493 U.S.

455
110 S.Ct. 792
107 L.Ed.2d 887

Francine TAFFLIN, et al., Petitioners

v.
Jeffrey A. LEVITT et al.
No. 88-1650.
Argued Nov. 27, 1989.
Decided Jan. 22, 1990.

Leave to File Second Petition for rehearing denied April 23, 1990.
See 495 U.S. 915, 110 S.Ct. 1942.
Syllabus
Petitioners, nonresidents of Maryland who are holders of unpaid
certificates of deposit issued by a failed Maryland savings and loan
association, filed a civil action in the Federal District Court against
respondents, former association officers and directors and others, alleging
claims under, inter alia, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968. The court dismissed
the action, concluding, among other things, that federal abstention was
appropriate as to the civil RICO claims, which had been raised in pending
litigation in state court, since state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
such claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. The
presumption in favor of such jurisdiction has not been rebutted by any of
the factors identified in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S.
473, 478, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2875, 69 L.Ed.2d 784. Pp. 458-467.
(a) As petitioners concede, there is nothing in RICO's explicit language to
suggest that Congress has, by affirmative enactment, divested state courts
of civil RICO jurisdiction. To the contrary, 1964(c)'s grant of federal
jurisdiction over civil RICO claims is plainly permissive and thus does not

operate to oust state courts from concurrent jurisdiction. Pp. 460-461.

(b) RICO's legislative history reveals no evidence that Congress even
considered the question of concurrent jurisdiction, much less any
suggestion that Congress affirmatively intended to confer exclusive
jurisdiction over civil RICO claims on the federal courts. Petitioners'
argument that, because Congress modeled 1964(c) after 4 of the
Clayton Actwhich confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts
it intended, by implication, to grant exclusive federal jurisdiction over
1964(c) claims is rejected. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346, and Agency Holding Corp. v. MalleyDuff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121, are
distinguished, since those cases looked to the Clayton Act in interpreting
RICO without the benefit of a background juridical presumption of the
type presented here. Pp. 461-463.
(c) No "clear incompatibility" exists between state court jurisdiction and
federal interests. The interest in uniform interpretation of federal criminal
laws, see 18 U.S.C. 3231, is not inconsistent with such jurisdiction
merely because state courts would be required to construe the federal
crimes that constitute RICO predicate acts. Section 1964(c) claims are not
"offenses against the laws of the United States," 3231, and do not result
in the imposition of criminal sanctions. There is also no significant danger
of inconsistent application of federal criminal law, since federal courts
would not be bound by state court interpretations of predicate acts, since
state courts would be guided by federal court interpretations of federal
criminal law, and since any state court judgments misinterpreting federal
criminal law would be subject to direct review by this Court. Moreover,
state courts have the ability to handle the complexities of civil RICO
actions. Many cases involve asserted violations of state law, over which
state courts presumably have greater expertise, and it would seem
anomalous to rule that they are incompetent to adjudicate civil RICO
claims when such claims are subject to adjudication by arbitration, see
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 239, 107
S.Ct. 2332, 2344, 96 L.Ed.2d 185. Further, although the fact that RICO's
procedural mechanisms are applicable only in federal court may tend to
suggest that Congress intended exclusive federal jurisdiction, it does not
by itself suffice to create a "clear incompatibility" with federal interests.
And, to the extent that Congress intended RICO to serve broad remedial
purposes, concurrent jurisdiction will advance rather than jeopardize
federal policies underlying the statute. Pp. 464-467.
865 F.2d 595 (CA4 1989), affirmed.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. WHITE, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 467. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which KENNEDY, J., joined, post, p. 469.
M. Norman Goldberger, Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioners.
Andrew H. Marks, Washington, D.C., for respondents.
Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over civil actions brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), Pub.L. 91-452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941, as amended,
18 U.S.C. 1961-1968.

* The underlying litigation arises from the failure of Old Court Savings &
Loan, Inc. (Old Court), a Maryland savings and loan association, and the
attendant collapse of the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corp. (MSSIC), a
state-chartered nonprofit corporation created to insure accounts in Maryland
savings and loan associations that were not federally insured. See Brandenburg
v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1181-1183 (CA4 1988) (reviewing history of
Maryland's savings and loan crisis). Petitioners are nonresidents of Maryland
who hold unpaid certificates of deposit issued by Old Court. Respondents are
the former officers and directors of Old Court, the former officers and directors
of MSSIC, the law firm of Old Court and MSSIC, the accounting firm of Old
Court, and the State of Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund Corp., the statecreated successor to MSSIC. Petitioners allege various state law causes of
action as well as claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act), 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., and RICO.

The District Court granted respondents' motions to dismiss, concluding that

petitioners had failed to state a claim under the Exchange Act and that, because
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims, federal
abstention was appropriate for the other causes of action because they had been
raised in pending litigation in state court. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed. 865 F.2d 595 (1989). The Court of Appeals agreed with the
District Court that the Old Court certificates of deposit were not "securities"
within the meaning of the Exchange Act, see 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10), and that
petitioners' Exchange Act claims were therefore properly dismissed. 865 F.2d,
at 598-599. The Court of Appeals further held, in reliance on its prior decision
in Brandenburg v. Seidel, supra, that "a RICO action could be instituted in a

state court and that Maryland's 'comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation
and liquidation of insolvent state-chartered savings and loan associations,' 859
F.2d at 1191, provided a proper basis for the district court to abstain under the
authority of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424
(1943)." 865 F.2d, at 600 (citations omitted).
4

To resolve a conflict among the federal appellate courts and state supreme
courts,1 we granted certiorari limited to the question whether state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. 490 U.S. 1089, 109 S.Ct. 2428,
104 L.Ed.2d 985 (1989). We hold that they do and accordingly affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

II
5

We begin with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States possess
sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to
limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause. Under this system of dual
sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority,
and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the
laws of the United States. See, e.g., Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 25-26, 5
L.Ed. 19 (1820); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-137, 23 L.Ed. 833
(1876); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 517, 18
S.Ct. 685, 688, 42 L.Ed. 1126 (1898); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368
U.S. 502, 507-508, 82 S.Ct. 519, 522-523, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962); Gulf Offshore
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-478, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2874-2875, 69
L.Ed.2d 784 (1981). As we noted in Claflin, "if exclusive jurisdiction be neither
express nor implied, the State courts have concurrent jurisdiction whenever, by
their own constitution, they are competent to take it." 93 U.S., at 136; see also
Dowd Box, supra, 368 U.S. at 507-508, 82 S.Ct., at 522-523 ("We start with the
premise that nothing in the concept of our federal system prevents state courts
from enforcing rights created by federal law. Concurrent jurisdiction has been a
common phenomenon in our judicial history, and exclusive federal court
jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law has been the exception rather
than the rule"). See generally 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *400;
The Federalist No. 82 (A. Hamilton); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business
of the Supreme Court 5-12 (1927); H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General
View 8-11 (1973).

This deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction

is, of course, rebutted if Congress affirmatively ousts the state courts of
jurisdiction over a particular federal claim. See, e.g., Claflin, supra, 93 U.S. at
137 ("Congress may, if it see[s] fit, give to the Federal courts exclusive

jurisdiction") (citations omitted); see also Houston, supra, 5 Wheat. at 25-26.

As we stated in Gulf Offshore:
7

"In considering the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular

federal claim, the Court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction. Congress, however, may confine jurisdiction to the
federal courts either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, the presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by
unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility
between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests." 453 U.S., at 478, 101
S.Ct., at 2875 (citations omitted).

See also Claflin, supra, 93 U.S. at 136 (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
"where it is not excluded by express provision, or by incompatibility in its
exercise arising from the nature of the particular case"). The parties agree that
these principles, which have "remained unmodified through the years," Dowd
Box, supra, 368 U.S. at 508, 82 S.Ct., at 523, provide the analytical framework
for resolving this case.

III
9

The precise question presented, therefore, is whether state courts have been
divested of jurisdiction to hear civil RICO claims "by an explicit statutory
directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests." Gulf
Offshore, supra, 453 U.S. at 478, 101 S.Ct., at 2875. Because we find none of
these factors present with respect to civil claims arising under RICO, we hold
that state courts retain their presumptive authority to adjudicate such claims.

10

At the outset, petitioners concede that there is nothing in the language of RICO
much less an "explicit statutory directive" to suggest that Congress has, by
affirmative enactment, divested the state courts of jurisdiction to hear civil
RICO claims. The statutory provision authorizing civil RICO claims provides
in full:

11

"Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of

section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (emphasis
added).

12

This grant of federal jurisdiction is plainly permissive, not mandatory, for "[t]he

12

This grant of federal jurisdiction is plainly permissive, not mandatory, for "[t]he
statute does not state nor even suggest that such jurisdiction shall be exclusive.
It provides that suits of the kind described 'may' be brought in the federal
district courts, not that they must be." Dowd Box, supra, 368 U.S., at 506, 82
S.Ct., at 522. Indeed, "[i]t is black letter law . . . that the mere grant of
jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from
concurrent jurisdiction over the cause of action." Gulf Offshore, supra, 453
U.S., at 479, 101 S.Ct., at 2875 (citing United States v. Bank of New York &
Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 479, 56 S.Ct. 343, 348, 80 L.Ed. 331 (1936)).

13

Petitioners thus rely solely on the second and third factors suggested in Gulf
Offshore, arguing that exclusive federal jurisdiction over civil RICO actions is
established "by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests," 453 U.S.,
at 478, 101 S.Ct., at 2875.

14

Our review of the legislative history, however, reveals no evidence that

Congress even considered the question of concurrent state court jurisdiction
over RICO claims, much less any suggestion that Congress affirmatively
intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction over such claims on the federal courts.
As the Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have concluded, "
[t]he legislative history contains no indication that Congress ever expressly
considered the question of concurrent jurisdiction; indeed, as the principal
draftsman of RICO has remarked, 'no one even thought of the issue.' "
Brandenburg, 859 F.2d, at 1193 (quoting Flaherty, Two States Lay Claim to
RICO, Nat.L.J., May 7, 1984, p. 10, col. 2); see also Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d
730, 736 (CA9 1987) ("The legislative history provides 'no evidence that
Congress ever expressly considered the question of jurisdiction; indeed, the
evidence establishes that its attention was focused solely on whether to provide
a private right of action' ") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993, 108
S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988); Chivas Products Ltd. v. Owen, 864 F.2d
1280, 1283 (CA6 1988) ("There is no 'smoking gun' legislative history in which
RICO sponsors indicated an express intention to commit civil RICO to the
federal courts"). Petitioners nonetheless insist that if Congress had considered
the issue, it would have granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil
RICO claims. This argument, however, is misplaced, for even if we could
reliably discern what Congress' intent might have been had it considered the
question, we are not at liberty to so speculate; the fact that Congress did not
even consider the issue readily disposes of any argument that Congress
unmistakably intended to divest state courts of concurrent jurisdiction.

15

Sensing this void in the legislative history, petitioners rely, in the alternative, on

our decisions in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275,
87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), and Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987), in which we noted that
Congress modeled 1964(c) after 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15(a).
See Sedima, supra, 473 U.S., at 489, 105 S.Ct., at 3281; Agency Holding,
supra, 483 U.S., at 151-152, 107 S.Ct., at 2764-2765. Petitioners assert that,
because we have interpreted 4 of the Clayton Act to confer exclusive
jurisdiction on the federal courts, see, e.g., General Investment Co. v. Lake
Shore & M.S.R. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 286-288, 43 S.Ct. 106, 116-117, 67 L.Ed.
244 (1922), and because Congress may be presumed to have been aware of and
incorporated those interpretations when it used similar language in RICO, cf.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-699, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 19561958, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), Congress intended, by implication, to grant
exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims arising under 1964(c).
16

This argument is also flawed. To rebut the presumption of concurrent

jurisdiction, the question is not whether any intent at all may be divined from
legislative silence on the issue, but whether Congress in its deliberations may
be said to have affirmatively or unmistakably intended jurisdiction to be
exclusively federal. In the instant case, the lack of any indication in RICO's
legislative history that Congress either considered or assumed that the
importing of remedial language from the Clayton Act into RICO had any
jurisdictional implications is dispositive. The "mere borrowing of statutory
language does not imply that Congress also intended to incorporate all of the
baggage that may be attached to the borrowed language." Lou, supra, at 737.
Indeed, to the extent we impute to Congress knowledge of our Clayton Act
precedents, it makes no less sense to impute to Congress knowledge of Claflin
and Dowd Box, under which Congress, had it sought to confer exclusive
jurisdiction over civil RICO claims, would have had every incentive to do so
expressly.

17

Sedima and Agency Holding are not to the contrary. Although we observed in
Sedima that "[t]he clearest current in [the legislative] history [of 1964(c) ] is
the reliance on the Clayton Act model," 473 U.S., at 489, 105 S.Ct., at 3281,
that statement was made in the context of noting the distinction between
"private and governmental actions" under the Clayton Act. Ibid. We intimated
nothing as to whether Congress' reliance on the Clayton Act implied any
intention to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction for civil RICO claims, and in
Sedima itself we rejected any requirement of proving "racketeering injury,"
noting that to borrow the "antitrust injury" requirement from antitrust law
would "creat[e] exactly the problems Congress sought to avoid." Id., 473 U.S.,
at 498-499, 105 S.Ct., at 3285-3286. Likewise, in Agency Holding we were

concerned with "borrowing," in light of legislative silence on the issue, an

appropriate statute of limitations period from an "analogous" statute. 483 U.S.,
at 146, 107 S.Ct., at 2762. Under such circumstances, we found it appropriate
to borrow the statute of limitations from the Clayton Act. Id., at 152, 107 S.Ct.,
at 2765. In this case, by contrast, where the issue is whether jurisdiction is
exclusive or concurrent, we are not free to add content to a statute via analogies
to other statutes unless the legislature has specifically endorsed such action.
Under Gulf Offshore, legislative silence counsels, if not compels, us to enforce
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. In short, in both Sedima and Agency
Holding we looked to the Clayton Act in interpreting RICO without the benefit
of a background juridical presumption of the type present in this case. Thus, to
whatever extent the Clayton Act analogy may be relevant to our interpretation
of RICO generally, it has no place in our inquiry into the jurisdiction of state
courts.
18

Petitioners finally urge that state court jurisdiction over civil RICO claims
would be clearly incompatible with federal interests. We noted in Gulf Offshore
that factors indicating clear incompatibility "include the desirability of uniform
interpretation, the expertise of federal judges in federal law, and the assumed
greater hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly federal claims." 453 U.S., at
483-484, 101 S.Ct., at 2877-2878 (citation and footnote omitted). Petitioners'
primary contention is that concurrent jurisdiction is clearly incompatible with
the federal interest in uniform interpretation of federal criminal laws, see 18
U.S.C. 3231,2 because state courts would be required to construe the federal
crimes that constitute predicate acts defined as "racketeering activity," see 18
U.S.C. 1961(1)(B), (C), and (D). Petitioners predict that if state courts are
permitted to interpret federal criminal statutes, they will create a body of
precedent relating to those statutes and that the federal courts will consequently
lose control over the orderly and uniform development of federal criminal law.

19

We perceive no "clear incompatibility" between state court jurisdiction over

civil RICO actions and federal interests. As a preliminary matter, concurrent
jurisdiction over 1964(c) suits is clearly not incompatible with 3231 itself,
for civil RICO claims are not "offenses against the laws of the United States,"
3231, and do not result in the imposition of criminal sanctions uniform or
otherwise. See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
240-241, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2344-2345, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (civil RICO
intended to be primarily remedial rather than punitive).

20

More to the point, however, our decision today creates no significant danger of
inconsistent application of federal criminal law. Although petitioners' concern
with the need for uniformity and consistency of federal criminal law is well

taken, see Ableman v. Booth, 21 Haw. 506, 517-518, 16 L.Ed. 169 (1859); cf.
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97, 68 S.Ct. 397, 398, 92 L.Ed. 562 (1948)
(vague criminal statutes may violate the Due Process Clause), federal courts,
pursuant to 3231, would retain full authority and responsibility for the
interpretation and application of federal criminal law, for they would not be
bound by state court interpretations of the federal offenses constituting RICO's
predicate acts. State courts adjudicating civil RICO claims will, in addition, be
guided by federal court interpretations of the relevant federal criminal statutes,
just as federal courts sitting in diversity are guided by state court interpretations
of state law, see, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465, 87
S.Ct. 1776, 1782, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967). State court judgments
misinterpreting federal criminal law would, of course, also be subject to direct
review by this Court. Thus, we think that state court adjudication of civil RICO
actions will, in practice, have at most a negligible effect on the uniform
interpretation and application of federal criminal law, cf. Pan-American
Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court of Delaware, Newcastle County, 366 U.S.
656, 665-666, 81 S.Ct. 1303, 1308-1309, 6 L.Ed.2d 584 (1961) (rejecting claim
that uniform interpretation of the Natural Gas Act will be jeopardized by
concurrent jurisdiction), and will not, in any event, result in any more
inconsistency than that which a multimembered, multi-tiered federal judicial
system already creates, cf. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492
U.S. 229, 235, n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2898 n. 2, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989)
(surveying conflict among federal appellate courts over RICO's "pattern of
racketeering activity" requirement).
21

Moreover, contrary to petitioners' fears, we have full faith in the ability of state
courts to handle the complexities of civil RICO actions, particularly since many
RICO cases involve asserted violations of state law, such as state fraud claims,
over which state courts presumably have greater expertise. See 18 U.S.C.
1961(1)(A) (listing state law offenses constituting predicate acts); Gulf
Offshore, supra, 453 U.S., at 484, 101 S.Ct., at 2878 ("State judges have greater
expertise in applying" laws "whose governing rules are borrowed from state
law"); see also Sedima, 473 U.S., at 499, 105 S.Ct., at 3286 (RICO "has
become a tool for everyday fraud cases"); BNA, Civil RICO Report, Vol. 2,
No. 44, p. 7 (Apr. 14, 1987) (54.9% of all RICO cases after Sedima involved
"common law fraud" and another 18% involved either "nonsecurities fraud" or
"theft or conversion"). To hold otherwise would not only denigrate the respect
accorded coequal sovereigns, but would also ignore our "consistent history of
hospitable acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction," Dowd Box, 368 U.S., at 508,
82 S.Ct., at 523. Indeed, it would seem anomalous to rule that state courts are
incompetent to adjudicate civil RICO suits when we have recently found no
inconsistency in subjecting civil RICO claims to adjudication by arbitration.

See Shearson/American Express, supra, 482 U.S., at 239, 107 S.Ct., at 2344
(rejecting argument that "RICO claims are too complex to be subject to
arbitration" and that "there is an irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and
RICO's underlying purposes").
22

Petitioners further note, as evidence of incompatibility, that RICO's procedural

mechanisms include extended venue and service-of-process provisions that are
applicable only in federal court, see 18 U.S.C. 1965. We think it sufficient,
however, to observe that we have previously found concurrent state court
jurisdiction even where federal law provided for special procedural mechanisms
similar to those found in RICO. See, e.g., Dowd Box, supra (finding concurrent
jurisdiction over Labor Management Relations Act 301(a) suits, despite
federal enforcement and venue provisions); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3,
n. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2503, n. 1, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980) (finding concurrent
jurisdiction over 42 U.S.C. 1983 suits, despite federal procedural provisions
in 1988); cf. Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 269, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 2430, 72
L.Ed.2d 824 (1982) (finding concurrent jurisdiction over disputes regarding the
applicability of 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973c,
despite provision for a three-judge panel). Although congressional specification
of procedural mechanisms applicable only in federal court may tend to suggest
that Congress intended exclusive federal jurisdiction, it does not by itself
suffice to create a "clear incompatibility" with federal interests.

23

Finally, we note that, far from disabling or frustrating federal interests, "
[p]ermitting state courts to entertain federal causes of action facilitates the
enforcement of federal rights." Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S., at 478, n. 4, 101 S.Ct.,
at 2875, n. 4; see also Dowd Box, supra, 368 U.S. at 514, 82 S.Ct., at 526.
(conflicts deriving from concurrent jurisdiction are "not necessarily
unhealthy"). Thus, to the extent that Congress intended RICO to serve broad
remedial purposes, see, e.g., Pub.L. 91-452, 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (RICO must
"be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes"); Sedima, supra, 473
U.S., at 492, n. 10, 105 S.Ct., at 3283, n. 10. ("[I]f Congress' liberalconstruction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in 1964, where RICO's
remedial purposes are most evident"), concurrent state court jurisdiction over
civil RICO claims will advance rather than jeopardize federal policies
underlying the statute.

24

For all of the above reasons, we hold that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to consider civil claims arising under RICO. Nothing in the
language, structure, legislative history, or underlying policies of RICO suggests
that Congress intended otherwise. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
accordingly

25

Affirmed.

26

Justice WHITE, concurring.

27

I agree that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO actions
and join the opinion and judgment of the Court. I add a few words only because
this Court has rarely considered contentions that civil actions based on federal
criminal statutes must be heard by the federal courts. As the Court observes
ante, at 465, the uniform construction of federal criminal statutes is no
insignificant matter, particularly because Congress has recognized potential
dangers in nonuniform construction and has confined jurisdiction over federal
criminal cases to the federal courts. There is, therefore, reason for caution
before concluding that state courts have jurisdiction over civil claims related to
federal criminal statutes and for assessing in each case the danger to federal
interests presented by potential inconsistent constructions of federal criminal
statutes.

28

RICO is an unusual federal criminal statute. It borrows heavily from state law;
racketeering activity is defined in terms of numerous offenses chargeable under
state law, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(A), as well as various federal offenses. To the
extent that there is any danger under RICO of nonuniform construction of
criminal statutes, it is quite likely that the damage will result from federal
misunderstanding of the content of state lawa problem, to be sure, but not one
to be solved by exclusive federal jurisdiction. Many of the federal offenses
named as racketeering activity under RICO have close, though perhaps not
exact, state-law analogues, cf. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 312, 16
S.Ct. 508, 510, 40 L.Ed. 709 (1896), which construed the federal mail fraud
statute, and it is unlikely that the state courts will be incompetent to construe
those federal statutes. Nor does incorrect state-court construction of those
statutes present as significant a threat to federal interests as that posed by
improper interpretation of the federal antitrust laws, which could have a
disastrous effect on interstate commerce, a particular concern of the Federal
Government. Racketeering activity as defined by RICO includes other federal
offenses without state-law analogues, but given the history as written until now
of civil RICO litigation, I doubt that state-court construction of these offenses
will be greatly disruptive of important federal interests.

29

There is also the possibility that the state courts will disrupt the uniform
construction of criminal RICO by launching new interpretations of the "pattern"
and "enterprise" elements of that offense when hearing civil RICO suits. This
possibility, though not insubstantial, cf. H.J. Inc. v. North- western Bell
Telephone Co., 429 U.S. 229, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989), is not

enough to require exclusive federal jurisdiction of civil RICO claims. Even

though varying interpretations of the "pattern" and "enterprise" elements of
RICO may drastically change the consequences that flow from particular acts,
these variations cannot make an act criminal in one court system but blameless
in another and therefore do not implicate the core due process concerns
identified by the Court, ante, at 464, as underlying the need for uniform
construction of criminal statutes. Moreover, we have the authority to reduce the
risk of, and to set aside, incorrect interpretations of these elements of RICO
liability.
30

Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice KENNEDY joins, concurring.

31

I join the opinion of the Court, addressing the issues before us on the basis
argued by the parties, which has included acceptance of the dictum in Gulf
Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2875, 69
L.Ed.2d 784 (1981), that " 'the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be
rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from
legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction
and federal interests.' " Ante, at 459-460. Such dicta, when repeatedly used as
the point of departure for analysis, have a regrettable tendency to acquire the
practical status of legal rules. I write separately, before this one has become too
entrenched, to note my view that in one respect it is not a correct statement of
the law, and in another respect it may not be.

32

State courts have jurisdiction over federal causes of action not because it is
"conferred" upon them by the Congress; nor even because their inherent powers
permit them to entertain transitory causes of action arising under the laws of
foreign sovereigns, see, e.g., McKenna v. Fisk, 1 How. 241, 247-249, 11 L.Ed.
117 (1843); but because "[t]he laws of the United States are laws in the several
States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State
laws are. . . . The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which
constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of the two
jurisdictions are not foreign to each other. . . ." Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.
130, 136-137, 23 L.Ed. 833 (1876); see also Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 221-223, 36 S.Ct. 595, 598-599, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916).

33

It therefore takes an affirmative act of power under the Supremacy Clause to

oust the States of jurisdictionan exercise of what one of our earliest cases
referred to as "the power of congress to withdraw" federal claims from statecourt jurisdiction. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 26, 5 L.Ed. 19 (1820)
(emphasis added). See also Bombolis, supra, 241 U.S., at 221, 36 S.Ct., at 598
(concurrent jurisdiction exists "unless excepted by express constitutional

limitation or by valid legislation"); Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M.R. Co. v.
Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 208, 45 S.Ct. 47, 48, 69 L.Ed. 247 (1924) ("As
[Congress] made no provision concerning the remedy, the federal and the state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction").
34

As an original proposition, it would be eminently arguable that depriving state

courts of their sovereign authority to adjudicate the law of the land must be
done, if not with the utmost clarity, cf. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 243, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (state
sovereign immunity can be eliminated only by "clear statement"), at least
expressly. That was the view of Alexander Hamilton:

35

"When . . . we consider the State governments and the national governments, as

they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE,
the inference seems to be conclusive that the State courts would have a
concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, where it
was not expressly prohibited." The Federalist No. 82, p. 132 (E. Bourne ed.
1947).

36

See also Galveston, H. & S.A.R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 490, 32 S.Ct.
205, 206, 56 L.Ed. 516 (1912) ("[J]urisdiction is not defeated by implication").
Although as early as Claflin, see 93 U.S., at 137, and as late as Gulf Offshore,
we have said that the exclusion of concurrent state jurisdiction could be
achieved by implication, the only cases in which to my knowledge we have
acted upon such a principle are those relating to the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Actwhere the full extent of our analysis was the less than
compelling statement that provisions giving the right to sue in United States
District Court "show that [the right] is to be exercised only in a 'court of the
United States.' " General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R.
Co., 260 U.S. 261, 287, 43 S.Ct. 106, 117, 67 L.Ed. 244 (1922) (emphasis
added). See also Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440, 40 S.Ct. 385, 386, 64 L.Ed. 649 (1920) (dictum);
Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448, 451, n. 6, 63 S.Ct. 1146, 11471148, n. 6, 87 L.Ed. 1509 (1943) (dictum); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,
267, n. 18, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 2429, n. 18, 72 L.Ed.2d 824 (1982) (dictum). In the
standard fields of exclusive federal jurisdiction, the governing statutes
specifically recite that suit may be brought "only" in federal court, Investment
Company Act of 1940, as amended, 84 Stat. 1429, 15 U.S.C. 80a-35(b)(5);
that the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be "exclusive," Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C. 78aa; Natural
Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 833, 15 U.S.C. 717u; Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 892, 29 U.S.C. 1132(e)(1); or indeed even that

the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be "exclusive of the courts of the
States," 18 U.S.C. 3231 (criminal cases); 28 U.S.C. 1333 (admiralty,
maritime, and prize cases), 1334 (bankruptcy cases), 1338 (patent, plant variety
protection, and copyright cases), 1351 (actions against consuls or vice consuls
of foreign states), 1355 (actions for recovery or enforcement of fine, penalty, or
forfeiture incurred under Act of Congress), 1356 (seizures on land or water not
within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction).
37

Assuming, however, that exclusion by implication is possible, surely what is

required is implication in the text of the statute, and not merely, as the second
part of the Gulf Offshore dictum would permit, through "unmistakable
implication from legislative history." 453 U.S., at 478, 101 S.Ct., at 2875.
Although Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7
L.Ed.2d 483 (1962), after concluding that the statute "does not state nor even
suggest that [federal] jurisdiction shall be exclusive," id., at 506, 82 S.Ct., at
522, proceeded quite unnecessarily to examine the legislative history, it did so
to reinforce rather than contradict the conclusion it had already reached. We
have never found state jurisdiction excluded by "unmistakable implication"
from legislative history. It is perhaps harmless enough to say that it can be,
since one can hardly imagine an "implication from legislative history" that is
"unmistakable"i.e., that demonstrates agreement to a proposition by a
majority of both Houses and the Presidentunless the proposition is embodied
in statutory text to which those parties have given assent. But harmless or not, it
is simply wrong in principle to assert that Congress can effect this affirmative
legislative act by simply talking about it with unmistakable clarity. What is
needed to oust the States of jurisdiction is congressional action (i.e., a provision
of law), not merely congressional discussion.

38

It is perhaps also true that implied preclusion can be established by the fact that
a statute expressly mentions only federal courts, plus the fact that state-court
jurisdiction would plainly disrupt the statutory scheme. That is conceivably
what was meant by the third part of the Gulf Offshore dictum, "clear
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests." 453 U.S.,
at 478, 101 S.Ct., at 2875. If the phrase is interpreted more broadly than that,
howeverif it is taken to assert some power on the part of this Court to
exclude state-court jurisdiction when systemic federal interests make it
undesirable it has absolutely no foundation in our precedent.

39

Gulf Offshore cited three cases to support its "incompatibility" formulation. The
first was Dowd Box, supra, 368 U.S., at 507-508, 82 S.Ct., at 523, which
contains nothing to support any "incompatibility" principle, except a quotation
from the second case Gulf Offshore cited, Claflin. Indeed, in response to the

argument that "[o]nly the federal judiciary . . . possesses both the familiarity
with federal labor legislation and the monolithic judicial system necessary" to
elaborate a coherent system of national labor laws, the Dowd Box opinion said:
"Whatever the merits of this argument as a matter of policy, we find nothing to
indicate that Congress adopted such a policy in enacting 301." 368 U.S., at
507, 82 S.Ct., at 522. The second case cited was Claflin, which said that
concurrent jurisdiction exists "where it is not excluded by express provision or
by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular case."
93 U.S., at 136. The subsequent discussion makes it entirely clear, however,
that what the Court meant by "incompatibility in its exercise arising from the
nature of the particular case" was that the particular statute at issue impliedly
excluded state-court jurisdiction. "Congress," the Court said, "may, if it sees fit,
give to the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction," which it does "sometimes . . .
by express enactment and sometimes by implication." Id., at 137. The third case
cited, Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228 (1953),
had nothing to do with state-court jurisdiction over a federal cause of action. It
held that the National Labor Relations Act, whose express provision that the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board shall be exclusive had
already been held to prevent federal courts from assuming primary jurisdiction
over labor disputes, see Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41,
48, 58 S.Ct. 459, 462, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938), prevented state courts as well.
40

In sum: As the Court holds, the RICO cause of action meets none of the three
tests for exclusion of state-court jurisdiction recited in Gulf Offshore. Since that
is so, the proposition that meeting any one of the tests would have sufficed is
dictum here, as it was there. In my view meeting the second test is assuredly not
enough, and meeting the third may not be.

Compare McCarter v. Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196, 201 (CA3 1989) (concurrent
jurisdiction); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1193-1195 (CA4 1988)
(same); Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 738-739 (CA9 1987) (same), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 993, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988); Simpson Elec.
Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 450, 534 N.Y.S.2d 152, 530 N.E.2d 860
(1988) (same); Rice v. Janovich, 109 Wash.2d 48, 742 P.2d 1230 (1987)
(same); Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.3d 903, 221 Cal.Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d
375 (1985) (same); County of Cook v. MidCon Corp., 773 F.2d 892, 905, n. 4
(CA7 1985) (dictum); Dubroff v. Dubroff, 833 F.2d 557, 562 (CA5 1987) (civil
RICO claims can "probably" be brought in state court), with Chivas Products
Ltd. v. Owen, 864 F.2d 1280, 1286 (CA6 1988) (exclusive jurisdiction);
VanderWeyst v. First State Bank of Benson, 425 N.W.2d 803, 812 (Minn.)
(expressing "serious reservations" about assuming concurrent RICO

jurisdiction), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943, 109 S.Ct. 369, 102 L.Ed.2d 359
(1988). See generally Note, 57 Ford L.Rev. 271, 271, n. 9 (1988) (listing
federal and state courts in conflict); Note, 73 Cornell L.Rev. 1047, 1047, n. 5
(1988) (same); Note, 62 St. John's L.Rev. 301, 303, n. 7 (1988) (same).
2

Title 18 U.S.C. 3231 provides in full:

"The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the
United States.
"Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the
courts of the several States under the laws thereof."