To appear in The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication.

Gianpietro Mazzoleni, General

Editor, and Kevin Barnhurst, Kenichi Ikeda, Rousiley Maia, Hartmut Wessler, Associate Editors

Ideology
Teun A. van Dijk
Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona

Third and final draft, September 16, 2013.

Word count: 5.326

Introduction
Ideology is a complex phenomenon that requires a multidisciplinary approach. As systems
of belief, ideologies are a form of social cognition and hence need to be studied in (social)
psychological terms. As developed and used by social groups, they need to be accounted
for in a sociological and politicological framework. And acquired, (re)produced and
communicated by situated text and talk they need a discourse analytical and
communicational approach. Such a multidisciplinary theory goes beyond traditional
philosophical views of ideology as a form of false consciousness. This chapter summarizes
such a multidisciplinary theory of ideology, with special attention to the relations between
ideology and communication, as may be expected in this Encyclopedia (for detail of the
theory summarized here, see *Van Dijk, 1998).
Another fundamental difference with most classical approaches is that ideologies are
not necessarily negative. They not only may be developed and used to sustain and
legitimate social and political power abuse, as is the case for racism. Social groups may
also share and use them to resist such domination and in order to propagate egalitarian
attitudes and practices, as is the case for feminism [see feminist Theory]. In both cases,

Teun A. van Dijk, Ideology (Encyclopedia of Political Communication)

ideologies are belief systems shared by groups in order to promote their interests and to
guide their social and political practices.

Ideology as social cognition

Whatever else ideologies may be or do, they are first of all a kind of beliefs, that is, mental
representations, as is also the case for forms of social cognition such as knowledge,
opinions, attitudes, norms and values [see Cognition, Political; Political Psychology]. But
different from personal opinions, they are essentially shared by social collectivities [see
Collective Memory; Groupthink]. They are a form of shared or widespread ideas
(*Fraser & Gaskell, 1990). There are no such things as personal ideologies, in the same
way as there are no personal languages. Even when the original ideas that give rise to an
ideology may have been developed by one or a few individuals, these ideas only constitute
an ideology as defined here when groups of people acquire, share, propagate and use them
to propagate their collective interests and to guide their social practices.
Yet, as is the case for languages, ideologies may be learned and used by individuals
as group members in their everyday practices thus bridging the well-known gap between
social structure and individual agency. This also guarantees that ideologies can be (slowly)
changed and adapted to new social and political situations.
As socially shared systems of ideas, ideologies are part of a very complex network of
neurologically based mental representations stored in (so-called semantic) Long Term
Memory. As is the case for the socioculturally shared knowledge of communities, they are
slowly acquired and relatively stable in order to serve as a fundamental cognitive basis for
the everyday social conduct and discourse of group members. One does not become a racist
or feminist overnight, nor an antiracist or an antifeminist for that matter.
Although there is since the 1980s a large number of studies on various forms of social
cognition in social psychology (for introduction and review see, e.g., *Fiske & Taylor,
1991; *Augoustinos, Walker & Donoghue, 2006), sociocognitive studies of ideology have
been rare (but see, e.g., *Aebischer, Deconchy & Lipiansky, 1992; *Augoustinos, 1995,
1999; *Billig, 1982).
Teun A. van Dijk, Ideology (Encyclopedia of Political Communication)

Ideologies as polarized self-schemas of a group

Although at present the detailed cognitive organization (as well as the neurological basis)
of ideologies is still unknown, ideologically based discourse and other social practices
provide some indirect insight into these underlying mental structures.
In order to serve the interest of a social group, ideologies must represent the very
definition of a group, so that group members can identify themselves as group members in
the first place. Thus, ideologies typically represent who we are, what we do, why we do so,
how we (should or should not) do so, and what for we do so, that is, our social identity,
actions, goals, norms and values, resources and interests. In that respect, ideologies are a
collective, basic mental self-schema of a group consisting of information organized by
these schematic categories. Often this self-schema is positively biased although some
(dominated) groups in a specific sociopolitical environment may have a negative selfschema (for detail, see *Van Dijk, 1998; for Social Identity Theory, see, e.g., *Abrams &
Hogg, 1999).
Secondly, most group ideologies are developed and used in relation to other social
groups, e.g., whether to compete with, dominate, resist or otherwise to interact with other
groups and their members. This is only possible when group members not only have an
ideological self-schema, but also need to form a schematic representation of relevant other
groups, as is the case for racists about ethnically different immigrants or minorities, and
feminists about sexist men. This other-representation is usually negatively biased. In other
words, ideologies tend to be polarized between Us and Them, between ingroups and
outgroups (*Berreby, 2008; *Elliott, 1986; for intergroup relations, see *Tajfel, 1982).
Unlike socially shared knowledge of communities, group ideologies are at least partly
evaluative, as is shown in their positive ingroup and negative outgroup bias, and as defined
by the norms and values of a group and its surrounding society and culture (*Gross, 1984)
[see Values]. Thus, a positive socioculturally shared value such as Freedom may be
construed in different ideologies in order to serve particular group interests, as is the case
for the freedom of the market, the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, academic

Teun A. van Dijk, Ideology (Encyclopedia of Political Communication)

freedom, on the one hand, and freedom from oppression, discrimination or pollution, on the
other hand.
As socially shared mental self-schemas, ideologies must be quite general and
abstract, because they need to be relevant for many different people, circumstances,
experiences and social practices and in many different situations during a relatively long
period, so as to be able to maintain the identity and serve the interest of a group. In that
sense they represent general principles and guidelines rather than detailed instructions or
opinions on specific issues.

Ideologies and social attitudes

In order to be able to serve as guidelines for everyday practices of group members,

ideologies are assumed to found and organize more specific, socially shared
representations, traditionally known as attitudes. Thus, group members may have
stereotypes, prejudices or other generic attitudes on government intervention in the market,
on immigration, abortion, homosexual marriages, the death penalty or minority quotas,
among many other issues. [see Stereotypes]
Although also the detailed structure of such attitudes has hardly been studied, despite
a long tradition of attitude research in social psychology (see, e.g., *Eagly & Chaiken,
1993), their ideological basis and manifestations in discourse and social practices suggests
that they also tend to be polarized, e.g., between Pro-Choice and Pro-Life views of
abortion, as well as the positive representation of the views and conduct of the ingroup, and
a negative one of the outgroup. Whereas ideologies may define the general coherence of
various attitudes of a group, attitudes themselves are more specific and tend to influence
more directly our discourse and other social practices as group members. This also means
that we usually first acquire specific attitudes, and only later may acquire a more
fundamental ideological framework for them. Thus, women may develop a critical attitude
against sexual harassment, and may later acquire a more general feminist ideology in order
to resist other forms of male domination.

Teun A. van Dijk, Ideology (Encyclopedia of Political Communication)

Ideological mental models

For ideologies to develop as the basis of shared experiences, and to act as guidelines of the
daily practices of group members, they obviously need to be related to the opinions and
activities of individual group members. To thus relate social structure and individual
agency, we use the fundamental cognitive notion of mental models. Models are defined as
embodied, subjective mental representations of personal experiences, actions and situations,
and are represented in the Episodic (autobiographical) Memory part of Long Term Memory
(*Johnson-Laird, 1983; *Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1993; *Gentner & Stevens, 1983).
In order to represent social situations and their environment, personal experiences, to
plan and execute specific actions and to understand or to coordinate with those of other
ingroup or outgroup members, people ongoingly form such subjective mental models.
These models on the one hand are construed by instantiations or applications of
socially shared knowledge in the community (e.g., on immigration) [see Political
Knowledge], and on the other hand they may be influenced by socially shared attitudes and
ideologies of the ingroup. But as personal mental models they are not merely instantiations
of socially shared beliefs, but also may be influenced by earlier or current personal
experiences, that is, old models, which may even be more or less at variance with shared
experiences of a group.
Thus, mental models construed by group members (as group members) are the ways
ideologies are lived in the everyday experiences of group members, and explain why and
how ideologies may show considerable personal variation, uses and manifestations. Based
on socially shared attitudes, thus, mental models feature personally variable opinions on
specific events. These mental models of personal experiences are also the source of the
possible changes of ideologies, for instance as changed circumstances may lead to changed
personal experiences shared by an increasing number of group members as we know
from the historical changes of racism, pacifism or feminism.
Models are subjective mental representations of specific events and situations and
share a very fundamental cognitive schema defining all human experiences, organized by

Teun A. van Dijk, Ideology (Encyclopedia of Political Communication)

such basic categories as Setting (Time, Place), Participants (and their identities, roles and
relationships), ongoing Events, Actions or Situations, and Goals. Such mental models not
only serve to represent past actions but also to control ongoing conduct and to plan future
actions of group members.
We see that the combined social and personal influences on the mental models of
everyday experiences and practices define these mental models as the ideal interface
between social structure and individual agency. Thus, ideologically based mental models
allow people to understand and act as group members and in the interest of a group. This
also means that they serve as the basis for discourse and communication as ideological
practices of groups and their members.

Ideological discourse and communication

Ideologies are not innate but learned. As briefly indicated above, they are gradually
acquired by people as members of social groups, mediated by personal experiences
(subjective mental models) instantiated by, or generalized as socially shared attitudes about
relevant social or political issues. For such social attitudes and their underlying ideologies
to be acquired and shared in a group in the first place, they usually need to be expressed,
formulated, or otherwise communicated among group members or defended or legitimated
outside of the group. That is, ideologies are typically produced and reproduced by talk or
text, that is, by ideological discourse, such as party programs, parliamentary debates, news
reports and editorials, textbooks, bibles, pamphlets, scientific articles, as well as everyday
conversations among or with people as group members (*Aronowitz, 1988; *Burton &
Carlen, 1979; *Dant, 1991; *Fox & Fox, 2004; *Malrieu, 1999; *Ptz, Neff-van Aertselaer,
& Van Dijk, 2004; *Van Dijk, 1998; 2008b)[see Political Discourse].

Ideological discourse structures

Ideological discourse is not shaped arbitrarily. In order to function as a persuasive

expression and reproduction of group attitudes and ideologies some discourse structures are
Teun A. van Dijk, Ideology (Encyclopedia of Political Communication)

more typical or efficient than others [see Persuasion]. Thus, one of the most typical and
general property of ideological discourse is its polarized nature, reflecting the underlying
polarized structure of social attitudes and ideologies, that is, a polarization between
(positive) Us, and (negative) Them. [see Polarization, Political] Indeed, these very
pronouns are the prototypical grammatical markers of underlying ideologies.
This polarization may affect all variable structures at all levels of discourse and its
communicative contexts, such as

who has the floor in a debate or conversation

who has active or passive access to public discourse,
overall discourse topics,
descriptions of people and their actions and properties,
lexical items (words),
metaphors,
implications and presuppositions,
arguments [see Argumentation, Political],
narrative structures,
rhetorical operations (figures), such as hyperboles and euphemisms,
images and photos,
and so on [See Discourse Analysis; Language]

This discursive polarization is typically characterized by enhancing the positive properties

of US, the ingroup, and the negative properties of THEM, the outgroup. At the same time,
the negative properties of the ingroup and the positive ones of the outgroup are typically
de-emphasized, toned down, mitigated or simply ignored or hidden. We thus obtain an
ideological square (*Van Dijk, 1998) that may be applied at all levels of the discourse:
positive topics about US (how tolerant, modern, advanced, peaceful or intelligent WE are),
negative topics about THEM (how intolerant, backward, aggressive, etc. THEY are), and
avoid negative topics about US (e.g., our racism or our international aggression, or their
contribution to our economy and welfare). The same for the words or metaphors we use, or
Teun A. van Dijk, Ideology (Encyclopedia of Political Communication)

what information is explicit or remains implicit, foregrounded or backgrounded, among

many other discourse structures. Even the syntax of active or passive sentences may thus be
used to emphasize our good properties or to hide or background or bad properties of people
talked about.
Polarized ideological discourse is not only based on polarized ideological mental
models of speakers, but is precisely also persuasively designed to help form or confirm
similar ideological models among the recipients of discourse and communication. It is in
this way that ideologies are slowly learned and reproduced by public ingroup discourse of
many types (from news in the media or school text books to everyday conversations). And
once such ideological models of specific events are created by the recipients, repeated
communication may lead to the formation of socially shared ideological attitudes and
finally to general, underlying ideologies. We thus analyze and explain how ideologies are
formed and reproduced and at the same time how they are used and thus at the same
time reproduced in social practices such as discourse and communication. And when the
social or political attitudes thus communicated are in the best interest of a dominant group
and against the best interest of a dominated group and/or the public at large, we specifically
deal with the form of persuasion we call manipulation (Van Dijk, 2005)[see Manipulation]

Context models

The expression and reproduction (or the challenge) of ideologies by discourse is not only
controlled by underlying mental models of events and situations we write or talk about. We
also have mental models of the very communicative situation we participate in, as when a
teacher represents her talking in a classroom for students, a politician addressing other
members of parliament or a journalist writing a news report. Since these models define the
context of discourse, we call them context models. They make sure that discourse is
appropriate in a given communicative situation e.g., what can or cannot be said in a
parliamentary debate and how it should (not) be said (*Van Dijk, 2008a, 2009a).
In a theory of ideology and its reproduction by discourse, we not only need to study
the structures of ideological text or talk, but especially also mental context models

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representing the definition of the communicative situation by the participants. Indeed, the
expression of ideologies is crucially dependent on context. Feminists will not always talk as
feminists, depending on the situation, to whom they talk and what the goal is of the
discourse. Similarly, racists or male chauvinist may sometimes hide their prejudices if their
current discourse would be against their interests. On the other hand, among group
members, or in conflict discourse, ideological discourse may be very explicit in order to
teach, propagate, defend or legitimate the ideology or the practices of a group. Hence, a
detailed analysis of the communicative situation is necessary in order to be able to describe
and explain the presence, absence or nature of ideological discourse structures.

Ideology is not the same as discourse

Since ideologies are usually expressed and reproduced by text or talk, there is a tendency to
confuse or collapse the notion of ideology with that of discourse. In our view, such a
conceptual identification is misguided, if only because ideologies are cognitive structures
and discourse, as defined here (as concrete instances of text or talk) are linguistic structures,
on the one hand, and a form of social action or communication, on the other hand.
Ideologies can be expressed by discourse, but are not the same as discourse. Ideologies can
also be expressed by other social practices, as we know from sexual harassment or racial
discrimination as expressions of sexist or racist ideologies. In other words, it makes sense
to distinguish ideologies as forms of social cognition from the ways they are being
expressed and used in discourse or other social practices.
The confusion between discourse and ideology is even more common for a concept of
discourse as used by *Foucault (1971), that is, not as concrete instances of text or talk, but
as systems or orders of discourse (as in genres of political discourse or even more abstractly
in terms of the discourse of modernity). This more abstract, more philosophical notion of
discourse is often also referred to with the term Discourse with a capital Discourse (see,
e.g., *Gee, 2010). In that case it (vaguely) refers to systems and ideas as well as sets of
(concrete) discourses and hence such a notion is closer to the notion of ideology as
defined here. But even for this (macro) concept of Discourse, it makes sense to distinguish

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between systems of ideas on the one hand and the ways these are expressed in (systems of
philosophical, political, media, etc.) discourses that express them, for instance during a
given historical period. And we also suggest to make a distinction between the general
notion of system of ideas (including philosophical systems) on the one hand, and
ideologies on the on the other. Thus, Marx developed a system of ideas, as did many
philosophers, but (fragments of) that system only became a (Marxist) ideology when it was
acquired, spread, and used by members of a collectivity. Kant also designed a system of
ideas, but it would be strange to talk of an ideology of Kantism. In other words, the history
and the theory of ideology (and that of discourse for that matter) has shown much
theoretical confusion that we are able to clear up with more explicit analytical categories
and distinctions today, e.g., from contemporary discourse studies and cognitive science.

Ideology and Society

The relevance of an analysis of context as part of ideological discourse analysis already
establishes a link between ideologies and the social situation, that is, with the identity and
goals of groups and group members and their ongoing practices. Thus, whereas the social
nature of ideologies on the one hand is defined by belief systems shared by social groups,
and used by group members, we also saw that the expression, acquisition and reproduction
of ideologies takes place in specific social communicative situations. Hence, the
communicative theory of ideology presented here triangulates a socio-political, cognitive
and discursive component (for the concept of ideology, especially as part of social and
political theory, see, among a vast number of books, e.g, *Eagleton, 1991; *Larrain, 1979;
*Thompson, 1984).
The social component of a theory of ideology not only deals with communicative
situations and interactions or social practices at the micro-level of the social order, but also
with complex, higher level societal structure and organization. We already defined
ideologies as a type of beliefs shared by social groups and their cognitive and discourse
structures as polarized between US and THEM, between ingroups and outgroups, and
involving the shared representation of social identities, goals, norms an discourse values,
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10

resources and interests. Such polarization often needs to be based on a societal analysis in
terms of power, power abuse, domination and resistance, including which groups have
access to public discourse, such as that of politics, the media or education - a major power
resource.
It is in such a broader framework that the fundamental functions of ideologies are
described and explained, for instance in terms of the promotion of group cohesion, the
coordination of collective action, maintaining or resisting power, defending or challenging
resources or other interests, and so on.
At the same time, a societal analysis of ideology needs to be more explicit about the
nature of different ideological groups, their position, interests, organization and collective
action. A racist political party, a feminist action group, a pacifist network, a labor union, or
a professional organization are all ideological groups, but have very different properties.
Some groups have explicit ideologues teaching group ideology to newcomers (as is the
case for catechism in church), or journalists spreading ideologies through the media of a
group, whereas other ideological groups have more informal ways of communicating and
reproducing its ideology. Ideological groups may be organized in many ways, with cardcarrying official members, elections and leaders, and so on, as is the case for political
parties, whereas other ideological groups only informally exist as people sharing specific
ideological ideas (as is the case for progressive and conservative ideologies or rather
meta-ideologies, because they may dominate many different ideologies). Patriarchy may
thus be a powerful dominant ideology, but is often not organized as such, e.g., by explicit
male chauvinist clubs, media, or memberships, but precisely present and shared in many or
most social groups and organizations dominated by men.
It is also within such a broader, sociopolitical framework that we need to describe and
explain the changes of ideologies, for instance as a result of the many forms of interaction
(including discourse and communication) between ideological groups, or the (lacking or
present) actions of the State. A characteristic example has been the positive influence of
ecological ideologies on many existing consumerist or industrial ideologies as may be
concluded from the analysis of the ecologically conscious advertising of polluting oil
companies, or the influence of feminism on traditional chauvinist ideologies and practices.

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11

Obviously, ideologies may develop as a function of economic and sociocultural conditions

even when the general Marxian thesis of the influence of the economic base on the
(ideological) superstructure is too vague and not generally true. Pacifism may be hard to
defend when the country is invaded. Racism and xenophobia typically tend to grow when
immigration drastically increases, especially in economically hard times, as is the case in
Europe today. Socialism developed as a reaction to capitalism, and antiracism is by
definition a reaction to racism and its discriminatory practices (for more recent studies of
political ideologies, see, e.g., among many books, *Ball & Dagger, 2002; *Baradat, 2002;
*Connolly, 2006; *Freeden, 1996).
Of course, these are all very general, societal macroprocesses that need detailed
microanalyses of the precise mechanisms involved, such as the discourse and
communication practices of an ideological group, how such discourses are understood and
how they form persuasive mental models and changing attitudes among members of other
ideological groups, and how these changing attitudes are in turn collectively reproduced in
the other group by various kinds of public discourses (political debate, policies, news,
propaganda, advertising, teaching, and so on).
In other words, even a macrosociological approach to the development, changes and
influences of ideologies in terms of groups, group relations, power, institutions, laws, and
so on, often requires detailed discourse and communication analysis. Ideologies may partly
develop as a result of the social and political circumstances of a group (e.g., as a reaction to
oppression and discrimination, or as legitimation of power abuse), yet for the mental
models of personal experiences (including emotions and opinions about such personal
experiences) to become shared in a group, so that other know what I know and feel, people
need to talk, write and communicate. Hence, at all levels of the theory of ideology, we
always need

(i) a macrosociological component of social or political situations, conditions or

group relations (of power, competition, etc.), on the one hand, and a
microsociological component of everyday interaction or social practices, especially
talk and text

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(ii) a sociocognitive component of mental models of specific, personal, situated

experiences, on the one hand, and generic, socioculturally attitudes, ideologies, norms
and values, on the other hand, and
(iii) a detailed analysis of the many ideologically influenced structures of text and talk
as forms of discursive interaction in specific situations and social practices, on the
one hand, and a general analysis of access to discourse, specific genres and the
overall communication institutions and processes in society including, for
instance, an analysis of media practices, control and power, on the other hand. These
ideological communicative practices are themselves instances of the
microsociological component with its macrosociological consequences, making the
theory a complete system of ideological reproduction in society.

In other words, the components of theoretical triangulation between Society, Cognition and
Discourse/Communication each have a micro and a macro level of analysis.

An example: Racism

By way of example, let us finally be more specific about racism as an ideology and how it
is discursively reproduced in society (for detail, see *Van Dijk, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993,
1998; 2009b)[see Race & Ethnic Minorities]
Racism is a social system of domination, in which white (European, etc.) groups
dominate non-white (non-European) groups. This overall system is implemented and
daily reproduced at the microlevel in and by specific forms of racist practices and
interaction: discrimination. This system of domination or inequality as well as its
discriminatory practices are based on and legitimated by an underlying, socially shared,
system of racist ideology, in which (white) ingroups are represented positively, and (nonwhite) outgroups negatively.
This overall ideology is derived from and then again applied in the formation or
confirmation of racist attitudes, e.g., about immigration, elections, busing, quotas,
intelligence, the labor market and so on. These attitudes in turn are derived (bottom up)

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from and again applied (top down) in the formation of, personally variable, racist mental
models of specific group members about specific racial or ethnic events in specific
situations. These various levels of racist mental representations are all involved in the
production of racist practices, e.g., of exclusion, marginalization and problematization of
many different kinds.
One of these ideological racist practices, discourse or communication has a double
function. On the one hand text and talk may be a discriminatory practice like all others (and
exclude, problematize and marginalize immigrants or minority members), and thus
reproduce the overall system of racist domination as explained above. On the other hand,
discourse is crucial in the development and especially the reproduction of underlying racist
attitudes and ideologies that sociocognitively grounds the system of domination, and
provides its rationale and legitimation. This is especially the case for the role of public
discourse, such as the discourses of politics and the bureaucracy, the mass media and
education.
However, only specific social groups, the symbolic elites, control and have
preferential access to such public discourse, making them primarily responsible for the
discursive reproduction of racism, whether or not influenced by non-elite members of the
dominant group (influence that itself is discursively managed and controlled). At the same
macrolevel of the analysis of racism, we further need to examine the role of (racist or
antiracist) political parties, legislation, the courts, racist and antiracist organizations, and so
on. Much of this analysis is again based on the public discourses (and their cognitive and
social consequences) of these groups and institutions.
In other words, also a complex system of domination such as racism and its
underlying ideology needs to be studied in terms of a social, cognitive and discursive
analysis of its development, reproduction and change. Detailed, and systematic discourse
analysis can be used to study the empirical data at all levels and in each component.

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