458 U.S.

592
102 S.Ct. 3260
73 L.Ed.2d 995

ALFRED L. SNAPP & SON, INC., et al., Petitioners

v.
PUERTO RICO, ex rel., Pedro BAREZ, Secretary of Labor
and Human Resources.
No. 80-1305.
Argued April 20, 1982.
Decided July 1, 1982.

Syllabus
Respondent Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed suit in Federal District
Court against petitioners, individuals and companies engaged in the apple
industry in Virginia, alleging that petitioners had violated related
provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, and implementing regulations. The purposes of this statutory
and regulatory scheme are to give United States workers, including
citizens of Puerto Rico, a preference over temporary foreign workers for
jobs that become available within this country, to ensure that working
conditions of domestic employees are not adversely affected when foreign
workers are brought in, and to prohibit discrimination against United
States workers in favor of foreign workers. It was alleged that pursuant to
the federal laws petitioners had reported 787 job openings for temporary
farm labor to pick the 1978 apple crop, and that in violation of such laws
petitioners had discriminated against Puerto Rican workers by failing to
provide employment for qualified Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers, by
subjecting those Puerto Rican workers that were employed to working
conditions more burdensome than those established for temporary foreign
workers, and by improperly terminating employment of Puerto Rican
workers. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in its capacity as parens
patriae, Puerto Rico asserted that this alleged discrimination deprived the
Commonwealth of its right "to effectively participate in the benefits of the
Federal Employment Service System of which it is a part" and thereby
caused irreparable injury to the Commonwealth's efforts "to promote
opportunities for profitable employment for Puerto Rican laborers and to

reduce unemployment in the Commonwealth." The District Court

dismissed the complaint, holding that Puerto Rico lacked standing to bring
the action in view of the small number of individuals directly involved
and the slight impact upon Puerto Rico's general economy that the loss of
787 temporary jobs could have. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: Puerto Rico has parens patriae standing to maintain this suit. Pp.
600-610. (a) In order to maintain a parens patriae action, a State must
articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties,
that is, the State must be more than a nominal party. The State must
express a "quasi-sovereign" interest, such as its interest in the health and
well-beingboth physical and economicof its residents in general.
Although more must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of
individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be considered
as well in determining whether the State has alleged injury to a
sufficiently substantial segment of its population. A State also has a quasisovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status
within the federal systemthat is, in ensuring that the State and its
general population are not excluded from the benefits that are to flow
from participation in the federal system. Pp. 600-608.
(b) Under the above principles, Puerto Rico's allegations that petitioners
discriminated against Puerto Ricans in favor of foreign laborers falls
within the Commonwealth's quasi-sovereign interest in the general wellbeing of its citizens. A State's interest in the well-being of its residents,
which extends beyond mere physical interests to economic and
commercial interests, also includes the State's substantial interest in
securing its residents from the harmful effects of discrimination. This
interest is peculiarly strong in the case of Puerto Rico simply because of
the fact that invidious discrimination frequently occurs along ethnic lines.
Alternatively, Puerto Rico has parens patriae standing to pursue its
residents' interests in the Commonwealth's full and equal participation in
the federal employment service scheme established by the laws involved
here. Pp.608-610
4th Cir., 632 F.2d 365, affirmed.
Thomas J. Bacas, Washington, D. C., for petitioners.
Paul A. Lenzini, Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico seeks to bring suit in its
capacity as parens patriae against petitioners for their alleged violations of
federal law. Puerto Rico contends that those violations discriminated against
Puerto Ricans and injured the Puerto Rican economy. The question presented
here is whether Puerto Rico has standing to maintain this suit.

2* A.
3

The factual background of this case involves the interaction of two federal
statutes, the Wagner-Peyser Act, 48 Stat. 113, 29 U.S.C. 49 et seq., and the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C.
1101 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.IV). The Wagner-Peyser Act was passed in
1933 in order to deal with the massive problem of unemployment resulting
from the Depression. The Act establishes the United States Employment
Service within the Department of Labor "[i]n order to promote the
establishment and maintenance of a national system of public employment
offices." 29 U.S.C. 49. State agencies, which have been approved by the
Secretary of Labor, are authorized to participate in the nationwide employment
service.1 49g. The Secretary is authorized to make "such rules and regulations
as may be necessary" to accomplish the ends of the Act. 49k. Federal
regulations issued pursuant to that authority have established an interstate
clearance system to provide employers a means of recruiting nonlocal workers,
when the supply of local workers is inadequate. 20 CFR 602.2(c) (1981). If
local workers are not available, a "clearance order" is sent through the
Employment and Training Administration of the Department of Labor to other
state agencies in order to give them an opportunity to meet the request.

Some of petitioners' obligations under the employment system established by

the Wagner-Peyser Act stem from the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, insofar as it regulates the admission of nonimmigrant aliens into the
United States. The latter Act authorizes the admission of temporary foreign
workers into the United States only "if unemployed persons capable of
performing such service or labor cannot be found in this country." 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii). The Attorney General is charged with determining whether
entry of foreign workers would meet this standard, "upon petition of the
importing employer." 8 U.S.C. 1184(c). He is to make this determination
"after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government." Ibid. The
Attorney General has delegated this responsibility to the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization, 8 CFR 2.1 (1982), who, in turn, relies on the
Secretary of Labor for the initial determinations. 8 CFR 214.2(h)(3) (1982).2
To meet this responsibility, the Secretary of Labor relies upon the employment
referral system established under the Wagner-Peyser Act.

Any employer who wants to employ temporary foreign agricultural laborers

must first seek domestic laborers for the openings through use of the interstate
clearance system. The employer who anticipates a need for foreign laborers
must file an application with the local public employment office, including a
copy of the job offer. 20 CFR 655.201(a)(1), (b)(1) (1981). The application
must be filed in sufficient time to allow the agency to recruit through the
interstate clearance system for 60 days prior to the estimated date of the start of
employment. 655.201(c). The regulations further provide that the employer
must include assurances that the job opportunity is "open to all qualified U. S.
workers without regard to race, color, national origin, sex, or religion, and is
open to United States workers with handicaps who are qualified to perform the
work," and that the employer will continue to seek United States workers until
the foreign workers have departed for the employer's place of employment.
655.203(c), (d).3 Finally, the regulations require that "each employer's job offer
to U. S. workers must offer U. S. workers at least the same benefits which the
employer is offering, intends to offer, or will afford, to temporary foreign
workers." 655.202(a). Similarly, the employer may not impose obligations or
restrictions on domestic workers that are not, or will not be, imposed on foreign
workers. Ibid.

The obvious point of this somewhat complicated statutory and regulatory

framework is to provide two assurances to United States workers, including the
citizens of Puerto Rico. First, these workers are given a preference over foreign
workers for jobs that become available within this country. Second, to the
extent that foreign workers are brought in, the working conditions of domestic
employees are not to be adversely affected, nor are United States workers to be
discriminated against in favor of foreign workers.

B
7

The particular facts of this case involve the 1978 apple harvest on the east
coast. That was apparently a good year for apples, resulting in a substantial
need for temporary farm laborers to pick the crop. To meet this need the apple
growers filed clearance orders with their state employment agencies. Through
the system described above, a total of 2,318 job openings were transmitted to
Puerto Rico on August 2, 1978. As of August 14, which marked the end of the
60-day "availability" period, supra, at 596, the Commonwealth Department of
Labor had recruited 1,094 Puerto Rican workers. Puerto Rican workers for the
remaining openings were subsequently recruited. As stated in Puerto Rico's
complaint:
"Of this total number of 2,318 Puerto Rican workers, only 992 actually arrived

on the mainland. The remainder never left Puerto Rico because of oral advice
from the United States Department of Labor requesting cancellation of
remaining flights because many of the defendant growers had refused to
employ Puerto Rican workers who had already arrived. Of the 992 workers
who arrived at the orchards, 420 came to Virginia orchards. Of these 420
workers, fewer than 30 had employment three weeks later, the growers having
refused to employ most of these workers and having dismissed most of the rest
within a brief time for alleged unproductivity." App. 17-18.

Puerto Rico filed this suit on January 11, 1979, naming as defendants numerous
individuals and companies engaged in the apple industry in Virginia. 4 Of the
2,318 job requests forwarded to Puerto Rico, respondent alleged that 787 of
these had come from the named Virginia growers. In three counts, the
complaint alleged that the defendants had violated the Wagner-Peyser Act, the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, and various federal regulations
implementing those statutes, by failing to provide employment for qualified
Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers, by subjecting those Puerto Rican workers
that were employed to working conditions more burdensome than those
established for temporary foreign workers,5 and by improperly terminating
employment of Puerto Rican workers. Alleging that this discrimination against
Puerto Rican farmworkers deprived "the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of its
right to effectively participate in the benefits of the Federal Employment
Service System of which it is a part" and thereby caused irreparable injury to
the Commonwealth's efforts "to promote opportunities for profitable
employment for Puerto Rican laborers and to reduce unemployment in the
Commonwealth," respondent sought declaratory relief with respect to the past
practices of petitioners and injunctive relief requiring petitioners to conform to
the relevant federal statutes and regulations in the future.

10

Petitioners responded with a motion to dismiss, asserting that respondent lacked

standing to bring this action. Although the District Court, 469 F.Supp. 928, held
that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is capable of asserting parens patriae
interests in general, it agreed with petitioners' contention that no such action
could be maintained under the circumstances of this case. In particular, the
District Court relied upon the relatively small number of individuals directly
involvedsome 787 out of a total population of close to 3 millionand the
slight impact upon the general economy of Puerto Rico that the loss of this
number of temporary jobs could have.

11

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.6 632
F.2d 365 (1980). The majority held that the District Court had focused too
narrowly on those directly involved, ignoring those that were indirectly affected

by petitioners' alleged actions. Noting the serious dimensions of the

unemployment problem in Puerto Rico and the general condition of its
economy,7 the court stated that "[d]eliberate efforts to stigmatize the labor
force as inferior carry a universal sting" and the "inability of the United States
government . . . to grant Puerto Ricans equal treatment with other citizens or
even with foreign temporary workers must certainly have an effect which
permeates the entire island of Puerto Rico." Id., at 370. These indirect effects
on the interests of "a substantial portion of its citizenry" were sufficient, in its
view, to support a parens patriae action. Ibid.
12

We granted certiorari to determine whether Puerto Rico could maintain a

parens patriae action here, despite the small number of individuals directly
involved. 454 U.S. 1079, 102 S.Ct. 631, 70 L.Ed.2d 612 (1981).

II
13

Parens patriae means literally "parent of the country."8 The parens patriae
action has its roots in the common-law concept of the "royal prerogative."9 The
royal prerogative included the right or responsibility to take care of persons
who "are legally unable, on account of mental incapacity, whether it proceed
from 1st. nonage: 2. idiocy: or 3. lunacy: to take proper care of themselves and
their property."10 At a fairly early date, American courts recognized this
common-law concept, but now in the form of a legislative prerogative: "This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature [and] is a
most beneficent function . . . often necessary to be exercised in the interests of
humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves." Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57, 10 S.Ct. 792,
808, 34 L.Ed. 481 (1890).

14

This common-law approach, however, has relatively little to do with the

concept of parens patriae standing that has developed in American law. That
concept does not involve the States stepping in to represent the interests of
particular citizens who, for whatever reason, cannot represent themselves. In
fact, if nothing more than this is involvedi.e., if the State is only a nominal
party without a real interest of its ownthen it will not have standing under the
parens patriae doctrine. See Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 96
S.Ct. 2333, 49 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304
U.S. 387, 58 S.Ct. 954, 82 L.Ed. 1416 (1938); Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. &
S.F.R. Co., 220 U.S. 277, 31 S.Ct. 434, 55 L.Ed. 465 (1911). Rather, to have
such standing the State must assert an injury to what has been characterized as a
"quasi-sovereign" interest, which is a judicial construct that does not lend itself

to a simple or exact definition. Its nature is perhaps best understood by

comparing it to other kinds of interests that a State may pursue and then by
examining those interests that have historically been found to fall within this
category.
15

Two sovereign interests are easily identified: First, the exercise of sovereign
power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdictionthis
involves the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal;
second, the demand for recognition from other sovereignsmost frequently
this involves the maintenance and recognition of borders. The former is
regularly at issue in constitutional litigation. The latter is also a frequent subject
of litigation, particularly in this Court:

16

"The original jurisdiction of this Court is one of the mighty instruments which
the framers of the Constitution provided so that adequate machinery might be
available for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States and between a
State and citizens of another State. . . . The traditional methods available to a
sovereign for the settlement of such disputes were diplomacy and war. Suit in
this Court was provided as an alternative." Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324
U.S. 439, 450, 65 S.Ct. 716, 722, 89 L.Ed. 1051 (1945).

17

Not all that a State does, however, is based on its sovereign character. Two
kinds of nonsovereign interests are to be distinguished. First, like other
associations and private parties, a State is bound to have a variety of proprietary
interests. A State may, for example, own land or participate in a business
venture. As a proprietor, it is likely to have the same interests as other similarly
situated proprietors. And like other such proprietors it may at times need to
pursue those interests in court. Second, a State may, for a variety of reasons,
attempt to pursue the interests of a private party, and pursue those interests only
for the sake of the real party in interest. Interests of private parties are
obviously not in themselves sovereign interests, and they do not become such
simply by virtue of the State's aiding in their achievement. In such situations,
the State is no more than a nominal party.

18

Quasi-sovereign interests stand apart from all three of the above: They are not
sovereign interests, proprietary interests, or private interests pursued by the
State as a nominal party. They consist of a set of interests that the State has in
the well-being of its populace. Formulated so broadly, the concept risks being
too vague to survive the standing requirements of Art. III: A quasi-sovereign
interest must be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy between
the State and the defendant. The vagueness of this concept can only be filled in
by turning to individual cases.

19

That a parens patriae action could rest upon the articulation of a "quasisovereign" interest was first recognized by this Court in Louisiana v. Texas, 176
U.S. 1, 20 S.Ct. 251, 44 L.Ed. 347 (1900). In that case, Louisiana
unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a quarantine maintained by Texas officials,
which had the effect of limiting trade between Texas and the port of New
Orleans. The Court labeled Louisiana's interest in the litigation as that of parens
patriae, and went on to describe that interest by distinguishing it from the
sovereign and proprietary interests of the State:

20

"Inasmuch as the vindication of the freedom of interstate commerce is not

committed to the State of Louisiana, and that State is not engaged in such
commerce, the cause of action must be regarded not as involving any
infringement of the powers of the State of Louisiana, or any special injury to
her property, but as asserting that the State is entitled to seek relief in this way
because the matters complained of affect her citizens at large." Id., at 19, 20
S.Ct., at 257. 11

21

Although Louisiana was unsuccessful in that case in pursuing the commercial

interests of its residents, a line of cases followed in which States successfully
sought to represent the interests of their citizens in enjoining public nuisances.
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 44 S.Ct. 138, 68 L.Ed. 342 (1923);
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 42 S.Ct. 552, 66 L.Ed. 999 (1922); New
York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 41 S.Ct. 492, 65 L.Ed. 937 (1921); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 27 S.Ct. 655, 51 L.Ed. 956 (1907); Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 27 S.Ct. 618, 51 L.Ed. 1038 (1907);
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 22 S.Ct. 552, 46 L.Ed. 838 (1902); Missouri
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 21 S.Ct. 331, 45 L.Ed. 497 (1901).

22

In the earliest of these, Missouri v. Illinois, Missouri sought to enjoin the

defendants from discharging sewage in such a way as to pollute the Mississippi
River in Missouri. The Court relied upon an analogy to independent countries
in order to delineate those interests that a State could pursue in federal court as
parens patriae, apart from its sovereign and proprietary interests:12

23

"It is true that no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct property rights
belonging to the complainant State. But it must surely be conceded that, if the
health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the
proper party to represent and defend them. If Missouri were an independent and
sovereign State all must admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and,
that failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war having been
surrendered to the general government, it was to be expected that upon the
latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy and that remedy, we

think, is found in the constitutional provisions we are considering." Id., at 241,

21 S.Ct., at 343.
24

This analogy to an independent country was also articulated in Georgia v.

Tennessee Copper Co., supra, at 237, 27 S.Ct., at 619, a case involving air
pollution in Georgia caused by the discharge of noxious gasses from the
defendant's plant in Tennessee. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, described
the State's interest under these circumstances as follows:

25

"[T]he State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens,
in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its
mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure
air. It might have to pay individuals before it could utter that word, but with it
remains the final power. . . .

26

". . . When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside
nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever
might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable
demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi -sovereign interests."

27

Both the Missouri case and the Georgia case involved the State's interest in the
abatement of public nuisances, instances in which the injury to the public health
and comfort was graphic and direct. Although there are numerous examples of
such parens patriae suits, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, supra (flooding);
New York v. New Jersey, supra (water pollution); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S.
125, 22 S.Ct. 552, 46 L.Ed. 838 (1902) (diversion of water), parens patriae
interests extend well beyond the prevention of such traditional public
nuisances.

28

In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658, 67 L.Ed. 1117
(1923), for example, Pennsylvania was recognized as a proper party to
represent the interests of its residents in maintaining access to natural gas
produced in West Virginia:

29

"The private consumers in each State . . . constitute a substantial portion of the

State's population. Their health, comfort and welfare are seriously jeopardized
by the threatened withdrawal of the gas from the interstate stream. This is a
matter of grave public concern in which the State, as representative of the
public, has an interest apart from that of the individuals affected. It is not
merely a remote or ethical interest but one which is immediate and recognized
by law." Id., at 592, 43 S.Ct., at 663.

30

The public nuisance and economic well-being lines of cases were specifically
brought together in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 65 S.Ct.
716, 89 L.Ed. 1051 (1945), in which Georgia alleged that some 20 railroads
had conspired to fix freight rates in a manner that discriminated against Georgia
shippers in violation of the federal antitrust laws:

31

"If the allegations of the bill are taken as true, the economy of Georgia and the
welfare of her citizens have seriously suffered as the result of this alleged
conspiracy. . . . [Trade barriers] may cause a blight no less serious than the
spread of noxious gas over the land or the deposit of sewage in the streams.
They may affect the prosperity and welfare of a State as profoundly as any
diversion of waters from the rivers. . . . Georgia as a representative of the
public is complaining of a wrong which, if proven, limits the opportunities of
her people, shackles her industries, retards her development, and relegates her
to an inferior economic position among her sister States. These are matters of
grave public concern in which Georgia has an interest apart from that of
particular individuals who may be affected." Id., at 450-451, 65 S.Ct., at 722723.13

32

This summary of the case law involving parens patriae actions leads to the
following conclusions. In order to maintain such an action, the State must
articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e.,
the State must be more than a nominal party. The State must express a quasisovereign interest. Although the articulation of such interests is a matter for
case-by-case developmentneither an exhaustive formal definition nor a
definitive list of qualifying interests can be presented in the abstractcertain
characteristics of such interests are so far evident. These characteristics fall into
two general categories. First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health
and well-beingboth physical and economic of its residents in general.
Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily
denied its rightful status within the federal system.

33

The Court has not attempted to draw any definitive limits on the proportion of
the population of the State that must be adversely affected by the challenged
behavior. Although more must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of
individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be considered as
well in determining whether the State has alleged injury to a sufficiently
substantial segment of its population. One helpful indication in determining
whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to
give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that
the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign
lawmaking powers.14

34

Distinct from but related to the general well-being of its residents, the State has
an interest in securing observance of the terms under which it participates in the
federal system. In the context of parens patriae actions, this means ensuring
that the State and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to
flow from participation in the federal system. Thus, the State need not wait for
the Federal Government to vindicate the State's interest in the removal of
barriers to the participation by its residents in the free flow of interstate
commerce. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658, 67
L.Ed. 1117 (1923). Similarly, federal statutes creating benefits or alleviating
hardships create interests that a State will obviously wish to have accrue to its
residents. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 65 S.Ct. 716, 89
L.Ed. 1051 (1945) (federal antitrust laws); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981) (Natural Gas Act). Once again, we
caution that the State must be more than a nominal party. But a State does have
an interest, independent of the benefits that might accrue to any particular
individual, in assuring that the benefits of the federal system are not denied to
its general population.

35

We turn now to the allegations of the complaint to determine whether they

satisfy either or both of these criteria.15

III
36

The complaint presents two fundamental contentions. First, it alleges that the
petitioners discriminated against Puerto Ricans in favor of foreign laborers.
Second, it alleges that Puerto Ricans were denied the benefits of access to
domestic work opportunities that the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 were designed to secure for United States workers.
We find each of these allegations to fall within the Commonwealth's quasisovereign interests and, therefore, each will support a parens patriae action.

37

Petitioners contend that at most there were only 787 job opportunities at stake
in Virginia and that this number of temporary jobs could not have a substantial
direct or indirect effect on the Puerto Rican economy. We believe that this is
too narrow a view of the interests at stake here. Just as we have long recognized
that a State's interests in the health and well-being of its residents extend
beyond mere physical interests to economic and commercial interests, we
recognize a similar state interest in securing residents from the harmful effects
of discrimination. This Court has had too much experience with the political,
social, and moral damage of discrimination not to recognize that a State has a
substantial interest in assuring its residents that it will act to protect them from
these evils. This interest is peculiarly strong in the case of Puerto Rico simply

because of the unfortunate fact that invidious discrimination frequently occurs

along ethnic lines. Puerto Rico's situation differs somewhat from the States in
this regardnot in theory but in factsimply because this country has for the
most part been spared the evil of invidious discrimination based on state lines.
Were this to come to pass, however, we have no doubt that a State could seek,
in the federal courts, to protect its residents from such discrimination to the
extent that it violates federal law. Puerto Rico claims that it faces this problem
now. Regardless of the possibly limited effect of the alleged financial loss at
issue here, we agree with the Court of Appeals that "[d]eliberate efforts to
stigmatize the labor force as inferior carry a universal sting." 632 F.2d, at 370.
38

Alternatively, we find that Puerto Rico does have parens patriae standing to
pursue the interests of its residents in the Commonwealth's full and equal
participation in the federal employment service scheme established pursuant to
the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
Unemployment among Puerto Rican residents is surely a legitimate object of
the Commonwealth's concern. Just as it may address that problem through its
own legislation, it may also seek to assure its residents that they will have the
full benefit of federal laws designed to address this problem. The
Commonwealth's position in this respect is not distinguishable from that of
Georgia when it sought the protection of the federal antitrust laws in order to
eliminate freight rates that discriminated against Georgia shippers, Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, or from that of Maryland when it sought to secure
the benefits of the Natural Gas Act for its residents, Maryland v. Louisiana,
supra. Indeed, the fact that the Commonwealth participates directly in the
operation of the federal employment scheme makes even more compelling its
parens patriae interest in assuring that the scheme operates to the full benefit of
its residents.16

39

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

40

Affirmed.

41

Justice POWELL took no part in the decision of this case.

42

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN,

and Justice STEVENS join, concurring.

43

As the Court notes, ante, at 603, n. 12, the question whether a State can bring a
parens patriae action within the original jurisdiction of this Court may well
turn on considerations quite different from those implicated where the State

seeks to press a parens patriae claim in the district courts. The Framers, in
establishing original jurisdiction in this Court for suits "in which a State shall be
a Party," Art. III, 2, cl. 2, and Congress, in implementing the grant of original
jurisdiction with respect to suits between States, 28 U.S.C. 1251(a) (1976 ed.,
Supp.IV), may well have conceived of a somewhat narrower category of cases
as presenting issues appropriate for initial determination in this Court than the
full range of cases to which a State may have an interest cognizable by a federal
court. The institutional limits on the Court's ability to accommodate such suits
accentuates the need for more restrictive access to the original docket. In
addition, because the judicial power of the United States does not extend to
suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State," U.S.Const., Amdt. 11, where one State brings a suit parens
patriae against another State, a more circumspect inquiry may be required in
order to ensure that the provisions of the Eleventh Amendment are not being
too easily circumvented by the device of the State's bringing suit on behalf of
some private party. Of course, none of the concerns that might counsel for a
restrictive approach to the question of parens patriae standing is present in this
case.
44

In cases such as the present one, I can discern no basis either in the Constitution
or in policy for denying a State the opportunity to vindicate the federal rights of
its citizens. At the very least, the prerogative of a State to bring suits in federal
court should be commensurate with the ability of private organizations. A
private organization may bring suit to vindicate its own concrete interest in
performing those activities for which it was formed. E.g., Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1124-1125, 71 L.Ed.2d
214 (1982);1 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 263, 97 S.Ct. 555, 562, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 428, 83 S.Ct. 328, 335, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). See also Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-111, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 16121613, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) (standing of municipality premised on diminished
tax base and other "harms flowing from the realities of a racially segregated
community"). Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361,
1368, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972).2 There is no doubt that Puerto Rico's interest in
this litigation compares favorably to interests of the private organizations, and
municipality, in the cases cited above.

45

More significantly, a State is no ordinary litigant. As a sovereign entity, a State

is entitled to assess its needs, and decide which concerns of its citizens warrant
its protection and intervention. I know of nothingexcept the Constitution or
overriding federal lawthat might lead a federal court to superimpose its
judgment for that of a State with respect to the substantiality or legitimacy of a

State's assertion of sovereign interest.

46

With these considerations in mind, I join the opinion of the Court.

As used in the Act, the word "State" includes Puerto Rico. 29 U.S.C. 49b(b).
Puerto Rico's Department of Labor and Human Resources has been approved
by the Secretary of Labor and participates in the federal-state system
established by the Act.

"Either a certification from the Secretary of Labor or his designated

representative stating that qualified persons in the United States are not
available and that the employment of the beneficiary will not adversely affect
the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly
employed, or a notice that such a certification cannot be made, shall be attached
to every nonimmigrant visa petition to accord an alien a classification under
section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)." 8 CFR 214.2(h)(3)(i) (1982).

There is a further requirement that the employer continue to provide an

opportunity for employment to any qualified United States worker who applies
for a position from the time the foreign workers depart for the employer's place
of employment until the time that 50 percent of the period of the work contract
has elapsed. 20 CFR 655.203(e) (1981).

The complaint named 51 defendants: 32 apple growers and 19 officers,

partners or employees of the apple growers.

The theory of the complaint was that the apple growers were discriminating
against the Puerto Ricans in favor of Jamaican workers. In August 1978, apple
growers in several States, including Virginia, filed suit in Federal District Court
seeking an injunction against the United States Secretary of Labor, the
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and their
subordinates, to permit the recruitment and employment of foreign workers.
Puerto Rico was allowed to intervene in this suit to represent the interests of its
residents in these work opportunities. The growers complained that the federal
employment service had not produced sufficient laborers to assure that the
harvest, which was about to begin, could be successfully accomplished with
sufficient speed. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering
that a certain number of foreign workers be allowed to enter this country to pick
apples. Frederick County Fruit Growers Assn., Inc. v. Marshall, No. 780086(H) (WD Va., Aug. 31, 1978). The Jamaicans secured entry under this
order. Prior to issuing this injunction, however, the court was assured by the

apple growers that they recognized their obligation to give priority to Puerto
Rican workers, notwithstanding the court order. Puerto Rico's complaint was
founded on the charge that the apple growers failed to meet this commitment
and, thus, failed to meet their obligations under federal law.
6

The dissenting judge agreed with the analysis of the District Court.

In September 1978, 18.5% of the adults in the Puerto Rican labor force were
unemployed. Rural unemployment stood at 23%.

" 'Parens patriae,' literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to role of
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." Black's Law
Dictionary 1003 (5th ed. 1979).

See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257, 92 S.Ct. 885, 888, 31
L.Ed.2d 184 (1972); G. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae, 25
DePaul L.Rev. 895, 896 (1976); Black's, supra.

10

J. Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown 155 (1820), quoted in Curtis, supra, at

896.

11

Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, specifically rejected the idea that

Louisiana had standing to pursue more than its sovereign and proprietary
interests: "I am of opinion that the State of Louisiana, in its sovereign or
corporate capacity, cannot bring any action in this court on account of the
matters set forth in its bill. The case involves no property interest of that State.
Nor is Louisiana charged with any duty, nor has it any power, to regulate
interstate commerce." 176 U.S., at 24, 20 S.Ct., at 259.

12

Admittedly, the discussion here and in the other cases discussed below focused
on the parens patriae question in the context of a suit brought in the original
jurisdiction of this Court. There may indeed be special considerations that call
for a limited exercise of our jurisdiction in such instances; these considerations
may not apply to a similar suit brought in federal district court.

13

The Court also said, 324 U.S., at 450, 451-452, 65 S.Ct., at 722, 723-724:
"It seems to us clear that under the authority of these cases Georgia may
maintain this suit as parens patriae acting on behalf of her citizens though here,
as in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., [206 U.S., at] 237 [27 S.Ct., at 619],
we treat the injury to the State as proprietor merely as a 'makeweight.' The
original jurisdiction of this Court is one of the mighty instruments which the
framers of the Constitution provided so that adequate machinery might be
available for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States and between a

State and citizens of another State. See Missouri v. Illinois, [180 U.S., at] 221224 [21 S.Ct., at 336-337]; Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 599, 38
S.Ct. 400, 404, 59 L.Ed. 1272. Trade barriers, recriminations, intense
commercial rivalries had plagued the colonies. The traditional methods
available to a sovereign for the settlement of such disputes were diplomacy and
war. Suit in this Court was provided as an alternative. Missouri v. Illinois,
supra, 180 U.S., p. 241, 21 S.Ct., at 343; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
supra, 206 U.S., p. 237, 27 S.Ct., p. 619.
*****
"Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., [220 U.S. 277, 31 S.Ct. 434, 55
L.Ed. 465 (1911)], is not opposed to this view. In that case, the defendant
railroad company had obtained a grant from Congress to locate and maintain a
railway line through the Indian Territory out of which the State of Oklahoma
was later formed. The federal act provided certain maximum transportation
rates which the company might charge. Oklahoma sued to cancel the grant, to
have the property granted decreed to be in the State of Oklahoma as cestui que
trust, to enjoin the defendant from operating a railroad in the State, and to
enjoin pendente lite the exaction of greater rates than the maximum rates
specified. The Court construed the Act of Congress as subjecting the rates to
federal control until the territory became a part of a State, at which time the
rates became subject to state control. The Court held that our original
jurisdiction could not be invoked by a State merely because its citizens were
injured. We adhere to that decision. It does not control the present one. This is
no attempt to utilize our original jurisdiction in substitution for the established
methods of enforcing local law. This is not a suit in which a State is a mere
nominal plaintiff, individual shippers being the real complainants. This is a suit
in which Georgia asserts claims arising out of federal laws and the gravamen of
which runs far beyond the claim of damage to individual shippers."
14

Obviously, a State might make use of "private bills" in order to use its
legislative power to aid particular individuals. If the analogy spoken of above is
to this form of legislative action, then the State remains merely a nominal party
from the perspective of a federal court; it has failed to articulate any general
interest, apart from that of the individual involved.

15

Although we have spoken throughout of a "State's" standing as parens patriae,

we agree with the lower courts and the parties that the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico is similarly situated to a State in this respect: It has a claim to
represent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court at least as strong as that
of any State.

16

A State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the
Federal Government. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-486, 43 S.Ct.
597, 600-601, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) ("While the State, under some
circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of its citizens
(Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241, 21 S.Ct. 331, 343, 45 L.Ed. 497), it is
no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations
with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the
State, which represents them as parens patriae"). Here, however, the
Commonwealth is seeking to secure the federally created interests of its
residents against private defendants. Indeed, the Secretary of Labor has
represented that he has no objection to Puerto Rico's standing as parens patriae
under these circumstances. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus
Curiae in Puerto Rico v. Bramkamp, No. 724, Docket 79-7777 (CA2).

Indeed, in Havens we held that interference with HOME's "ability to provide

counseling and referral services," 455 U.S., at 379, 102 S.Ct., at 1124, provided
it with standing to vindicate claims under the Fair Housing Act of 1968. In this
case, the alleged violations of the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. 49 et seq.,
directly interfere with Puerto Rico's ability to perform the job referral service
that it has undertaken as part of its sovereign responsibility to its citizens.

A private organization may also maintain a federal-court action on behalf of its

members. E.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428, 83 S.Ct. 328, 335, 9
L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); National Motor Freight Assn. v. United States, 372 U.S.
246, 83 S.Ct. 688, 9 L.Ed.2d 709 (1963) (per curiam ). See Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 341-345, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 24402442, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).