Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954)

348 U.S.
61
75 S.Ct. 191
99 L.Ed. 68
Latham CASTLE, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, et

al., Petitioners,
v.
HAYES FREIGHT LINES, Inc.
No. 44.
Argued Nov. 17, 1954.
Decided Dec. 6, 1954.
Mr.John L. Davidson, Jr., Springfield, Ill., for petitioner.

Mr. David Axelrod, Chicago, Ill., for respondent.
Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion
This case raises important questions concerning the power of states to bar
interstate motor carriers from use of state roads as punishment for repeated
violations of state highway regulations. The respondent Hayes Freight Lines,
Inc. is such a carrier transporting goods to and from many points in Illinois and
seven other states.1 This extensive interstate business is done under a certificate
of convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission
under authority of the Federal Motor Carrier Act.2 Hayes also does an intrastate
carrier business in Illinois under a certificate issued by state authorities. Illinois
has a statute which limits the weight of freight that can be carried in
commercial trucks over Illinois highways; the same statute also provides for a
balanced distribution of freight loads in relation to the truck's axles.3 Repeated
violations of these provisions by trucks of a carrier are made punishable by
total suspension of the carrier's right to use Illinois state highways for periods of
ninety days and one year.4 This action was brought in a state court to restrain
Illinois officials from prosecuting Hayes as a repeated violator. The State
Supreme Court held that the punishment of suspension provided by the state
statute could not be imposed on the interstate operations of the respondent
Hayes. Such a state suspension of interstate transportation, it was decided,
would conflict with the Federal Motor Carrier Act which is the supreme law of
the land.5 We granted the State's petition for certiorari. 347 U.S. 1009, 74 S.Ct.
865.
2
Congress in the Motor Carrier Act adopted a comprehensive plan for regulating
the carriage of goods by motor truck in interstate commerce. The federal plan
of control was so all-embracing that former power of states over interstate
motor carriers was greatly reduced. No power at all was left in states to
determine what carriers could or could not operate in interstate commerce.
Exclusive power of the Federal Government to make this determination is
shown by 306 of 49 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C.A. 306 which describes the
conditions under which the Interstate Commerce Commission can issue
certificates of convenience and necessity. And 312 of the same title provides
that all certificates, permits or licenses issued by the Commission 'shall remain
in effect until suspended or terminated as herein provided.' But in order to
provide stability for operating rights of carriers, Congress placed within very
narrow limits the Commission's power to suspend or revoke an outstanding
certificate. No certificate is to be revoked, suspended or changed until after a
hearing and a finding that a carrier has willfully failed to comply with the
provisions of the Motor Carrier Act or with regulations properly promulgated
under it.6 Under these circumstances, it would be odd if a state could take
action amounting to a suspension or revocation of an interstate carrier's
commission-granted right to operate. Cf. Hill v. State of Florida, 325 U.S. 538,
65 S.Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782. It cannot be doubted that suspension of this
common carrier's right to use Illinois highways is the equivalent of a partial
suspension of its federally granted certificate. The highways of Illinois are not
only used by Hayes to transport interstate goods to and from that State but are
also used as connecting links to points in other states which the Commission
has authorized Hayes to serve. Consequently if the ninety-day or the one-year
suspension should become effective, the carriage of interstate goods into
Illinois and other states would be seriously disrupted.
That Illinois seeks to punish Hayes for violations of its road regulations does
not justify this disruption of federally authorized activities. A state's regulation
of weight and distribution of loads carried in interstate trucks does not itself
conflict with the Federal Act. The reason for this as pointed out in Maurer v.
Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 60 S.Ct. 726, 84 L.Ed. 969, is that the Federal Act has
a provision designed to leave states free to regulate the sizes and weights of
motor vehicles. But it would stretch this statutory provision too much to say
that it also allowed states to revoke or suspend the right of interstate motor
carriers for violation of state highway regulations.
It is urged that without power to impose punishment by suspension states will
be without appropriate remedies to enforce their laws against recalcitrant motor

carriers. We are not persuaded, however, that the conventional forms of
punishment are inadequate to protect states from overweighted or improperly
loaded motor trucks. Moreover, a Commission regulation requires motor
carriers to abide by valid state highway regulations.7 And as previously pointed
out, the Commission can revoke in whole or in part certificates of motor
carriers which willfully refuse to comply with any lawful regulation of the
Commission.8 If, therefore, motor carriers persistently and repeatedly violate
the laws of a state, we know of no reason why the Commission may not protect
the state's interest, either on the Commission's own initiative or on complaint of
the state.9
5
We agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois that the right of this carrier to use
Illinois highways for interstate transportation of goods cannot be suspended by
Illinois.
Affirmed.
Indiana, Missouri, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.
49 Stat. 543. Now Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 919, 49
U.S.C. 301 et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. 301 et seq.
Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, c. 95 1/2, 228.
Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, c. 95 1/2, 229b. This section provides for a 90-day

suspension upon a finding of 10 or more violations. If thereafter the same
carrier is found to have been guilty of 10 or more later violations the suspension
is for one year.
2 Ill.2d 58, 117 N.E.2d 106. But the State Supreme Court held that Hayes'
intrastate operations could be suspended. Hayes appealed to this Court. We
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 347 U.S. 994, 74 S.Ct. 866.
Smith Bros., Revocation of Certificate, 33 M.C.C. 465, 472. See United States
v. Seatrain Lines, 329 U.S. 424, 67 S.Ct. 435, 91 L.Ed. 396.
49 CFR, 1954 Cum.Supp., 192.3. 'Every motor vehicle shall be driven in

accordance with the laws, ordinances, and regulations of the jurisdiction in
which it is being operated, unless such laws, ordinances and regulations are at
variance with specific regulations of this Commission which impose a greater
affirmative obligation or restraint.'

8
49 Stat. 555, 49 U.S.C. 312, 49 U.S.C.A. 312.
49 Stat. 555, 49 U.S.C. 312, 49 U.S.C.A. 312. For cases in which the
Commission has considered violations of state law in passing on the fitness and
ability of applicants to operate as carriers in interstate commerce see Southwest
Freight Lines, Inc., ExtensionGlass Products, 54 M.C.C. 205, 219; Hayes
Freight Lines, Inc., ExtensionAlternate Routes, 54 M.C.C. 643, 659.

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348 U.S.

Latham CASTLE, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, et

Mr.John L. Davidson, Jr., Springfield, Ill., for petitioner.

It is urged that without power to impose punishment by suspension states will

be without appropriate remedies to enforce their laws against recalcitrant motor

Indiana, Missouri, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.

Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, c. 95 1/2, 228.

Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, c. 95 1/2, 229b. This section provides for a 90-day

49 CFR, 1954 Cum.Supp., 192.3. 'Every motor vehicle shall be driven in

affirmative obligation or restraint.'

49 Stat. 555, 49 U.S.C. 312, 49 U.S.C.A. 312.

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