395 U.S.

621
89 S.Ct. 1886
23 L.Ed.2d 583

Morris H. KRAMER, Appellant,

v.
UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 15 et al.
No. 258.
Argued Jan. 16, 1969.
Decided June 16, 1969.

Osmond K. Fraenkel, New York City, for appellant.

John P. Jehu, Albany, N.Y., for appellees.
Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we are called on to determine whether 2012 of the New York
Education Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 16, is constitutional. The
legislation provides that in certain New York school districts residents who are
otherwise eligible to vote in state and federal elections may vote in the school
district election only if they (1) own (or lease) taxable real property within the
district, or (2) are parents (or have custody of) children enrolled in the local
public schools. Appellant, a bachelor who neither owns nor leases taxable real
property, filed suit in federal court claiming that 2012 denied him equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. With one
judge dissenting, a three-judge District Court dismissed appellant's complaint.
Finding that 2012 does violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we reverse.

I.
2

New York law provides basically three methods of school board selection. In
some large city districts, the school board is appointed by the mayor or city
council. N.Y.Educ.Law 2553, subds. 2, 4 (1953), as amended (Supp.1968).
On the other hand, in some cities, primarily those with less than 125,000
residents, the school board is elected at general or municipal elections in which

all qualified city voters may participate. N.Y.Educ.Law 2502, subd. 2, 2553,
subd. 3 (1953). Cf. N.Y.Educ.Law 2531 (1953). Finally, in other districts
such as the one involved in this case, which are primarily rural and suburban,
the school board is elected at an annual meeting of qualified school district
voters.1
3

The challenged statute is applicable only in the districts which hold annual
meetings. To be eligible to vote at an annual district meeting, an otherwise
qualified2 district resident must either (1) be the owner or lessee of taxable real
property located in the district, (2) be the spouse of one who owns or leases
qualifying property, or (3) be the parent or guardian of a child enrolled for a
specified time during the preceding year in a local district school.

Although the New York State Department of Education has substantial

responsibility for education in the State, the local school districts maintain
significant control over the administration of local school district affairs.3
Generally, the board of education has the basic responsibility for local school
operation, including prescribing the courses of study, determining the textbooks
to be used, and even altering and equipping a former schoolhouse for use as a
public library. N.Y.Educ.Law 1709 (1953). Additionally, in districts selecting
members of the board of education at annual meetings, the local voters also
pass directly on other district matters. For example, they must approve the
school budget submitted by the school board. N.Y.Educ.Law 2021, 2022
(1953).4 Moreover, once the budget is approved, the governing body of the
villages within the school district must raise the money which has been
declared 'necessary for teachers' salaries and the ordinary contingent expenses
(of the schools).' N.Y.Educ.Law 1717 (1953).5 The voters also may 'authorize
such acts and vote such taxes as they shall deem expedient * * * for * * *
equipping for library use any former schoolhouse * * * (and) for the purchase
of land and buildings for agricultural, athletic, playground or social center
purposes * * *.' N.Y.Educ.Law 416 (1953).

Appellant is a 31-year-old college-educated stockbroker who lives in his

parents' home in the Union Free School District No. 15, a district to which
2012 applies. He is a citizen of the United States and has voted in federal and
state elections since 1959. However, since he has no children and neither owns
nor leases taxable real property, appellant's attempts to register for and vote in
the local school district elections have been unsuccessful. After the school
district rejected his 1965 application, appellant instituted the present class
action challenging the constitutionality of the voter eligibility requirements.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied

appellant's request (made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281) that a three-judge

district court be convened, and granted appellees' motion to dismiss appellant's
complaint. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 259 F.Supp. 164
(D.C.E.D.N.Y.1966). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, ruling appelln t's complaint warranted convening a three-judge court.
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 379 F.2d 491 (C.A.2d Cir. 1967).
On remand, the three-judge court ruled that 2012 is constitutional and
dismissed appellant's complaint. 282 F.Supp. 70. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1253,
appellant filed a direct appeal with this Court; we noted probable jurisdiction.
393 U.S. 818, 89 S.Ct. 117, 21 L.Ed.2d 90 (1968).
II.
7

At the outset, it is important to note what is not at issue in this case. The
requirements of 2012 that school district voters must (1) be citizens of the
United States, (2) be bona fide residents of the school district, and (3) be at
least 21 years of age are not challenged. Appellant agrees that the States have
the power to impose reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements on
the availability of the ballot. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct.
775, 777, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 S.Ct.
573, 48 L.Ed. 817 (1904). The sole issue in this case is whether the additional
requirements of 2012requirements which prohibit some district residents
who are otherwise qualified by age and citizenship from participating in district
meetings and school board electionsviolate the Fourteenth Amendment's
command that no State shall deny persons equal protection of the laws.

'In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause,
we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests
which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are
disadvantaged by the classification.' Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89
S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). And, in this case, we must give the statute a
close and exacting examination. '(S)ince the right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized.' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct.
1362, 1381, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). See Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 393 U.S. at
31, 89 S.Ct. at 10; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11
L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). This careful examination is necessary because statutes
distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our representative
society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in
political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy
of representative government.

Thus, state apportionment statutes, which may dilute the effectiveness of some
citizens' votes, receive close scrutiny from this Court. Reynolds v. Sims, supra.
See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45
(1968). No less rigid an examination is applicable to statutes denying the
franchise to citizens who are otherwise qualified by residence and age. 6
Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the
danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs
which substantially affect their lives.7 Therefore, if a challenged state statute
grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and
citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine
whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
See Carrington v. Rash, supra, 380 U.S., at 96, 85 S.Ct., at 780.

10

And, for these reasons, the deference usually given to the judgment of
legislators does not extend to decisions concerning which resident citizens may
participate in the election of legislators and other public officials. Those
decisions must be carefully scrutinized by the Court to determine whether each
resident citizen has, as far as is possible, an equal voice in the selections.
Accordingly, when we are reviewing statutes which deny some residents the
right to vote, the general presumption of constitutionality afforded state statutes
and the traditional approval given state classifications if the Court can conceive
of a 'rational basis' for the distinctions made 8 are not applicable. See Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 16
L.Ed.2d 169 (1966). The presumption of constitutionality and the approval
given 'rational' classifications in other types of enactments9 are based on an
assumption that the institutions of state government are structured so as to
represent fairly all the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in
effect a challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve
as the basis for presuming constitutionality. And, the assumption is no less
under attack because the legislature which decides who may participate at the
various levels of political choice is fairly elected. Legislation which delegates
decision making to bodies elected by only a portion of those eligible to vote for
the legislature can cause unfair representation. Such legislation can exclude a
minority of voters from any voice in the decisions just as effectively as if the
decisions were made by legislators the minority had no voice in selecting.10

11

The need for exacting judicial scrutiny of statutes distributing the franchise is
undiminished simply because, under a different statutory scheme, the offices
subject to election might have been filled through appointment.11 States do have
latitude in determining whethe certain public officials shall be selected by
election or chosen by appointment and whether various questions shall be
submitted to the voters. In fact, we have held that where a county school board

is an administrative, not legislative, body, its members need not be elected.

Sailors v. Kent County Bd. of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 108, 87 S.Ct. 1549,
1552, 18 L.Ed.2d 650 (1967). However, 'once the franchise is granted to the
electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, supra, 383 U.S., at 665, 86 S.Ct., at 1080.12
12

Nor is the need for close judicial examination affected because the district
meetings and the school board do not have 'general' legislative powers. Our
exacting examination is not necessitated by the subject of the election; rather, it
is required because some resident citizens are permitted to participate and some
are not. For example, a city charter might well provide that the elected city
council appoint a mayor who would have broad administrative powers.
Assuming the council were elected consistent with the commands of the Equal
Protection Clause, the delegation of power to the mayor would not call for this
Court's exacting review. On the other hand, if the city charter made the office
of mayor subject to an election in which only some resident citizens were
entitled to vote, there would be presented a situation calling for our close
review.

III.
13

Besides appellant and others who similarly live in their parents' homes, the
statute also disenfranchises the following persons (unless they are parents or
guardians of children enrolled in the district public school): senior citizens and
others living with children or relatives; clergy, military personnel, and others
who live on tax-exempt property; boarders and lodgers; parents who neither
own nor lease qualifying property and whose children are too young to attend
school; parents who neither own nor lease qualifying property and whose
children attend private schools.

14

Appellant asserts that excluding him from participation in the district elections
denies him equal protection of the laws. He contends that he and others of his
class are substantially interested in and significantly affected by the school
meeting decisions. All members of the community have an interest in the
quality and structure of public education, appellant says, and he urges that 'the
decisions taken by local boards * * * may have grave consequences to the
entire population.' Appellant also argues that the level of property taxation
affects him, even though he does not own property, as property tax levels affect
the price of goods and services in the community.

15

We turn therefore to question whether the exclusion is necessary to promote a

compelling state interest. First appellees13 argue that the State has a legitimate
interest in limiting the franchise in school district elections to 'members of the
community of interest'those 'primarily interested in such elections.' Second,
appellees urge that the State may reasonably and permissibly conclude that
'property taxpayers' (including lessees of taxable property h o share the tax
burden through rent payments) and parents of the children enrolled in the
district's schools are those 'primarily interested' in school affairs.
16

We do not understand appellees to argue that the State is attempting to limit the
franchise to those 'subjectively concerned' about school matters. Rather, they
appear to argue that the State's legitimate interest is in restricting a voice in
school matters to those 'directly affected' by such decisions. The State
apparently reasons that since the schools are financed in part by local property
taxes, persons whose out-of-pocket expenses are 'directly' affected by property
tax changes should be allowed to vote. Similarly, parents of children in school
are thought to have a 'direct' stake in school affairs and are given a vote.

17

Appellees argue that it is necessary to limit the franchise to those 'primarily

interested' in school affairs because 'the ever increasing complexity of the many
interacting phases of the school system and structure make it extremely
difficult for the electorate fully to understand the whys and wherefores of the
detailed operations of the school system.' Appellees say that many
communications of school boards and school administrations are sent home to
the parents through the district pupils and are 'not broadcast to the general
public'; thus, nonparents will be less informed than parents. Further, appellees
argue, those who are assessed for local property taxes (either directly or
indirectly through rent) will have enough of an interest 'through the burden on
their pocketbooks, to acquire such information as they may need.' We need
express no opinion as to whether the State in some circumstances might limit
the exercise of the franchise to those 'primarily interested' or 'primarily
affected.' Of course, we therefore do not reach the issue of whether these
particular elections are of the type in which the franchise may be so limited.
For, assuming, arguendo, that New York legitimately might limit the franchise
in these school district elections to those 'primarily interested in school affairs,'
close scrutiny of the 2012 classifications demonstrates that they do not
accomplish this purpose with sufficient precision to justify denying appellant
the franchise.

18

Whether classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to those resident

citizens 'primarily interested' deny those excluded equal protection of the laws
depends, inter alia, on whether all those excluded are in fact substantially less
interested or affected than those the statute includes. In other words, the

classifications must be tailored so that the exclusion of appellant and members

of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated state goal.14 Section 2012
does not meet the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which
selectively distribute the franchise. The classifications in 2012 permit
inclusion of many persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect interest, in
school affairs and, on the other hand, exclude others who have a distinct and
direct interest in the school meeting decisions.15
19

Nor do appellees offer any justification for the exclusion of seemingly

interested and infore d residentsother than to argue that the 2012
classifications include those 'whom the State could understandably deem to be
the most intimately interested in actions taken by the school board,' and urge
that 'the task of * * * balancing the interest of the community in the
maintenance of orderly school district elections against the interest of any
individual in voting in such elections should clearly remain with the
Legislature.'16 But the issue is not whether the legislative judgments are
rational. A more exacting standard obtains. The issue is whether the 2012
requirements do in fact sufficiently further a compelling state interest to justify
denying the franchise to appellant and members of his class. The requirements
of 2012 are not sufficiently tailored to limiting the franchise to those
'primarily interested' in school affairs to justify the denial of the franchise to
appellant and members of his class.

20

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York is therefore reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

21

It is so ordered.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.

Section 2012, New York Education Law:
22

'A person shall be entitled to vote at any school meeting for the election of
school district officers, and upon all other matters which may be brought before
such meeting, who is: 1. A citizen of the United States.

23

'2. Twenty-one years of age.

24

'3. A resident within the district for a period of thirty days next preceding the
meeting at which he offers to vote; and who in addition thereto possesses one of

the following three qualifications:

25

'a. Owns or is the spouse of an owner, leases, hires, or is in the possession under
a contract of purchase or is the spouse of one who leases, hires or is in
possession under a contract of purchase of, real property in such district liable to
taxation for school purposes, but the occupation of real property by a person as
lodger or boarder shall not entitle such person to vote, or

26

'b. Is the parent of a child of school age, provided such a child shall have
attended the district school in the district in which the meeting is held for a
period of at least eight weeks during the year preceding such school meeting, or

27

'c. Not being the parent, has permanently residing with him a child of school
age who shall have attended the district school for a period of at least eight
weeks during the year preceding such meeting.

28

'No person shall be deemed to be ineligible to vote at any such meeting, by

reason of sex, who has the other qualifications required by this section.'

29

Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK, and Mr. Justice
HARLAN join, dissenting.

30

In Lassiter v. Northampton County Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 79 S.Ct. 985, 3
L.Ed.2d 1072 this Court upheld against constitutional attack a literacy
requirement, applicable to voters in all state and federal elections, imposed by
the State of North Carolina. Writing for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice
Douglas said:

31

'The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the
conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 663, 24 S.Ct. 573, 576, 48 L.Ed. 817; Mason v.
Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 335, 21 S.Ct. 125, 128, 45 L.Ed. 214, absent of course
the discrimination which the Constitution condemns.' 360 U.S., at 5051, 79
S.Ct., at 989.

32

Believing that the appellant in this case is not the victim of any 'discrimination
which the Constitution condemns,' I would affirm the judgment of the District
Court.

33

The issue before us may be briefly summarized. New York has provided that in

certain areas of the State local authority over public schools shall reside in
'Union Free School Districts,' such as the District involved here. In such areas,
the qualified voters of the i strict annually elect members of a Board of
Education and determine by vote the basic fiscal policy of the school system:
they adopt a budget and in effect decide the amount of school taxes that shall
be imposed upon the taxable real property of the District. State and federal
grants provide some additional funds for the operation of the school system, but
the only method by which the District itself may raise its own revenue is
through such property taxes.1
34

Three classes of persons are qualified under New York law to vote in these
school elections: (1) parents or guardians of children attending public schools
within the District; (2) persons who own taxable real property within the
District, and their spouses; and (3) persons who lease taxable real property
within the District, and their spouses.2 The appellant, a bachelor who lives with
his parents and who neither owns nor leases any real property within the
District, falls within none of those classes, and consequently is disqualified
from voting despite the fact that he meets the general age and residence
requirements imposed by state law. The question presented is whether, by
virtue of that disqualification the appellant is denied the equal protection of the
laws.

35

Although at times variously phrased, the traditional test of a statute's validity

under the Equal Protection Clause is a familiar one: a legislative classification
is invalid only 'if it rest(s) on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of the
regulation's objectives.' Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S.
552, 556, 67 S.Ct. 910, 912, 91 L.Ed. 1093. 3 It was under just such a test that
the literacy requirement involved in Lassiter was upheld. The premise of our
decision in that case was that a State may constitutionally impose upon its
citizens voting requirements reasonably 'designed to promote intelligent use of
the ballot.' 360 U.S., at 51, 79 S.Ct., at 990. A similar premise underlies the
proposition, consistently endorsed by this Court, 4 that a State may exclude
nonresidents from participation in its elections. Such residence requirements,
designed to help ensure that voters have a substantial stake in the outcome of
elections and an opportunity to become familiar with the candidates and issues
voted upon, are entirely permissible exercises of state authority. Indeed, the
appellant explicitly concedes, as he must, the validity of voting requirements
relating to residence, literacy, and age. Yet he arguesand the Court accepts
the argumentthat the voting qualifications involved here somehow have a
different constitutional status. I am unable to see the distinction.

36

Clearly a State may reasonably assume that its residents have a greater stake in

the outcome of elections held within it boundaries than do other persons.

Likewise, it is entirely rational for a state legislature to suppose that residents,
being generally better informed regarding state affairs than are nonresidents,
will be more likely than nonresidents to vote responsibly. And the same may be
said of legislative assumptions regarding the electoral competence of adults and
literate persons on the one hand, and of minors and illiterates on the other. It is
clear, of course, that lines thus drawn can not infallibly perform their intended
legislative function. Just as '(i) lliterate people may be intelligent voters,'5
nonresidents or minors might also in some instances be interested, informed,
and intelligent participants in the electoral process. Persons who commute
across a state line to work may well have a great stake in the affairs of the State
in which they are employed; some college students under 21 may be both better
informed and more passionately interested in political affairs than many adults.
But such discrepancies are the inevitable concomitant of the line drawing that is
essential to law making. So long as the classification is rationally related to a
permissible legislative end, thereforeas are residence, literacy, and age
requirements imposed with respect to voting there is no denial of equal
protection.
37

Thus judged, the statutory classification involved here seems to me clearly to

be valid. New York has made the judgment that local educational policy is best
left to those persons who have certain direct and definable interests in that
policy: those who are either immediately involved as parents of school children
or who, as owners or lessees of taxable property are burdened with the local
cost of funding school district operations.6 True, persons outside those classes
may be genuinely interested in the conduct of a school district's businessjust
as commuters from New Jersey may be genuinely interested in the outcome of a
New York City election. But unless this Court is to claim a monopoly of
wisdom regarding the sound operation of school systems in the 50 States, I see
no way to justify the conclusion that the legislative classification involved here
is not rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. 'There is no group
more interested in the operation and management of the public schools than the
taxpayers who support them and the parents whose children attend them.'
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435, 72 S.Ct. 394, 398, 96 L.Ed. 475
(Douglas, J., dissenting).

38

With good reason, the Court does not really argue the contrary. Instead, it
strikes down New York's statute by asserting that the traditional equal
protection standard is inapt in this case, and that a considerably stricter standard
under which classifications relating to 'the franchise' are to be subjected to
'exacting judicial scrutiny'should be applied. But the asserted justification for
applying such a standard cannot withstand analysis.

39

The Court is quite explicit in explaining why it believes this statute should be
given 'close scrutiny':

40

'The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given 'rational'

classifications in other types of enactments are based on an assumption that the
institutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly all the
people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of
this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the basis for
presuming constitutionality.' (Footnote omitted.)

41

I am at a loss to understand how such reasoning is at all relevant to the present

case. The voting qualifications at issue have been promulgated, not by Union
Free School District No. 15, but by the New York State Legislatr e, and the
appellant is of course fully able to participate in the election of representatives
in that body. There is simply no claim whatever here that the state government
is not 'structured so as to represent fairly all the people,' including the appellant.

42

Nor is there any other jurisdiction for imposing the Court's 'exacting' equal
protection test. This case does not involve racial classifications, which in light
of the genesis of the Fourteenth Amendment have traditionally been viewed as
inherently 'suspect.'7 And this statute is not one that impinges upon a
constitutionally protected right, and that consequently can be justified only by a
'compelling' state interest.8 For 'the Constitution of the United States does not
confer the right of suffrage upon any one * * *.' Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall.
162, 178, 22 L.Ed. 627.

43

In any event, it seems to me that under any equal protection standard, short of a
doctrinaire insistence that universal suffrage is somehow mandated by the
Constitution, the appellant's claim must be rejected. First of all, it must be
emphasized despite the Court's undifferentiated references to what it terms 'the
franchise'that we are dealing here, not with a general election, but with a
limited, special-purpose election.9 The appellant is eligible to vote in all state,
local, and federal elections in which general governmental policy is determined.
He is fully able, therefore, to participate not only in the processes by which the
requirements for school district voting may be changed, but also in those by
which the levels of state and federal financial assistance to the District are
determined. He clearly is not locked into any self-perpetuating status of
exclusion from the electoral process.10

44

Secondly, the appellant is of course limited to asserting his own rights, not the
purported rights of hypothetical childless clergymen or parents of preschool

children, who neither own nor rent taxable property. The appellant's status is
merely that of a citizen who says he is interested in the affairs of his local
public schools. If the Constitution requires that he must be given a decisionmaking role in the governance of those affairs, then it seems to me that any
individual who seeks such a role must be given it. For as I have suggested,
there is no persuasive reason for distinguishing constitutionally between the
voter qualifications New York has required for its Union Free School District
elections and qualifications based on factors such as age, residence, or
literacy.11
45

Today's decision can only be viewed as irreconcilable with the established

principle that '(t)he States have * * * broad powers to determine the conditions
under which the right of suffrage may be exercised * * *.' Since I think that
principle is entirely sound, I respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment and
opinion.

In some districts the election takes place on the Wednesday following the
district meeting. N.Y.Educ.Law 2013 (Supp. 1968).

The statute also requires that a voter be a citizen of the United States and at
least 21 years of age. Appellant meets these requirements and doe not challenge
the citizenship, age, or residency requirements of 2012. See infra, at 625. The
statute is set out in the Appendix, infra.

'But while the administration of schools and the formulation of general policies
have been centralized in the State Education Department * * * the immediate
control and operation of the schools in New York have to a large extent been
vested in the localities. The thousands of districts * * * possess a high degree of
authority in education. They decide matters of local taxation for school
purposes, elect trustees and other school officials, purchase buildings and sites,
employ teachers and * * * maintain discipline * * *.' Graves, Development of
the Education Law in New York, 16 Consolidated Laws of New York
(Education Law) xxiii (McKinney 1953). See R. Pyle, Some Aspects of
Education in New York 913 (1967).

In districts which do not have annual meetings, the budget is not submitted to
district voters. Thus, in city districts where the board of education is elected by
all the voters, the board has the power to set the budget and assess taxes to meet
expenditures. In large city districts, where the board is appointed, the board
must submit requests to the city government, much as would any other city
department. R. Pyle, Some Aspects of Education in New York 11 (1967).

The legislation provides that the money shall be raised through a 'tax, to be
levied upon all the real property in (the) village * * *.' And, the 'corporate
authorities shall have no power to withhold the sums so declared to be
necessary * * *.' N.Y.Educ.Law 1717 (1953).

This case presents an issue different from the one we faced in McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22
L.Ed.2d 739 (1969). The present appeal involves an absolute denial of the
franchise. In McDonald, on the other hand, we were reviewing a statute which
made casting a ballot easier for some who were unable to come to the polls. As
we noted, there was no evidence that the statute absolutely prohibited anyone
from exercising the franchise; at issue ws not a claimed right to vote but a
claimed right to an absentee ballot. Id., at 807808, 89 S.Ct., at 1408.

Of course, the effectiveness of any citizen's voice in governmental affairs can

be determined only in relationship to the power of other citizens' votes. For
example, if school board members are appointed by the mayor, the district
residents may effect a change in the board's membership or policies through
their votes for the mayor. Cf. N.Y.Educ.Law 2553, subds. 2, 4 (1953), as
amended (Supp. 1969). Each resident's formal influence is perhaps indirect, but
it is equal to that of other residents. However, when the school board positions
are filled by election and some otherwise qualified city electors are precluded
from voting, the excluded residents, when compared to the franchised
residents, no longer have an effective voice in school affairs. This is precisely
the situation with regard to the size of the school budget in districts where
2012 applies. See n. 4, supra.

See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425428, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104
1106, (1961); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527, 79
S.Ct. 437, 441, 3 L.Ed.2d 480, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1959); Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).

Of course, we have long held that if the basis of classification is inherently

suspect, such as race, the statute must be subjected to an exacting scrutiny,
regardless of the subject matter of the legislation. See, e.g., McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 85 S.Ct. 283, 288, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 1143,
92 L.Ed. 1478 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640, 68 S.Ct. 269,
272, 92 L.Ed. 249 (1948).

10

Thus, statutes structuring local government units receive no less exacting an

examination merely because the state legislature is fairly elected. See Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 481, n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 1118, 20 L.Ed.2d 45

(1968).
11

Similarly, no less a showing of a compelling justification for disenfranchising

residents is required merely because the questions scheduled for the election
need not have been submitted to the voters.

12

In Sailors v. Kent County Bd. of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 87 S.Ct. 1549, 18
L.Ed.2d 650 (1967), each local school board sent one delegate to a biennial
meeting at which the members of the county board of education were selected.
We noted that 'the choice of members of the county school board did not
involve an election.' Id., at 111, 87 S.Ct., at 1553. However, we also pointed
out that the members of the local school boards, who in effect made the county
board appointments, were elected, but that 'no constitutional complaint (was)
raised respecting that election.' Ibid.

13

The Union Free School District No. 15 and each member of its board of
education were named as defendants. The Attorney General of New York
intervened as an appellee.

14

Of course, if the exclusions are necessary to promote the articulated state

interest, we must then determine whether the interest promoted by limiting the
franchise constitutes a compelling state interest. We do not reach that issue in
this case.

15

For example, appellant resides with his parents in the school district, pays state
and federal taxes and is interested in and affected by school board decisions;
however, he has no vote. On the other hand, an uninterested unemployed young
man who pays no state or federal taxes, but who rents an apartment in the
district, can participate in the election.

16

We were informed at oral argument, however, that a very small proportion of

the eligible voters attend the meetings.

The District Court's statement to this effect has been explicitly reiterated and
emphasized by the appellees, and the proposition is apparently conceded by the
appellant. See N.Y.Educ.Law 416, 1717, 2021; N.Y.Real.Prop.Tax Law
McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 50A, 1302, 1306, 1308.

New York's general age and residence requirements must also be met.

See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105,
6 L.Ed.2d 393:
'The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on

grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State

legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.'
4

Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 S.Ct. 573, 48 L.Ed. 817; Lassiter v.
Northampton County Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51, 79 S.Ct. 985, 990, 3
L.Ed.2d 1072; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 9394, 96, 85 S.Ct. 775, 778
779, 13 L.Ed.2d 675; see Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 666, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 16 L.Ed.2d 169.

Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. at 52, 79 S.Ct. at 990.

Presumably the rationale for including lessees and their spouses in the electoral
process is that the cost of property taxes is in many instances passed on from
owner to lessee.

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194;
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 85 S.Ct. 283, 288, 13 L.Ed.2d 222.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600;
cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172.

Special-purpose governmental authorities such as water, lighting, and sewer

districts exist in various sections of the country, and participation in such
districts is undoubtedly limited in many instances to those who partake of the
agency's services and are assessed for its expenses. The constitutional validity
of such a policy is, it seems to me, unquestionable. And while it is true, as the
appellant argues, that a school system has a more pervasive influence in the
community than do most other such special-purpose authorities, I cannot agree
that that difference in degree presents anything approaching a distinction of
constitutional dimension.

10

Compare Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 84 S.Ct.

1459, 12 L.Ed.2d 632; with Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12
L.Ed.2d 506. Since Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d
675; and Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079,
16 L.Ed.2d 169, dealt with requirements for voting in general elections, those
decisions do not control the result here.

11

A comparison of the classification made by New Yok with one based on

literacy, for instance, presumably would attempt to weigh the interest of the
person excluded from voting against the reasonableness of the legislative

assumption regarding his competence as a voter or his connection with the

subject matter of the election. In such a speculative analysis precision is not
attainable; for that very reason, it seems to me, the standard of adjudication
should be a reasonably tolerant one. But even assuming such an analysis were
attempted, it could not in my view justify drawing a constitutional line between
the classification involved here and a literacy requirement. True, the appellant
and persons in his class might be thought to have generally more ability to vote
intelligently than do illiterates. On the other hand, illiterate citizens clearly have
considerably more of a stake in the outcome of general elections than do the
members of the appellant's class in the result of school district elections.