498 U.S.

479
111 S.Ct. 888
112 L.Ed.2d 1005

Gene McNARY, Commissioner of Immigration and

Naturalization, et al., Petitioners,
v.
HAITIAN REFUGEE CENTER, INC., et al.
No. 89-1332.
Argued Oct. 29, 1990.
Decided Feb. 20, 1991.

Syllabus
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Reform Act) amended
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) creating, inter alia, a "Special
Agricultural Workers" (SAW) amnesty program for specified alien
farmworkers. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
determined SAW status eligibility based on evidence presented at a
personal interview with each applicant. Section 210(e)(1) of the INA
barred judicial review "of a determination respecting an application"
except in the context of judicial review of a deportation order, a review
conducted by the courts of appeals. Respondents, the Haitian Refugee
Center and unsuccessful individual SAW applicants, filed a class action in
the District Court, alleging that the initial application review process was
conducted in an arbitrary manner in violation of the Reform Act and the
applicants' due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. While
recognizing that individual aliens could not obtain judicial review of
denials of their SAW status applications except in deportation proceedings
in the courts of appeals, the District Court accepted jurisdiction because
the complaint did not challenge any individual determination of any
application for SAW status, but rather contained allegations about the
manner in which the entire program was being implemented. The court
found that a number of INS practices violated the Reform Act and were
unconstitutional, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The District Court had federal-question jurisdiction to hear
respondents' constitutional and statutory challenges to the INS procedures.

Pp. 895-899.
(a) There is no clear congressional language mandating preclusion of
jurisdiction. Section 210(e)(1)'s language prohibiting judicial review "of a
determination respecting an application " refers to the process of direct
review of individual denials of SAW status, not to general collateral
challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the INS in
processing applications. The reference to "a determination" describes a
single act, as does the language of 210(e)(3), which provides for
"judicial review of such a denial." Section 210(e)(3)(B), which specifies
that judicial review is to be based on the administrative record and thatfac
tual determinations contained in such a record shall be conclusive absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion, supports this reading. A record
emerging from the administrative appeals process does not address the
kind of procedural and constitutional claims respondents have brought,
and the abuse-of-discretion standard does not apply to constitutional or
statutory determinations, which are subject to de novo review. Limiting
judicial review of general constitutional and statutory challenges to the
provisions set forth in 210(e) therefore is not contemplated. Moreover,
had Congress intended the limited review provisions of 210(e) to
encompass challenges to INS procedures and practices, it could easily
have used broader statutory language. Pp. 491-494.
(b) As a practical matter, the individual respondents would be unable to
obtain meaningful judicial review of their application denials or of their
objections to INS procedures if they were required to avail themselves of
the INA's limited judicial review procedures. Under the statutory scheme,
review of an individual determination would be limited to the
administrative record, which respondents have alleged is inadequate;
aliens would have to surrender themselves for deportation in order to
receive any judicial review, which is tantamount to a complete denial of
such review; and a court of appeals reviewing an individual determination
would most likely not have an adequate record as to a pattern of allegedly
unconstitutional practices and would lack a district court's factfinding and
record-developing capabilities. Given this Court's well-settled
presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review
of administrative action, the Court cannot conclude that Congress so
intended to foreclose all forms of meaningful judicial review of SAW
application denials and general collateral challenges to INS procedures.
This case is therefore controlled by Bowen v. Michigan Academy of
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623, which
interpreted the Medicare statute to permit individuals to challenge a
payment regulation's validity even though the statute barred judicial

review of individual claims for payment under the regulation. Heckler v.

Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622, distinguished. Pp.
494-499.
872 F.2d 1555 (CA 11 1989), affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, and
in Parts I, II, III, and IV of which WHITE, J., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. ----.
Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.
Ira J. Kurzban, Miami, Fla., for respondents.
Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.*

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Reform Act)1 constituted a
major statutory response to the vast tide of illegal immigration that had
produced a "shadow population" of literally millions of undocumented aliens in
the United States. On the one hand, Congress sought to stem the tide by
making the plight of the undocumented alien even more onerous in the future
than it had been in the past; thus, the Reform Act imposed criminal sanctions
on employers who hired undocumented workers2 and made a number of
federally funded welfare benefits unavailable to these aliens.3 On the other
hand, in recognition that a large segment of the shadow population played a
useful and constructive role in the American economy,4 but continued to reside
in perpetual fear,5 the Reform Act established two broad amnesty programs to
allow existing undocumented aliens to emerge from the shadows.

The first amnesty program permitted any alien who had resided in the United
States continuously and unlawfully since January 1, 1982, to qualify for an
adjustment of his or her status to that of a lawful permanent resident. See 100
Stat. 3394, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1255a. The second program required the
Attorney General to adjust the status of any alien farmworker who could
establish that he or she had resided in the United States and performed at least
90 days of qualifying agricultural work during the 12-month period prior to
May 1, 1986, provided that the alien could also establish his or her
admissibility in the United States as an immigrant. The Reform Act required
the Attorney General first to adjust the status of these aliens to "[s]pecial
agricultural workers" (SAW's) lawfully admitted for temporary residence, see
100 Stat. 3417, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1160(a)(1), and then eventually to

aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, see 1160(a)(2).

3

This case relates only to the SAW amnesty program. Although additional issues
were resolved by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the only question
presented to us is whether 210(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), which was added by 302(a) of the Reform Act and sets forth the
administrative and judicial review provisions of the SAW program, see 8
U.S.C. 1160(e), precludes a federal district court from exercising general
federal-question jurisdiction over an action alleging a pattern or practice of
procedural due process violations by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) in its administration of the SAW program. We hold that given the
absence of clear congressional language mandating preclusion of federal
jurisdiction and the nature of respondents' requested relief, the District Court
had jurisdiction to hear respondents' constitutional and statutory challenges to
INS procedures. Were we to hold otherwise and instead require respondents to
avail themselves of the limited judicial review procedures set forth in 210(e)
of the INA, meaningful judicial review of their statutory and constitutional
claims would be foreclosed.

* The Reform Act provided three important benefits to an applicant for SAW
status. First, the mere filing of a "non-frivolous application" entitled the alien to
a work authorization that would remain valid during the entire period that the
application was being processed. See 8 U.S.C. 1160(d)(2)(B). Second,
regardless of the disposition of the application, the Reform Act expressly
prohibited the Government from using any information in the application for
enforcement purposes. Thus, the application process could not be used as a
means of identifying deportable aliens; rather, the initiation of a deportation
proceeding had to be based on evidence obtained from an independent source.
See 1160(b)(6). Third, if SAW status was granted, the alien became a lawful
temporary resident, see 1160(a)(1), and, in due course, could obtain the status
of a permanent resident, see 1160(a)(2).

In recognition that the fear of prosecution or deportation would cause many

undocumented aliens to be reluctant to come forward and disclose their illegal
status, the Reform Act directed the Attorney General to enlist the assistance of
a variety of nonfederal organizations to encourage aliens to apply and to
provide them with counsel and assistance during the application process. These
"qualified . . . designated entities" (QDE's), which included private entities such
as farm labor organizations and associations of agricultural employers as well
as qualified state, local, and community groups, were not allowed to forward
applications for SAW status to the Attorney General unless the applicant
consented. See 1160(b)(2), (b)(4).

The Reform Act provided that SAW status applications could be filed with a
specially created legalization office (LO), or with a QDE, which would forward
applications to the appropriate LO, during an 18-month period commencing on
June 1, 1987. See 1160(b)(1)(A). Regulations adopted by the INS to
administer the program provided for a personal interview of each applicant at
an LO. See 8 CFR 210.2(c)(2)(iv) (1990). In the application, the alien had to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she worked the requisite 90
days of qualifying seasonal agricultural services. See 210.3(a), (b)(1). To
meet the burden of proof, the applicant was required to present evidence of
eligibility independent of his or her own testimony. See 210.3(b)(2). The
applicant could meet this burden through production of his or her employer's
payroll records, see 8 U.S.C. 1160(b)(3)(B)(ii), or through submission of
affidavits "by agricultural producers, foremen, farm labor contractors, union
officials, fellow employees, or other persons with specific knowledge of the
applicant's employment," see 8 CFR 210.3(c)(3) (1990). At the conclusion of
the interview and of the review of the application materials, the LO could deny
the application or make a recommendation to a regional processing facility that
the application be either granted or denied. See 210.1(q). A denial, whether at
the regional or local level, could be appealed to the legalization appeals unit,
which was authorized to make the final administrative decision in each
individual case. See 103.3(a)(2)(iii).

The Reform Act expressly prohibited judicial review of such a final

administrative determination of SAW status except as authorized by 210(e)(3)
(A) of the amended INA. That subsection permitted "judicial review of such a
denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or deportation."6 In
view of the fact that the courts of appeals constitute the only fora for judicial
review of deportation orders, see 75 Stat. 651, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1105a,
the statute plainly foreclosed any review in the district courts of individual
denials of SAW status applications. Moreover, absent initiation of a deportation
proceeding against an unsuccessful applicant, judicial review of such individual
determinations was completely foreclosed. II

This action was filed in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida
by the Haitian Refugee Center, the Migration and Refugee Services of the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Palm Beach,7 and 17 unsuccessful individual SAW
applicants. The plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of a class of alien farmworkers
who either had been or would be injured by unlawful practices and policies
adopted by the INS in its administration of the SAW program. The complaint
alleged that the interview process was conducted in an arbitrary fashion that
deprived applicants of the due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution. Among other charges, the plaintiffs alleged that INS

procedures did not allow SAW applicants to be apprised of or to be given

opportunity to challenge adverse evidence on which denials were predicated,
that applicants were denied the opportunity to present witnesses on their own
behalf, that non-English speaking Haitian applicants were unable to
communicate effectively with LO's because competent interpreters were not
provided, and that no verbatim recording of the interview was made, thus
inhibiting even any meaningful administrative review of application denials by
LO's or regional processing facilities. See App. 44-45; Haitian Refugee Center,
Inc. v. Nelson, 694 F.Supp. 864, 867 (SD Fla.1988).
9

After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction,
that the case should proceed as a class action, and that a preliminary injunction
should issue. The court recognized that individual aliens could not contest the
denial of their SAW applications "unless and until the INS institut[ed]
deportation proceedings against them," but accepted jurisdiction because the
complaint "does not challenge any individual determination of any application
for SAW status but rather attacks the manner in which the entire program is
being implemented, allegations beyond the scope of administrative review."8
On the merits, the District Court found that a number of INS practices violated
the Reform Act and were unconstitutional,9 and entered an injunction requiring
the INS to vacate large categories of denials,10 and to modify its practices in
certain respects.11

10

The Court of Appeals affirmed. On the merits, it upheld all of the findings and
conclusions of the District Court, and it also rejected each of the Government's
jurisdictional arguments. Relying on earlier Circuit precedent, it held that the
statutory bar to judicial review of individual determinations was inapplicable:

11

"In Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.1984) (in banc), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846,
105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985), we reaffirmed that section 106 of the
INA (Codified at 8 U.S.C. 1105a) does not deprive district courts of
jurisdiction to review allegations of systematic abuses by INS officials. Jean,
727 F.2d at 980. We explained that to postpone 'judicial resolution of a disputed
issue that affects an entire class of aliens until an individual petitioner has an
opportunity to litigate it on habeas corpus would foster the very delay and
procedural redundancy that Congress sought to eliminate in passing 1105a.'
Id. In this action, appellees do not challenge the merits of any individual status
determination; rather . . . they contend that defendants' policies and practices in
processing SAW applications deprive them of their statutory and constitutional
rights." Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555, 1560 (CA11
1989).

12

In their certiorari petition, petitioners did not seek review of the District Court's
rulings on the merits or the form of its injunctive relief. Our grant of certiorari
is therefore limited to the jurisdictional question.

III
13

We preface our analysis of petitioners' position with an identification of matters

that are not in issue. First, it is undisputed that SAW status is an important
benefit for a previously undocumented alien. This status not only protects the
alien from deportation; it also creates job opportunities that are not available to
an alien whose application is denied. Indeed, the denial of SAW status places
the alien in an even worse position than he or she was in before the Reform Act
was passed because lawful employment opportunities are no longer available to
such persons. Thus, the successful applicant for SAW status acquires a measure
of freedom to work and to live openly without fear of deportation or arrest that
is markedly different from that of the unsuccessful applicant. Even disregarding
the risk of deportation, the impact of a denial on the opportunity to obtain
gainful employment is plainly sufficient to mandate constitutionally fair
procedures in the application process. At no time in this litigation have
petitioners asserted a right to employ arbitrary procedures, or questioned their
obligation to afford SAW status applicants due process of law.

14

Nor, at this stage of the litigation, is there any dispute that the INS routinely
and persistently violated the Constitution and statutes in processing SAW
applications. Petitioners do not deny that those violations caused injury in fact
to the two organizational plaintiffs as well as to the individual members of the
plaintiff class. Although it does not do so explicitly, petitioners' argument
assumes that the District Court would have federal-question jurisdiction over
the entire case if Congress had not, through the Reform Act, added 210(e) to
the INA. The narrow issue, therefore, is whether 210(e), which bars judicial
review of individual determinations except in deportation proceedings, also
forecloses this general challenge to the INS' unconstitutional practices.

IV
15

Petitioners' entire jurisdictional argument rests on their view that respondents'

constitutional challenge is an action seeking "judicial review of a determination
respecting an application for adjustment of status" and that district court
jurisdiction over the action is therefore barred by the plain language of 210(e)
(1) of the amended INA. See 8 U.S.C. 1160(e)(1).12 The critical words in
210(e)(1), however, describe the provision as referring only to review "of a
determination respecting an application " for SAW status (emphasis added).

Significantly, the reference to "a determination" describes a single act rather

than a group of decisions or a practice or procedure employed in making
decisions. Moreover, when 210(e)(3), see 8 U.S.C. 1160(e)(3), further
clarifies that the only judicial review permitted is in the context of a deportation
proceeding, it refers to "judicial review of such a denial "again referring to a
single act, and again making clear that the earlier reference to "a determination
respecting an application" describes the denial of an individual application. We
therefore agree with the District Court's and the Court of Appeals' reading of
this language as describing the process of direct review of individual denials of
SAW status, rather than as referring to general collateral challenges to
unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing
applications.
16

This reading of the Reform Act's review provision is supported by the language
in 210(e)(3)(B) of the INA, which provides that judicial review "shall be
based solely upon the administrative record established at the time of the
review by the appellate authority and the findings of fact and determinations
contained in such record shall be conclusive unless the applicant can establish
abuse of discretion or that the findings are directly contrary to clear and
convincing facts contained in the record considered as a whole." 8 U.S.C.
1160(e)(3)(B). This provision incorporates an assumption that the limited
review provisions of 210(e) apply only to claims that have been subjected to
administrative consideration and that have resulted in the creation of an
adequate administrative record. However, the record created during the SAW
administrative review process consists solely of a completed application form, a
report of medical examination, any documents or affidavits that evidence an
applicant's agricultural employment and residence, and notes, if any, from an
LO interviewall relating to a single SAW applicant. Because the
administrative appeals process does not address the kind of procedural and
constitutional claims respondents bring in this action, limiting judicial review
of these claims to the procedures set forth in 210(e) is not contemplated by
the language of that provision.

17

Moreover, the "abuse-of-discretion" standard of judicial review under 210(e)

(3)(B) would make no sense if we were to read the Reform Act as requiring
constitutional and statutory challenges to INS procedures to be subject to its
specialized review provision. Although the abuse-of-discretion standard is
appropriate for judicial review of an administrative adjudication of the facts of
an individual application for SAW status, such a standard does not apply to
constitutional or statutory claims, which are reviewed de novo by the courts.
The language of 210(e)(3)(B) thus lends substantial credence to the
conclusion that the Reform Act's review provision does not apply to challenges

to INS' practices and procedures in administering the SAW program.

18

Finally, we note that had Congress intended the limited review provisions of
210(e) of the INA to encompass challenges to INS procedures and practices, it
could easily have used broader statutory language. Congress could, for
example, have modeled 210(e) on the more expansive language in the general
grant of district court jurisdiction under Title II of the INA by channeling into
the Reform Act's special review procedures "all causes . . . arising under any of
the provisions" of the legalization program. 66 Stat. 230, 8 U.S.C. 1329. It
moreover could have modeled 210(e) on 38 U.S.C. 211(a), which governs
review of veterans' benefits claims, by referring to review "on all questions of
law and fact" under the SAW legalization program.

19

Given Congress' choice of statutory language, we conclude that challenges to

the procedures used by INS do not fall within the scope of 210(e). Rather, we
hold that 210(e) applies only to review of denials of individual SAW
applications. Because respondents' action does not seek review on the merits of
a denial of a particular application, the District Court's general federal-question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 to hear this action remains unimpaired by
210(e).

V
20

Petitioners place their principal reliance on our decision in Heckler v. Ringer,

466 U.S. 602, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984). The four respondents in
Ringer wanted to establish a right to reimbursement under the Medicare Act for
a particular form of surgery that three of them had undergone and the fourth
allegedly needed. They sought review of the Secretary's policy of refusing
reimbursement for that surgery in an original action filed in the District Court,
without exhausting the procedures specified in the statute for processing
reimbursement claims. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction because the essence of the complaint was a claim of entitlement to
payment for the surgical procedure. With respect to the three respondents who
had had the surgery, we concluded that "it makes no sense" to construe their
claims "as anything more than, at bottom, a claim that they should be paid for
their BCBR [bilateral carotid body resection] surgery," id., at 614, 104 S.Ct., at
2021, since success in their challenge of the Secretary's policy denying
reimbursement would have the practical effect of also deciding their claims for
benefits on the merits. "Indeed," we noted, "the relief that respondents seek to
redress their supposed 'procedural' objections is the invalidation of the
Secretary's current policy and a 'substantive' declaration from her that the
expenses of BCBR surgery are reimbursable under the Medicare Act." Ibid.

Concluding that respondents' judicial action was not "collateral" to their claims
for benefits, we thus required respondents first to pursue their administrative
remedies. In so doing, we found it significant that respondents, even if
unsuccessful before the agency, "clearly have an adequate remedy in 405(g)
for challenging [in the courts] all aspects of the Secretary's denial of their
claims for payment for the BCBR surgery." Id., at 617, 104 S.Ct., at 2022-23. 13
21

Unlike the situation in Heckler, the individual respondents in this action do not
seek a substantive declaration that they are entitled to SAW status. Nor would
the fact that they prevail on the merits of their purportedly procedural
objections have the effect of establishing their entitlement to SAW status.
Rather, if allowed to prevail in this action, respondents would only be entitled
to have their case files reopened and their applications reconsidered in light of
the newly prescribed INS procedures.

22

Moreover, unlike in Heckler, if not allowed to pursue their claims in the

District Court, respondents would not as a practical matter be able to obtain
meaningful judicial review of their application denials or of their objections to
INS procedures notwithstanding the review provisions of 210(e) of the
amended INA. It is presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge of our
basic rules of statutory construction, and given our well-settled presumption
favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative
action, see Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667,
670, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 2135, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986), coupled with the limited
review provisions of 210(e), it is most unlikely that Congress intended to
foreclose all forms of meaningful judicial review.

23

Several aspects of this statutory scheme would preclude review of respondents'

application denials if we were to hold that the District Court lacked jurisdiction
to hear this challenge. Initially, administrative or judicial review of an agency
decision is almost always confined to the record made in the proceeding at the
initial decisionmaking level, and one of the central attacks on INS procedures in
this litigation is based on the claim that such procedures do not allow applicants
to assemble adequate records. As the District Court found, because of the lack
of recordings or transcripts of LO interviews and the inadequate opportunity for
SAW applicants to call witnesses or present other evidence on their behalf, the
administrative appeals unit of the INS, in reviewing the decisions of LO's and
regional processing facilities, and the courts of appeals, in reviewing SAW
denials in the context of deportation proceedings, have no complete or
meaningful basis upon which to review application determinations.

24

Additionally, because there is no provision for direct judicial review of the

denial of SAW status unless the alien is later apprehended and deportation
proceedings are initiated, most aliens denied SAW status can ensure themselves
review in courts of appeals only if they voluntarily surrender themselves for
deportation. Quite obviously, that price istanta mount to a complete denial of
judicial review for most undocumented aliens.
25

Finally, even in the context of a deportation proceeding, it is unlikely that a

court of appeals would be in a position to provide meaningful review of the
type of claims raised in this litigation. To establish the unfairness of the INS
practices, respondents in this case adduced a substantial amount of evidence,
most of which would have been irrelevant in the processing of a particular
individual application. Not only would a court of appeals reviewing an
individual SAW determination therefore most likely not have an adequate
record as to the pattern of INS' allegedly unconstitutional practices, but it also
would lack the factfinding and record-developing capabilities of a federal
district court. As the American Bar Association as amicus points out, statutes
that provide for only a single level of judicial review in the courts of appeals
"are traditionally viewed as warranted only in circumstances where district
court factfinding would unnecessarily duplicate an adequate administrative
record circumstances that are not present in 'pattern and practice' cases where
district court factfinding is essential [given the inadequate administrative
record]." Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 7. It therefore
seems plain to us, as it did to the District Court and the Court of Appeals, that
restricting judicial review to the courts of appeals as a component of the review
of an individual deportation order is the practical equivalent of a total denial of
judicial review of generic constitutional and statutory claims.

26

Decision in this case is therefore supported by our unanimous holding14 in

Bowen, supra. In that case we rejected the Government's contention that two
sections of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq. (1982 ed.), barred
judicial review of the validity of a regulation governing the payment of
Medicare benefits. We recognized that review of individual determinations of
the amount due on particular claims was foreclosed, but upheld the collateral
attack on the regulation itself, emphasizing the critical difference between an
individual "amount determination" and a challenge to the procedures for
making such determinations:

27

"The reticulated statutory scheme, which carefully details the forum and limits
of review of 'any determination . . . of . . . the amount of benefits under part A,'
42 U.S.C. 1395ff(b)(1)(C) (1982 ed., Supp. II), and of the 'amount of . . .
payment' of benefits under Part B, 42 U.S.C. 1395u(b)(3)(C), simply does not
speak to challenges mounted against the method by which such amounts are to

be determined rather than the determinations themselves. As the Secretary has

made clear, 'the legality, constitutional or otherwise, of any provision of the Act
or regulations relevant to the Medicare Program' is not considered in a 'fair
hearing' held by a carrier to resolve a grievance related to a determination of the
amount of a Part B award. As a result, an attack on the validity of a regulation
is not the kind of administrative action that we described in [U.S. v.] Erika [Inc.,
456 U.S. 201, 102 S.Ct. 1650, 72 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) ] as an 'amount
determination' which decides 'the amount of the Medicare payment to be made
on a particular claim' and with respect to which the Act impliedly denies
judicial review. 456 U.S., at 208 [102 S.Ct., at 1654]." 476 U.S., at 675-676,
106 S.Ct., at 2138-2139 (emphasis in original).
28

Inherent in our analysis was the concern that absent such a construction of the
judicial review provisions of the Medicare statute, there would be "no review at
all of substantial statutory and constitutional challenges to the Secretary's
administration of Part B of the Medicare program." Id., at 680, 106 S.Ct., at
2141.

29

As we read the Reform Act and the findings of the District Court, therefore,
this case is controlled by Bowen rather than by Heckler. The strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action is not overcome
either by the language or the purpose of the relevant provisions of the Reform
Act.

30

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

31

It is so ordered.

32

Chief Justice REHNQUIST, with whom Justice SCALIA joins, dissenting.

33

Congress has carefully limited the judicial review available under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Reform Act) in language which
"he who runs may read." The Court, with considerable and obvious effort, finds
a way to avoid this limitation, because to apply the statute as written could bar
judicial review of respondents' constitutional claims. The statute as written is,
in my view, constitutional, and there is therefore no need to rewrite it.

34

* The relevant provisions of the Reform Act dealing with administrative and
judicial review are found in 8 U.S.C. 1160(e):

35

"(1) Administrative and judicial review

35

"(1) Administrative and judicial review

36

"There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination

respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in
accordance with this subsection.

37

"(2) Administrative review

38

"(A) Single level of administrative appellate review

39

"The Attorney General shall establish an appellate authority to provide for a

single level of administrative appellate review of such a determination

....
40
41

"(3) Judicial review

42

"(A) Limitation to review of exclusion or deportation

43

"There shall be judicial review of such a denial only in the judicial review of an
order of exclusion or deportation under section 1105a of this title." The first of
the quoted sentences states, as clearly as any language can, that judicial review
of a "determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this
section" may not be had except in accordance with the provisions of the
subsection. The plain language of subsection (3)(A) provides that judicial
review of a denial may be had only in connection with review of an order of
exclusion or deportation. The Court chooses to read this language as dealing
only with "direct review of individual denials of SAW status, rather than as
referring to general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and
policies used by the agency in processing applications." Ante, at 492. But the
accepted view of judicial review of administrative action generallyeven when
there is no express preclusion provision as there is in the present statuteis
that only "final actions" are reviewable in court. The Administrative Procedure
Act provides:

44

"[F]inal agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court
[is] subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate
agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the
review of the final agency action." 5 U.S.C. 704.

45

The Court's reasoning is thus a classic non sequitur. It reasons that because

Congress limited judicial review only of what were in effect final administrative
decisions, it must not have intended to preclude separate challenges to
procedures used by the agency before it issued any final decision. But the type
of judicial review of agency action which the Court finds that Congress failed
to preclude is a type not generally available even without preclusion. In the
light of this settled rule, the natural reading of "determination respecting an
application" in 1160(e) encompasses both final decisions and procedures used
to reach those decisions. Each of respondents' claims attacks the process used
by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to make a determination
respecting an application.
46

We have on several occasions rejected the argument advanced by respondents

that individual plaintiffs can bypass restrictions on judicial review by
purporting to attack general policies rather than individual results. For instance,
in United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 102 S.Ct. 1650, 72 L.Ed.2d 12
(1982), we found that in the context of the "precisely drawn provisions" of the
Medicare statute, the provision of judicial review for awards made under Part A
of the statute, coupled with the omission of judicial review for awards under
Part B, "provides persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to
foreclose further review of such claims." Id., at 208, 102 S.Ct., at 1654
(citations omitted). Similarly, in Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 104 S.Ct.
2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984), we addressed a challenge to a ruling issued by
the Secretary of Health andHuman Services that precluded payment under
Medicare for a particular medical procedure. The Medicare Act permits judicial
review of "any claim arising under" the Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(g), (h), only
after a claimant seeks payment and exhausts administrative remedies. The
plaintiffs contended that their lawsuits challenging the Secretary's refusal to
reimburse the procedure at issue were permissible without exhausting
administrative remedies because they challenged only the Secretary's "
'procedure' for reaching her decision," not the underlying decision on their
particular claims. 466 U.S., at 614, 104 S.Ct., at 2021. We rejected this
distinction, finding that "it makes no sense to construe the claims . . . as
anything more than, at bottom, a claim that they should be paid for their . . .
surgery." Ibid. This holding was based on the recognition that a contrary result
would allow claimants "to bypass the exhaustion requirements of the Medicare
Act by simply bringing declaratory judgment actions in federal court before
they undergo the medical procedure in question." Id., at 621, 104 S.Ct., at
2025. We expressly rejected the contentionalso urged by the respondents
herethat "simply because a claim somehow can be construed as 'procedural,'
it is cognizable in federal district court by way of federal-question jurisdiction."
Id., at 614, 104 S.Ct., at 2021.

47

It is well settled that when Congress has established a particular review

mechanism, courts are not free to fashion alternatives to the specified scheme.
See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 448-449, 108 S.Ct. 668, 673-674, 98
L.Ed.2d 830 (1988); Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust
Co., 379 U.S. 411, 419-422, 85 S.Ct. 551, 556-559, 13 L.Ed.2d 386 (1965). In
creating the Reform Act and the SAW program, Congress balanced the goals of
the unprecedented amnesty programs with the need "to insure reasonably
prompt determinations" in light of the incentives and opportunity for ineligible
applicants to delay the disposition of their cases and derail the program. The
Court's ponderously reasoned gloss on the statute's plain language sanctions an
unwarranted intrusion into a carefully drafted congressional program, a
program which placed great emphasis on a minimal amount of paperwork and
procedure in an effort to speed the process of adjusting the status of those aliens
who demonstrated their entitlement to adjustment. "If the balance is to be struck
anew, the decision must come from Congress and not from this Court." Ringer,
supra, 466 U.S., at 627, 104 S.Ct., at 2028.

II
48

The Court bases its conclusion that district courts have jurisdiction to entertain
respondents' pattern and practice allegations in part out of respect for the
"strong presumption" that Congress intends judicial review of administrative
action. Ante, at 498. This presumption, however, comes into play only where
there is a genuine ambiguity as to whether Congress intended to preclude
judicial review of administrative action. In this case two things are evident:
First, in drafting the Reform Act, Congress did not preclude all judicial review
of administrative action; as detailed earlier, Congress provided for judicial
review of INS action in the courts of appeals in deportation proceedings, and in
the district courts in orders of exclusion. Second, by enacting such a scheme,
Congress intended to foreclose all other avenues of relief. Therefore, since the
statute is not ambiguous, the presumption has no force here.

49

The Court indicates that this presumption of judicial review is particularly

applicable in cases raising constitutional challenges to agency action. Ante, at
496-499. I believe that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of such
claims in this instance, and that in this context it is permissible for it to do so.

50

In the Reform Act, Congress enacted a one-time amnesty program to process

claims of illegal aliens allowing them to obtain status as lawful residents.
Congress intended aliens to come forward during the limited, 12-month
eligibility period because "[t]his is the first call and the last call, a one-shot
deal." 132 Cong.Rec. 33217 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Simpson). If an alien

failed to file a legalization application within the 12-month period, the

opportunity was lost forever. To further expedite this unique and unprecedented
amnesty program and to minimize the burden on the federal courts, Congress
provided for limited judicial review.
51

Given the structure of the Act, and the status of these alien respondents, it is
extremely doubtful that the operation of the administrative process in their
cases would give rise to any colorable constitutional claims. " 'An alien who
seeks political rights as a member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only
upon terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority
to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the
legislative will in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare.' " INS v.
Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 884, 108 S.Ct. 2210, 2216, 100 L.Ed.2d 882 (1988)
(quoting United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 474, 37 S.Ct. 422, 425, 61
L.Ed. 853 (1917)).

52

Respondents are undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of those procedures which

Congress has accorded them in the Reform Act. But there is no reason to
believe that administrative appeals as provided in the Actwhich simply have
not been resorted to by these respondents before suing in the District Court
would not have assured them compliance with statutory procedures. The Court
never mentions what colorable constitutional claims these aliens, illegally
present in the United States, could have had that demand judicial review. The
most that can be said for respondents' case in this regard is that it is
conceivable, though not likely, that the administrative processing of their claims
could be handled in such a way as to deny them some constitutional right, and
that the remedy of requesting deportation in order to obtain judicial review is a
burdensome one. We have never held, however, that Congress may not, by
explicit language, preclude judicial review of constitutional claims, and here,
where that body was obviously interested in expeditiously processing an
avalanche of claims from noncitizens upon whom it was conferring a
substantial benefit, I think it may do so.

Justice WHITE joins only Parts I, II, III, and IV of this opinion.

Pub.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.

Prior to November 6, 1986, the enactment date of the Reform Act, the
employment of undocumented aliens did not violate federal law. See 66 Stat.
228, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a) (1982 ed.) (providing that "for the
purposes of this section [criminalizing the bringing in and harboring of aliens

not lawfully entitled to enter and reside in the United States], employment
(including the usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall not be
deemed to constitute harboring"). Section 101 of the Reform Act, however,
authorized both civil and criminal penalties against employers who hire
unauthorized aliens either knowingly or without complying with specified
verification requirements. See 8 U.S.C. 1324a.
3

Section 121 of the Reform Act amended several federal programs to deny
benefits to aliens who could not verify their lawful status. See Pub.L. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3384-3394.

The House Committee noted the purpose behind the legalization programs in
the Reform Act:
"The United States has a large undocumented alien population living and
working within its borders. Many of these people have been here for a number
of years and have become a part of their communities. Many have strong family
ties here which include U.S. citizens and lawful residents. They have built
social networks in this country. They have contributed to the United States in
myriad ways, including providing their talents, labor and tax dollars. However,
because of their undocumented status, these people live in fear, afraid to seek
help when their rights are violated, when they are victimized by criminals,
employers or landlords or when they become ill.
"Continuing to ignore this situation is harmful to both the United States and the
aliens themselves. However, the alternative of intensifying interior enforcement
or attempting mass deportations would be both costly, ineffective, and
inconsistent with our immigrant heritage.
"The Committee believes that the solution lies in legalizing the statuts [sic ] of
aliens who have been present in the United States for several years, recognizing
that past failures to enforces [sic ] the immigration laws have allowed them to
enter and to settle here.
"This step would enable INS to target its enforcement efforts on new flows of
undocumented aliens and, in conjunction with the proposed employer sanctions
programs, help stem the flow of undocumented people to the United States. It
would allow qualified aliens to contribute openly to society and it would help to
prevent the exploitation of this vulnerable population in the work place."
H.R.Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, p. 49 (1986), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
1986, pp. 5649, 5653.

Senator Simpson, one of the sponsors of the Reform Act, described the
vulnerability of this "subculture of human beings who are afraid to go to the

cops, afraid to go to a hospital, afraid to go to their employer who says 'One

peep out of you, buster, and you are down the road.' " 132 Cong.Rec. 33222
(1986).
6

The full text of 210(e) of the INA, as set forth in 8 U.S.C. 1160(e), reads as
follows:
"(e) Administrative and judicial review
"(1) Administrative and judicial review
"There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination
respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in
accordance with this subsection.
"(2) Administrative review
"(A) Single level of administrative appellate review
"The Attorney General shall establish an appellate authority to provide for a
single level of administrative appellate review of such a determination.
"(B) Standard for review
"Such administrative appellate review shall be based solely upon the
administrative record established at the time of the determination on the
application and upon such additional or newly discovered evidence as may not
have been available at the time of the determination.
"(3) Judicial review
"(A) Limitation to review of exclusion or deportation
"There shall be judicial review of such a denial only in the judicial review of an
order of exclusion or deportation under section 1105a of this title.
"(B) Standard for judicial review
"Such judicial review shall be based solely upon the administrative record
established at the time of the review by the appellate authority and the findings
of fact and determinations contained in such record shall be conclusive unless
the applicant can establish abuse of discretion or that the findings are directly
contrary to clear and convincing facts contained in the record considered as a
whole."

The complaint alleges that this respondent has the following interest in the
litigation:
"Plaintiff MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICES OF THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PALM BEACH ("RCDPB") is a component of the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Palm Beach. Its principle [sic] place of business is
West Palm Beach, Florida. Many members of parishes within the diocese of
Palm Beach are foreign agricultural workers who worked at least 90 man-days
in the 1985 and 1986 season, and are therefore potentially eligible for the SAW
program. In addition, Plaintiff MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICES OF
THE RCDPB has been designated by Defendant INS as a "Qualified
Designated Entity" (QDE) under IRCA. QDE's are authorized to provide
counseling to aliens about the legalization program, to assist them in filling out
applications and obtain documentation, and receive applications for adjustment
to temporary resident status. Under IRCA, applications filed with a QDE are
deemed to have been filed as of the same date with INS, to whom the QDE's
forward the applications for processing. QDE's are authorized to receive fees
from applicants and reimbursement from INS for counseling and filing
services. The actions of Defendants complained of in this case discourages
otherwise eligible SAW applicants from seeking counseling and filing of their
applications by Plaintiffs MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICES OF THE
RCDPB and prevents them from fulfilling its basic mission of assisting aliens to
qualify under IRCA." App. 24.

Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 694 F.Supp. 864, 873 (SD Fla.1988).
The District Court also found that both of the organizational plaintiffs had
standing. It explained:
"HRC has alleged that the '[d]efendants' refusal to recognize that such persons
[HRC's members] are eligible under IRCA both directly and indirectly injures
HRC. It directly injures the organization because it makes HRC's work of
assisting the Haitian refugee community more difficult and results in the
diversion of HRC's limited resources away from members and clients having
other urgent needs.' Complaint at 17. HRC also alleges an indirect injury
through the adverse effect upon its members. Id. The plaintiff MRS is a QDE
under IRCA authorized to provide counseling to aliens about the legalization
process and to assist them in obtaining documentation. It also receives
applications and fees from aliens and is reimbursed by the INS for counseling
and filing services. MRS alleges that the defendants' behavior has discouraged
otherwise eligible SAW applicants from seeking counseling and/or filing their
claims and MRS is prevented from fulfilling its basic mission of assisting aliens
to qualify under IRCA." Id., at 874-875.

Although many employers did not maintain payroll records for seasonal
workers, some LO's routinely denied applications that were not supported by
such records. The District Court found that the INS maintained a secret list of
employers whose supporting affidavits were routinely discredited without
giving applicants an opportunity to corroborate the affiants' statements. See id.,
at 871-872. The District Court moreover found that interpreters were not
provided at LO interviews, even though many Haitian applicants spoke only
Creole and no personnel in a particular LO understood that language, and that
no recordings or transcripts of LO interviews were made, despite the fact that
the interview "is the only face to face encounter between the applicant and the
INS allowing the INS to assess the applicant's credibility." See id., at 869.

10

The preliminary injunction provides in part:

"(3) In those cases which the INS denied based in whole or in part on the fact
that the applicant failed to submit payroll records or piecework receipts, the
INS shall vacate the denials and reconsider the cases in light of the proper
standard of proof which will require the government to present evidence to
negate the just and reasonable inference created by the affidavits and other
documents submitted by the applicant;
"(4) The INS shall vacate those denials issued by the Legalization Offices
during the period June 1, 1987, to March 29, 1988, unless the government can
show that the applications were clearly frivolous based upon the documentation
submitted by the applicant or that the applicant admitted fraud or
misrepresentation in the application process." Id., at 881.

11

The preliminary injunction entered by the District Court ordered the INS to
institute the following procedures:
"(6) The Legalization Offices shall maintain competent translators, at a
minimum, in Spanish and Haitian Creole, and translators in other languages
shall be made available if necessary;
"(7) The INS shall afford the applicants the opportunity to present witnesses at
the interview including but not limited to growers, farm labor contractors, coworkers, and any other individuals who may offer testimony in support of the
applicant;
"(8) The interviewers shall be directed to particularize the evidence offered,
testimony taken, credibility determinations, and any other relevant information
on the form I-696." Ibid.

12

As petitioners state in their brief:

"The Act declares in all-encompassing terms: 'There shall be no administrative

or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of
status under this section except in accordance with this subsection.' 8 U.S.C.
1160(e)(1). In the following paragraphs, the subsection spells out the precise
procedures intended to provide the exclusive method of review. The subsection
requires the establishment of a 'a single level of administrative appellate review
of such a determination,' and unequivocally states that '[t]here shall be judicial
review of such a denial [of a SAW application] only in the judicial review of an
order of exclusion or deportation under section 1105a of this title.' 8 U.S.C.
1160(e)(2)(A) and (e)(3)(A). Section 1105a(a), in turn, provides that a petition
for review in the court of appeals
'shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for[] the judicial review of all final
orders of deportation,' while exclusion orders are reviewable exclusively in
habeas corpus proceedings. 8 U.S.C. 1105a(b). Congress could hardly have
chosen clearer or more forceful language to express its intention to preclude any
judicial review of a 'determination respecting an application' for SAW status,
other than in the specified review proceedings applicable to individual
deportation or exclusion orders.
"In light of IRCA's clear directions, district courts are not free to draw on their
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, or on their jurisdiction
granted under the immigration laws, 8 U.S.C. 1329, to entertain collateral
attacks on procedures used to adjudicate SAW applications. The exercise of
either source of general power is barred by the precise and specific language of
IRCA." Brief for Petitioners 11-13 (footnotes omitted).
13

The Court in Heckler also concluded that the fourth respondent's claim was
"essentially one requesting the payment of benefits for BCBR surgery, a claim
cognizable only under 405(g)," 466 U.S., at 620, 104 S.Ct., at 2024, and held
that the "claim for future benefits must be construed as a 'claim arising under'
the Medicare Act because any other construction would allow claimants
substantially to undercut Congress' carefully crafted scheme for administering
the Medicare Act." Id., at 621, 104 S.Ct., at 2025.

14

Justice REHNQUIST did not participate in the case.