500 U.S.

646
111 S.Ct. 2096
114 L.Ed.2d 691

Janice G. CLARK, et al., Appellants

v.
Charles "Buddy" ROEMER, Governor of Louisiana, et al.
No. 90-952.
Argued April 22, 1991.
Decided June 3, 1991.

Syllabus
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires covered jurisdictions
to obtain either judicial preclearance from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia or administrative preclearance from the
United States Attorney General before implementing new voting
practices, in order to prevent changes that have a discriminatory purpose
or effect. Appellants, black registered voters and a voting rights
organization in Louisiana, filed suit in the District Court, challenging the
validity of Louisiana's electoral scheme for certain judges under, inter
alia, 5. In response to their 1987 amended complaint alleging that a
number of statutory and constitutional changes, many of which were
adopted in the late 1960's and 1970's, had not been precleared under 5,
Louisiana submitted all of the unprecleared voting changes for
administrative preclearance. In June 1990, after the Attorney General had
objected to preclearance for some changes, including the creation of
several judgeships, Louisiana asked him to reconsider and proceeded with
plans to hold fall elections for all of the seats. The District Court denied
appellants' motion to enjoin the elections for the unprecleared seats, but
enjoined the winners from taking office pending its further orders. In
October, the court, noting that some of the judgeships to which the
Attorney General now objected were in districts where the State had
obtained administrative preclearance for later-created judgeships, ruled
that the Attorney General had precleared the earlier judgeships when he
precleared the later, or related, voting changes. The court also refused to
enjoin elections for those judgeships that it found were subject to valid
objections by the Attorney General and violated 5, holding that the

winners could take office, pending judicial preclearance.

Held:
1. The District Court erred by not enjoining elections for judgeships to
which the Attorney General interposed valid objections. Section 5
requires preclearance. Without it, a voting change will not be effective as
law, Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656, 95 S.Ct. 2003, 44 L.Ed.2d 486, and
is unenforceable, Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 269, 102 S.Ct. 2421,
2430, 72 L.Ed.2d 824. Moreover, 5 plaintiffs are entitled to an
injunction prohibiting a State from implementing changes that have not
been precleared, Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572, 89
S.Ct. 817, 835, 22 L.Ed.2d 1. The court's reasons for refusing to enjoin the
elections lack merit. Appellants displayed no lack of diligence in
challenging the elections, and every participant in the process knew for
over three years that the challenged seats were unprecleared. Nor was
5's applicability to judges uncertain until 1990, since this Court issued a
summary affirmance of a decision holding that 5 applied to judges in
1986, Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410, aff'd mem., 477 U.S. 901, 106
S.Ct. 3268, 91 L.Ed.2d 559. The court's concern about the potential for
voter confusion and low voter turnout in a special election for the
unprecleared seats did not justify its position, since voters may be more
confused and inclined to avoid the polls when an election is held in
conceded violation of federal law. Moreover, the court's stated purpose to
avoid possible challenges to civil and criminal judgments counsels in
favor of enjoining the illegal elections, thus averting a federal challenge to
state judgments. This Court's decisions dealing with the ex post question
whether to set aside illegal elections, see, e.g., Perkins v. Matthews, 400
U.S. 379, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27 L.Ed.2d 476, are inapposite to the instant case,
which addresses the ex ante question whether to allow illegal elections to
be held at all. And it is not necessary to decide here whether there are
instances in which a court may deny a motion for an injunction and allow
an election to go forward. Pp. 652-655.
2. The State's failure to preclear certain earlier voting changes under 5
was not cured by the Attorney General's preclearance of later, or related,
voting changes. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 104 S.Ct. 1037, 79
L.Ed.2d 271, made clear that the submission of legislation for
administrative preclearance under 5 defines the preclearance request's
scope. Normally, a submission pertains only to identified changes in that
legislation, and any ambiguity in the request's scope must be resolved
against the submitting authority. A submission's description of the change
from one number of judges to another in a particular judicial district does

not, by itself, constitute a submission to the Attorney General of the prior

voting changes incorporated in the newly amended statute. The
requirement that a State identify each change is necessary for the Attorney
General to perform his preclearance duties, since otherwise he would have
to add to his redoubtable obligations the additional duty to research each
submission to ensure that all earlier unsubmitted changes had been
brought. Here, Louisiana's submissions of contemporary legislation to the
Attorney General failed as a matter of law to put him on notice that the
prior unsubmitted changes were included. Pp. 655-659.
3. Appellants' request that the elections held for the seats in question be
set aside and the judges be removed is not a proper matter for this Court to
consider in the first instance. Pp. 659-660.
751 F.Supp. 586 (M.D.La.1990), reversed and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Robert B. McDuff, for appellants.
James A. Feldman, for U.S., as amicus curiae, supporting appellants, by
special leave of Court.
Robert G. Pugh, Jr., for appellees.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises two issues under 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat.
439, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973c.

* The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq., contains two major
provisions governing discrimination in election practices. Section 2 addresses
existing election procedures. It prohibits procedures that "resul[t] in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color. . . ." 1973(a). Section 5 governs changes in voting
procedures. In order to prevent changes that have a discriminatory purpose or
effect, 5 requires covered jurisdictions, such as Louisiana, to obtain
preclearance by one of two methods before implementing new voting practices.
1973c. Through judicial preclearance, a covered jurisdiction may obtain from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia a declaratory
judgment that the voting change "does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."

Ibid. Through administrative preclearance, the jurisdiction may submit the

change to the Attorney General of the United States. If the Attorney General
"has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission," the
State may enforce the change. Ibid.
3

Appellants are black registered voters and a voting rights organization in

Louisiana. They filed this suit in 1986 under 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, challenging the validity of Louisiana's multimember, at large electoral
scheme for certain appellate, district, and family court judges. Under 2,
appellants alleged that Louisiana's electoral scheme diluted minority voting
strength. In an amended complaint filed in July 1987, appellants also alleged
that Louisiana violated 5 by failing to submit for preclearance a number of
statutory and constitutional voting changes, many of them adopted in the late
1960's and 1970's. The 2 portion of the case was assigned to a single District
Court Judge; the 5 allegations were heard by a three-judge District Court, 42
U.S.C. 1973c; 28 U.S.C. 2284.

In response to the appellants' 5 allegations, Louisiana submitted all of the

unprecleared voting changes for administrative preclearance. In September
1988 and May 1989, the Attorney General granted preclearance for some of the
changes, but objected to others. On June 18 and 20, 1990, Louisiana asked the
Attorney General to reconsider his denial of preclearance for these seats, and
proceeded with plans to hold elections for them in the fall of 1990. On July 23,
1990, petitioners filed a motion asking the three-judge District Court to enjoin
the elections for the unprecleared seats.

On August 15, 1990, the District Court presiding over the 2 case enjoined the
State from holding elections in 11 judicial districts which it determined violated
2. Some of these judicial districts were also at issue in the 5 portion of the
case. On September 28, 1990, the three-judge District Court presiding over the
5 case denied appellants' motion to enjoin the State from holding elections for
the seats not blocked by the 2 injunction. The three-judge panel, however, did
enjoin the winning candidates from taking office pending its further orders.

Also on September 28, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en banc, held that judges are not representatives for purposes of
2 of the Voting Rights Act. League of the United Latin American Citizens
Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (1990), cert. granted, 498 U.S. ---, 111 S.Ct. 775, 112 L.Ed.2d 838 (1991). Based on this precedent, the District
Court Judge presiding over the 2 aspect of the case dissolved the 2
injunction on October 2 and ordered that elections for the 11 districts be held
on November 6 and December 8, 1990. On the same day, the three-judge

District Court presiding over the 5 case refused to enjoin the elections for the
unprecleared seats, but it again enjoined the winning candidates from taking
office pending its further orders. As of October 2, 1990, then, Louisiana had
scheduled elections for all of the judgeships to which the Attorney General had
interposed objections.
7

In an October 22 order and an October 31 opinion, the three-judge District

Court made its final pronouncement on the status of the unprecleared
judgeships. The court divided the unprecleared electoral changes into two
categories. Category one involved at-large judgeships in districts where, for the
most part, the State had obtained administrative preclearance for later-created
judgeships. The three-judge District Court held that, despite his current
objections, the Attorney General had precleared the earlier judgeships when he
precleared the later, or related, voting changes. For example, the First Judicial
District Court in Caddo Parish has a number of judgeships, called Divisions,
subject to 5. Louisiana submitted and obtained approval for Divisions E
(created in 1966, precleared in 1986), G (created and precleared in 1976), H
(created and precleared in 1978), and I (created and precleared in 1982).
Division F was not submitted for approval when it was created in 1973; rather,
it was submitted and objected to in 1988. The three-judge District Court held,
however, that when the Attorney General precleared Divisions G, H, and I, he
also precleared Division F. The court reasoned that because the legislation
creating Divisions G, H, and I added to the number of prior judgeships in
Caddo Parish, including Division F, approval of the legislation constituted
approval of Division F. 751 F.Supp. 586, 592, and n. 35 (M.D.La.1990)

Category two under the court's ruling involved judgeships subject to valid
objections by the Attorney General. Yet despite its holding that these
unprecleared judgeships violated 5, the court refused to enjoin the elections.
It found "the potential harm to all of the citizens of Louisiana [from such an
injunction] outweigh[ed] the potential harm, if any, of allowing the elections to
continue." Id., at 595. It allowed the election to proceed under the following
conditions. The winning candidates could take office if, within 90 days,
Louisiana filed a judicial preclearance action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia or persuaded the Attorney General to withdraw his
objections. The winners of the election could remain in office pending judicial
preclearance, and could retain office for the remainder of their terms if the
State obtained judicial preclearance. If the State failed to obtain judicial
preclearance, the installed candidates could remain in office only 150 days after
final judgment by the District Court.

On October 29, 1990, appellants filed an emergency application in this Court to

enjoin the November 6 and December 8 elections pending appeal. On

November 2, we granted the application in part and enjoined the elections for
the judgeships that the District Court conceded were uncleared. Clark v.
Roemer, 498 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 376, 112 L.Ed.2d 390, modified, 498 U.S. ----,
111 S.Ct. 399, 112 L.Ed.2d 391 (1990). We did not overturn the District
Court's refusal to enjoin elections for the judgeships that it considered
precleared by implication. Ibid.
10

On January 18, 1991, we noted probable jurisdiction. 498 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct.
775, 112 L.Ed.2d 838. The next day, the State sought judicial preclearance for
the electoral changes that the three-judge District Court found to be uncleared.
That action is still pending in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.

II
11

The case presents two discrete issues under 5 of the Voting Rights Act. First,
we must decide whether the District Court erred by not enjoining elections held
for judgeships to which the Attorney General interposed valid 5 objections.
Second, we must determine whether the State's failure to preclear certain earlier
voting changes under 5 was cured by the Attorney General's preclearance of
later, or related, voting changes.

A.
12

The District Court held that the Attorney General had interposed valid
objections to some judgeships. Nonetheless, it permitted elections for those
seats to go forward and allowed the winners to take office pending resolution of
Louisiana's judicial preclearance request. This ruling was error.

13

Section 5 requires States to obtain either judicial or administrative preclearance

before implementing a voting change. A voting change in a covered jurisdiction
"will not be effective as la[w] until and unless cleared" pursuant to one of these
two methods. Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656, 95 S.Ct. 2003, 44 L.Ed.2d 486
(1975) (per curiam). See also United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren
County, 429 U.S. 642, 645, 97 S.Ct. 833, 834, 51 L.Ed.2d 106 (1977) ("No new
voting practice or procedure may be enforced unless the State or political
subdivision has succeeded in its declaratory judgment action or the Attorney
General has declined to object"). Failure to obtain either judicial or
administrative preclearance "renders the change unenforceable." Hathorn v.
Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 269, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 2430, 72 L.Ed.2d 824 (1982). If
voting changes subject to 5 have not been precleared, 5 plaintiffs are

entitled to an injunction prohibiting the State from implementing the changes.

Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572, 89 S.Ct. 817, 835, 22
L.Ed.2d 1 (1969).
14

The District Court ignored these principles altogether. It presented a number of

reasons for not enjoining the election, none of which we find persuasive. The
court cited the short time between election day and the most recent request for
injunction, the fact that qualifying and absentee voting had begun, and the time
and expense of the candidates. But the parties, the District Court, and the
candidates had been on notice of the alleged 5 violations since appellants filed
their July 1987 amended complaint. When Louisiana asked the Attorney
General for reconsideration of its original preclearance decision in June 1990, it
became apparent that the State intended to hold elections for the unprecleared
seats in the fall of the same year. Less than a month later, and more than two
months before the scheduled October 6, 1990, election, appellants filed a
motion to enjoin elections for the unprecleared seats. Appellants displayed no
lack of diligence in challenging elections for the unprecleared seats, and every
participant in the process knew for over three years that the challenged seats
were unprecleared, in violation of 5.

15

The other reasons for the District Court's decision lack merit as well. The
District Court maintained that the applicability of 5 to judges was uncertain
until our summary affirmance in Brooks v. Georgia State Board of Elections,
1989 WL 180759, aff'd mem., 498 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 288, 112 L.Ed.2d 243
(1990). But in Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410 (EDNC 1985), aff'd mem., 477
U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3268, 91 L.Ed.2d 559 (1986), we issued a summary
affirmance of a decision holding that 5 applied to judges. Nor did the District
Court's vague concerns about voter confusion and low voter turnout in a special
election for the unprecleared seats justify its refusal to enjoin the illegal
elections. Voters may be more confused and inclined to avoid the polls when
an election is held in conceded violation of federal law. Finally, the District
Court's stated purpose to avoid possible challenges to criminal and civil
judgments does not justify allowing the invalid elections to take place. To the
contrary, this concern counsels in favor of enjoining the illegal elections, thus
averting a federal challenge to state judgments.

16

The three-judge District Court, 751 F.Supp., at 595, maintained that its decision
to give provisional effect to elections conducted in violation of 5 "closely
parallel[ed]" a number of our decisions, including Perkins v. Matthews, 400
U.S. 379, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971), NAACP v. Hampton County
Election Commission, 470 U.S. 166, 105 S.Ct. 1128, 84 L.Ed.2d 124 (1985),
Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 98 S.Ct. 2692, 57 L.Ed.2d 693 (1978), and

Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 93 S.Ct. 1702, 36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973).
The cases are inapposite. Perkins stated that "[i]n certain circumstances . . . it
might be appropriate to enter an order affording local officials an opportunity to
seek federal approval and ordering a new election only if local officials fail to
do so or if the required federal approval is not forthcoming." 400 U.S., at 396397, 91 S.Ct., at 441. But in Perkins, as in Hampton County, Berry, and
Georgia, the elections in question had been held already; the only issue was
whether to remove the elected individuals pending preclearance. Here the
District Court did not face the ex post question whether to set aside illegal
elections; rather, it faced the ex ante question whether to allow illegal elections
to be held at all. On these premises, 5's prohibition against implementation of
unprecleared changes required the District Court to enjoin the election. This is
especially true because, unlike the circumstance in Perkins, Hampton County,
Berry, or Georgia, the Attorney General interposed objections before the
election.
17

We need not decide today whether there are cases in which a District Court
may deny a 5 plaintiff's motion for injunction and allow an election for an
unprecleared seat to go forward. An extreme circumstance might be present if a
seat's unprecleared status is not drawn to the attention of the State until the eve
of the election and there are equitable principles that justify allowing the
election to proceed. No such exigency exists here. The State of Louisiana failed
to preclear these judgeships as required by 5. It received official notice of the
defect in July 1987, and yet three years later it had still failed to file for judicial
preclearance, the "basic mechanism" for preclearance, United States v. Sheffield
Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 136, 98 S.Ct. 965, 981, 55 L.Ed.2d 148
(1978). It scheduled elections for the unprecleared seats in the fall of 1990 even
after the Attorney General had interposed objections under 5. In short, by the
fall 1990 election, Louisiana had with consistency ignored the mandate of 5.
The District Court should have enjoined the elections.

B
18

The District Court held also that the Attorney General's preclearance of voting
change legislation in some districts operated to preclear earlier voting changes
in those districts, even though the Attorney General now objects to the earlier
changes. This ruling conflicts with our decision in McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S.
236, 104 S.Ct. 1037, 79 L.Ed.2d 271 (1984), and subverts the efficacy of
administrative preclearance under 5.

19

McCain involved a 1966 South Carolina statute establishing a three-member

county council elected at large by all county voters and requiring candidates to

reside in and run from one of three residency districts. The State failed to
preclear the 1966 statute. In 1971, the State amended the statute to increase the
number of residency districts and county council members from three to five,
and submitted the new Act for preclearance. Based on a request by the
Attorney General for additional information, South Carolina also submitted a
copy of the 1966 Act. The Attorney General declined to interpose any objection
"to the change in question." Id., at 241, 104 S.Ct., at 1041. In a later 5
challenge to the 1966 changes, a District Court held that the Attorney General's
request for additional information indicated that he considered and approved all
aspects of the electoral scheme subject to the 1971 amendments, including the
changes effected by the 1966 Act. In the alternative, the District Court held that
since the 1971 Amendment retained or incorporated changes effected by the
1966 Act, the lack of objection to the 1971 submission constituted approval of
the 1966 Act.
20

We reversed both holdings. We made clear that the submission of legislation

for administrative preclearance under 5 defines the scope of the preclearance
request. Under normal circumstances, a submission pertains only to identified
changes in that legislation. Id., at 251, 257, 104 S.Ct., at 1046, 1049. We
established also that any ambiguity in the scope of a preclearance request must
be resolved against the submitting authority. Ibid. Applying these standards, we
held that the three-judge District Court's finding that the Attorney General had
considered and approved the changes made by the 1966 Act in the course of
approving the 1971 amendment was clearly erroneous, because the information
submitted was limited to election changes effected by the 1971 amendments.

21

We held further that the District Court erred as a matter of law in determining
that approval of the 1971 submission was also an approval of the changes in the
1966 statute. We explained that "the preclearance procedures mandated by 5 .
. . focus entirely on changes in election practices," id., at 251, 104 S.Ct., at
1046, and that "submission of a particular change does not encompass all prior
changesprecleared or notthat have been made since the Act's effective date
. . .," id., at 255, n. 26, 104 S.Ct., at 1048, n. 26.

22

"When a jurisdiction adopts legislation that makes clearly defined changes in

its election practices, sending that legislation to the Attorney General merely
with a general request for preclearance pursuant to Section 5 constitutes a
submission of the changes made by the enactment and cannot be deemed a
submission of changes made by previous legislation which themselves were
independently subject to Section 5 preclearance." Id., at 256, 104 S.Ct., at 1049.

23

The three-judge District Court in the instant case reasoned as follows in ruling

that submission and approval of the later electoral changes constituted

submission and approval of the earlier changes:
24

"[W]e find that there was express approval by the Attorney General for those
judicial positions set forth in Part I of our October 22, 1990, order. The
language of the various acts submitted to the Attorney General, as well as the
letters submitted by the State of Louisiana seeking preclearance, support this
conclusion. Thus, the change submitted to the Attorney General is not only the
Amendment, but the entire act as passed by the legislature. When the Attorney
General approves the new act, he not only approves the amended portion but
necessarily approves the older, reenacted part, which forms part of the new act.
Thus, when an act provides for a certain number of judicial positions, approval
of that act must include all of the judicial positions necessary to reach that
number." 751 F.Supp., at 592-593 (footnotes omitted).

25

And in a footnote, the court explained that the submission of the later Acts
covered the earlier Acts as well because "in most cases the letter of submission
clearly and expressly states that the number of judges in a particular district is
being increased from one number to another." Id., at 592-593, n. 38. On this
basis alone, the District Court distinguished McCain. 751 F.Supp., at 592-593,
n. 38.

26

The District Court's explanation for its holding replicates the precise factual
and legal errors we identified in McCain. Its ruling that preclearance "not only
approves the amended portion of the new act but necessarily approves the
older, reenacted part, which forms part of the new act" is inconsistent with
McCain. McCain establishes a presumption that the Attorney General will
review only the current changes in election practices effected by the submitted
legislation, not prior unprecleared changes reenacted in the amended
legislation. A submission's description of the change from one number of
judges to another in a particular judicial district does not, by itself, constitute a
submission to the Attorney General of the prior voting changes incorporated in
the newly amended statute. "A request for preclearance of certain identified
changes in election practices which fails to identify other practices as new ones
thus cannot be considered an adequate submission of the latter practices." 465
U.S., at 256-257, 104 S.Ct., at 1049. Of course, a State may include earlier
unprecleared changes as a specific submission along with its preclearance
request for contemporary legislation. But it must identify with specificity each
change that it wishes the Attorney General to consider.

27

The requirement that the State identify each change is necessary if the Attorney
General is to perform his preclearance duties under 5. The Attorney General

has substantial responsibilities under 5. The Attorney General represents to us

that he reviews an average of 17,000 electoral changes each year, and that
within the 60-day preclearance period, he must for each change analyze
demographics, voting patterns, and other local conditions to make the statutory
judgment concerning the presence of a discriminatory purpose or effect. Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 22, n. 18. Congress recognized that the
Attorney General could not, in addition to these duties, also monitor and
identify each voting change in each jurisdiction subject to 5. "[B]ecause of the
acknowledged and anticipated inability of the Justice Departmentgiven
limited resourcesto investigate independently all changes with respect to
voting enacted by States and subdivisions covered by the Act," 465 U.S., at
247, 104 S.Ct., at 1044-1045, Congress required each jurisdiction subject to
5, as a condition to implementation of a voting change subject to the Act, to
identify, submit, and receive approval for all such changes. The District Court's
holding upsets this ordering of responsibilities under 5, for it would add to the
Attorney General's already redoubtable obligations the additional duty to
research each submission to ensure that all earlier unsubmitted changes had
been brought to light. Such a rule would diminish covered jurisdictions'
responsibilities for self-monitoring under 5 and would create incentives for
them to forgo the submission process altogether. We reaffirm McCain in
rejecting this vision of 5.
28

In light of its legal errors, the District Court's finding that the Attorney General
"expressly approved" the prior uncleared changes cannot stand. Neither the
initial submission nor the Attorney General's ruling upon it can be deemed to
include the earlier unprecleared seats. Louisiana's submissions of contemporary
legislation to the Attorney General failed as a matter of law to put him on notice
that the prior unsubmitted changes were included. None of the submissions
informed the Attorney General that prior voting changes were uncleared and
were being transmitted along with the new changes. In most instances,
Louisiana submitted only the legislation containing the new voting change. The
record contains five submission letters, but these communications do not give
requisite notice. Two were mere cover letters that added nothing to the
submitted legislation. The other three letters note changes in the number of
judges in a District, but as we have explained, this alone does not constitute a
submission of the prior uncleared changes. In light of these legal errors and the
presumption that "any ambiguity in the scope of the preclearance request" must
be construed against the submitting jurisdiction, id., at 257, 104 S.Ct., at 1050,
"we are left with the definite and firm conviction," id., at 258, 104 S.Ct., at
1050, that the court erred in finding that the Attorney General gave express
approval to the earlier changes.

29

Appellants request that we set aside the elections held for these seats and
remove the judges from office. This is not a proper matter for us to consider in
the first instance. "[A] local district court is in a better position than this Court
to fashion relief, because the district court 'is more familiar with the nuances of
the local situation' and has the opportunity to hear evidence." Hathorn v.
Lovorn, 457 U.S., at 270, 102 S.Ct., at 2431, quoting Perkins v. Matthews, 400
U.S., at 397, 91 S.Ct., at 441. In fashioning its decree granting relief, the
district court should adopt a remedy that in all the circumstances of the case
implements the mandate of 5 in the most equitable and practicable manner
and with least offense to its provisions.

30

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

31

It is so ordered.