Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973)

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414 U.S.

21
94 S.Ct. 190
38 L.Ed.2d 179

Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, et


al.
v.
Raymond R. STONE and Eugene F. Huffman.
No. 73122.
Nov. 5, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

In separate trials, appellees were convicted of violating Fla.Stat. 800.01


(1965), F.S.A., which proscribed 'the abominable and detestable crime against
nature, either with mankind or with beast . . ..'1 Having exhausted state
remedies,2 appellees sought federal habeas corpus, asserting, among other
things, that the Florida statute was impermissibly vague. The writ was granted
to both appellees. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the sole ground that
800.01 was unconstitutionally vague and void on its face for failure to give
appellees adequate notice that the conduct for which they were convicted was
forbidden by law. 478 F.2d 390 (CA5 1973).

We reverse. We perceive no violation of the 'underlying principle . . . that no


man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed.' United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). Stone was convicted for
copulation per os and per anum, Huffman for copulation per anum. These very
acts had long been held to constitute 'the abominable and detestable crime
against nature' under 800.01 and predecessor statutes. Delaney v. State, 190
So.2d 578 (Fla.Sup.Ct.1966), appeal dismissed, 387 U.S. 426, 87 S.Ct. 1710,
18 L.Ed.2d 866 (1967), declared as much; and this had been the case since
1921 under Ephraim v. State, 82 Fla. 93, 89 So. 344 (1921). Delaney also held
that there could be no complaint of vagueness or lack of notice that the
defendant's conduct was criminal where the acts committed were among those
that prior cases had held covered by the statute.

Delaney and its supporting cases require reversal of the Court of Appeals. The
judgment of federal courts as to the vagueness or not of a state statute must be
made in the light of prior state constructions of the statute. For the purpose of
determining whether a state statute is too vague and indefinite to constitute
valid legislation 'we must take the statute as though it read precisely as the
highest court of the State has interpreted it.' Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v.
Probate Court, 309 U.S. 507, 514, 68 S.Ct. 665, 669, 92 L.Ed. 744 (1940).
When a state statute has been construed to forbid identifiable conduct so that
'interpretation by (the state court) puts these words in the statute as definitely as
if it had been so amended by the legislature,' claims of impermissible
vagueness must be judged in that light. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
514, 68 S.Ct. 665, 669, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948). This has been the normal view in
this Court. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277, 35 S.Ct. 383, 384, 59 L.Ed.
573 (1915); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 253, 72 S.Ct. 725, 728, 96
L.Ed. 919 (1952); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 506, 86 S.Ct. 958, 962,
16 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966). The Court of Appeals, therefore, was not free to ignore
Delaney and related cases; and as construed by those cases, 800.01 afforded
appellees ample notice that their conduct was forbidden by law.

Appellees rely on Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla.Sup.Ct.1971), to avoid


the efficacy of prior constructions of 800.01. In that case, decided after
appellees' convictions had become final, the Florida Supreme Court
reconsidered Delaney and held that if 800.01 was intended to reach oral and
anal sexual activity, that intention should appear on the face of the statute;
otherwise it was void for vagueness and uncertainty in its language. But this
holding did not remove the fact that when appellees committed the acts with
which they were changed, they were on clear notice that their conduct was
criminal under the statute as then construed. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court
expressly ruled in Franklin that 'this judgment holding the felony statute void is
not retroactive, but prospective only,' id., 257 So.2d, at 24; and subsequently
the Florida courts denied appellee Stone's request for relief based on the
Franklin case. Stone v. State, supra, n. 2. The State Supreme Court did not
overrule Delaney with respect to pre-Franklin convictions. Nor was it
constitutionally compelled to do so or to make retroactive its new construction
of the Florida statute: 'A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent
may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and
that of relation backword. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though
later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions.' Great
Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364, 53 S.Ct.
145, 148, 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932). Contrary to the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, 800.01 was not void at the time appellees performed the acts for
which they were convicted. The motion of appellees to proceed in forma

pauperis is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.


5

So ordered.

Judgment reversed.

Fla.Stat. 800.01 (Supp.1973), F.S.A. presently provides: 'Whoever commits


the abominable and detestable crime against nature, either with mankind or with
beast, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degeee, punishable as provided in
(other statutory sections).' At the time of appellees' convictions the maximum
penalty was 20 years' imprisonment.

Appellee Stone's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Stone v. State, 245
So.2d 91 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1971), and his motion for post-conviction relief was
denied. Stone v. State, 264 So.2d 81 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 267 So.2d
329 (Fla.Sup.Ct.1972). It appears that appellee Huffman appealed from his
conviction, but did not seek collateral relief. The District Court found
exhaustion unnecessary since Huffman's claim had already been determined
adversely by the ruling in Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla.Sup.Ct.1971),
discussed in text infra.

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