup.
Merely permissible: that which is morally optional but not supererogatory.

Divine Command Theory: What god says makes things right or wrong.
The Aims of Moral Theory:
Practical Aim: The main practical aim of moral theory is to discover a decision procedure that
can be used as a guide in our moral deliberations about what to do.
Theoretical Aim: The main theoretical aim of moral theory is to discover what underlying
features of actions make them right and wrong and then, on that basis, to formulate a criterion
of moral rightness that states the most general conditions under which actions are right or
wrong.
Moral Theorizing: The Method of Narrow Reflection Equilibrium you want to just keep going
straight on one moral path. You want a theory that is consistant with your morals. - (An equilibrium
in which you dont want to change your intuition or moral)
Start with some provisional moral judgments.
Formulate some provisional moral theory (or general principle) that accounts for these
provisional moral judgments.
Test this provisional moral theory (or general principle) to see whether its implications conflict
with any of your other moral judgments. When conflicts arise, it is an open question as to
whether it is the theory or the judgments that need to be revised. Decide which to revise on the
basis of which seems more intuitively plausible after reflection. Do this until no further revisions

are necessary.
An illustration via a set of cases:
Does it matter is you chose to be in the situations or not? Or if you were forced to choose.
The Boat Rescue (Save the 1 person or the 5)
The Transplant (Kill your patient (non-consented) to save 5 people who need the
patients organs)
Whats the moral judgment that explains why you dont save five people in
the transplant?
Right of self ownership?
(1) It is permissible to let someone die to save five, but not
permissible to kill one to save five.
The Runaway Trolley
Train can run through 5 people, unless you flip a switch which then makes the
train run only over one person.
If you choose to kill the one then (1) is flawed.
You still kill one person through the action of killing that one person.
Doctrine of allowing?
~Doing harm is wrong but allowing harm is ok?~
Why we shouldnt stop after having only reached a narrow reflective equilibrium.
The method of narrow reflective equilibrium is too conservative. It helps to us to render our
moral beliefs consistent, but we should not be satisfied with simply rendering our own beliefs
consistent.
To enrich our reflection, we must reflect on alternative theories, alternative judgments,
counterarguments to our theory, counterarguments to our judgments, the source of moral
judgments and the reliability of that source, our background assumptions, and our competency
to judge.

The Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium

The method tells us to do three things (DePaul):
Reflect on the interconnections among our beliefs.
Leave nothing out of our reflections. Reflect not only on our own initial beliefs and their
interconnections, but also on ourselves and our competency to judge, and reflect on alternative
beliefs, theories, and arguments.
Settle any conflicts that emerge, deciding what to believe on the basis of what seems to be the
most intuitively plausible upon reflection.
Is there any rational alternative to this?

1/25
DCT: An act is obligatory if and only it, and because, God commands it.
H1: God commands/forbids certain actions, because they are obligatory/wrong.

H2: Actions are obligatory/wrong, because God commands/forbids them.

A tyrant is someone who exerts power over others without either the proper moral authority of
sufficient moral justification for doing so.
2/2/10
DTC (Cont.)
On DCT, what is it to say that God is good?
Answer: Its to say that God is it doesnt make sense with this view because it is to say
something that god commands us to bring about or preserve. But, surely, this cant be
right. Gods not good. Not bad. Neutral.
This is the depriving God of His goodness objection.
Argument Against H1
P1: If H1 is true, then God cant change the fact that X is wrong (or right).
P2: If God cant change the fact that X is wrong (or right), then God isnt omnipotent.
P3: God is omnipotent.
C: Therefore, H1 is false.
What does it mean to say that God is omnipotent?
Can God create a boulder that even He cannot lift?
He can do anything that is logically possible. Anything that does not create a
contradiction.
The Problem of Evil
The fact that X is wrong (or right) is either a necessary truth or a contingent truth. If its a
necessary truth, we should reject P2. And if its a contingent truth, we should reject P1. So,
either way, then, the argument is unsound.
Necessaryandcontingenttruths.
Which of the following are necessary? Which are contingent?
Barack Obama was the President of the United States in 2009. Contingent.
Either it is the case that Doug has a wife or it is not the case that Doug has a wife. Necessary.
Masses attract one another. Contingent.
All bachelors are unmarried. Necessary.
2/4/10
Another Argument Against H1
P1: If H1 is true, theres a standard of right and wrong thats independent of God.
P2: If theres a standard of right and wrong thats independent of God, then God didnt create
morality.
P3: If God didnt create morality, then God isnt the Creator of all that is.
P4: God is the Creator of all that is.
C: Therefore, H1 is false.
Is this a good argument?

Evaluating this argument

P1.H1claimsonlythatmoralityisindependentofGodscommands,notthatmoralityis
independentofGod.TwoExamples:(1)Fionaandherdad.(2)Thelawsofnatureand
God.
Ofcourse,onemightarguethat,unlikethelawsofnature,thelawsofmoralityare
necessarilywhattheyare.Whatthen?
Weshould,then,rejectP4.Heisnotthecreatorofallthatis.Onlycontingenttruths.
GodistheCreatorofthatiscontingent.Afterall,[Redacted].

Some Conclusions
The DCT/H2 seems to conflict with a number of common theistic tenets: (1) God is good. (2) that
gos commands are not morally arbitrary, and (3) that God is not a tyrant.
The DCT/H2 also implausibly implies that anything goes with regard to whats right and wrong.
H1, by contrast, conflicts with no theistic tenets. Its compatible with both the idea that God is
the creator of all that contingently is and with the idea that God is omnipotent.
It seems, therefore, that even the theist should reject DCT and embrace H1.

1. Moral Relativism
Whats right and wrong for a person to do is ultimately determined by the fundamental (i.e., basic) moral
norms of his or her culture.
More precisely, moral relativism says: an act, A, performed by a subject, S, who is a member of a
culture, C, is morally permissible if and only if, and because, the fundamental moral norms of C permits
A to perform S.
2. Definitions
D1: C is a culture =df. C is a collection of people, often living in close proximity to each other, sharing a
set of social norms, conventions, and practices.
D2: X is a moral norm =df. X is a standard (that is, a rule or a principle) that renders some verdict
regarding the moral status of some act-type (e.g., it is wrong to commit adultery).
3. Continued
D3: X is a fundamental moral norm =df. X is a moral standard that doesnt derive from any more
fundamental moral standard. (e.g., the divine command theorist takes it is wrong to act as God
forbids to be a fundamental moral norm).
D4: X is a fundamental moral norm of C =df. the vast majority of the members of C believe that X is a
fundamental moral standard.
4. Moral Absolutism and Moral Non-Absolutism
Moral absolutism is the view that certain types of acts are wrong no matter how valuable their
consequences. Examples: Pacifists. Kant and the Inquiring Murderer.
The distinction between an act-token and an act-type.
Moral non-absolutism is the view that there are no types of acts that are wrong types of acts that are
wrong no matter how valuable their consequences.

Note that there is a problem with defining the moral absolutist as one who believes that there are
absolute (exception-less) moral rules. Consider act-consequentialism: an act is morally permissible if and
only if, and because, there is no available alternative that would produce more good than it would.

5.TheContextSensitivityThesis
Timmonsdefinesthethesisasfollows:
Therightnessorwrongnessofanaction(performedinsomeparticularcontext)partlydepends
onnonmoralfactsthatholdinthecontextfactsconcerningagentsandtheircircumstances(p.
42).
Thisthesisisfairlyuncontroversial,butitshouldnotbeconfusedwithmoralrelativism.
Someonecanacceptthisthesisanddenymoralrelativism.Andsomeonecanacceptthisthesis
whilealsoacceptingmoralrelativism.

6.MoralObjectivism
MoralObjectivism(a.k.a.theUniversalityThesis):Thereareuniversalmoralnormsthatare
bindingonallpersonsirrespectiveoftheculture/societytowhichtheybelong.Onmoral
objectivism,thetruthofamoralclaim/judgmentdoesNOTdependonwhetherit
conformstothenorms,beliefs,attitudes,orconventionsofanygrouporindividual.It
depends,rather,onwhattheobjectivemoralfactsare.

7.Continued
Moreprecisely,moralobjectivismsays:anact,A,performedbyasubject,S,ismorally
permissibleifandonlyif,andbecause,theuniversalmoralnormsthatarebindingonall
personspermitStoperformA.
Examples:ActConsequentialismDivineCommandTheory.
Canthemoralobjectivistacceptmoralnonabsolutism?

8.Apracticequiz(butfirstsomepreliminaries)
PandQarecompatible=df.itislogicallypossibleforbothPandQtobetrue.
PandQareincompatible=df.itislogicallyimpossibleforbothPandQtobetrue.
Arethefollowingsetsofclaimscompatible?
A1:Johnismarried.A2:Johnisabachelor.(Incompatible.)
B1:Johnisaprofessionalphilosopher.B2:Johnisarockstar.(Compatible.)
C1:Johnisnothappy.C2:Johnisnotunhappy.(Compatible.)
D1:Johnisnotinsane.D2:Johnisnotsane.(Incompatible.)
E1:JohnKerryistall.E2:GeorgeW.BushisaDemocrat.(Compatible.)

9.TheQuestions
Foreachofthenumberedclaimsbelow,state(a)whetheritscompatibleorincompatiblewith
moralrelativism(MR)and(b)whetheritscompatibleorincompatiblewithmoralobjectivism
(MO).

(C1)Actsofcruelty,slavery,terrorism,andgenocidearewrongwhetherpeopleorsocieties
condemnorcondonethem.
MR?
MR:Incompatible.Thus.MRhassomeseriouslycounterintuitiveimplications.
MO?
MO:Compatible.

10.Continued
(C2)IntheUnitedStates,certainfundamentalmoralnorms(e.g.,thosewithregardtohow
womenandminoritiesshouldbetreated)havechangedforthebetter.
MR?
MR:Incompatible.Notethat,onMRtherecanbenomoralprogressinthesenseofsociety's
normschangingforthebetter.Therecanonlybemoralprogressinthesenseofpeoplesrateof
compliancewiththemoralnormsincreases.

11.Continued
MO?
MO:Compatible.OnMO,thereisanobjectivelycorrectsetofmoralnorms.And,thus,there
canbemoralprogresswhenoursociety'smoralnormschangefromthosethatareincorrectto
thosethatarecorrect.

12.Continued
(C3)Thepeopleofdifferentsocietiesacceptdifferentmoralnorms.
MR?
MR:Compatible.
MO?
MO:Compatible.AccordingtoMO<thereisoneobjectivelycorrectsetofmoralnorms.Butthe
moralobjectivistdoesnotclaimthatallsocietiesacceptthesenormsoreventhatallsocieties
willacceptthesamenorms.

13.Continued
(C4)Whetherlyingisrightorwrongdependsonthevalueoftheconsequencesofdoingso.
MR?
MR:Compatible.
MO?
MO:Compatible.Themoralobjectivistcanbeamoralnonabsolutist.

14.Continued
(C5)AlthoughitwouldbewrongforDWPtolethisgrandparentsfreezetodeathjustsothathe
canusehisdisposableincometotakeavacationratherthantopaytheirheatingbill,itwasnt
wrongfortheEskimostolettheireldersfreezetodeathastheysometimesdidpriortothe20th
century.
MR?

MR:Compatible.
MO?

15.Continued
MO:Compatible.ThemoralobjectivistcanacceptC5byassertingthatthefollowingisa
universalmoralnorm:ThisprincipleyieldsdifferentmoralverdictsforDWPandthehistorical
Eskimosgiventhattheircircumstancesare/wereverydifferent.But,ofcourse,ifDWPdid
everfindhimselfinrelevantlysimilarcircumstances,thenthemoralobjectivistmustadmitthat
DWPwouldbepermittedtolethiseldersdie.

16.Continued
(C6)Whatitisrightandwrongtodocandependonthecustomsofagivensociety.
MR?
MR:Compatible.
MO?
MO:Compatible.OnMO,fundamentalmoralnormsareuniversal,butthemoralobjectivistcan
acceptthecontextsensitivitythesisandholdthatderivativemoralnormsvaryfromoneculture
toanother.

17.Continued
Supposethatthefollowingisauniversal,fundamentalmoralnorm:"Bepolitetoagracious
host."Giventhisprinciple,whatshouldamandobeforeenteringachurch?Asynagogue?What
shouldsomeonedoifinvitedintosomeoneshomeinJapan?ThemainlandU.S.?Sincewhats
rightandwrongtodocandependonwhatsconsideredpolite,andsincewhatsconsidered
politejustdependsonthecustomsofagivensociety,whatitisrightandwrongtodocan
(indirectly)dependonthecustomsofagivensociety

18.Continued
(C7)Whetherornotwomenshouldgoaroundbarebreastedandwhetherornotmenshould
wearasuitandtietoworkisjustamatterofcustom.Thereisnoobjectivetruthaboutsuch
matters.
MR?
MR:Compatible.
MO?
MO:Compatible.Arguable,normsofdressarenotmoralnorms,butrathernormsofetiquette.
Themoralobjectivistisonlycommittedtotherebeinganobjectivetruthaboutmorality,not
etiquette.

19.Continued
(C8)Onesownsocietyisntinaprivilegedpositionwithregardtoknowingwhatsrightand
wrongforonetodo.
MR?
MR:Incompatible.One'sownsocietyisinaprivilegedpositionwithregardtoknowingwhat's

rightandwrongforonetodo,for,onMR,what'srightandwrongforonetodojustdependson
whatthenormsofone'ssociety.
MO?
MO:Compatible.

20.Continued
(C9)Peopleofallsocietiesshouldbetolerantofoneanothersreligiousbeliefs.
MR?
MR:Incompatible.Whetherornotsomeoneshouldbetolerantofsomeoneelse'sreligios
beliefsisamoralquestion.And,onMR,suchmoralquestionsaredeterminedbythemoral
normsofone'sculture.Since,insomecultures...

21.Continued
MO?
MO:Compatible.Indeed,sinceC9isstatingauniversalmoralnorm,onemostbeanmoral
objectivisttoacceptC9.

22.Whyacceptorrejectmoralrelativism?
Next,wewilllookatvariousargumentsforandagainstmoralrelativism.

23.TheMoralDiversityThesis(MDT)
ManypeopleacceptMRonthebasisofthefollowingthesis.
TheMoralDiversityThesis:Peopleindifferentsocietiesacceptdifferentfundamentalmoral
norms(a.k.a.basicmoralnorms).
NotethattheMDTisaclaimaboutwhatpeoplebelievetobetrue,whereasMRisclaimabout
whatistrue.
IsMDTtrue?

24.TheArgumentfortheMoralDiversityThesis
Peopleindifferentsocietiesmakedifferentmoraljudgmentsregardingthesametypeofaction.
Ifpeopleindifferentsocietiesmakedifferentmoraljudgmentsregardingthesametypeofaction,
theymustacceptdifferentfundamentalmoralnorms.
Therefore,peopleindifferentsocietiesacceptdifferentfundamentalmoralnorms.(TheMoral
DiversityThesis)

25.P2isfalse
Someotherpossibleexplanationsformoraldisagreement:
DifferentNonmoralbeliefs(Ex.ApplyOneoughtnotkillsacredbeingstobothHinduand
Christiancultures.)
DifferentCustoms(Ex.ApplyOneoughttobepolitetoagracioushost.todifferent
culturalcontexts.)

26.Continued
DifferentEnvironmentalConditions(Ex.ApplySavepeoplefromdeathunlessdoingso
willverylikelyincreasethenumberofdeathsoverall.todifferentenvironmental
conditions.)
AlthoughP2oftheArgumentfortheMoralDiversityThesisisfalse,itdoesntfollowthatthe
moraldiversitythesisisfalse.So,forthesakeofargument,Iwillgranttheproponentofmoral
relativismthatitistrue.Thefollowingaretwoargumentsbasedonthemoraldiversitythesis.

27.TheArgumentfromFundamentalMoralDisagreement,v1(a.k.a.TheAnthropologists
Argument,v1)
Peopleindifferentsocietiesacceptdifferentfundamentalmoralnorms.(=MDT)
Ifpeopleindifferentsocietiesacceptdifferentfundamentalmoralnorms,thenMOisfalse.
Therefore,MOisfalse.

28.EvaluatingtheArgument
Isthisagoodargument?
Well,aswesaw,P1isquestionable.
Inanycase,P2isfalse.ThefactthatpeopledisagreeaboutXdoesnotentailthatthere
isnoobjectivefactaboutX.
ConsidertheshapeoftheEarth.

29.TheArgumentfromFundamentalMoralDisagreement,v2
OBSERVATION:Thequalityandquantityofmoraldisagreementappearstodiffersignificantly
fromthequalityandquantityofdisagreementthatwefindwithregardtoobjectivemattersoffact
(e.g.,mattersofscience).
EXPLANATION:OnepossibleexplanationfortheobservationinP1isthatthereisnoobjective
morality.
COMPARISON:NootherexplanationfortheobservationinP1providesatleastasgoodan
explanationastheexplanationgiveninP2.
Therefore,thereisnoobjectivemorality.

30.TheMainThrustoftheArgument
Somephilosophersbelievethatwhatexplainsinterandintrasocietalmoraldisagreementisthat
therearesimplynomoralfacts,butonlydifferingmoralattitudes.Accordingtothese
philosophers,differencesinmoralbeliefaremorereadilyexplainedbythehypothesisthatthey
reflectpeoplesdifferingattitudesthanbythehypothesisthattheyreflectpeoplesvarious
distortions,misperceptions,orignoranceofanobjectivemoralreality.

31.Continued
Nowweshouldnotethattherehasbeenanawfullotofgenuinedisagreementintheareasof
scienceandmetaphysics,andfromthis,wedonotconcludethattherearenoscientificfacts
andnometaphysicalfacts.Sothesephilosophersmustclaimthatmoraldisagreementis

somehowmoresubstantialormorefundamentalthanthekindofdisagreementwefindinthese
otherareaswherethereisclearlysomeobjectivefactofthematter.

32.Ismoraldisagreementmorefundamentalorsubstantial?
Wemustkeepthefollowinginmind:
Theremaybelessmoraldisagreementandmoremoralagreementthanyouthink.
Disagreementaboutspecificmoralrulesoftenissuesfromdisagreementconcerningthe
relevantnonmoralfacts.Consider,forexample,theissuesofabortionandcapitalpunishment.
Andthereisafairamountofmoralagreement.Forexample,thereiswideagreementthat
sufferingisbadandoughttobeprevented.

33.Continued
Theremaybemoredisagreementinthesciencesthanyouthink.Atbottom,sciencerelieson
abductivereasoning.Butthereisnearlyasmuchdisagreementconcerningtheprinciplesof
abductivereasoningasthereisconcerningmoralprinciples.
Nonreligiousmoralinquiryisrelativelyyoungcomparedtoscientificinquiry.Ifwelookat
scientificinquiryinitsinfancy,therewasatremendousamountofdisagreement.Yetwewould
havebewrongtoconcludebackthen,thatthebestexplanationforthesedisagreementswas
thattherearenoobjectivescientificfacts.

34.Continued
Considerthatthebreadthanddepthofdisagreementregardingotherphilosophicalissuesisno
greaterthanthatregardingmoralissuesinparticular.Philosophersdisagreejustasmuchabout
metaphysicalissuessuchas,aboutwhetherGodexists,aboutwhetherfreewilliscompatible
withdeterminism,andaboutwhetherthemindisidenticaltothebrainastheydoaboutmoral
issuessuchas,whethertheendsjustifythemeans.Sowefaceadilemma:eitherthisbreadth
anddepthofdisagreementwarrantsdenyingobjectivityaboutanyoftheseissuesoritwarrants
denyingobjectivityaboutnoneoftheseissues.Butdowereallybelievethatthereisnoobjective
factastowhether,say,Godexists?

35.ProblemswithMoralRelativism
ProblemsofFormulation
TheProblemofInterculturalEvaluationcantevaluateotherculturesbasedonour
fundamentallymoralnorms.
TheProblemofIntraculturalEvaluation
TheMoralReformerProblemThereisnoobjectivetruthaboutwhat'smorallyrightor
wrongsomorallawscantbereformedforthebetter.(Orworse)
TheProblemofConflictswithOurConsideredMoralJudgments

36.MoralRelativismandTolerance
Supposethatwegrantthatmoralrelativismistrue.Woulditfollowthatpeopleofallsocieties
shouldbetolerantofeachothersdifferingnormsandpractices?Afterall,itsnotasifones
societysnormsandpracticeswouldbeanybetterthananothersocietysnormsandpractices,

wouldit?

37.EvaluatingDCT
Consistency
Determinacy
IntuitiveAppeal
InternalSupport
ExplanatoryPower
ExternalSupport

38.Conclusions
Wevefoundnogoodargumentinsupportofmoralrelativism.
Wevefoundthatmoralrelativism,butnotmoralobjectivism,iswildlyatoddswithour
commonsenseintuitions.

DouglasPortmore

LECTURE4:
ValuesinaScientificWorld
LastUpdated:1/28/10

1.TheChallengeforMoralObjectivism
Suppose,with[moral]objectivism,thatmoraljudgmentsaretrue,andtruequiteindependently
ofwhatwehappentothinkofthem.Theyaretrue,whentheyare,becausetheyaccurately
reportobjectivemoralfacts.Butthenatureofsuchfactscanappearverymysterious.Wereadily
grantthatgeologistsandchemists,physicistsandastronomersdealinobjectivetruth,because
webelievethattheirfindingsaretargetedonanaturalworldwhosefeaturesexistindependently
ofwhetheranyonerecognizesthem.Botanicalfactsarefactsaboutplantsgeologicalfactsare
factsaboutrocks.

2.TheChallengeforMoralObjectivism(continued)
Inbotanyandgeology,evidenceissuppliedbythreedimensional,tangible,physicalstuff.We
cantasteit,smellit,andseeit.Wecanttastewrongnessorhearrightness.Moralfacts,ifthey
weretoexist,wouldhavetobequiteoddsortsofthings,certainlynothingatalllikethekindsof
phenomenastudiedbytherecognizedsciences(91).

3.Aremoralfactsscientificallyconfirmable(i.e.,scientificallyverifiable)?
Canwesee,touch,taste,hear,orsmellthewrongnessofanact?
Somerejecttheideathattherearemoralfactsgiventhatmoralfactsarenotscientifically
confirmable.

4.TheConfirmationTest

Accordingtotheconfirmationtest,aclaim(orputativefact)istrueifandonlyifitis
scientificallyconfirmable(i.e.,empiricallyverifiable).
Notethatonlytrueclaimscanbeconfirmed.However,sometrueclaimsarenot
scientificallyconfirmable.Forinstance,wecannotscientificallyconfirmeitherthatparallel
linesdonotintersectorthatthesumoftheanglesofanytriangleequals180degrees.
Theconfirmationtestcannotbetrue.Ifitweretrue,itwouldrefuteitself,foritstatesaclaim
thatisnotitselfscientificallyconfirmable.Thus,it'saselfrefutingclaim.

5.TheConfirmationTest(continued)
Inanycase,evenscientificclaims(suchastheclaimthattheEarthisnotflat)cannotbe
confirmedviaempiricalobservationalone.
Theexampleofaboatdisappearingoverthehorizon.
Observationsaretheoryladen.And,thus,attheendoftheday,sciencemustrelyonabductive
reasoning(reasoningfrombestexplanation).Andtheprinciplesofabductivereasoningarenot
themselvesscientificallyconfirmable.Soevensciencerestsonclaimsthatarenotthemselves
scientificallyconfirmable.

6.Butaremoralfactsneededtoexplainanything?
Peoplesmoralbeliefs?Peoplesmoralattitudes?Peoplesmoral(orimmoral)behavior?
Whataboutothermoralfacts?Mightweneedsomemoralfactstoexplainothermoralfacts?
Perhaps,butthiswouldbegthequestion.
Itseems,then,thatwedonotneedtopostulatemoralfactstoexplainanynonmoralfact.And
althoughwemightneedmoralfactstoexplainothermoralfacts,wecantjustassumethatthere
areanymoralfactsthatneedexplaining,fordoingsowouldamounttobeggingthequestion.

7.OccamsRazor
SomemightemployOccamsrazoragainsttheideathattherearemoralfacts.
Occamsrazor(a.k.a.theprincipleofparsimony):Otherthingsbeingequal,onehypothesisis
betterthananotherifitissimplerthantheother,andonehypothesisissimplerthananotherif
andonlyifitrequiresustopostulatetheexistenceoffewerunknownfacts,entities,
properties,orprocessesthatis,fewerfacts,entities,properties,andprocesses
beyondthosethatwealreadyknowaboutit.

8.OccamsRazor(continued)
Thesimplestexplanationisnotnecessarilytheonethatistheleastcomplexortheeasiest
tounderstand.
Examples:Explaining(1)biologicalorganisms,(2)cropcircles,(3)reportsofalienabduction,(4)
noisesinthewallswhenthehotwateristurnedon,etc.
Occamsrazordoesntsaythatitismorelikelythattherearenasopposedton+1facts,entities,
properties,orprocessesintheuniverse.Itdoesnotsay,forinstance,that,inabsenceany
evidenceeitherway,itismorelikelythatsiliconbasedlifeformsdontexistthanitisthat
siliconbasedlifeformsdoexist,otherthingsbeingequal.Rather,itsaysonlythat,inthe
absenceofanyevidencefortheexistenceofsiliconbasedlifeforms,anexplanationthatdoesnt

postulatetheirexistenceissuperiortoonethatdoes,otherthingsbeingequal.

9.OccamsRazor(continued)
Whyistheonesuperiortotheother?
Answer:Becauseithasfewercommitmentsthatmightturnouttobefalse.
Ofcourse,thismeansthatanexplanationthatpostulatesnothingwithrespecttowhether
siliconbasedlifeformsexistis,otherthingsbeingequal,superiortoanexplanationthat
postulatesthatsiliconbasedlifeformsdontexist.
Thus,anexplanationthatpostulatessomeunknownnegativeexistentialclaimisjustas
worrisomeasanexplanationthatpostulatessomeunknownpositiveexistentialclaim.
SoOccamsrazordoesnotsupportthecontentionthattherearenofactsorpropertiesbeyond
thosethatareneededtoexplainourempiricalobservations.Indeed,suchacontentionisquite
controversial.

10.TheArgumentfromExplanatoryImpotence
IfX(somefact,entity,property,orprocess)existsorisreal,thenitsreality/existencemustbe
necessarytoexplainsomeofourempiricalobservations.
Thereality/existenceofmoralfactsandpropertiesisntneededtoexplainanyofourempirical
observations.
Therefore,moralfactsandpropertiesdontexistandarenotreal.

11.WhyweshouldrejectPremise1oftheexplanatoryimpotenceargument
WhyacceptPremise1?
Premise1hascounterintuitiveimplications.Premise1impliesthatsuchthingsas
atmospheres,rockstrata,newts,anddandelionsdontexistorareunreal,fornoneoftheseare
neededtoexplainourempiricalobservations.Afterall,itseemsthatweneedonlypostulatethe
existenceofsubatomicparticlestoexplainourempiricalobservations.
Butevenifyoudonthaveaproblemwithsuchasparseontology,thereisanotherreasonto
rejectpremise1.IfweacceptPremise1,thenwemustdenytherealityofallnormativefacts
andproperties,includingthenormativefactthatweoughttoinfertheConclusion(i.e.,3)from
Premises1and2.

12.Whyallnormativefactsseemtobeinthesameboat
AnormativefactisafactaboutwhetherSoughtorhasreasonto,whereSstandsforsome
rationalsubjectandstandsforsomereasonsensitiveattitudesuchasadesire,abelief,oran
intention.Thesefactsincludesprudentialandepistemicfacts.
Nonormativefactisscientificallyconfirmable.Norarenormativefactsneededtoexplainanyof
ourempiricalobservations.
Soifwerejectmoralfactsonsuchgrounds,thenwemustrejectallnormativefacts,includingall
prudentialfactsandallepistemicfacts.Andthatsatoughpilltoswallow.

13.ExplanationversusPrescription

Toinsistthat,formoralfactsandpropertiestoexist,theymustbeabletoexplainsomeofour
empiricalobservationsisjusttomissthepointandpurposeofmoralthinking.Thepointof
thinkingaboutwhatisrightorwrong,goodorbad,justorunjust,isnot,itseems,tofigureout
whathappenedorwhy,buttofigureoutwhatshouldhappenandwhy(SayreMcCord).Thusthe
pointisprescription,notexplanationthatis,toprescribewhatoughttobethecaseasopposed
toexplainwhatisthecase.

14.Continued
So,yes,itstruethatmoralfactsandpropertiesarenotneededtoexplainanything,butthat
doesntmeanthatweshoulddenythattherearesuchfactsandproperties,forexplanationisnot
allthatthereis.Thereisalsoprescription(ornormativity).And,fortheretobeprescription,there
mustbenormativefactsandproperties.

15.Aremoralfactscompatiblewithascientificworldview?
Theanswerdependsonwhetherthescientificworldviewistakentobe(a)theviewthatthere
arenootherfactsorpropertiesbesidesthosethatarestudiedbyempiricalsciencesor
(b)theviewthatalleventsinspaceandtimearebestgivenscientificexplanations.
If(a),theanswertotheabovequestionisno.
If(b),theanswertotheabovequestionisyes.
Whichismoreplausible:(a)or(b)?

16.Continued
Itmayseemthatifnormativeclaimsarenonscientificclaims,thentheymustconflictwiththe
claimsofscience.Thisisnotso.Ofcourse,somenonscientificclaimsdoconflictwiththe
claimsofscience,viz.,thosethatinvolveclaimsabouteventsoccurringinspaceandtime,and
aboutwhatthingscauseorarecausedbythem(Scanlon).Butunlikevariouscausalclaims
involvingtheparanormalandthesupernatural(ESP,ghostlyhauntings,actsofGod,therapeutic
touch,demonicpossessions,etc.),whichareallveryimplausiblegivenourordinaryempirical
standardsforassessingsuchcausalclaims,normativeclaimsmakenoclaimsabouteventsin
spaceandtime.

17.Continued
Itmaybeobjectedthatourbeliefsaboutnormativefactsmusthavemotivationalefficacyif
theyretoretaintheirpracticalrelevance.Andthusournormativebeliefsmustbeabletocause
ustohavetheattitudesthattheysupportourhaving,andthis,somemightargue,wouldbejust
asmysteriousassupernaturalcausalpowers,suchastherapeutictouch.Butthereisnothing
mysterioushere,foritisnotthenormativefactthatmusthavemotivational/causalefficacy.
Rather,itisthenormativebelief(anatural,psychologicalstate)thatmusthave
motivational/causalefficacy.Soitisthenaturalstateofbelievingsomenormativefact,notthe
normativefactitself,thathasthepowertocausetheformationoftheattitudethatiscalledforby
thenormativefact.

18.Conclusions
Weveseenthatthatthefactthatmoralfactsarenotscientificallyconfirmabledoesnotsupport
thecontentionthattherearenomoralfacts.
WeveseenthatOccamsrazordoesnotsupportthecontentionthattherearenomoralfacts.
Andweveseenthatthefactthatmoralfactsarenotneededtoexplainanyofourempirical
observationsdoesnotsupportthecontentionthattherearenomoralfacts.
Furthermore,weveseenthatmoralfactsseemtobeinthesameboatasothernormativefacts.
Ifwerejectmoralfactsonthegroundsthattheyrenotempiricallyverifiable,thenwewouldhave
toalsorejectepistemicfacts,fortheyarenomoreempiricallyverifiablethanmoralfactsare.
Andifwerejectepistemicfacts,thenwemustdenythatthereisanyreasontorejecttheview
thattherearemoralfacts.

PossibleExamQuestionsconcerningLecture4
(a)Whatdoestheconfirmationtestsay?(b)Istheconfirmationtesttrue?Explain.
(a)ExplainOccamsrazor.(b)Giveanexamplewhere,accordingtoOccamsrazor,one
explanationissuperiortoanother.(c)Isthesimplestexplanationtheonethatistheeasiestto
understand?Explain.(d)DoesOccamsrazorsupportthecontentionthattherearenomoral
factsorproperties?Explain.
Aremoralfactsneededtoexplainanything?Explain.
Criticallyassessthefollowingargument:
IfX(somefact,entity,property,orprocess)existsorisreal,thenitsreality/existencemustbe
necessarytoexplainsomeofourempiricalobservations.
Thereality/existenceofmoralfactsandpropertiesisntneededtoexplainanyofourempirical
observations.
Therefore,moralfactsandpropertiesdontexistandarenotreal.
Whatispointofthinkingaboutwhatisrightorwrong,goodorbad,justorunjust?
Aremoralfactscompatiblewithascientificworldview?Explain.

PHI105
LECTURE5:
Utilitarianism
LastUpdated:3/2/10

1.ActUtilitarianismCharacterized
Theviewisconsequentialist:Actionsaretobejudgedrightorwrongsolelyinvirtueofthe
goodnessorbadnessoftheirconsequences.
Theviewiswelfarist:Inassessingthegoodness(orbadness)ofanactsconsequences,
theonlythingthatmattersiswelfare(i.e.,thatwhichmakessomeoneslifegowellfor
himorher).Welfareistheonlythinggoodforitsownsake.
Theviewisuniversalist,impartialist,andaggregative:Therightactistheonethe
producesthegreatestnetsumofwelfarewhileweighingimpartiallyincreasesand
diminutionsinthewelfareofallthoseaffectedbytheact.
Theviewendorsesamaximizingconceptionofrightaction:Anactispermissibleifand

onlyifthereisnoavailablealternativethatwouldproducemoreutilitythanitwould.

2.HedonisticActUtilitarianism
HedonisticActUtilitarianism:Anactismorallypermissibleifandonlyif,andbecause,it
maximizeshedonicutility.
HedonicUtility:Thehedonicutilityofanactequalsthetotalamountofhedonsit
producesminusthetotalamountofdolorsitproduces,whereahedonisthestandard
unitofmeasurementofpleasureandadoloristhestandardunitofmeasurementof
pain.
Anactmaximizeshedonicutilityifandonlyifthereisnoalternativeactavailableto
theagentthatwouldproducemorehedonicutilitythanitwould.Note,then,that
morethanoneactcanmaximizehedonicutility.

3.AnExampleoftheHAUCalculus
AnExampleoftheHAUCalculus:Supposethattheavailablealternativesarea1,a2,a3,
anda4.Andsupposethatthepeoplewhowouldbeaffectedarep1,p2,p3,andp4

4.AnExampleoftheHAUCalculus(continued)

p1

p2

p3

p4

HU

a1

10

14

10

=20

a2

100

90

=18

a3

=20

a4

10

10

10

35

=5

5.TheMotivationforHAU
ThethoughtisthatHAUisjustanaturalextensionofthefamiliarbalancingand
maximizingconceptionofrationalityfromdiachronicintrapersonalcontextsto
diachronicinterpersonal(moral)contexts.
Thediachronicintrapersonalcontext:Thetemporallocationofabenefitorharmwithina
lifedoesnot,assuch,haveanyrationalsignificance.Weshould,therefore,betemporally
neutralwithrespecttowhenharmsandbenefitsoccurinourlives.Andweshouldbe
willingtomakesacrificesnowforthesakeoffuturebenefitsthatwillmorethanoffset
thesesacrifices.

6.Continued
Thediachronicinterpersonal(moral)context:Fromthemoralpointofview,noone
personswelfareisanymoreorlessimportantthatanothers.So,thelocationofabenefit
orharmwithinapopulationofpersonshasnomoralsignificance.Andthus,aswemove

fromthepointofviewofindividualrationalitytothepointofviewofmorality,weshouldnot
onlybetemporallyneutralwithrespecttowhenharmsandbenefitsoccur,butalsobe
personneutral(orimpartial)withrespecttowhoreceivessomeharmorbenefit.
Furthermore,weshouldagainbewillingtomaketradeoffs(tobalance)forthesakeof
maximizingwelfareovertimeandacrossindividuals.

7.Gettingafeelforthetheory:APracticeQuiz
Answerthefollowingquestionsaccordingtowhathedonisticactutilitarianism(HAU)
entails.AnswereitherNecessarilyTrueorNotNecessarilyTrue.
(Q1)Anactismorallyimpermissibleifitcausessomeonealotofpainandnopleasure.
Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Answer:[Redacted].

8.Continued
Supposethatthereareexactlythreeactalternativesavailabletotheagent:a1a3.Further
supposethattheseactswillhaveeffectsononlythreepersons:p1p3.NowletHU(p1)
standforp1shedonicutility,andletHUstandforthetotalaggregateutility.Suppose,
then,thatthescenarioisthis:

act

HU(p1)

HU(p2)

HU(p3)

HU

moralstatus

a1

+10

100

+130

+40

permissible

a2

+5

+5

+5

+15

impermissible

a3

+15

+25

+40

permissible

9.Continued
Lesson:OnHAU,[Redacted].Thismeansthatonemaypermissiblyimposegreat
sacrificesonsomeforthesakeofgreatergainsintheaggregate.
(Q2)Anactismorallyimpermissibleifitproduces,intheaggregate,morepainthan
pleasure.Inotherwords,anactismorallyimpermissibleifithasnegativehedonicutility.
Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?

10.Continued
Answer:[Redacted].Consider,forinstance,thefollowingscenario:

act

HU(p1)

HU(p2)

HU(p3)

HU

moralstatus

a1

+10

100

+30

60

impermissible

a2

+5

impermissible

a3

+15

+25

41

permissible

11.Continued
Lesson:AccordingtoHAU,whetherornotanactispermissiblecanonlybedetermined
by[Redacted].
(Q3)Ifanactproducespleasureformanyandpainfornoone,thenitismorally
permissible.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?

12.Continued
Answer:[Redacted].OnHAU,itsnotalwayssufficienttoproducepleasureformany
andpainfornooneonemust[Redacted].Considerthefollowingscenario:

act

HU(p1)

HU(p2)

HU(p3)

HU

moralstatus

a1

+10

100

+130

+40

impermissible

a2

+100

+100

+100

+300

impermissible

a3

+100

+101

+100

+301

permissible

13.Continued
Lesson:BecauseHAUrequiresthatwealwaysmaximizehedonicutility,itwillbea
[Redacted].Itwillrequireeachofustoperformanaltruisticselfsacrificingactwhenever
theselfsacrificethatwetherebymakewillbemorethanoffsetbyaltruisticbenefitswe
therebybestowonothers.
(Q4)ItismorallyimpermissibletolistentoMetallicaonthecarsCDplayeriftheother
twopeopleinthecarwouldgetmorepleasurefromlisteningtoTheBeatles.Assume
thatlisteningtoMetallicaandlisteningtoTheBeatlesaretheonlytwoavailableoptions.
Assumethatyouandtheothertwopeopleinthecararetheonlyoneswhowillbe
affectedbythischoice.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?

14.Continued
Answer:[Redacted].IfHAUwasademocracy,itwouldbe[Redacted]itwouldnotbe
[Redacted].Leta1=listentoMetallica,andleta2=listentoTheBeatles.Now
supposethatthescenarioisthis:
act

HU(p1)

HU(p2)

HU(p3)

HU

moralstatus

a1

+10

+10

+80

+100

permissible

a2

+15

+15

+15

+45

impermissible

15.Continued
Lesson:Somepeoplewill[Redacted]simplybecausetheystandtogainorlosemore
thanothersdo.Theremightevenbeutilitymonsters:peoplewhogetsomuchpleasure
fromgettingwhattheywantthattherestofuswouldallbemorallyrequiredtodo
whateverwecantofulfilltheireverydesire.
(Q5)Inanefforttohelphispatient,Dr.SmithinjectsJoneswithashotofpenicillinafter
dutifullyaskinghimwhetherhesallergictopenicillinandhearingJonessaythatheisnt.
Nevertheless,itturnsout,unbeknownsttoJoneseven,thatJonesisseverelyallergicto
penicillin,and,consequently,hediesasaresultoftheinjection.Assumingthatthere
wouldhavebeenmorehedonicutilityhadDr.SmithnotinjectedJoneswiththeshotof
penicillin,itfollowsthatwhatDr.Smithdidwaswrong.Necessarilytrueornot
necessarilytrue?

16.Continued
Answer:[Redacted].OnHAU,[Redacted]areirrelevantinassessingwhetherhisorher
actispermissibleornotitsonlytheconsequencesoftheactionandoftheiralternatives
thatmatter.
Lesson:HAUsaysnothingabout[Redacted].Thusitdoesnotrequirethatweare
alwaysmotivatedtoactoutofaconcerntomaximizehedonicutility.Sometimeswewill
actoutofapartialconcernforourselvesorforourlovedones,butwhatsimportantis
thatouractsaccordwithHAU,notthattheyaremotivatedbyadesiretoactin
accordancewithHAU.
17.Continued
(Q6)AnyonewhoactswronglyasDr.Smithdidaboveisamorallybadperson,
deservingofbothblameandpunishment.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Answer:[Redacted].Asitstands,HAUevaluates[Redacted].Soitentailsnothing
aboutwhethersuchapersonismorallybadordeservingofblame.

18.Continued
Caveat:EvenifHAUcommitsustotheviewthatanagentsmotivesandintentionsare
irrelevantwhenassessingthemoralvalueofheractions,itdoesntcommitustotheview
thatanagentsmotivesandintentionsareirrelevantwhenassessingthemoralgoodness
ofhercharacter.
(Q7)Itismorallypermissibletotortureaninnocentbabyincertaincircumstances.
Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Answer:[Redacted].OnHAU,[Redacted],andthusvirtuallyanytypeofactcan,in
principle,bejustifiedand,indeed,willbejustifiedifitmaximizeshedonicutility.

19.Continued
Toillustrate,leta1=torturetheinnocentbaby,a2=refrainfromtorturingtheinnocent
baby,p1=thewouldbetorturer,andp2=thewouldbetorturevictim.Nowconsiderthe
followingscenario:

act

HU(p1)

HU(p2)

HU

moralstatus

a1

+100

99

+1

permissible

a2

impermissible

20.Continued
Lessons:First,onHAU,everyoneswelfarecounts,andcountsequally,regardlessof
desert.Second,onHAU,itispermissibletomaim,murder,andevenmassacreinnocent
peopleprovidedthatdoingsowillmaximizehedonicutility.OnHAU,mostanytypeofact
is,inprinciple,justifiable.
(Q8)Theeffectsthatouractionswillhaveonpeopleswelfaremillionsofyearsfromnow
arejustasimportantastheirimmediateeffects.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?

21.Continued
Answer:[Redacted].OnHAU,[Redacted].Leta1=stayafterclassandtalktoJohn,a2
=gohomeimmediatelyafterclass,stoppingtotalktonoone,pc=thesixbillionorso
peoplethatcurrentlyexist,andpf=thetenbillionorsopeoplethatwillexistthree
generationsfromnow.AndletssupposethatifIstayafterclassandtalktoJohn,John
willafterwerefinishedgotothelocalcoffeeshopandmeetawomanstandingbehind
himinline,awomanwhomhefallsinlovewithandhasachildwith.Assumethatthis
childsgrandchildendsupbeinganevilfascistdictatorwhocausesuntoldsuffering.
Lastly,assumethathadInotstayedafterclasstotalkwithJohn,hewouldhaveleftfor
thecoffeeshopmuchearlier,and,consequently,thisevilfascistdictatorwouldhave
neverexisted.

22.Continued
Suppose,then,thatthescenarioisthis:
act

HU(pc)

HU(pf)

HU

moralstatus

a1

+1

100tr.

999,999,999,99 impermissible
9

a2

permissible

23.Continued
Lesson:Giventhatthereare,atanygivenmoment,aninfinitenumberofavailableact
alternatives,andgiventhatonewouldneedtoknowwhateffectseachofthesewillhave
fromnowuntiltheendoftimetoknowwhattheirhedonicutilitiesare,onecannever
knowwithanydegreeofcertaintywhatonemorallyoughttodoonHAU.Somehave,
therefore,objectedtoHAUonthegroundsthatitistooimpracticaltobeactionguiding.

24.Continued
(Q9)Whilewaitingatacrosswalk,Mr.Smithseesastrangeraboutstepoffthecurbinto
thepathonanoncoming,speedingbus.Withoutthinking,Mr.Smithreachesout,grabs
thestranger,andpullshimbackontothecurb,savinghislife.Mr.Smithdoesthiswithout
eventhinkingaboutwhatthehedonicutilityofthisactoranyofitsalternativesmightbe.
WhatMr.Smithdidwaswrong.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Answer:[Redacted].OnHAU,whatmattersisnot[Redacted],butwhetherthewayyou
infactactedmaximizedhedonicutility.

25.Continued
Toillustrate,leta1=yourinstinctuallygrabbingthestrangerandpullinghimbackto
safety,a2=yourcalculatingthelikelyhedonicutilityofeachofthevariousactalternatives
availabletoyouwhilethestrangerisstruckandkilledbythebus,p1=you,andp2=the
stranger.Suppose,then,thatthescenarioisthis:

act

HU(p1)

HU(p2)

HU

moralstatus

a1

+20

+20

permissible

a2

20

999,980

1mil.

impermissible

26.Continued
Lesson:HAUisa[Redacted].Tounderstandthedifference,considerthedifference
betweenthecriterionforbeingHIVinfected(orbraindead),andtheprocedurethatwe
mightusetodeterminewhethersomeoneisHIVinfected(orbraindead).Andnotethat
HAUisnomoreimpracticalthantheviewthatthemostprudentactistheonethatwill
maximizeonesutilityovertime.Andnoonewouldsuggestthatweoughttorejectthe
investmentprincipleBuylow,andsellhighjustbecauseitisoftentimespractically
impossibletoknowwhetherthepriceofastockisheadedupordown.

27.Continued
(Q10)Ifyoupromisedakidtenbuckstowashyourcarandhedidaspromised(he
washedyourcaranddidanicejob),youshouldgivehimthetenbucks.Necessarilytrue
ornotnecessarilytrue?
Answer:[Redacted].Whetherornotyoushouldgivethekidthetenbucksdepends,not
onwhether[Redacted],butratheronwhether[Redacted].
Lesson:HAUisentirely[Redacted].Whathappenedinthepastis,onHAU,irrelevantin
determiningwhatonemorallyoughttodo.Thepastisirrelevant,becausenothingyoudo
nowcanaffectthehedonicutilityofanypastevent.

28.Continued
(Q11)Mr.Smithhasanextra$500thismonthafterpayingallhisbills.Heusesthat$500
tobuyhissonasetofencyclopediastohelpwithhissonsschoolwork.ButhadSmith

insteadusedthat$500tobuysomestrangerskidasetofencyclopediasthatwouldhave
producedslightlymorehedonicutility.WhatMr.Smithdidwaswrong.Necessarilytrueor
notnecessarilytrue?
Answer:[Redacted].OnHAU,[Redacted]pleasuresandpainscountequally,
regardlessofonesrelationshiptothoseaffected.Thehedonicutilityofonesfriendsand
familymembersarenomore(orless)important,onHAU,thanthatofcomplete
strangers.
Lesson:OnHAU,therearenospecialobligations,andspecialrelationshipshaveno
intrinsicimportance.

29.Continued
(Q12)Indecidingwhattoeatforbreakfastthismorning,Mr.Johnsonismorallyrequired
tomakethechoicethatproducesthegreatesthedonicutility.Assumethat,accordingto
HAU,Mr.Johnsonoughttoeatsomethingforbreakfastthismorning,andthatwhat
choicehemakeswillaffectonlyhimself.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Answer:[Redacted].
Lesson:AccordingtoHAU,moralityis[Redacted].Everypracticaldecisionandchoice
isamoralone,eventhosethatarequitetrivialandhavenoramificationsforanyonebut
theagent.Thereisnomoralasymmetrybetweentheselfandothers.Youhavejustas
muchmoralreasontopromoteyourownhedonicutilityastopromoteanyoneelses.

30.Continued
(Q13)TheKingofSiammustadopteitherpolicyXorpolicyY.Thisdecisionwillaffect
onlythosepeoplebelongingtooneofthefollowingtwopopulations:populationAand
populationB.PopulationAconsistsinahundredpoorpersonswith10hedonseach.
PopulationBconsistsinahundredaffluentpersonswith100hedonseach.TheKingof
SiamadoptspolicyX,whichhasnoeffectonthepeopleinpopulationA,butraisesthe
numberofhedonsforeachpersoninpopulationBby90hedons.HadtheKingofSiam
adoptedpolicyYinstead,thiswouldhavehadnoeffectonthepeopleinpopulationB,but
wouldhaveraisedthenumberofhedonsforeachpersoninpopulationAby90hedons.
Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?

31.Continued
PolicyX,therefore,worsensthealreadyexistinginequalitythatexistsbetweenthetwo
populations,whereaspolicyYwouldmakethingsequalbyraisingthelevelofwelfareof
theworseoff.GiventhatthepeopleinpopulationAareequallydeservingof100hedons
asthepeopleinpopulationBare,itwaswrongoftheKingofSiamtohaveadoptedpolicy
X.

32.Continued
Answer:[Redacted].Leta1=adoptpolicyX,a2=adoptpolicyY,pA=populationA,and
pB=populationB.Thescenarioisasfollows:

act

HU(pa)

HU(pb)

HU

moralstatus

a1

+10,000

+10,000

+20,000

permissible

a2

+1000

+19,000

+20,000

permissible

33.Continued
Lesson:OnHAU,[Redacted].HAUisnotsensitivetoconcernsaboutdesertor
distributivejustice.
(Q14)OnHAU,therearenosupererogatoryacts(i.e.,actsthatgoaboveandbeyond
whatdutyrequires).Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Answer:[Redacted].Whetheritistrueornotdependsonwhatcountsasa
supererogatoryact.Somedefinesupererogatoryactsasthosethatdomoreforthesake
ofothersthandutyrequires.OthersdefinesupererogatoryactssuchthatSsperforming
xissupererogatoryonlyifthereexistssomeavailablealternative,y,suchthat(a)Sis
morallypermittedbothtoperformxandtoperformy,and(b)Shasmoremoralreason
toperformxthantoperformy.

34.Continued
Iftheformerdefinitioniscorrect,thenHAUcanaccommodatesupererogatoryacts.Butif
thelatteristhecorrectdefinition,thenHAUcannotaccommodatesupererogatoryacts.
LetHU(s)=thehedonicutilitythataccruestooneselfandHU(o)=thehedonicutilitythat
accruestoothers.
act

HU(s)

HU(o)

HU

moralstatus

a1

+10

+5

+15

permissible

a2

+5

+10

+15

perm.orsuper.(?)

a3

+10

+10

impermissible

35.Continued
Lesson:EitherHAUleavesnoroomforsupererogatoryactsorthereisnomoremoral
reasontoperformasupererogatoryactthanthereistoperformsomepermissiblebut
nonsupererogatoryalternative.
(Q15)Mr.Smithknowinglysendsaninnocentmantoprisonfortenlongyears.WhatMr.
Smithdidwaswrong.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Answer:[Redacted].Itmaybethatpunishingthisinnocentman[Redacted].

36.Continued
Lesson:OnHAU,weshouldpunishsomeoneifandonlyif[Redacted].Thismeansthat,

onHAU,weshouldpunishtheinnocentandweshouldrefrainfrompunishingtheguilty
wheneverdoingsowillmaximizehedonicutility.Also,onHAU,theseverityofthe
punishmentshouldnotnecessarilybeinproportiontotheseverityofthecrime.The
punishmentforalessseverecrimeshouldbegreaterthanthepunishmentforamore
severecrimeifthiswillmaximizehedonicutility.

37.ThePracticalObjectiontoHAU
OnHAU,itisoftentimespracticallyimpossibletoknowhowyououghttoact.Toknow
whatyououghttodo,youwouldhavetoconsidereverypossiblealternativeactopento
you,and,foreach,youwouldneedtoknow,allofitseffectsfromnowuntiltheendof
time.
Response:HAUisacriterionofrightness([Redacted])notadecisionprocedure
([Redacted]).
NotethatHAUisnomoreimpracticalthantheviewthatthemostprudentactistheone
thatwillmaximizeonesutilityovertime.Noonewouldsuggestthatweoughttoreject
theinvestmentprincipleBuylow,andsellhighjustbecauseitoftentimespractically
impossibletoknowwhetherthepriceofastockspriceisheadedupordown.
Notethattheutilitariancanemploy[Redacted].

38.TheoreticalObjectionstoHAU
Punishment:HAUwill,incertaincircumstances,callforpunishingtheinnocentaswellas
callfordisproportionatepunishmentvisvistheseverityofthecrime.
Rights:HAUdoesntallowforthenotionthatpeoplehaverightsthatprotectthemfrom
certainformsoftreatmentabsenttheirautonomousconsent.
DistributiveJustice:[Redacted].

39.Continued
BackwardLookingReasons:HAUisentirelyforwardlooking.Thusthefactthat
someone,inthepast,madesomepromise,committedsomeinjustice,orwasthevictim
ofsomeinjusticeismorallyirrelevant.
Demandingness:HAUisextremelydemanding.TherearefewmoraloptionsonHAU.
HAUrequiresgreatpersonalsacrificeevenwhentheresultingoutcomeisonlymarginally
betterthanitwouldbehadyounotsacrificed.
40.Continued
Supererogation:OnHAU,therearenosupererogatoryacts.Anactissupererogatoryif
andonlyifthereismoremoralreasontoperformitthantoperformsomemorally
permissiblealternative.
SpecialRelationships:OnHAU,onesspecialrelationshipsaremorallyirrelevant.HAU
requiresactinginawaythatscompletelyimpartial.(However,itdoesntrequirethatyour
motivesbeimpartial.)

41.Responsestothesetheoreticalobjections
FirstLineofDefense:Appealto[Redacted].Someproponentsarguethat,inmostreal

worldcases,HAUdoesnothavethewildlycounterintuitiveimplicationsthatitis
purportedtohave.

42.Continued
SecondLineofDefense:[Redacted]:SomeproponentsadmitthatHAUdoeshave
wildlycounterintuitiveimplicationsinatleasthypotheticalcases,buttheycitevarious
reasonsforquestioningourcommonsenseintuitionsinsuchcases.
EvolutionaryReasons:GreenesWorkonOurIntuitionsinDifferentTrolley
Cases:Personalvs.ImpersonalViolations
AnthropologicalReasons:Ourintuitionshavebeenwildlymistakeninthepast:
TheCaseofSlaveryandtheSubjugationofWomen.
ConsistencyReasons:Ourintuitionsareofteninconsistent:Singeroncharityand
animalexperimentation

PossibleExamQuestionsconcerningLecture3
(a)Explainhedonisticactutilitarianism(HAU).(b)Whatisthehedonicutilityofanaction?
(c)Fillintheblank:Anactmaximizeshedonicutilityifandonlyif.(d)Explainthe
motivationforhedonisticactutilitarianism.
(a)Explainhedonisticactutilitarianism(HAU).(b)Explainfouroftheseventheoretical
objectionstoHAUthatwerediscussedinclass.
(a)Againstthesetheoreticalobjections,theutilitariancanappealtoremoteeffects.
Explainhowthisdefensegoes.(b)Theutilitariancouldalsojustbitethebulletandargue
thatthefactthatHAUhascounterintuitiveimplicationsisntoverlyworrisomegiventhat
ourintuitionsaboutsuchmattersaresuspect.Explainhowthisdefensegoes.
(a)Explainhedonisticactutilitarianism(HAU).(b)Criticallyassessthepracticalobjection
toHAU.(c)Whatsortofdecisionprocedureshouldhedonisticactutilitariansadopt?(d)
Explainthedistinctionbetweenacriterionofrightnessandadecisionprocedure.
Answerthefollowingquestionsaccordingtowhathedonisticactutilitarianism(HAU)
entailsanswereitherNecessarilyTrueorNotNecessarilyTrue.Ineachcase,explainyour
answerandwhatlesson(orlessons)weshouldtakefromit.
Anactismorallyimpermissibleifitcausessomeonealotofpainandnopleasure.
Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Anactismorallyimpermissibleifitproduces,intheaggregate,morepainthanpleasure.
Inotherwords,anactismorallyimpermissibleifithasnegativehedonicutility.
Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Ifanactproducespleasureformanyandpainfornoone,thenitismorallypermissible.
Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
ItismorallyimpermissibletolistentoMetallicaonthecarsCDplayeriftheothertwo
peopleinthecarwouldgetmorepleasurefromlisteningtoTheBeatles.Assumethat
listeningtoMetallicaandlisteningtoTheBeatlesaretheonlytwoavailableoptions.
Assumethatyouandtheothertwopeopleinthecararetheonlyoneswhowillbe
affectedbythischoice.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Inanefforttohelphispatient,Dr.SmithinjectsJoneswithashotofpenicillinafter

dutifullyaskinghimwhetherhesallergictopenicillinandhearingJonessaythatheisnt.
Nevertheless,itturnsout,unbeknownsttoJoneseven,thatJonesisseverelyallergicto
penicillin,and,consequently,hediesasaresultoftheinjection.Assumingthatthere
wouldhavebeenmorehedonicutilityhadDr.SmithnotinjectedJoneswiththeshotof
penicillin,itfollowsthatwhatDr.Smithdidwaswrong.Necessarilytrueornot
necessarilytrue?
AnyonewhoactswronglyasDr.Smithdidaboveisamorallybadperson,deservingof
bothblameandpunishment.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Itismorallypermissibletotortureaninnocentbabyincertaincircumstances.Necessarily
trueornotnecessarilytrue?
Theeffectsthatouractionswillhaveonpeopleswelfaremillionsofyearsfromnoware
justasimportantastheirimmediateeffects.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Whilewaitingatacrosswalk,Mr.Smithseesastrangeraboutstepoffthecurbintothe
pathonanoncoming,speedingbus.Withoutthinking,Mr.Smithreachesout,grabsthe
stranger,andpullshimbackontothecurb,savinghislife.Mr.Smithdoesthiswithout
eventhinkingaboutwhatthehedonicutilityofthisactoranyofitsalternativesmightbe.
WhatMr.Smithdidwaswrong.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Ifyoupromisedakidtenbuckstowashyourcarandhedidaspromised(hewashed
yourcaranddidanicejob),youshouldgivehimthetenbucks.Necessarilytrueornot
necessarilytrue?
Mr.Smithhasanextra$500thismonthafterpayingallhisbills.Heusesthat$500tobuy
hissonasetofencyclopediastohelpwithhissonsschoolwork.ButhadSmithinstead
usedthat$500tobuysomestrangerskidasetofencyclopediasthatwouldhave
producedslightlymorehedonicutility.WhatMr.Smithdidwaswrong.Necessarilytrueor
notnecessarilytrue?
Indecidingwhattoeatforbreakfastthismorning,Mr.Johnsonismorallyrequiredto
makethechoicethatproducesthegreatesthedonicutility.Assumethat,accordingto
HAU,Mr.Johnsonoughttoeatsomethingforbreakfastthismorning,andthatwhat
choicehemakeswillaffectonlyhimself.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
TheKingofSiammustadopteitherpolicyXorpolicyY.Thisdecisionwillaffectonly
thosepeoplebelongingtooneofthefollowingtwopopulations:populationAand
populationB.PopulationAconsistsinahundredpoorpersonswith10hedonseach.
PopulationBconsistsinahundredaffluentpersonswith100hedonseach.TheKingof
SiamadoptspolicyX,whichhasnoeffectonthepeopleinpopulationA,butraisesthe
numberofhedonsforeachpersoninpopulationBby90hedons.HadtheKingofSiam
adoptedpolicyYinstead,thiswouldhavehadnoeffectonthepeopleinpopulationB,but
wouldhaveraisedthenumberofhedonsforeachpersoninpopulationAby90hedons.
Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
OnHAU,therearenosupererogatoryacts(i.e.,actsthatgoaboveandbeyondwhatduty
requires).Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?
Mr.Smithknowinglysendsaninnocentmantoprisonfortenlongyears.WhatMr.Smith
didwaswrong.Necessarilytrueornotnecessarilytrue?


1.SingersThesis
Allanimals(humanandnonhuman)areequal,inthesamesensethatallhumansare
equal.

2.TheNotionofEquality
Whenweclaimthatallhumanbeings,whatevertheirrace,creed,orsex,areequal,what
exactlyareweasserting?
Areweassertingthatallhumanbeingsareequalintheirabilitiesandcapacities?

Areweassertingthatallraces,andbothsexes,areequalintheirabilitiesandcapacities?
Tworeasonswhyweoughtnottobaseouroppositiontoracismandsexismonanykind
ofactualequality,eventhelimitedkindthatassertsthatvariationsincapacitiesand
abilitiesarespreadevenlybetweenthedifferentracesandbothsexes:
Itmayturnoutthatvariationsincapacitiesandabilitiesarenotspreadevenlybetween
theracesandsexes,andsomevariationsturnouttobeinnate.
Wewould,then,havenobasisforopposinganinegaltariansocietybasedonfactual
differences.

4.FactualEqualityvs.PrescriptiveEquality
Theprincipleoftheequalityofhumanbeingsisnotadescriptionofanallegedactual
equalityamonghumansitisaprescriptionofhowweshouldtreathumans.

5.TheBasicPrincipleofEquality
ThePrincipleofEqualConsiderationofInterests:Weoughttogiveequalconsiderationto
theinterestsofallsentientbeingswhatevertheirrace,creed,sex,orspeciesinour
moraldeliberations.

6.InterestsandSuffering
Thecapacityforsufferingissufficientforhavinginterests.Anybeingwiththecapacityto
sufferhasaninterestinavoidingsuffering.
Mostanimals(unlikestones,plantsetc)havethecapacitytosuffer.
Therefore,mostanimalshaveaninterestinavoidingsuffering.
Equalconsiderationrequiresthatanimalinterestsinnotsufferingbetakenequallyinto
accountwithhumaninterestsinnotsuffering.
Failuretogiveequalconsiderationtobothhumanandanimalinterestisspeciesm.

7.Racism,Sexism,andSpeciesism
Whatisracism?Whatissexism?
Speciesism:Abiastowardstheinterestofthemembersofone'sownspeciesand
againstthoseofthemembersofanotherspecies.
species:speciesism::race:racism::sex:sexism
Note,then,thatonSingersconceptualframeworktheviewthatonerace/sex/speciesis

superiortoanotherisacertainrespectisnotracist/sexist/speciest.

8.Whyisracismwrong?
Whyisracismwrong?Whyisitwrongtoletourtreatmentofothersbedictatedbytheir
race?
Answer:Becauseraceisnotitself,relevanttohowothersoughttobetreated.

9.Isspeciesmembershiprelevant?
Isspeciesmembershipmorallyrelevant?WhatisittobelongtothespeciesHomo
sapiens?
Doesonehavetohavethecapacityforlanguage?
Doesonehavetohavethecapacityforabstractreasoning?
MembershipinthespeciesHomosapiensseemsbothtoonarrowandtoobroadtoserve
asalegitimatebasisforgivingdirectmoralconsideration.
Directversusindirectmoralconsideration.
TooNarrow:Intelligentaliens.
TooBroad:Braindeadhumans.

11.TheArgumentfromMarginalCases
TheArgumentfromMarginalCasesismeanttoshowthatifwedontoweanimalsdirect
moralconsideration,thenwedontowemarginalcasesofhumanitydirectmoral
considerationeither.Herestheargument:
Ifwearejustifiedindenyingdirectmoralconsiderationtoanimals,thenwearejustifiedin
denyingdirectmoralconsiderationtothemarginalcases.
Wearenotjustifiedindenyingdirectmoralconsiderationtothemarginalcases.
Therefore,wearenotjustifieddenyingdirectmoralconsiderationtoanimals.

12.Toavoidbeingspeciesist
mustwetreatallanimalsthesame?
Equalconsiderationfordifferentbeingsmayleadtodifferenttreatmentwhere
interestdiffer,treatmentmaydiffer.
Animalscanfeelpain,[and]therecanbenomoraljustificationforregardingthepain
(orpleasure)thatanimalsfeelaslessimportantthanthesameamountofpain(or
pleasure)feltbyhumans.

13.However
However,wemustnotethat
Thesameamountofphysicalpaincancausemoretotalhumansufferingthananimal
sufferinghumanshaveextracapacities:
humanmemoryandanticipation
emotionaltiesbetweenhumans
socialcommunicationandstability
Butthismaynotapplytoorphanhumaninfants.

Wealsomustnotethatananimalslackofabilitytounderstandmayleadtoitsgreater
suffering.

14.Toavoidbeingspeciesist
mustweextendthesamerightstoallanimals?
Equalconsiderationfordifferentbeingsmayleadtodifferentrightse.g.assertingthat
dogshavearighttovoteisjustasassertingthatmenhavearighttoanabortion.

15.Toavoidbeingspeciesist
mustwevaluethelivesofallanimalsequally?
Wemayadmitthatsomefeaturesofcertainbeings(e.g.,selfawareness,theabilityto
understandabstractconcepts,theabilitytoactforareason,etc.)maketheirlives
morevaluablethanthelivesofotherbeingswhodonothavethesefeaturesbut
therewillsurelybesomenonhumananimalswhoselives,byanysuchstandards,are
morevaluablethanthelivesofsomehumans.

16.Continued
Thequestionisshouldwetreatseverelydisabledhumansaswenowtreatnonhuman
animalswithequivalentabilitiesandcapacities,orshouldwetreatthesenonhuman
animalswiththesamecarethatwecurrentlyextendtoeventhemostseverelydisabled
humans.Orperhapsweshouldadoptsomemiddleposition.

17.Whythebeliefthathumanlife,andonlyhumanlife,issacrosanctisspeciesist?
Toholdthattheboundaryoftherighttoliferunsexactlyparalleltotheboundaryofour
ownspeciesisirredeemablyspeciesist.Thosewhoholdthesanctityof[human]lifedo
thisbecausewhiledistinguishingsharplybetweenhumansandotheranimalstheyallow
nodistinctionstobemadewithinourownspecies,objectingtothekillingoftheseverely
retardedandthehopelesslysenileasstronglyastheyobjecttothekillingofnormal
adults.

18.Thetestforspeciesism:
IfwearewillingtodoXtocertainnonhumananimalsbutunwillingtodoXonhumans
whoareinallmorallyrelevantrespectsinferiortothesenonhumananimals,then
weareactingspeciesistindoingXtothosenonhumananimals.

19.SpeciesisminPractice:
FactoryFarming
Defenses?
AnimalTestingandExperimentation
Defenses?

20.APotentialProblemwithSingersAccountofSexism/Racism/Speciesism

Isitsexistforawomantodonatehermoneytobreastcancerresearchasopposedto
prostatecancerresearcheveniftheprincipleofequalconsiderationofinterestssupports
thelatter?
IsitracistforanAfricanAmericantosetupascholarshipfordisadvantagedAfrican
AmericansasopposedtosettingupascholarshipfordisadvantagedNativeAmericans
eveniftheprincipleofequalconsiderationofinterestssupportsthelatter?
Theimportanceofspecialrelationships

21.Continued
Dowehaveaspecialrelationshipwithothermembersofourspeciesinthewaythat,
say,womenhaveaspecialrelationshipwithothermembersoftheirsex?
HowdoesthisproblembearonSingersargumentsagainstpracticessuchasanimal
testingandfactoryfarming?

22.Theargumentfromfairness,anargumentagainstspeciesism
Fairnessdemandsthatbeingsthatarealikeinallmorallyrelevantrespectsbetreated
alike.
Fairnessdemandsthatbringsthatarealikeinallmorallyrelevantrespects
betreatedalike.
Speciesism/racism/sexisminvolvestreatingdifferentbeingsdifferently
simplybecausetheybelongtoadifferentspecies/race/sex.
Whatspecies/race/sexabeingbelongstoisnot,initself,morallyrelevant.
Therefore,speciesismisunfair.

Whatspecies/race/sexabeingbelongstoisnot,initself,morallyrelevant.
Therefore,speciesismisunfair.
Objections?

TheProblem:AbsolutePoverty

Nearlyonefifthoftheworldspopulationlivesinabsolutepoverty.Absolutepovertyis
povertybyanystandard,whichistobedistinguishedfromtherelativepovertythatweare
familiarwithinindustrializednations.RobertMcNamara,pastpresidentoftheWorld
Bank,describesabsolutepovertyasfollows:Aconditionoflifesocharacterizedby
malnutrition,illiteracy,disease,squalidsurroundings,highinfantmortalityrateandlowlife
expectancyastobebeneathanyreasonabledefinitionofhumandecency.

2.Continued
Thoselivinginabsolutepovertyhave:
Aninfantmortalityratethatiseighttimeshigherthanthatinmostindustrializednations.
Alifeexpectancythatisonethirdlowerthatthatinmostindustrializednations.
Anutritionallevel,foroneofeverytwointhepopulation,belowacceptablestandards.

Littletonoaccesstoevenbasichealthcare.
Littletonoaccesstosafedrinkingwater.
TheaboveinformationisfromPeterSinger,PracticalEthics,2ndEdition(NewYork:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1993).

3.Somewidelyavailablefactsaboutsomeeasilypreventabledeaths
Eachyearmillionsofchildrendiefromeasilypreventablecauses.Eachyeararound
threemillionchildrendiefromdehydratingdiarrhea.Mostofthesedeathscanbe
preventedbyadministratingoralrehydrationsaltsatacostofaround15centsapacket.
Alsomillionsofchildrendiefromimmunizablediseases.Eachyearoveramilliondie
frommeaslesalone,anditonlycosts$17tovaccinateachildagainstmeasles.
Pneumoniaclaims3.5millionchildreneachyear,makingittheleadingchildhoodkiller.
However,mostofthesedeathscanbepreventedwithasimpleshotofantibioticscosting
about25cents.ManymalnourishedchildrenhaveadeficiencyinvitaminA,causingtheir
immunesystemstobegreatlydebilitated.Manyofthesechildrencanbesavedwitha
semiannualdoseofvitaminAcostingonly10cents.

4.Somemisconceptionsabouttheproblem
ReducingtheinfantmortalityrateintheThirdWorldwouldcauseapopulationexplosion.

Thebestavailableevidencesupportstheclaimthatdecreasinginfantmortalityrate
actuallylowerstherateofpopulationgrowth.ConsiderthepovertyriddenIndianstateof
Kerala.Inthisstate,theinfantmortalityrateissignificantlylowerthanaverage.Yetithas
alowTotalFertilityRate,1.9,meaningthatthepopulationsizeisactuallyindecline.
Reducingtheinfantmortalityratewouldbepointlessbecausethereislittlechancethat
eventhosechildrenthatmakeitthroughinfancywillliveonintoadulthood.
Thosechildrenthatmakeitthroughthefirstfiveyearsoflifehavea90percentchanceof
livingbeyondtheageof21.

5.Continued
Povertyisinseparablylinkedwithhighinfantmortalityandlowlifeexpectancy.
ConsideragaintheIndianstateofKerala,oneofIndia'spooreststates.Because
Keralanshaveanadequatesupplyoffood,safedrinkingwater,andbasichealthcare,
theyhavethehighestlifeexpectancyofanystateinIndiaandalowerthanaverageinfant
mortalityrate.
Thereisnotenoughfoodtomeetthenutritionalneedsofeveryoneintheworld.
Thereismorethanenoughfoodtofeedtheworld'spopulation.Mostofthegrain
producedinindustrializednationsisfedtofarmanimals,convertingitintomeat,milk,and
eggs.Becausethisisaveryinefficientprocess,wastingupto95%ofthenutritionalvalue
oftheanimalfeed,peopleincountriessuchastheU.S.consumemorethanthreetimes
asmuchgrainpercapitathanthosecountriesthatconsumelessanimalproducts.
TheaboveinformationcomesfromPeterUngersLivingHighandLettingDie:Our

IllusionofInnocence(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996).

6.FocusingonthePhilosophicalIssue
Forourpurposes,wewillnotbeconcernedwithwhetherornotUngerandSingerhave
theirfactsright.Wewillinsteadbeinterestedinthefollowingphilosophicalquestion:If
thesefactsarecorrect,doesitfollowthatwehaveanethicalobligationtodosomething
toalleviateabsolutepovertyand,ifso,whatexactly?
And,forthesakeofargument,letsassumethattherearesomeeasilyidentifiable
organizations(suchas,OxfamandUNICEF)suchthatthefollowingistrue:wereyouto
giveasubstantialportionofyourincometothoseorganizations,thegoodthatthat
organizationwoulddowithyourmoneywouldfarexceedthegoodthatwouldcomefrom
yourspendingthatmoneyluxuriesforyourselfandforyourlovedones.Morespecifically,
letsassumethatforeach$200donationthatyoumakesomechildwhowouldotherwise
dieininfancywillinsteadliveareasonablylonglifethatiswellworthliving.

7.SingersArgument
If[itisinourpowertopreventsomethingbadfromhappening,withoutthereby
sacrificinganythingofmoralsignificance,weought,morally,todoit.],weought,
morally,todoit.
Absolutepoverty(i.e.,sufferinganddeathfromlackoffood,shelter,andmedicalcare)is
bad.
Thereissomeabsolutepovertythatwecanpreventwithoutsacrificinganythingof
(comparable)moralsignificance.
Therefore,we(morally)oughttopreventsomeabsolutepoverty.

8.CriticallyAssessingtheArgument
Istheargumentvalid?
Yes.
Theargumentisvalidbecausethereisnopossiblewayfortheconclusion
tobefalsewhilethepremisesaretrue.
Which,ifany,premisesarecontroversial?
Premise2isincontrovertible.
Premise3iscontroversial,butwe'regoingtoacceptitforthesakeofthe
argumentsincewereinterestedinthephilosophicalissueofwhetherassuming
thatPremise3istruewereobligatedtodosomethingtopreventabsolute
poverty.
ThisleavesuswithPremise1.

9.Premise1:SingersPrinciple
Bywithoutsacrificinganythingof(comparable)moralsignificance,Singermeans
withoutcausinganythingelse(comparably)morallybadtohappen,ordoingsomething
thatiswronginitself,orfailingtopromotesomemoralgood(comparableinsignificance

tothebadthingwecanprevent).
Doesgivingupluxuriescountassacrificinganythingofmoralsignificanceletaloneas
sacrificinganythingofcomparablemoralsignificance?
Byeliminatingboththeparenthesesandthewordsenclosedbythem,weobtainthe
moderateprinciple.Byeliminatingtheparenthesesandkeepingthewordsthey
enclosed,weobtainthestrongprinciple.

10.GettingClearonWhatthePrincipleSays
IseitherversionofSingersprincipleequivalenttotheactutilitarianism(a.k.a.the
principleofutility)?
Answer:No.
Neitherprinciplerequiresthatwedoanythinginaworldinwhichnothing
badisgoingtohappen.Actutilitarianismrequiresusnotonlytoprevent
whatisbadbutalsotopromotewhatisgood.
Whatdoeshemeanbymorallyoughttogiveaid?Doeshemeanthatitwouldbe
supererogatorytodosoorthatitwouldbewrongnottodoso?
Answer:Hemeansthatyou'remorallyobligatedtogiveandthusitwould
bewrongnottodoso.
WhatdoesSingersayinsupportofhisprinciple?
Answer:Hegivestheexampleoftheshallowpondandourintuitionofwe
aremorallyobligatedtosavethechild.

11.TwoImplicationsofHisPrinciple
ItmakesnodifferencewhetherthepersonIcanhelpisaneighborschildtenyardsaway
frommeoraBengaliwhosenameIshallneverknow,tenthousandmilesaway.
Thesituationwheretherearemillionsofotherpeoplewhoareequallyabletoprovideaid
butarenotdoingsoisnotsignificantlydifferent,morallyspeaking,fromthesituation
whereIamtheonlypersonwhocanprovideaid.

12.Withregardtothefirstimplication
Proximitymaymakeitmorelikely,forobviouspsychologicalreasons,thatIshallassist
him,butitisnotobviousthatproximitymakesanydifferenceconcerningwhetherIought
toassisthim.
Distancecanmatterindirectly,aswhereproximityputsmeinabetterpositiontojudge
whatapersonneedsare.ButisitatallunclearwhattheBengalisrefugeesneedsare?
Distancecanalsomatterindirectly,aswhereproximityputsmeinabetterpositionto
effectapositiveoutcome.Butfaminerelieforganizationshavepeopleinthefieldwho
candirectouraidtodistantstrangersinneedjustaseffectivelyaswecouldsomeoneon
ourownblock.Infact,theymightevenbemoreeffective.

13.Withregardtothesecondimplication
ConsiderthecasewhereIseeotherpeoplearoundtheshallowpond,nofurtheraway

thanIam,whohavealsonoticedthedrowningchildbutaredoingnothing.
Ismyobligationtosavethechilddiminished?
Butsupposethatifeveryonewastogive$10totheBengalReliefFund,therewouldbe
enoughtoprovidefood,shelter,andmedicalcareforalltherefugees.WhyshouldIbe
requiredtogivemorethan$10?
Herestheargument:
Ifeveryoneincircumstanceslikemineweretogive$10,Iwouldhavenoobligationtogive
morethan$10.Therefore,Iamnotobligatedtogivemorethan$10.Thisisinvalid.
Whatpremisewouldweneedtoaddtomaketheargumentvalid?
Isthatpremisetrue?
Peopleinthesamecircumstanceshavethesameobligation,butthefactthatothers
havegivenornotgiven,orareexpectedornotexpectedtogive,arerelevant
circumstances.

14.Objections
Doeshisprinciple(themoderateversion)implythatweshouldtakecareofthosein
absolutepovertybeforetakingcareofourown(friends,family,countrymen,etc.)?
No.Buttherecanbeaspecialobligationtoourown.
Doeshisprinciple(eitherversion)implythatwedonthavetherighttoourownmoney,a
righttodowithourmoneywhatwepleasewithouthavingittakenawayfromusbyforce?
No.He'snotarguingthatthegovernment,oranyoneelseforthatmatter
hastherighttotakemoneyfromyoutogiveaidtoothersinabsolute
property.
Doestheimplicationsofhisprincipleconflictwithourcommonsensemoraljudgments.
Yes.Wedonotcondemnthosewhospendmoneyonluxuriesratherthangiving
tofaminerelief.ButSingersaysthatourcommonsensemoraljudgmentsmaynotbe
right.PerhapsweshouldrejectourcommonsensejudgmentsratherthanSingers
conclusion.

15.Continued
Objection:Untilwehaveeffectivepopulationcontrol,relievingcurrentfaminemerely
postponestarvation.
Response:Thisisanawfullycruelwayofadministeringpopulationcontrol.
Considerthepossibilityofdemographictransitionandthenegativeeffectthatdecreasing
infantmortalityhasonpopulationgrowthrate.Butmostofallconsiderthatthisisonlyan
objectiontoaparticularmethodofpreventingabsolutepoverty:foodaid.Youcould
insteadpreventabsolutepovertybycontributingtoorganizationsthatspecificallyworkto
controlpopulationgrowth.ThusthisisntanobjectiontoSinger'sconclusionthatwe
haveanobligationtopreventsomeabsolutepoverty.ItisanobjectiontoSinger's
viewaboutwhatthebestmeansoffulfillingthatobligationis.
Otherobjections?

16.Ungers:LivingHighandLettingDie

TheVintageSedan:Nottrulyrich,youroneluxuryinlifeisavintageMercedessedan
that,withmuchtime,attentionandmoney,youverestoredtomintcondition.In
particular,yourepleasedbytheautosfineleatherseating.Oneday,youstopatthe
intersectionoftwosmallcountryroads,bothlightlytraveled.Hearingavoicescreaming
forhelp,yougetoutandseeamanwhoswoundedandcoveredwithalotofhisblood.
Assuringyouthathiswoundsconfinedtooneofhislegs,themanalsoinformsyouthat
hewasamedicalstudentfortwofullyears.And,despitehisexpulsionforcheatingon
hissecondyearfinalexams,whichexplainshisindigentstatussince,hes
knowledgeablytiedhisshirtnearthewoundsoastostoptheflow.So,theresnourgent
dangeroflosinghislife,youreinformed,buttheresgreatdangeroflosinghislimb.This
canbeprevented,however,ifyoudrivehimtoaruralhospitalfiftymilesaway.Howdid
thewoundoccur?youask.Anavidbirdwatcher,headmitsthathetrespassedona
nearbyfieldand,incarelesslyleaving,cuthimselfonrustybarbedwire.Now,ifyoudaid
thistrespasser,youmustlayhimacrossyourfinebackseat.But,then,yourfine
upholsterywillbesoakedthroughwithblood,andrestoringthecarwillcostovertwo
thousanddollars.So,youdriveaway.Pickedupthenextdaybyanotherdriver,he
survivesbutlosesthewoundedleg.

17.Continued
TheEnvelope:Inyourmailbox,theressomethingfromUNICEF.Afterreadingitthrough,
youcorrectlybelievethat,unlessyousoonsendinacheckfor$200,then,insteadof
livingwellintoadulthood,atwoyearoldchildwilldieverysoon.Nevertheless,youthrow
thematerialinyourtrashbasket,includingtheconvenientreturnenvelopeprovided,you
sendnothing,andinsteadoflivingwellintoadulthood,onemorechilddiesthanwould
havehadyousentintherequested$200.

18.UngersArgument
Premise1:YourconductinTheVintageSedanisseriouslymorallywrong.
Premise2:YourconductinTheEnvelopeisatleastasmorallywrongasyourconduct
inTheVintageSedan.Infact,thereareatleastfourreasonsforthinkingthatitsworse.
(Whatarethesefourreasons?)
Conclusion:Therefore,yourconductinTheEnvelopeisseriouslymorallywrong.

19.TheFourReasons
TheselfsacrificerequiredislessintheEnvelopethanitisintheVintageSedan.
ThebenefittoothersisgreaterintheEnvelopethanitisintheVintageSedan.
UnlikeintheVintageSedan,thepersoninneedofhelpintheEnvelopeisnotresponsible
forhisorherpredicament.
UnlikeinthecaseoftheVintageSedan,thepersoninneedofhelpintheEnvelopeis
morallyinnocent.

20.PotentiallyRelevantDifferencesbetweentheTwoCases

(1)physicalproximity,(2)socialproximity,(3)experientialimpact,(4)thethoughtofa
disastrousfurtherfuture,(5)uniquepotentialsaviorversusmultiplepotentialsaviors,(6)
thecontinuingmessversusthecleanedscene,(7)thethoughtofgovernments,(8)
urgency,(9)causallyfocusedaidversuscausallydispersedaid,and(10)identifiable
victimversusunidentifiablevictim.
Areanyoftheserelevant?

1.TheAidQuestion
TheQuestion:HowmuchmustIgivetoaidorganizationsthathelppeoplewhosufferin
absolutepoverty?
Ononeextreme,wehavePeterSingersfamousanswer:ImustgiveuntilIreachthe
level...atwhich,bygivingmore,Iwouldcauseasmuchsufferingtomyselformy
dependentsasIwouldrelievebymygift.
Ontheotherextreme,wehavethelibertariansanswer:Idonthavetogiveanythingat
all.
Whatwewant,though,issomemoderatepositionthatfallsbetweenthesetwo
extremes.

2.Tryingtoformulateaplausiblemoderateposition
Murphyssuggestion:Murphysuggestsacomplianceconditiononanyplausible
principleofbeneficence.Itshouldnotincreaseitsdemandsonagentsasexpected
compliancewiththeprinciplebyotheragentsdecreases.Demandsonanagentunder
partialcomplianceshouldnotexceedwhattheywouldbe...Underfullcompliance.
Problem:Supposethatonehundredpeoplearedrowning.Nearby,Melandninetynine
othersarestandingnexttoahundredlifepreservers.Theconceptionoffairnesson
whichMurphyrelieswouldrequireeachbystanderonlytodohisorherfairshareofthe
rescuetothrowonelifepreservereachbutnomore.Butsupposethatnoneofthe
othersiswillingtotakethetroubletothrowasinglelifepreserver.Isitreallyplausibleto
saythatMelsmoralobligationstillendsaftershethrowsonelifepreserver?

3.Continued
Hookerssuggestion:Overtimeagentsshouldhelpthoseingreaterneed...evenifthe
personalsacrifices...adduptoasignificantcosttotheagents.Althoughbeneficence
canrequiresacrificesthatadduptoasignificantcost,onceagentshavemetthe
significantcostthreshold,theywouldnotberequiredtogobeyondthisthreshold,
eventosavelives."
Problem:Thisprincipleallowsapersonwhohasmetherquotaofrequiredsacrificeto
refusetohelpanyoneelse,nomatterhoweasilyshecandoso.But[h]owcouldit
everbemorallypermissibletoshutthegatesofmercyonmankind?

4.ANew(Or,Actually,Old)Approach:PerfectandImperfectDuties
Thedistinctionbetweenperfectdutiesandimperfectduties:whereasaperfectduty

requiresacertainfairlyspecificactionoromission,animperfectdutyrequiresthe
adoptionofanend.Imperfectdutiesdorequireustoact,buttherequirementis
indirect:Whenapersonadoptsanend,shetherebycommitsherselftoapolicyof
choosingactionsthatwouldpromotetheendandavoidingactionsthatwouldthwartit.
Havingapolicytopromoteanenddoesnotentailmaximallypromotingtheendrather,it
involvesadoptingapropensitytopromoteit.

5.Continued
HavingapropensitytoAdoesnotimplythatoneAsateveryfavorableopportunity.For
example,tosaythatFredhasapropensitytodrinkalcoholdoesnotmeanthatFred
drinkswheneverpossibleorevenateveryfavorableopportunity.Fredmayretaina
propensitytodrinkevenifhesometimesturnsdowndrinksatpartiesthataregood
opportunitiesfordrinking.Thus,oneorafewfailurestoAevenatgoodopportunitiesfor
AingneednotraisedoubtsaboutapersonhavingapropensitytoA.However,apattern
ofcontinualfailurestoAdespitemanyfavorableopportunitieswouldcastdoubtonthe
claimthatapersonhasapropensitytoA.
Someexamplesofperfectandimperfectdutiesare
Oneofthethingsthatsetsthetwoapartisthatimperfectdutiesallowformuchmore
personalchoiceinhowonechoosestocomplywiththeseduties.

6.HillsUnderstandingoftheImperfectDutyofBeneficence
ThomasHill,Jr.describesthisideaasrequiringustomakethehappinessofothersa
serious,major,continuallyrelevant,lifeshapingend.thatisanalwayspotentially
relevantmoralconsideration.
Theideaisthatthehappinessofothersshouldbeoneofmycentrallifeprojectsinthe
waythattakingcareofmyfamily,promotingtheirandmyownhappiness,and
contributingtothephilosophicalliteraturearecentrallifeprojectsofmine.

7.Continued
Onthisview,moralityrequiresmakingbeneficenceacentralprojectofoneslife,though
itdoesnotrequiremakingittheonlyproject.Apersonwhofulfillsthisdutywillmakea
significantcommitmenttoallocatesomeofherresourcestopromotingthewelfareof
others.Thiscommitmentwilltakestrongbutnotabsolutepriorityoverherpromotionof
nonultimateends,anditwillbesignificantenoughtoimpingeuponherdecisionsabout
howtoallocateresourcestothepromotionofherotherultimateends[centrallife
projects].Sheneednotsacrificeherownhappiness,hercommitmentstothewelfareof
specificotherpersons,orhermostfundamentalprojects,butshewillreallocatesomeof
theresourcespreviouslyallocatedtopromotingtheseendstopromotingthewelfareof
personsingeneral.Furthermore,shewillseeklessexpensivewaystopromoteherother
ultimateends,andwillcommitsomeofthefreedupresourcestowardtheprojectof
beneficence.Finally,itisdifficulttoseehowonecouldsethumanwelfareasanend
withoutgivingsignificantpriorityinonesbeneficentactivitiestothosewhosewelfare
facesthegreatestthreats.Thus,beneficentagentswilltendtofavoraidorganizations

whichdothemostgoodwiththeresourcestheyreceiveandwhichcarefullybalance
projectsthatmeeturgentneedswiththosethatfocusonlongtermsolutionstochronic
problems.

8.HowthisdiffersfromSingersprinciple
Onthisview,thereisnodutytogiveupallofmyluxuries.Afterall,theseluxuries
promotemyhappiness,whichisoneofmycentrallifeprojects.Itdoes,however,require
thatIdedicatelessofmysurplusincometosuchluxuriessoastomakeroomfor
makingthehappinessofothersasoneofmycentrallifeprojectsinthesamewaythatI
gaveupmanyluxuriessoastomakeroomformakingmydaughterhappinessasoneof
mycentrallifeprojects.
ThisprinciplealsoaccountsforwhyImobligatedtosavethekiddrowningintheshallow
pond.Arguably,thisprincipleoffersamoreplausibleexplanationforourintuitioninthe
ShallowPondCasethanSingersprincipledoes.

9.TwoObjections
CanitaccountforwhyImobligatedtosavethekidinShallowPondversuspasshimbuy
andjustsendthemoneythatIsavefromnothavingtobuynewshoestoOxfamlater?
Canwejustifymakingourownhappinessoneofourcentrallifeprojectswhenthereisso
muchsufferingintheworld?

10.MoralRationalism
MoralRationalism:IfSismorallyrequiredtodox,thenShasdecisivereason,all
thingsconsideredtodox.
Ihaveanagentrelativereasontopromotemyownhappiness,areasonthatgoes
beyondtheagentneutralreasonweallhavetopromoteDougshappiness.
Singerspositiononmoralrationalism,andtheimplicationsofhispositionwithregardto
howmuchweought,allthingsconsidered,togivetoaidorganizations.

PossibleExamQuestionsconcerningLecture8
(a)ExplainMurphyssuggestedmoderatepositionand(b)explaintheproblemwithit.
(a)ExplainHookerssuggestedmoderatepositionand(b)explaintheproblemwithit.
(a)Explainthedistinctionbetweenperfectandimperfectduties.(b)Explainwhatitisto
haveapropensitytodoA.(c)Giveexamplesofperfectandimperfectduties.
ExplainHillsunderstandingoftheimperfectdutyofbeneficence.
(a)Explainmoralrationalism.(b)ExplainSingerspositiononmoralrationalism.(c)
Explaintheimplicationsofhispositionwithregardtohowmuchweought,allthings
considered,togivetoaidorganizations.