Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986)

476 U.S.
140
106 S.Ct. 1745
90 L.Ed.2d 116
Despina SMALIS and Ernest Smalis, Petitioners,

v.
PENNSYLVANIA.
No. 85-227.
Argued April 2, 1986.
Decided May 5, 1986.
Syllabus
Petitioners, husband and wife, who owned a building housing a restaurant
and apartments, were charged with various crimes in connection with a
fire in the building that resulted in the killing of two tenants. At the close
of the prosecution's case in chief at their bench trial in a Pennsylvania
state court, petitioners challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by filing
a demurrer pursuant to a Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure. The
trial court sustained the demurrer, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court
quashed the Commonwealth's appeal on the ground that it was barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the granting of a demurrer is not the functional equivalent of
an acquittal and that, for purposes of considering a plea of double
jeopardy, a defendant who demurs at the close of the prosecution's case in
chief "elects to seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or
innocence."
Held: The trial judge's granting of petitioners' demurrer was an acquittal
under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Commonwealth's appeal was
barred because reversal would have led to further trial proceedings.
Whether the trial is to a jury or, as here, to the bench, subjecting the
defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or
innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Pp. 144-146.
507 Pa. 344, 490 A.2d 394 (1985), reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Norma Chase, for petitioners.

Robert L. Eberhardt, Pittsburgh, Pa., for respondent.
Andrew L. Frey, Washington, D.C., for U.S., as amicus curiae, by special
leave of Court.
Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the close of the prosecution's case in chief, the trial court dismissed certain
charges against petitioners on the ground that the evidence presented was
legally insufficient to support a conviction. The question presented is whether
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecution from appealing this ruling.
* Petitioners, husband and wife, owned a building housing a restaurant and

some apartments that burned under suspicious circumstances, killing two of the
tenants. Petitioners were charged with various crimes in connection with this
fire, including criminal homicide, reckless endangerment, and causing a
catastrophe.1 They opted for a bench trial, and at the close of the prosecution's
case in chief challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by filing a demurrer
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1124(a)(1).2 The trial
court sustained petitioners' demurrer to charges of murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and causing a catastrophe, stating:
"As the trier of fact and law, the court was not satisfied, after considering all of
the facts together with all reasonable inferences which the Commonwealth's
evidence tended to prove, that there was sufficient evidence from which it
could be concluded that either of the defendants was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of setting or causing to be set the fire in question." App. to Pet. for Cert.
101a-102a.
The Commonwealth sought review of this ruling in the Superior Court of

Pennsylvania, but a panel of that court quashed the appeal, holding it barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Superior Court granted review en banc and
affirmed. 331 Pa.Super. 307, 480 A.2d 1046 (1984). Citing a number of our
decisions as controlling authority, the court set out two relevant principles of
law. First, a judgment that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a guilty
verdict constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct.
1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct.
2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct.
2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91, 98 S.Ct.
2187, 2193, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (dicta); Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40,
101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981). Second, when a trial court enters such a
judgment, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars an appeal by the prosecution not
only when it might result in a second trial, but also if reversal would translate
into further proceedings devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the
elements of the offense charged. The Superior Court concluded that because
reversal of the trial court's granting of petitioners' demurrer would necessitate
further trial proceedings, the Commonwealth's appeal was improper under
Martin Linen.
5
The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which

reversed. Commonwealth v. Zoller, 507 Pa. 344, 490 A.2d 394 (1985). 3 The
court relied heavily on the statement in United States v. Scott, supra, that a trial
judge's ruling in a defendant's favor constitutes an acquittal "only when 'the
ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the
defendant's favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the
offense charged.' " Id., 437 U.S., at 97, 98 S.Ct., at 2197 (quoting Martin Linen,
supra, 430 U.S., at 571, 97 S.Ct., at 1354). The court gave the following
explanation of why the trial court's ruling on petitioners' demurrer is not within
this definition of an acquittal:
"In deciding whether to grant a demurrer, the court does not determine whether
or not the defendant is guilty on such evidence, but determines whether the
evidence, if credited by the jury, is legally sufficient to warrant the conclusion
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
"Hence, by definition, a demurrer is not a factual determination. . . . [T]he

question before the trial judge in ruling on a demurrer remains purely one of
law.
"We conclude, therefore, that a demurrer is not the functional equivalent of an

acquittal, and that the Commonwealth has the right to appeal from an order
sustaining defendant's demurrer to its case-in-chief. In such a situation, the
defendant himself elects to seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual
guilt or innocence." Commonwealth v. Zoller, supra, at 357-358, 490 A.2d, at
401.
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case to the

Superior Court for a determination on the merits of the appeal. We granted
certiorari, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S.Ct. 307, 88 L.Ed.2d 285 (1985), and now
reverse.4
II
10
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that, for purposes of

considering a plea of double jeopardy, a defendant who demurs at the close of
the prosecution's case in chief "elects to seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to
his factual guilt or innocence." Commonwealth v. Zoller, supra, at 358, 490
A.2d, at 401. What the demurring defendant seeks is a ruling that as a matter of
law the State's evidence is insufficient to establish his factual guilt.5 Our past
decisions, which we are not inclined to reconsider at this time, hold that such a
ruling is an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e.g., United States
v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra; Sanabria v. United States, supra.6 United
States v. Scott does not overturn these precedents; indeed, it plainly indicates
that the category of acquittals includes "judgment[s] . . . by the court that the
evidence is insufficient to convict." 437 U.S., at 91, 98 S.Ct., at 2194. 7
11
The Commonwealth argues that its appeal is nonetheless permissible under

Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80
L.Ed.2d 311 (1984), because resumption of petitioners' bench trial following a
reversal on appeal would simply constitute "continuing jeopardy." Brief for
Respondent 87-88. But Lydon teaches that "[a]cquittals, unlike convictions,
terminate the initial jeopardy." 466 U.S., at 308, 104 S.Ct., at 1813. Thus,
whether the trial is to a jury or to the bench, subjecting the defendant to
postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211-212, 104 S.Ct.
2305, 2310-11, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). 8
12
When a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to

proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the appeal itself has no
proper purpose. Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the interest of the
accused in having an end to the proceedings against him. The Superior Court
was correct, therefore, in holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a
postacquittal appeal by the prosecution not only when it might result in a
second trial, but also if reversal would translate into " 'further proceedings of
some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of
the offense charged.' " Martin Linen, 430 U.S., at 570, 97 S.Ct., at 1354. 9
13
We hold, therefore, that the trial judge's granting of petitioners' demurrer was
an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that the Commonwealth's
appeal was barred because reversal would have led to further trial proceedings.
14
The judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
15
Reversed.
Various misdemeanor charges were also filed against petitioners, as well as

charges relating to a previous fire in another building that they owned. These
other charges are not relevant to this petition.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1124, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. (1985

Pamphlet), provides in relevant part:
"Challenges to Sufficiency of Evidence
"(a) A defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
conviction of one or more of the offenses charged by a:
"(1) demurrer to the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at the close of
the Commonwealth's case-in-chief;
*****
"(b) A demurrer to the evidence shall not constitute an admission of any facts
or inferences except for the purpose of deciding the demurrer. If the demurrer
is not sustained, the defendant may present evidence and the case shall
proceed."
Before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, petitioners' case was consolidated

with another case presenting the same double jeopardy issue, Commonwealth v.
Zoller, 318 Pa.Super. 402, 465 A.2d 16 (1983).
For purposes of our jurisdiction, the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court was final and subject to review at this time under 28 U.S.C. 1257(3).
Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 92 S.Ct. 183, 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971). As
explained in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d
651 (1977):
"[T]he guarantee against double jeopardy assures an individual that, among
other things, he will not be forced, with certain exceptions, to endure the
personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more
than once for the same offense. . . . Obviously, these aspects of the guarantee's
protections would be lost if the accused were forced to 'run the gauntlet' a
second time before an appeal could be taken; even if the accused is acquitted,
or, if convicted, has his conviction ultimately reversed on double jeopardy

grounds, he has still been forced to endure a trial that the Double Jeopardy
Clause was designed to prohibit." Id., at 661-662, 97 S.Ct., at 2041-2042
(footnote omitted).
5
We of course accept the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's definition of what the

trial judge must consider in ruling on a defendant's demurrer. But just as "the
trial judge's characterization of his own action cannot control the classification
of the action [under the Double Jeopardy Clause]," United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82, 96, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2196, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (citation omitted), so
too the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's characterization, as a matter of double
jeopardy law, of an order granting a demurrer is not binding on us.
See also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1
(1978), where a Court of Appeals' reversal of the defendant's conviction on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury verdict
"unquestionably . . . 'represente[d] a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of
the factual elements of the offense charged.' " Id. at 10, 98 S.Ct., at 2147
(quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S., at 571, 97 S.Ct., at 1354).
The status of the trial court's judgment as an acquittal is not affected by the
Commonwealth's allegation that the court "erred in deciding what degree of
recklessness was . . . required to be shown under Pennsylvania's definition of
[third-degree] murder." Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. "[T]he fact that 'the acquittal may
result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of
governing legal principles' . . . affects the accuracy of that determination but it
does not alter its essential character." United States v. Scott, 437 U.S., at 98, 98
S.Ct., at 2197 (quoting id., at 106, 98 S.Ct., at 2201 (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting)). Accord, Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57
L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) supra; Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81
L.Ed.2d 164 (1984).
In Rumsey, a trial judge sitting as a sentencer in a death-penalty proceeding

entered an "acquittal," i.e., a life sentence, based on an erroneous construction
of the law governing a particular aggravating circumstance. The Court held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a second sentencing hearing. It
distinguished United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d
232 (1975), which holds that the prosecution may appeal when the trial court
enters judgment n.o.v. following a jury verdict of guilty. Rumsey explains that "
[n]o double jeopardy problem was presented in Wilson because the appellate
court, upon reviewing asserted legal errors of the trial judge, could simply
order the jury's guilty verdict reinstated; no new factfinding would be
necessary, and the defendant therefore would not be twice placed in jeopardy."
467 U.S., at 211-212, 104 S.Ct., at 2310-2311.

9
The fact that the "further proceedings" standard which the Superior Court
quoted from Martin Linen was first articulated in United States v. Jenkins, 420
U.S. 358, 370, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975), does not detract
from its authority. United States v. Scott, supra, overrules Jenkins only insofar
as Jenkins bars an appeal by the government when a defendant successfully
moves for dismissal on a ground "unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. . . ."
Scott, supra, 437 U.S., at 99, 98 S.Ct., at 2198. The issue before us in Scott was
what constitutes an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause; the question of
the circumstances under which an acquittal is appealable was not presented.

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476 U.S.

Despina SMALIS and Ernest Smalis, Petitioners,

Norma Chase, for petitioners.

* Petitioners, husband and wife, owned a building housing a restaurant and

The Commonwealth sought review of this ruling in the Superior Court of

The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which

"Hence, by definition, a demurrer is not a factual determination. . . . [T]he

"We conclude, therefore, that a demurrer is not the functional equivalent of an

Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case to the

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that, for purposes of

The Commonwealth argues that its appeal is nonetheless permissible under

When a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to

The judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is

Various misdemeanor charges were also filed against petitioners, as well as

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1124, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. (1985

Before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, petitioners' case was consolidated

For purposes of our jurisdiction, the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme

or, if convicted, has his conviction ultimately reversed on double jeopardy

We of course accept the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's definition of what the

In Rumsey, a trial judge sitting as a sentencer in a death-penalty proceeding

467 U.S., at 211-212, 104 S.Ct., at 2310-2311.

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