Beatrice Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 1218 (1969)

396 U.S.
1218
90 S.Ct. 14
24 L.Ed.2d 41
Beatrice ALEXANDER et al.

v.
HOLMES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.
No. ____.
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1969.
September 5, 1969
Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, and Norman C. Amaker, on the

application.
William A. Allain, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Mississippi, and John C.
Satterfield, in opposition.
Solicitor General Griswold, for the United States.
See also 396 U.S. 802, 90 S.Ct. 21.
Mr. Justice BLACK, Circuit Justice.
For a great many years Mississippi has had in effect what is called a dual
system of public schools, one system for white students only and one system for
Negro students only. On July 3, 1969, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
entered an order requiring the submission of new plans to be put into effect this
fall to accelerate desegregation in 33 Mississippi school districts. On August
28, upon the motion of the Department of Justice and the recommendation of
the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, the Court of Appeals suspended
the July 3 order and postponed the date for submission of the new plans until
December 1, 1969. I have been asked by Negro plaintiffs in 14 of these school
districts to vacate the suspension of the July 3 order. Largely for the reasons set
forth below, I feel constrained to deny that relief.
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873
(1954), and Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed.
1083 (1955), we held that state-imposed segregation of students according to
race denied Negro students the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Brown I was decided 15 years ago, but in Mississippi
as well as in some other States the decision has not been completely enforced,
and there are many schools in those States that are still either 'white' or 'Negro'
schools and many that are still all-white or all-Negro. This has resulted in large
part from the fact that in Brown II the Court declared that this unconstitutional
denial of equal protection should be remedied, not immediately, but only 'with
all deliberate speed.' Federal courts have ever since struggled with the phrase
'all deliberate speed.' Unfortunately this struggle has not eliminated dual school
systems, and I am of the opinion that so long as that phrase is a relevant factor
they will never be eliminated. 'All deliberate speed' has turned out to be only a
soft euphemism for delay.
In 1964 we had before us the case of Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S.
218, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256, and we said the following:
'The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out, and that phrase can no longer
justify denying these Prince Edward County school children their constitutional
rights to an education equal to that afforded by the public schools in the other
parts of Virginia.' Id., at 234, 84 S.Ct. 1226.
That sentence means to me that there is no longer any excuse for permitting the
'all deliberate speed' phrase to delay the time when Negro children and white
children will sit together and learn together in the same public schools. Four
years later14 years from after Brown Ithis Court decided the case of Green
v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20
L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). In that case Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for a
unanimous Court, said:
"The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out * * *.' The burden on a school
today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now.' Id., at 438-439, 88 S.Ct. 1689.
'The Board must be required to formulate a new plan * * * which promise[s]

realistically to convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and a
'Negro' school, but just schools.' Id., at 442, 88 S.Ct. 1689.
These cases, along with others, are the foundation of my belief that there is no
longer the slightest excuse, reason, or justification for further postponement of
the time when every public school system in the United States will be a unitary
one, receiving and teaching students without discrimination on the basis of their
race or color. In my opinion the phrase 'with all deliberate speed' should no
longer have any relevancy whatsoever in enforcing the constitutional rights of
Negro students. The Fifth Circuit found that the Negro students in these school
districts are being denied equal protection of the law, and in my view they are
entitled to have their constitutional rights vindicated now without postponement
for any reason.
9
Although the foregoing indicates my belief as to what should ultimately be

done in this case, when an individual Justice is asked to grant special relief,
such as a stay, he must consider in light of past decisions and other factors what
action the entire Court might possibly take. I recognize that, in certain respects,
my views as stated above go beyond anything this Court has expressly held to
date. Although Green reiterated that the time for all deliberate speed had
passed, there is language in that opinion which might be interpreted as
approving a 'transition period' during which federal courts would continue to
supervise the passage of the Southern schools from dual to unitary systems.*
Although I feel there is a strong possibility that the full Court would agree with
my views, I cannot say definitely that they would, and therefore I am compelled
to consider the factors relied upon in the courts below for postponing the
effective date of the original desegregation order.
10
On August 21 the Department of Justice requested the Court of Appeals to

delay its original desegregation timetable, and the case was sent to the District
Court for hearings on the Government's motion. At those hearings both the
Department of Justice and the Department of Health, Education & Welfare took
the position that time was too short and the administrative problems too
difficult to accomplish a complete and orderly implementation of the
desegregation plans before the beginning of the 1969-1970 school year. The
district court found as a matter of fact that the time was too short, and the Court
of Appeals held that these findings were supported by the evidence. I am
unable to say that these findings are not supported. Therefore, deplorable as it is
to me, I must uphold the court's order which both sides indicate could have the
effect of delaying total desegregation of these schools for as long as a year.
11
This conclusion does not comport with my ideas of what ought to be done in
this case when it comes before the entire Court. I hope these applicants will
present the issue to the full Court at the earliest possible opportunity. I would
then hold that there are no longer any justiciable issues in the question of
making effective not only promptly but at oncenoworders sufficient to
vindicate the rights of any pupil in the United States who is effectively
excluded from a public school on account of his race or color.

12
It has been 15 years since we declared in the two Brown cases that a law which
prevents a child from going to a public school because of his color violates the
Equal Protection Clause. As this record conclusively shows, there are many
places still in this country where the schools are either 'white' or 'Negro' and not
just schools for all children as the Constitution requires. In my opinion there is
no reason why such a wholesale deprivation of constitutional rights should be
tolerated another minute. I fear that this long denial of constitutional rights is
due in large part to the phrase 'with all deliberate speed.' I would do away with
that phrase completely.
13
Application to vacate suspension of order denied.
'The obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the
effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation. There is no
universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there is obviously no
one plan that will do the job in every case. The matter must be assessed in light
of the circumstances present and the options available in each instance. It is
incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises
meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed
segregation.' Green v. County School Board, supra, at 439, 88 S.Ct. 1689.
'Where [freedom of choice] offers real promise of aiding a desegregation
program to effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a unitary,
nonracial system there might be no objection to allowing such a device to prove
itself in operation. * * *
'The New Kent School Board's 'freedom-of-choice' plan cannot be accepted as a
sufficient step to 'effectuate a transition' to a unitary system. * * *' Id., at 440441, 88 S.Ct. 1689.

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396 U.S.

Beatrice ALEXANDER et al.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, and Norman C. Amaker, on the

'The Board must be required to formulate a new plan * * * which promise[s]

Although the foregoing indicates my belief as to what should ultimately be

On August 21 the Department of Justice requested the Court of Appeals to

excluded from a public school on account of his race or color.

Application to vacate suspension of order denied.

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