1.

Specific Jurisdiction
a. Supreme Court
i. 1987 Constitution
a) Art. VIII.1, 2, 5 (see also Part I.B.1) judicial power
1) Automatic review in certain criminal
cases - People of the Philippines vs.
Espejon (G.R. No. 134767, February
22, 2002)
(Death penalty conviction by RTC automatic review by SC) In this
regard, we may well point out that
an automatic review is a remedy
provided by law for the benefit of
the accused.
2) Questions of law v. questions of fact;
certiorari as a special civil action
contradistinguished from certiorari as
a mode of appeal
There is a question of law when the
doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain set of
facts. There is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts (Riano)
A petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is a special civil action. It is not a
mode of appeal. It is an original
action
independent
from
the
principal action which resulted in
the rendition of the judgment or
order complained of (Rule 65, Rules
of Court).
Certiorari is a remedy for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction,
not errors of judgment. It is an
original and independent action
that was not part of the trial that
had resulted in the rendition of the
judgment or order complained of.
The rule is well-recognized that an
appeal to the Supreme Court may
be taken only by petition for review
on certiorari (Sec. 3, Rule 56, Rules
of Court). This is not the certiorari
under Rule 65 but under Rule 45.
Any party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the

Regional Trial Court or other courts

whenever authorized by law, may
file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on
certiorari and which shall raise only
questions of law (Sec. 1, Rule 45,
Rules of Court).
a. Josefa v. Zhandong Trading
Corp.
(G.R.
No.
150903,
December 8, 2003)
While it is firmly entrenched in our
jurisdiction that only questions of
law may be entertained by this
Court in a petition for review on
certiorari, however, such rule is not
ironclad
and
admits
certain
exceptions, such as when: (1) the
conclusion
is
grounded
on
speculations,
surmises
or
conjectures; (2) the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation
of specific evidence on which the
factual findings are based; (7) the
finding of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; (9) the
Court
of
Appeals
manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) the findings of the
Court of Appeals are beyond the
issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties.[5] Here,
we find that the trial court and the
Court of Appeals misapprehended
and
overlooked
relevant
and
established facts.
b. Santos vs. Committee on Claims
Settlement, etc., et al. (G.R. No.
158071, April 2, 2009)
A question of law exists when there
is doubt or controversy on what the
law is on a certain state of facts.
There is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises from the

truth or the falsity of the allegations

of facts.
As a general rule, appeals on pure
questions of law are brought to this
Court...Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure constitutes an
exception to the aforesaid general
rule on appeals. Rule 43 provides
for an instance where an appellate
review solely on a question of law
may be sought in the CA instead of
this Court.
c. Del Prado vs. People of the
Philippines (G.R. No. 186030,
March 21,2012)
Settled is the rule that in a petition
for review under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be raised. It is
not this Courts function to analyze
or weigh all over again evidence
already
considered
in
the
proceedings below, our jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing only
errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower court. The
resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are
received with respect. A question of
law which we may pass upon must
not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants.
Sec. 1, Rule 45: The petition...shall
raise only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth.
d. Malayang
Manggagawa
ng
Stayfast v. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No.
155306, August 28, 2013)
The proper remedy to obtain a
reversal of judgment on the merits,
final order or resolution is appeal.
This holds true even if the error
ascribed to the court rendering the
judgment is its lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the
exercise of power in excess thereof,
or grave abuse of discretion in the
findings of fact or of law set out in
the decision, order or resolution.
The existence and availability of the
right of appeal prohibits the resort
to certiorari because one of the

requirements for the latter remedy

is that there should be no appeal.
b) Art. IX, A, sec. 7; c.f. B. P. 129, Sec. 9 (as
as amended by R. A. 7902); Rule 43
Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each (Constitutional)
Commission may be brought to the SC
on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 30 days from receipt of a copy
thereof (Art IX) -- compare with next
point - The
CA
shall
exercise...Exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgements, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial
agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commission,
including the Securities and Exchange
Commission,
the
Social
Security
Commission,
the
Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, Except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution...(BP 129)
Appeals from CTA and quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA (Rule 43)
c) Change of venue
1) People v. Sola, et al. (G.R. No. L56158-64
March 17, 1981)
The Supreme Court could order "a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice." - Article X,
Section 5(4) Consti
Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable
Court of its above constitutional power in
this case will be appropriate. The
witnesses in the case are fearful for their
lives. They are afraid they would be
killed on their way to or from
Himamaylan during any of the days of
trial. Because of fear, they may either
refuse to testify or testimony falsely to
save their lives.
In case of doubt, it should be resolved in
favor of a change of venue.
d) Hierarchy of courts
1) Liga ng mga Barangay National vs.

City Mayor of Manila (G.R. No. 154599,

January 21,2004)
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice
of the court to which application
therefor0 will be directed. There is after
all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals,
and
also
serves
as
a
general
determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard
of that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions
for
the
issuance
of
extraordinary writs against first level
(inferior) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against
the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It
is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts
time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Courts
docket.
2) Gerochi, et al. vs. Department of
Energy, et al. (G.R. No. 159796, July
17,2007)
But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, while
concurrent with that of the regional trial
courts and the Court of Appeals, does
not give litigants unrestrained freedom
of choice of forum from which to seek
such relief. It has long been established
that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, or where exceptional and
compelling
circumstances
justify
availment of a remedy within and call for
the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
This circumstance alone warrants the
outright dismissal of the present action.
3) Dy

vs.

Bibat-Palamos

(G.R.

No.

196200, September 11,2013)

Under the principle of hierarchy of
courts, direct recourse to this Court is
improper because the Supreme Court is
a court of last resort and must remain to
be so in order for it to satisfactorily
perform its constitutional functions,
thereby allowing it to devote its time and
attention to matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction
and
preventing
the
overcrowding of its docket. Nonetheless,
the invocation of this Courts original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has
been allowed in certain instances on the
ground of special and important reasons
clearly stated in the petition, such as,(1)
when dictated by the public welfare and
the advancement of public policy; (2)
when demanded by the broader interest
of justice; (3) when the challenged
orders were patent nullities; or (4) when
analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified the
immediate and direct handling of the
case.
ii.

P.D. 1606, sec. 7, as am. by R.A. 7975 and R.A.

8249
Decisions and final orders for the Sandiganbayan
shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari raising pure
questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
iii. Final arbiter; En banc and Divisions
a) 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 4;
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court;
The Supreme Court shall be composed of
a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members
All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard
by the Supreme Court en banc, and all
other cases which under the Rules of
Court are required to be heard en banc,
including
those
involving
the
constitutionality,
application,
or
operation
of
presidential
decrees,
proclamations,
orders,
instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations, shall
be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually

took part in the deliberations on the

issues in the case and voted thereon.
(Internal Rules) Court en banc matters
and cases. The Court en banc shall act
on the following matters and cases:
(a) cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, executive
order, presidential decree, proclamation,
order,
instruction,
ordinance,
or
regulation is in question;
(b) criminal cases in which the appealed
decision imposes the death penalty or
reclusion perpetua;
(c) cases raising novel questions of law;
(d) cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls;
(e)
cases
involving
decisions,
resolutions, and orders of the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit;
(f)
cases
where
the
penalty
recommended or imposed is the
dismissal of a judge, the disbarment of a
lawyer, the suspension of any of them
for a period of more than one year, or a
fine exceeding forty thousand pesos;
(g) cases covered by the preceding
paragraph
and
involving
the
reinstatement in the judiciary of a
dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a
lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the
lifting of a judges suspension or a
lawyers suspension from the practice of
law;
(h) cases involving the discipline of a
Member of the Court, or a Presiding
Justice, or any Associate Justice of the
collegial appellate court;
(i) cases where a doctrine or principle
laid down by the Court en banc or by a
Division my be modified or reversed;
(j) cases involving conflicting decisions
of two or more divisions;
(k) cases where three votes in a Division
cannot be obtained;
(l) Division cases where the subject
matter has a huge financial impact on
businesses or affects the welfare of a
community;
(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule,
other division cases that, in the opinion
of at least three Members of the Division
who are voting and present, are
appropriate for transfer to the Court en

banc;
(n) Cases that the Court en banc deems
of sufficient importance to merit its
attention; and
(o) all matters involving policy decisions
in the administrative supervision of all
courts and their personnel.
b) Cases
1) US v. Lim Siongco (G.R. No. 16217,
October 9, 1920)
The Supreme Court remains a unit
notwithstanding it works in divisions.
Although it may have two decisions, it is
but a single court.
The Philippine Legislature had power to
enact a law authorizing the Supreme
Court to sit either in banc or in divisions
to transact business.
2) Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services,
Inc. vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. L-58011
and L-58012, November 18,1993)
Any doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the Court, whether en banc or
in Division, may be modified or reversed
only by the Court en banc. (Section 2(3),
Article X, Constitution.) In the rare
instances when one Division disagrees in
its views with the other Division, or the
necessary votes on an issue cannot be
had in a Division, the case is brought to
the Court en banc to reconcile any
seeming conflict, to reverse or modify an
earlier decision, and to declare the
Court's doctrine.
At the outset, we are faced with the
question whether or not the Court en
banc should give due course to the
motion for reconsideration inspite of its
having been denied twice by the Court's
Second Division. The case was referred
to and accepted by the Court en banc
because of the movants' contention that
the decision in this case by the Second
Division deviated from Wallem Phil.
Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor (L50734-37, February 20, 1981), a First
Division case with the same facts and
issues.
3) In re: Joaquin Boromeo (A.M. No. 93-7696-0, February 21, 1995)
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court
as a collegiate court, whether an en

banc or division, speak for themselves

and are entitled to full faith and
credence and are beyond investigation
or inquiry under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the
legislature.
4) Cabuay, Jr., et al. v. Malvar, et al. (G.R.
No. 123780, September 24, 2002)
no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the (Supreme) Court en banc or its
Divisions may be modified or reversed
except by the Court sitting en banc.
A Decision rendered by a Division of this
Court in violation of the above
constitutional provision would be in
excess of jurisdiction and, therefore,
invalid.
5) J.G. Summit Holdings v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 124293, January 31,
2005)
6) Apo Fruits Plantation v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 164195, April 30,
2008)
The Supreme Court sitting En Banc is not
an appellate court vis--vis its Divisions,
and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction
over the latter. Each division of the Court
is considered not a body inferior to the
Court en banc, and sits veritably as the
Court en banc itself. It bears to stress
further that a resolution of the Division
denying a partys motion for referral to
the Court en banc of any Division case,
shall be final and not appealable to the
Court en banc.
7) Commission on Higher Education v.
Dasig (G.R. No. 172776, December 17,
2008)
Apart from its mandated duty to take
judicial notice of the resolution in the
disbarment case, the Court of Appeals is
bound by this Courts findings and
conclusions in the said resolution in
accordance with the doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere.
8) Diaz vs. Republic (G.R. No. 181502,
February 2, 2010)
Furthermore, the motion to refer the
case to the banc was likewise denied as
the banc is not an appellate court to

which decisions or resolutions of the

divisions may be appealed
9) In re: Letters of Atty. Estelito Mendoza
(A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC March 13,2012)
Section 3, Rule 8 of the IRSC should be
read as the general rule applicable to
the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge.
This general rule should, however, yield
where the inhibition occurs at the late
stage of the case when a decision or
signed resolution is assailed through an
MR. At that point, when the situation
calls for the review of the merits of the
decision or the signed resolution made
by a ponente (or writer of the assailed
ruling), Section 3, Rule 8 no longer
applies and must yield to Section 7, Rule
2 of the IRSC which contemplates a
situation when the ponente is no longer
available, and calls for the referral of the
case for raffle among the remaining
Members of the Division who acted on
the decision or on the signed resolution.
This latter provision should rightly apply
as it gives those who intimately know
the facts and merits of the case, through
their
previous
participation
and
deliberations, the chance to take a look
at the decision or resolution produced
with their participation.
10) Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. v.
Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp.
(G.R. Nos. 180880-81, 1808896-97,
September 18, 2012)
It bears mentioning however, that when
the court en banc entertains a case for
its resolution and disposition, it does so
without implying that the division of
origin is incapable of rendering objective
and fair justice. The action of the Court
simply means that the nature of the
cases calls for en banc attention and
consideration.
b. Court of Appeals
i. B. P. 129, Sec. 9 (as as amended by R. A. 7902)

See above
ii.

1987 Constitution, Art. VIII.5.e

SC Jurisdiction: All cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved.

iii. Rule 43.1, 2

Section 1.

Scope. This Rule shall apply to

appeals from judgments or final orders of the

Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions. Among these agencies are the
Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land
Registration
Authority,
Social
Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform
under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission,
Agricultural
Invention
Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.
Section 2.
Cases not covered. This Rule
shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines. (n)
iv. St. Martins Funeral Home v. NLRC (G.R. No.
130866, Sept 16, 1998)
While we do not wish to intrude into the
Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom
of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of
labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not
being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained
to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of
unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the
Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that
purpose, aside from the increased number of its
component divisions; and that there is undeniably
an imperative need for expeditious action on labor
cases as a major aspect of constitutional
protection to labor.
a) A.M. No. 99-2-01-SC

In light of the decision in St. Martin

Funeral Homes v. NLRC (G.R. No.
130866, 16 September 1998), all special
civil actions arising out of any decision
or final resolution or order of the
National Labor Relations Commission
filed with the Court after 01 June 1999
shall no longer be referred to the Court
of Appeals, but shall forthwith be
DISMISSED.

v.

A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC

AMENDMENTS TO RULES 41, 45, 58 AND 65 OF
THE RULES OF COURT
Important point: filing of appeals and provisional
remedies with CA (wag diretso SC)

vi. Rule 47
Annulment of Judgments of Final Orders and
Resolutions
Rule 47 governs the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts
(Sec. 1, Rule 47, Rules of Court)
action for annulment of judgment - a remedy in
law independent of the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose
of such action is to have the final and executory
judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal
of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner, and is based on only two
grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or
denial of due process.
c. Regional Trial Courts
i. B. P. 129 (as amended by R.A. 7691)
a) in ordinary civil actions B.P. 129, sec. 19;
R.A. 7691, sec. 1, 5; SC Admin. Circular 0994 (June 14, 1994); R.A. 7691
1) Good Development v. Tutaan (G.R. No.
L-41641, September 30, 1976)
2) Pantranco North Express, et al. v.
Standard Insurance, et al. (G.R. No.
140746, March 16, 2005)
3) Sante, et al. v. Claravall, et al. (G.R.
No. 173915, February 22, 2010)
4) Tumpag v. Tumpag (G.R. No. 199133,
September 29, 2014)
5) Central Bank v. CA (G.R. No. 88353,
May 8, 1992; 208 SCRA 652 Read
esp. pp. 654-656; 661-665; 673, last
par. 677, par. after quote; 679-683)
6) Olivarez Realty v. Castillo (G.R. No.
196251, July 9, 2014)
7) Cruz v. Tan (G.R. No. L-3448.
November 27, 1950)
8) Baito v. Sarmiento (G.R. No. L-13105,
August 25, 1960)
9) Manufacturers Distributors v. Yu Siu
Liong (G.R. No. L-21285, April 29,
1966))

b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)

10) Lapitan v. Scandia (G.R. No. L24668, July 31, 1968)

11) Ascue v. CA (G.R. No. 84330, May
8, 1991)
12) Home Guaranty v. R-II Builders
(G.R. No. 192649, June 22, 2011)
13) Indophil Textile v. Engr. Adviento
(G.R. No. 171212. August 4, 2014)
in special civil actions and the special
proceeding of habeas corpus B.P. 129,
sec. 21
exclusive appellate jurisdiction B.P. 129,
sec. 22
special jurisdiction B.P. 129, sec. 23; Rule
1, sec. 4; Rule 143
SC Cir. No. 11-99 (transfer to RTC from MTC
of cases within the jurisdiction of family
courts under R.A. 8369)
RA No. 8799, sec. 5.2
1) Matling Industrial v. Coros (G.R. No.
157802, October 13, 2010)
Rule 47

d. Metropolitan, Municipal, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts

i. Rule 5.2
ii. B.P. 129, sec. 28, 29, 30, 31, as am. by R.A. 7691
a) P.D. 537; Administrative Order No. 33 (June
13, 1978)
iii. A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC (December 16, 2015), sec. 2,
5, 8
iv. in civil and estate settlement proceedings/over
provisional remedies
a) B.P. 129, sec. 33 (1); R.A. 7691, sec. 3 & 5
b) SC Admin. Circular 09-94 (June 4, 1994)
v. in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
a) B.P. 129, sec. 33 (2); R.A. 7691, sec. 3
b) Lim v. CA (G.R. No. 93451, March 18,
1991)
vi. in civil actions involving title to or possession of
real property
a) B.P. 129, sec. 33 (3) as am. by R.A. 7691,
sec. 3
b) Russel v. Vestil (G.R. No. 119347, March
17, 1999)
vii. delegated jurisdiction
a) B.P. 129, sec. 34
b) R.A. 7691, sec. 4
c) SC Circular 38-97 (June 20, 1997)
viii. special jurisdiction B.P. 129, sec. 35
ix. summary procedure in special cases B.P. 129,
sec. 36