United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966)

384 U.S.
251
86 S.Ct. 1416
16 L.Ed.2d 510
UNITED STATES, Appellant,

v.
Ben BLUE.
No. 531.
Argued April 21, 1966.
Decided May 23, 1966.
Solicitor Gen. Thurgood Marshall, for appellant.

Ernest R. Mortenson, Pasadena, Cal., for appellee.
Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1962 the appellee, Ben Blue, was informed by the Internal Revenue Service
that he might be criminally prosecuted for violation of the federal income tax
laws. The following year the Service made jeopardy assessments against Blue,
his wife, and his wholly owned corporation for tax liability for the years 1958
to 1960 inclusive; the known assets of all three were seized and tax liens
recorded. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 63216323, 6331, 6861.
Statutory notices were then issued giving Blue 90 days within which to file
petitions if he wished to contest the proposed deficiencies in the Tax Court,
I.R.C. 6213, and Blue filed petitions setting forth his position and alleging
errors in the Commissioner's determination of deficiencies. More than a year
later the Government initiated the present criminal case by a six-count
indictment charging Blue with wilfully attempting to evade personal income
taxes for the years 1958 through 1960 and with filing false returns for his
corporation during the same years. I.R.C. 7201, 7206(1).
Blue filed a pretrial motion seeking dismissal of the indictment on several

grounds. After a hearing the District Court granted the motion. The court stated
orally that because of the jeopardy assessment and Tax Court proceeding Blue
'has been compelled and will be compelled to come forward on the same
matters as are concerned in this criminal case, to testify against himself * * *.'1
The Government filed a notice of appeal and the case was docketed in the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Determining that the District Court had
sustained a 'motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy' so
that a direct appeal lay to this Court,2 the Court of Appeals certified the case to
us, 350 F.2d 267, and we postponed jurisdiction, 382 U.S. 971, 86 S.Ct. 534, 15
L.Ed.2d 463. We agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal and, on
the merits, reverse the decision of the District Court.
3
Since Blue had not yet been brought to trial and put in jeopardy when dismissal
occurred, see United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 283, 30 S.Ct. 93, 94, 54
L.Ed. 195, our jurisdiction under the statute is secure if the motion sustained by
the District Court was a motion in bar. See, supra, n. 2. This in turn depends on
'the effect of the ruling sought to be reviewed,' United States v. Hark, 320 U.S.
531, 536, 64 S.Ct. 359, 361, 88 L.Ed. 290, and not on how the pleading is
styled or on whether it is ultimately sustained on appeal. Like the Court of
Appeals, we take the dismissal in this case as a ruling that absent reversal on
review future prosecution of Blue on the pending counts is forever barred.
While there are slight ambiguities in language, the District Court's dismissal
was grounded in what it found to be past compulsory self-incrimination and in
its apparent belief that this mischief could not be undone save by turning back
the clock through ending the prosecution.
Because the dismissal by its own force would 'end the cause and exculpate the
defendant,' United States v. Hark, 320 U.S., at 536, 64 S.Ct. at 362, rather than
merely abate the prosecution on account of some normally curable defect, one
requisite of a motion in bar is met. Whether it is a further requisite that the
motion introduce 'new matter' in the fashion of a plea by way of confession and
avoidance need not here be decided. See United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S.
431, 441, 453, 80 S.Ct. 459, 465, 474, 4 L.Ed.2d 423 (separate opinions
disagreeing on this point). For in this instance Blue unquestionably relied on
new matter in alleging self-incrimination, so the motion qualifies even under
the more stringent definition. Thus under either view of a motion in bar taken in
Mersky, this case qualifies for direct review. Our conclusion on the
jurisdictional issue is further supported by two analogous decisions of this
Court treating claims of statutory immunity as pleas in bar which permitted
direct appeal. United States v. Hoffman, 335 U.S. 77, 68 S.Ct. 1413, 92 L.Ed.
1830; United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376.
On the merits of the case, we do not believe that the District Court should have
dismissed the indictment. The Government has argued that the statements made
by Blue in his Tax Court petitions were no more than successive denials of the
alleged underpayments and do not constitute incriminating evidence. The
Government has also intimated that by merely providing the occasion for the
filing of Blue's petitions in fulfilling its statutory duty to make jeopardy
assessments and send deficiency notices, it ought not be regarded as compelling
the taxpayer to incriminate himself within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. There is no need, however, to consider these or other contentions
that may point in the same direction.
6
Even if we assume that the Government did acquire incriminating evidence in

violation of the Fifth Amendment, Blue would at most be entitled to suppress
the evidence and its fruits if they were sought to be used against him at trial.3
While the general common-law practice is to admit evidence despite its illegal
origins, this Court in a number of areas has recognized or developed
exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's
rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652; Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct.
1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479. Our numerous precedents ordering the exclusion of such
illegally obtained evidence assume implicitly that the remedy does not extend
to barring the prosecution altogether. So drastic a step might advance
marginally some of the ends served by exclusionary rules, but it would also
increase to an intolerable degree interference with the public interest in having
the guilty brought to book.
We remand this case to the District Court to proceed on the merits, leaving
Blue free to pursue his Fifth Amendment claim through motions to suppress
and objections to evidence. It is not entirely clear from Blue's brief and
argument whether he seeks to sustain the dismissal below on other grounds that
the District Court did not accept. See, supra, n. 1. Putting to one side
jurisdictional difficulties this course might encounter under the direct-review
statute,4 we believe it is fairer to all to regard no other grounds as presented,
thus reserving to Blue the opportunity to articulate them plainly and support
them by the record.
Reversed and remanded.
The court stated that it based the dismissal 'on that ground alone.' It rejected a
claim that the seizure of property and recording of tax liens had prevented Blue
from preparing an adequate defense by depleting his resources. It did not
expressly consider Blue's claim that there is an administrative practice of

making no assessments in advance of criminal proceedings and that failure to
extend the policy to him was a denial of due process.
2
18 U.S.C. 3731 (1964 ed.) provides in part:

'An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district
courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in
the following instances:
'From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant
has not been put n jeopardy.
'If an appeal shall be taken pursuant to this section to any court of appeals,
which, in the opinion of such court, should have been taken directly to the
Supreme Court of the United States, such court shall certify the case to the
Supreme Court of the United States, which shall thereupon have jurisdiction to
hear and determine the case to the same extent as if an appeal had been taken
directly to that Court.'
It does not seem to be contended that tainted evidence was presented to the
grand jury; but in any event our precedents indicate this would not be a basis for
abating the prosecution pending a new indictment, let alone barring it
altogether. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed.
397; Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 321; 8
Wigmore, Evidence 2184a, at 40 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
See Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 211, at 31 33 (1962);

Friedenthal, Government Appeals in Federal Criminal Cases, 12 Stan.L.Rev.
71, 97100 (1959).

United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

384 U.S.

UNITED STATES, Appellant,

Solicitor Gen. Thurgood Marshall, for appellant.

Blue filed a pretrial motion seeking dismissal of the indictment on several

Even if we assume that the Government did acquire incriminating evidence in

Reversed and remanded.

expressly consider Blue's claim that there is an administrative practice of

18 U.S.C. 3731 (1964 ed.) provides in part:

See Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 211, at 31 33 (1962);

You might also like