Union Pac. RR Co. v. Weld County, 247 U.S. 282 (1918)
Union Pac. RR Co. v. Weld County, 247 U.S. 282 (1918)
247 U.S.
282
38 S.Ct. 510
62 L.Ed. 1110
UNION PAC. R. CO.
v.
BOARD OF COM'RS OF WELD COUNTY, COLORADO, et
al.
No. 22.
Argued Nov. 15, 1916.
Decided June 3, 1918.
Messrs. Clayton C. Dorsey, of Denver, Colo., and N. H. Loomis, of
Omaha, Neb., for appellant.
Mr. Charles F. Tew, of Greeley, Colo., for appellees.
Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit by the Union Pacific Railroad Company to enjoin the collection of
a portion of the taxes levied on its property in Weld county, Colorado, in a
particular year, the gravamen of the complaint being that the company's
property was assessed at one-third of its value, while most of the other property
was assessed at one-fifth and some not at all, and that this operated to place an
undue burden of taxation on the company contrary to the Constitution and laws
of the state and to the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. A portion of the taxes was conceded to be valid and
was paid. The portion in dispute amounts to $31,127.37. An application for a
temporary injunction, submitted on affidavits and other proofs, was denied by
the District Court, and that interlocutory order was affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals (217 Fed. 540, 133 C. C. A. 392; 222 Fed. 651, 138 C. C. A.
175), both courts being of opinion that relief by injunction was not admissible
because there was a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. While that
view might have resulted in a final decree dismissing the bill, such a decree was
neither entered in the District Court nor directed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. In other words, an amendment of the bill and further proceedings were
not precluded.
An appeal to his court from the affirmance of the District Court's interlocutory
order was allowed, but the appeal is without statutory sanction and must be
dismissed. Anticipating that this might be so, the company presented a petition
for a writ of certiorari under section 262 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3,
1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1162 [Comp. St. 1916, 1239])see McClellan v.
Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 30 Sup. Ct. 501, 54 L. Ed. 762; United States v. Beatty,
232 U. S. 463, 467, 34 Sup. Ct. 392, 58 L. Ed. 686; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley
R. R. Co., 234 U. S. 749, 34 Sup. Ct. 674, 58 L. Ed. 1576consideration of
which was postponed to the hearing on the appeal. We now grant the petition
and treat the record on the appeal as the return to the writ. See Farrell v.
O'Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 101, 25 Sup. Ct. 727, 50 L. Ed. 101; White-Smith Music
Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1, 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 319, 52 L. Ed. 655, 14 Ann. Cas.
628.
For many years the revenue laws of Colorado have contained a section 1
imposing on the board of county commissioners 'in all cases' the duty of
refunding to the taxpayer 'without abatement or discount' 'any tax, interest or
costs, or any part thereof,' which is found to have been 'erroneous or illegal,'
and by a necessary implication conferring on him a correlative and substantive
right to have the same so refunded. Laws 1870, p. 123, 106; 2 Mills Ann.
Stat. 3777; Laws 1902, c. 3, 202; Rev. Stat. 1908, 5750; Prico v. Kramer,
4 Colo. 546, 555; Woodward v. Ellsworth, 4 Colo. 580, 581; Hallett v.
Arapahoe County, 40 Colo. 308, 318, 90 Pac. 678; County Commissioners of
Bent County v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., 52 Colo. 609, 612-614, 125 Pac. 528. If
that section is still in force, unqualified and unmodified, the conclusion below
that in this case there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, and
therefore that relief by injunction is not admissible, is fully sustained by our
decisions. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481, 33 Sup. Ct.
942, 57 L. Ed. 1288, and cases there cited; Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Board of
Public Works, 172 U. S. 32, 19 Sup. Ct. 90, 43 L. Ed. 354; Arkansas Building
and Loan Ass'n v. Madden, 175 U. S. 269, 20 Sup. Ct. 119, 44 L. Ed. 159;
Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, 38, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, 52 L.
Ed. 78, 12 Ann. Cas. 757; Johnson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 239 U. S. 234, 243,
36 Sup. Ct. 62, 60 L. Ed. 243; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. R. Co., 244
U. S. 499, 519, 37 Sup. Ct. 673, 61 L. Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88.
That the taxes were levied for state, school district and town, as well as for
county, purposes is not material; for it is apparent from the Colorado statutes
and decisions that the section covers broadly the whole of the tax that is found
to have been erroneous or illegal, regardless of the purpose for which it was
levied and placed on the county tax roll. And it also is immaterial that the taxes
were made a lien on the company's real property, for the lien would be
effectually removed by paying them and suing to recover back the money.
Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 658, 661, 11 Sup. Ct. 682, 35 L.
Ed. 303; Arkansas Building and Loan Ass'n v. Madden, supra, 175 U. S. 273,
20 Sup. Ct. 119, 44 L. Ed. 159.
5
Whether the section named is still in force, unqualified and unmodified, is the
important question. If not in force, a single action at law would not suffice, for
then it would be necessary to bring a separate action against each of several
school districts and towns for its part of the tax. See Raymond v. Chicago
Union Traction Co., supra, 207 U. S. 39, 40, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, 52 L. Ed. 78, 12
Ann. Cas. 757. And if the section has been so qualified and modified that the
continued existence of the right originally conferred on the taxpayer is involved
in uncertainty, an essential element of the requisite remedy at law is wanting;
for, as this court has said:
'It is a settled principle of equity jurisprudence that, if the remedy at law be
doubtful, a court of equity will not decline cognizance of the suit. * * * Where
equity can give relief, plaintiff ought not to be compelled to speculate upon the
chance of his obtaining relief at law.' Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 680, 688, 15
Sup. Ct. 555, 39 L. Ed. 578.
In 1911 Colorado established a state tax commission and conferred on it
extensive supervisory powers over the administration of the revenue laws of the
state, including the acts of assessors and boards of county commissioners. Laws
1911, c. 216. And in 1913, before the pres nt suit was begun, the state adopted
a statute extending the powers of the commission and repealing 'all acts or parts
of acts in conflict' therewith. Laws 1913, c. 134. The fifth section of that act
says:
'No abatement, rebate or refund of taxes shall be allowed by the county
commissioners, unless a hearing shall be had thereon and a notice of such
hearing and an opportunity to be present being [be] first given to the assessor,
and in case any abatement, rebate or refund of taxes shall be recommended by
said county commissioners, they shall certify to the Colorado tax commission
their findings, giving the amount of such abatement, rebate or refund, and their
reasons therefor, and such abatement, rebate or refund shall become effective
upon the indorsement thereon of the approval of the Colorado tax commission
and in case the said Colorado tax commission shall disapprove the
recommendation of the county commissioners, they shall indorse their
disapproval thereon and return it to the county commissioners with a statement
of their reasons therefor and no abatement, rebate or refund of taxes shall be
allowed by the said board of county commissioners if the application is
disapproved by the said Colorado tax commission.'
9
Counsel differ widely respecting the effect of this statute on the earlier section
(section 5750, Rev. Stat. 1908) and on the substantive right given by it to have
an erroneous or illegal tax refunded. On the one hand it is said that neither the
earlier section nor the right thereby conferred is in any wise affected, and that
one paying an erroneous or illegal tax still may call on the county board to
refund it and, if the application be refused, has a right of action to compel the
board to refund. On the other hand, it is said that the new statute qualifies and
modifies the earlier section by restricting the power and duty of the county
board to refund to instances in which the state tax commission approves the
application, and that the correlative right of the taxpayer under the earlier
sectionthe right impliedly arising out of the duty imposed on the county
boardis qualified and modified accordingly; in other words, that the new
statute prohibits any refunding of taxes by the county board save in instances
having the approval of the state commission and that in other instances it
operates to withdraw from the taxpayer all right of action against the county
board under the earlier section.
10
An examination of the new statute shows that the controversy just outlined is
not without some real basis and that its solution is not free from difficulty. The
question is purely one of state law, and, so far as we are advised, the Supreme
Court of the state has not passed on or considered it. A ruling by us on the
question would neither settle it for that court nor be binding in an action to
recover the tax if paid. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the
company certainly or plainly has an adequate and complete remedy at law. On
the contrary, the existence of such a remedy is debatable and uncertain. And
this being so, the situation is not one in which cognizance of the present suit
properly can be declined.
11
With the question of equitable jurisdiction out of the way, the District Court
should dispose of the application for a temporary injunction on the merits and
otherwise proceed with the suit in regular course. The controverted questions of
fact arising on that application have not been considered by us and we intimate
no opinion respecting them. Such questions are rarely, if ever, regarded as
properly subject to examination here on writ of certiorari.
12
Appeal dismissed; certiorari granted, record on appeal to stand as return to writ;
decrees below reversed and cause remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
'* * * And in all cases where any person shall pay any tax, interest or costs, or
any portion thereof, that shall thereafter be found to be erroneous or illegal, whe
her the same be owing to erroneous assessment, to improper or irregular
levying of the tax, or clerical or other errors or irregularities, the board of
county commissioners shall refund the same without abatement or discount to
the taxpayer.'
