Torts 1st Set

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 33

G.R. No.

L-12219

March 15, 1918

AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
Alejo Mabanag for appellant.
G. E. Campbell for appellee.
STREET, J.:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum
of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant.
From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant
from liability the plaintiff has appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on
the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the
plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve
miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely
up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the
reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the
automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to
the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of
the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right
to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left
hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the accident
occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge
was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.

The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the
bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side;
but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not
be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while
the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the
power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of
the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to
an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side
and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this,
the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into
doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of
horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with
automobiles, he might get exited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When
the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye
of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment
of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in
the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them
or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they
can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is
clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under

these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were
not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps
be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part
of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce
the damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The
defendant company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails
from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed
upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track
gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road
bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and
broken. It appeared in evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had
dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company was
negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment
of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in
front or behind. It was held that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its
negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair nevertheless the amount of the
damages should be reduced on account of the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen
the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The liability of the company
arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the one now
before us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which caused the
damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in
order to apportion the damage according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that
the negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the
accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the defendant's
answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the
court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the accident in question
occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace
charging the defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary
investigation the defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed.
Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for
the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from
negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the action of the justice of

the peace in dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect.
(See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos
(P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the
horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel,
and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the
plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Avancea, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,


vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing
the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome,
these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until
paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat
would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found
out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court
of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all
the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of
record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case
shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every
decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised
before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law,
however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's
conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened
with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This
is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A
decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long
as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is
no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence
for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed,
"the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere
fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into
consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own
testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of
each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that

the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an
issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of
this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first
class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for
first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the
Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that
plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of
his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was
no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation.
We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like
defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to
honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it
issues are to be honored or not.22

Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention,
thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question.
Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and
defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral
evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for,
a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the
reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe
that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class"
ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the
amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has
merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of
Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all
questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be
regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be
regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the
decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at
war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or
grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger
have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the

passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks
a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in
the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such
is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which
the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and
was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the
flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its
position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent
Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as
petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat
and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take
a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the
seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of
Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this
issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant,
under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff,
First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of
Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the
plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and
embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a
first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract
was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that
there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason
of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is
true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad
faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was
averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
Carrascoso was oustedby petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b)
evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of
the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment
in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured
by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the
question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by
the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated

Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white
man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him
when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked
out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and
indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the
white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the
more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the
testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning
of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for
first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of
the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19,
1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a
"better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white
man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid
and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok,
the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said
Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules
of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does
find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but
threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first
class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did
not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to
bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in
law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39

And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in
Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that
he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a
"white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the
"first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the
corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is
well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely
notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the
relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad
train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the
train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would
pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and

the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
passenger.
1awphl.nt

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the
flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and
she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note
anything there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough
leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there.
He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me
because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his
notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above]
which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. 49a

Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died
down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they
grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really
true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should
have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in
addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just
and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that
discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The
Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give
our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. 57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error.
We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.

Metro Manila transit vs CA


DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 25, 1999 in CAG.R. CV No. 45002, which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 62, in Civil Case No. 16062. The trial court found herein petitioners liable for the death
of Florentina Sabalburo in a vehicular accident involving a passenger bus owned by petitioner
Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) and driven by petitioner Apolinario Ajoc, and ordered
them to pay damages to private respondents.
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
The eyewitness account of plaintiffs witness, Maria Zenaida Baylon, tends to show that in the
afternoon of December 24, 1986, she, her daughter Maria Zenia and the victim, Florentina
Sabalburo, were on their way to Baclaran to buy foodstuffs for their Noche Buena. For some
time, they stood on the island at the intersection of St. Andrews Street[2] and Domestic Road,
[Pasay City] waiting for the traffic light to change so they could cross to the other side of St.
Andrews Street where they intended to take a ride for Baclaran. When the traffic light turned red
and the vehicles along St. Andrews Street had stopped, the three of them stepped off the
island. Just as they started to cross the street, she (Baylon) saw an MMTC bus coming from

their right (Tramo) which was moving at a fast speed. The next moment, the left front portion of
the bus hit the victim on the right side of her head. The impact was of such force that the victims
right ear was slashed off and she thereupon fell on the cement and became unconscious. The
victim was brought by the bus driver, Apolinario Ajoc and the bus conductress to the San Juan
de Dios Hospital where she was given medical attention. Florentina Sabalburo never regained
consciousness and it was on January 3, 1987 that she succumbed to her injuries.[3]
On February 16, 1987, private respondents filed a complaint[4] for damages against MMTC
and its driver, Ajoc, with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Docketed as Civil Case No. 16062,
the complaint essentially alleged that Ajoc drove the MMTC bus in a wanton and reckless
manner, in gross violation of traffic rules and regulations, without due regard for the safety of
others, thus causing the untimely death of the victim.
Petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint, disclaimed any liability for the
incident, and insisted that the accident was solely due to the victims own negligence. The
appellate court summed up their version of the incident as follows:
xxx
That at the time material to this case, bus no. 033, with defendant Ajoc driving, then bound
towards the direction of Baclaran proper, was slowly accelerating speed on the outer right lane
of the road, in response to the go signal of the traffic light situated in the intersection of
Domestic Road [and Andrew Avenue], while the vehicles on the inner right lane which were
going to turn left towards Domestic Road were at a stop position, the deceased FLORENTINA
G. SABALBURO, whose stationary position was then covered from Ajocs peripheral vision by a
big truck then bound to MIA Road [that] was at a stop position, suddenly, without regard to her
own safety and in total defiance of traffic signs designed to protect pedestrian[s], suddenly
darted across the road; Ajoc, thus caught by surprise, tried to prevent impact by releasing his
accelerator pedal and applying his brakes but the time lag between the deceaseds negligent act
and Ajocs prudent and diligent reaction to the former made the impact a certainty.[5]
As special and affirmative defenses, petitioners also claimed that:
(1) MMTC hires its drivers, conductors and other employees only after they have
successfully passed rigid and extensive theoretical and practical examinations designed to
determine their skills and competenceand imposes upon its drivers the duty to undergo regular
seminars in defensive driving techniques and road safety habits;[6]
(2) MMTC had taken every human care and foresight possible in carrying their passengers
safely to their respective place (sic) of destination as well as in avoiding harm to the life and
limbs or risk against pedestrians so that they not be held liable;[7] and
(3) [T]he buses of the defendant corporation, including its bus no. 033 were all properly
maintainedbefore the buses left the garage for their respective routes on that particular day, as

in all other days, they were rigidly inspected and examined and properly certified as roadworthy.
[8]

The trial court found private respondents version more credible and on August 12, 1993,
decided the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against defendants as follows:
1. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiff Martin Sabalburo actual damages in
the sum of P63,943.88 representing the unpaid expenses of plaintiff in connection with the
death of Florentina Sabalburo;
2. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the sum of P180,000.00 for the loss
of the earning capacity of the deceased for a period of ten (10) years;
3. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiff Martin Sabalburo the amount of
P500,000.00 as moral damages;
4. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiff Martin Sabalburo the sum of
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. Ordering defendants [to] jointly and severally pay plaintiff Martin Sabalburo the sum of
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
6. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioners seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which docketed their appeal as
CA-G.R. CV No. 45002. Before the appellate court, petitioners insisted that the accident was
solely the fault of the victim since she suddenly crossed a very busy street with complete
disregard for her safety and in violation of traffic rules and regulations designed to protect
pedestrians.
As earlier stated, the appellate court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 45002, affirmed the trial courts
decision, thus:
IN JUDGMENT, we hold that the appeal interposed by appellants is not meritorious and the
judgment of the lower court which we find to be in accordance with law and the evidence is
therefore AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.[10]

Petitioners then moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied their motion in its
resolution of December 10, 1999.[11]
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners submit as sole issue for our resolution the following:
WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLE 2179[12] AS AN EXCEPTION TO ARTICLE 2176[13] OF THE
CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Petitioners insist that a closer look at the facts established by the trial court would show that
the incident happened at around 3:30 in the afternoon of December 24, 1986 or barely eight (8)
hours before Christmas Eve. Thus, the victims thoughts were naturally directed towards
the Noche Buena. The victim then crossed busy Andrew Avenue for the purpose of getting a
ride to Baclaran to buy food for the Christmas Eve celebration. Since her thoughts were on the
Christmas Eve feast, she crossed where there was no pedestrian lane and while the green light
for vehicular traffic was on. Petitioner MMTC submits that petitioner Ajoc cannot be charged with
negligence considering that he cannot see what is in the mind of a pedestrian. Considering that
the victims own negligence was the direct and proximate cause of her injuries and untimely
demise, it was error for the Court of Appeals not to have applied Article 2179 of the Civil Code to
the instant case.
Petitioners claim that at the time of the incident, the victims mind was preoccupied with the
preparations for the Noche Buena, is naught but pure conjecture and speculation, with nary a
scintilla of proof to support it, according to respondents. Both the trial and appellate courts
established that the immediate and proximate cause of the victims death was the negligent and
careless driving by petitioner Ajoc. Therefore, the full force of Article 2176 of the Civil Code
applies, concluded respondents.
In asking us to apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code, we note that petitioners are asking us to
make a finding that the victims own negligence was the direct and proximate cause of her
death. This we cannot do. The issue of whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact.
[14]
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, [15] although it has the power and authority to review
and reverse the factual findings of lower courts where these do not conform to the evidence[16] or
where the courts below came up with contradictory factual findings.[17]
We have thoroughly perused the records of this case, and nowhere do we find evidence to
support petitioners claim that the victim was so engrossed in thinking aboutNoche Buena while
crossing a busy street. Petitioners stance regarding the victims alleged negligence is non
sequitur. It simply does not follow that one who is run over by a vehicle on Christmas Eve (or
any other holiday for that matter) is negligent because his thoughts were on the holiday
festivities.
Instead, the records support private respondents claim that the MMTC bus was being
driven carelessly. As found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the victim and

her companions were standing on the island of Andrew Avenue, waiting for the traffic light to
change so they could cross. Upon seeing the red light, the victim and her companions started to
cross. It was then when petitioner Ajoc, who was trying to beat the red light, hit the victim. As the
court a quo noted, Ajocs claim that he failed to see the victim and her companions proves his
recklessness and lack of caution in driving his vehicle. [18] Findings of fact of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme
Court.[19] More so, as in this case, where petitioners have not adequately shown that the courts
below overlooked or disregarded certain facts or circumstances of such import as would have
altered the outcome of the case. Contrary to petitioners insistence, the applicable law in this
case is Article 2176 of the Civil Code and not Article 2179.
Petitioner MMTC next contends that the Court of Appeals erred in finding it solidarily liable
for damages with its driver/employee, Ajoc, pursuant to the relevant paragraphs of Article
2180[20] of the Civil Code. It argues that the act of Ajoc in bringing the victim to a hospital reflects
MMTCs diligence in the selection and supervision of its drivers, particularly with regard to safety
measures. Hence, having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees to prevent damage, MMTC should not be held vicariously
liable.
It should be stressed, however, that whenever an employees negligence causes damage or
injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on
the part of the employer, either in the selection of the employee (culpa in eligiendo) or the
supervision over him after the selection (culpa in vigilando).[21]Hence, to escape solidary liability
for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family.[22] In the present case, petitioner
MMTC failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on its part.
The claim that Ajocs act of bringing the victim to the nearest medical facility shows
adequate supervision by MMTC over its employees deserves but scant consideration.For one,
the act was after the fact of negligence on Ajocs part. For another, the evidence on record
shows that Ajocs act was neither voluntary nor spontaneous; he had to be prevailed upon by the
victims companions to render assistance to his victim. [23] Moreover, the evidence to show that
MMTC had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees consisted
merely of the pertinent guidelines for the screening and selection of its drivers, as well as
periodic seminars on road safety. As found by the trial court, and affirmed by the appellate court,
petitioner MMTC failed to show that its driver, Ajoc, had actually undergone such screening or
had attended said seminars. As previously held, [t]he mere formulation of various company
policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt
(an employer) from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon
petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures
and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. [24] In this case, MMTC has made
no satisfactory showing that it had paid more than lip service to its guidelines and policies in
hiring and supervision. Its failure to do so cannot but warrant the proper sanctions from this

Court, considering that MMTC is a government-owned public utility organized for the public
welfare. Having failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on its part, MMTC is primarily and
directly liable for the damages caused by its employee, the erring driver, Ajoc, pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code, which provides as follows:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions-, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The owners of public utilities fall within the scope of this article. [25] As earlier stated, MMTC
is a public utility, organized and owned by the government for public transport service. Hence,
its liability to private respondents, for the negligent and reckless acts of its driver, Ajoc, under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code is both manifest and clear.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45002 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 82465

February 25, 1991

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO
LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND
PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO
and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.
Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.
Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed, with the following
modifications: (1) Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 are hereby awarded to
plaintiffs, in addition to the actual damages of P30,000.00, moral damages of P20,000.00
and attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 awarded to plaintiffs in the decision under
appeal; (2) St. Francis High School, represented by the Spouses Fernando Nantes and
Rosario Lacandula, and Benjamin Illumin, are hereby held jointly and severally liable with
defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment
to plaintiffs of the abovementioned actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages

and attorney's fees, and for costs; and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are
hereby absolved from liability, and the case against them, together with their respective
counterclaims, is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)
The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St.
Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan
Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia
Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring
food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so.
However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female
teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue,
but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to
resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to
the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8834, in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena City, against the St. Francis High School, represented by the
spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers:
Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for
Damages which respondents allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand
Castillo. Contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise
the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning, respondents
prayed of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves,
Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay respondents the
sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's
fees, and to pay the costs. The court a quo reasoned:
Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Court believes that the defendant
teachers namely: Connie Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly Jaro, Nida Aragones
and Patria Cadiz had failed to exercise the diligence required of them by law under the
circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen. (pp. 2930, Rollo)
xxx

xxx

xxx

While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic
site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them
from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty
to safeguard the students. (p. 30,Rollo)
The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were easily attracted to the sea
without aforethought of the dangers it offers. Yet, the precautions and reminders allegedly
performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the standard required by law
under the circumstances. While the defendants-teachers admitted that some parts of the sea
where the picnic was held are deep, the supposed lifeguards of the children did not even
actually go to the water to test the depth of the particular area where the children would
swim. And indeed the fears of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was dangerous was

confirmed by the fact that three persons during the picnic got drowned at the same time. Had
the defendant teachers made an actual and physical observation of the water before they
allowed the students to swim, they could have found out that the area where the children
were swimming was indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male teachers who according
to the female teachers were there to supervise the children to ensure their safety were not
even at the area where the children were swimming. They were somewhere and as testified
to by plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin
Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the court a quo:
As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find sufficient evidence showing that the
picnic was a school sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has been shown to hold
defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of Ferdinand
Castillo together with the other defendant teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that
Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the
other hand, defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she
was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C
to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents-spouses assigned
the following errors committed by the trial court:
1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St. Francis High School and its
administrator/principal Benjamin Illumin as equally liable not only for its approved cocurricular activities but also for those which they unreasonably failed to exercise control and
supervision like the holding of picnic in the dangerous water of Talaan Beach, Sariaya,
Quezon.
2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis High School and principal Benjamin
Illumin as jointly and solidarily liable with their co-defendants-teachers Rosario Lacandula, et
als., for the tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon,
last March 20, 1982.
3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for actual and moral damages for the
untimely and tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in favor of plaintiffs-appellants against all the
defendants. (pp. 56-57,Rollo)
The Court of Appeals ruled:
We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.
Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school-sponsored activity,
nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the same was held under the supervision of the
teachers employed by the said school, particularly the teacher in charge of Class I-C to
whom the victim belonged, and those whom she invited to help her in supervising the class
during the picnic. Considering that the court a quo found negligence on the part of the six
defendants-teachers who, as such, were charged with the supervision of the children during
the picnic, the St. Francis High School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable
under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. They cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the picnic was not an
"extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis High School." We find from the evidence that, as

claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school principal had knowledge of the picnic even from
its planning stage and had even been invited to attend the affair; and yet he did not express
any prohibition against undertaking the picnic, nor did he prescribe any precautionary
measures to be adopted during the picnic. At the least, We must find that the school and the
responsible school officials, particularly the principal, Benjamin Illumin, had acquiesced to
the holding of the picnic.
Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal must be
found jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by
the plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. It is the rule that in cases where the abovecited provisions find application, the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or
damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager
of the establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its principal); and
while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing
proof that the owner and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees causing the injury or
damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers). The record does not disclose such evidence
as would serve to overcome the aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High
School and its principal from liability under the above-cited provisions.
As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-appellants, while We cannot but
commiserate with the plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell them in the untimely death of their
son Ferdinand Castillo and understand their suffering as parents, especially the victim's
mother who, according to appellants, suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of the
tragedy, We find that the amounts fixed by the court a quo as actual damages and moral
damages (P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively) are reasonable and are those which
are sustained by the evidence and the law.
However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P20,000.00
may and should be, as it is hereby, imposed in the present case by way of example of
correction for the public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors committed by the trial court:
1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chavez, Luisito Vinas, Nida
Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly and severally liable for
damages such finding not being supported by facts and evidence.
2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendants. (p. 59, Rollo)
On this score, respondent Court ruled:
The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the parents of the victim
Ferdinand Castillo, were not able to prove by their evidence that they did not give their son
consent to join the picnic in question. However, We agree with the trial court in its finding that
whether or not the victim's parents had given such permission to their son was immaterial to
the determination of the existence of liability on the part of the defendants for the damage
incurred by the plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the death of their son. What is material to
such a determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of defendants vis-avis the supervision of the victim's group during the picnic; and, as correctly found by the trial
court, an affirmative reply to this question has been satisfactorily established by the
evidence, as already pointed out.

However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of the defendants-teachers, Yoly


Jaro and Nida Aragones, are concerned. As to them, the trial court found:
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the
picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and
cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late,
they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students.
The evidence shows that these two defendants had satisfactorily explained why they were
late in going to the picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the entrance examination
being conducted by the school which is part of their duty as teachers thereof. Since they
were not at the picnic site during the occurrence in question, it cannot be said that they had
any participation in the negligence attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to
exercise diligence in the supervision of the children during the picnic and which failure
resulted in the drowning of plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or omission to
the two teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury caused
to the plaintiffs because of the death of their son resulting from his drowning at the picnic.
Accordingly, they must be absolved from any liability.
As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-appellants, We agree with the court a
quo that the counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
The issues presented by petitioners are:
A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will warrant the
award of damages to the plaintiffs;
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to the
case at bar;
C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the
circumstances surrounding the case at bar. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)
In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
The petition is impressed with merit.
If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own negligence or the negligence
of people under them. In the instant case however, as will be shown hereunder, petitioners are
neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they cannot be
held liable for damages of any kind.
At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim
Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.
Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores

Q Now, when your son asked you for money to buy food, did you not ask him where
he will bring this?
A I asked him where he was going, he answered, I am going to the picnic, and when
I asked him where, he did not answer, sir.
Q And after giving the money, you did not tell him anything more?
A No more, sir.
Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was drowned in the picnic
came to you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of March 20, 1982, you
did not know that your son join the picnic?
A No, sir, I did not know.
Q Did you not look for your son during that time?
A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I was not able, sir.
Q You did not ask your wife?
A I did not, sir.
Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the picnic?
A Later on after 12:00, sir.
Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire whether your son
have joined that picnic?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness Romulo Castillo)
The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will
be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same. Furthermore.
Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:
Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination?

A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself She even felt guilty
about the death of her son because she cooked adobo for him so he could join the
excursion where her son died of drowning.
Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was the one who
personally cooked the adobo for her son?
A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient herself. She was
very sorry had she not allowed her son to join the excursion her son would have not
drowned. I don't know if she actually permitted her son although she said she cooked
adobo so he could join. (Emphasis Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30, 1984,
Dr. Lazaro witness).
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in
rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his
employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an
employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned
tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most
importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear
from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis
High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head
or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it
considered as an extra-curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning
of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show
acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no
basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of
respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being
hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or
omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of
damages to the respondents-spouses.

Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her
best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or
damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors
and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even
respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life
savers especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also
show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.
Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,
Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand Castillo, you approached the boy and claim
also having applied first aid on him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were applying the so called first aid, the children were covering you
up or were surrounding you?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?
A No, sir.
Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition?
A Yes, sir.
Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your application of first
aid?
A Yes, sir.
Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" in the process of your application of
the first aid on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
A No, sir, because we were attending to the application of first aid that we were
doing, sir.
Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you claimed the boy did
not respond, were you not disturb anyway?
A I was disturbed during that time, sir.
Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back pressure?
A From 9 to 11 times, sir.

Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your body on the body of
Ferdinand Castillo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of back to back pressure?
A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards, then the face was a
little bit facing right and doing it by massaging the back of the child, sir." (TSN, pp.
32-35, hearing of July 30, 1984)
Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the child?
A Myself, sir.
Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?
A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I applied back to
back pressure and took notice of the condition of the child. We placed the feet in a
higher position, that of the head of the child, sir.
Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position, where the feet were on a
higher level than that of the head, what did you do next?
A The first thing that we did, particularly myself, was that after putting the child in that
position, I applied the back to back pressure and started to massage from the
waistline up, but I noticed that the boy was not responding, sir.
Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy?
A About 10 seconds, sir.
Q What about Mr. Vinas?
A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds, sir.
Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding, what did you do?
A When we noticed that the boy was not responding, we changed the position of the
boy by placing the child facing upwards laying on the sand then we applied the
mouth to mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-93, Rollo)
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondentsspouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.

Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence,
hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this
does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required
diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar,
petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for
moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated November 19, 1987, finding petitioners
herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the
respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein are concerned, but the
portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim, there being no merit, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur

G.R. No. L-23052

January 29, 1968

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,


vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and
P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him
down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a
stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit
the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left
eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and

pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital,
where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in
his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and
the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic
eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further
medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of
Manila, a complaint which was, subsequently, amended for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the
decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a
professor at the University of the East. He held responsible positions in various business
firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan
Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated with
several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of
the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident,
plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff
has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the
incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends.
During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the
welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case,
plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the
Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the
uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets,
Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that
again the iron cover of the same catch basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but
the said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer
never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in question was not covered
between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of the said office, which
is charged with the duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila,
that whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover,
the matter is immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or
covering the catchbasin with steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business
then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the City
Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to
prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins
in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and
openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the city
from time to time whenever funds were available.

After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned
decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without
costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the
City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from
the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409,
is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law,
applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar
as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of
Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages
or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of"
said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or
other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article
2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason"
specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective
condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the
accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not
been negligent in connection therewith.

As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer
of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his
injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of
the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and
the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned"
who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties
as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was
and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for
the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion
raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be
set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate
court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue
were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control
or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting,
cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection of, fix
the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer
and other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in
and under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide
for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales
upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances in the
same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction and
maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate
ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using
the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of
horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits
of the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for
and change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to
raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad
companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable protection against

injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and
culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent
property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive
Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or
appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and
municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and
Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning
the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the
construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid
provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and
Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be
financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual
or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the
maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of
fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
City of Manila. It is so ordered.
1wph1.t

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.

You might also like