334 U.S.

1
68 S.Ct. 836
92 L.Ed. 1161

SHELLEY et ux.
v.
KRAEMER et ux. McGHEE et ux. v. SIPES et al.
Nos. 72, 87.
Argued Jan. 15, 16, 1948.
Decided May 3, 1948.

Messrs. George L. Vaughn and Herman Willer, both of St. Louis, Mo., for
petitioners Shelley.
Messrs. Thurgood Marshall, of New York City, Loren Miller, for
petitioners McGhee.
Mr. Gerald L. Seegers, of St. Louis, Mo., for respondents Kraemer.
Messrs. Henry Gilligan and James A. Crooks, both of Washington, D.C.
for respondents Sipes and others.
Mr. Philip B. Perlman, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for the United
States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.
Mr. Cheif Justice VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases present for our consideration questions relating to the validity of
court enforcement of private agreements, generally described as restrictive
covenants, which have as their purpose the exclusion of persons of designated
race or color from the Basic constitutional issues of obvious importance have
been raised.

The first of these cases comes to this Court on certiorari to the Supreme Court
of Missouri. On February 16, 1911, thirty out of a total of thirty-nine owners of
property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue between Taylor Avenue and
Cora Avenue in the city of St. Louis, signed an agreement, which was

subsequently recorded, providing in part:

3

'* * * the said property is hereby restricted to the use and occupancy for the
term of Fifty (50) years from this date, so that it shall be a condition all the time
and whether recited and referred to as (sic) not in subsequent conveyances and
shall attach to the land, as a condition precedent to the sale of the same, that
hereafter no part of said property or any portion thereof shall be, for said term
of Fifty-years, occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being
intended hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of time
against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property for
resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.'

The entire district described in the agreement included fifty-seven parcels of

lamd. The thirty owners who signed the agreement held title to forty-seven
parcels, including the particular parcel involved in this case. At the time the
agreement was signed, five of the parcels in the district were owned by
Negroes. One of those had been occupied by Negro families since 1882, nearly
thirty years before the restrictive agreement was executed. The trial court found
that owners of seven out of nine homes on the south side of Labadie Avenue,
within the restrit ed district and 'in the immediate vicinity' of the premises in
question, had failed to sign the restrictive agreement in 1911. At the time this
action was brought, four of the premises were occupied by Negroes, and had
been so occupied for periods ranging from twenty-three to sixty-three years. A
fifth parcel had been occupied by Negroes until a year before this suit was
instituted.

On August 11, 1945, pursuant to a contract of sale, petitioners Shelley, who are
Negroes, for valuable consideration received from one Fitzgerald a warranty
deed to the parcel in question.1 The trial court found that petitioners had no
actual knowledge of the restrictive agreement at the time of the purchase.

On October 9, 1945, respondents, as owners of other property subject to the

terms of the restrictive covenant, brought suit in Circuit Court of the city of St.
Louis prarying that petitioners Shelley be restrained from taking possession of
the property and that judgment be entered divesting title out of petitioners
Shelley and revesting title in the immediate grantor or in such other person as
the court should direct. The trial court denied the requested relief on the ground
that the restrictive agreement, upon which respondents based their action, had
never become final and complete because it was the intention of the parties to
that agreement that it was not to become effective until signed by all property
owners in the district, and signatures of all the owners had never been obtained.

The Supreme Court of Missouri sitting en banc reversed and directed the trial
court to grant the relief for which respondents had prayed. That court held the
agreement effective and concluded that enforcement of its provisions violated
no rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Federal Constitution.2 At the time the
court rendered its decision, petitioners were occupying the property in question.

The second of the cases under consideration comes to this Court from the
Supreme Court of Michigan. The circumstances presented do not differ
materially from the Missouri case. In June, 1934, one Ferguson and his wife,
who then owned the property located in the city of Detroit which is involved in
this case, executed a contract providing in part:

'This property shall not be used or occupied by any person or persons except
those of the Caucasian race.

10

'It is further agreed that this restriction shall not be effective unless at least
eighty percent of the property fronting on both sides of the street in the block
where our land is located is subjected to this or a similar restriction.'

11

The agreement provided that the restrictions were to remain in effect until
January 1, 1960. The contract was subsequently recorded; and similar
agreements were executed with respect to eighty percent of the lots in the block
in which the property in question is situated.

12

By deed dated November 30, 1944, petitioners, who were found by the trial
court to be Negroes, acquired title to the property and thereupon entered into its
occupancy. On January 30, 1945, respondents, as owners of property subject to
the terms of the restrictive agreement, brought suit against petitioners in the
Circuit Court of Wayne County. After a hearing, the court entered a decree
directing petitioners to move from the property within ninety days. Petitioners
were further enjoined and restrained from using or occupying the premises in
the future. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, deciding
adversely to petitioners' contentions that they had been denied rights protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.3

13

Petitioners have placed primary reliance on their contentions, first raised in the
state courts, that judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these
cases has violated rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Acts of Congress passed pursuant
to that Amendment.4 Specifically, petitioners urge that they have been denied
the equal protection of the laws, deprived of property without due process of

law, and have been denied privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States. We pass to a consideration of those issues.
I.
14

Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment inhibits

judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or
color is a question which this Court has not heretofore been called upon to
consider. Only two cases have been decided by this Court which in any way
have involved the enforcement of such agreements. The first of these was the
case of Corrigan v. Buckley, 1926, 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.Ed. 969.
There, suit was brought in the courts of the District of Columbia to enjoin a
threatened violation of certain restrictive covenants relating to lands situated in
the city of Washington. Relief was granted, and the case was brought here on
appeal. It is apparent that that case, which had originated in the federal courts
and involved the enforcement of covenants on land located in the District of
Columbia, could present no issues under the Fourteenth Amendment; for that
Amendment by its terms applies only to the States. Nor was the question of the
validity of court enforcement of the restrictive covenants under the Fifth
Amendment properly before the Court, as the opinion of this Court specifically
recognizes.5 The only constitutional issue which the appellants had raised in the
lower courts, and hence the only constitutional issue before this Court on
appeal, was the validity of the covenant agreements as such. This Court
concluded that since the inhibitions of the constitutional provisions invoked,
apply only to governmental action, as contrasted to action of private
individuals, there was no showing that the covenants, which were simply
agreements between private property owners, were invalid. Accordingly, the
appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial question. Nothing in the opinion
of this Court, therefore, may properly be regarded as an adjudication on the
merits of the constitutional issues presented by these cases, which raise the
question of the validity, not of the private agreements as such, but of the
judicial enforcement of those agreements.

15

The second of the cases involving racial restrictive covenants was Hansberry v.
Lee, 1940, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22, 132 A.L.R. 741. In that
case, petitioners, white property owners, were enjoined by the state courts from
violating the terms of a restrictive agreement. The state Supreme Court had
held petitioners bound by an earlier judicial determination, in litigation in
which petitioners were not parties, upholding the validity of the restrictive
agreement, although, in fact, the agreement had not been signed by the number
of owners necessary to make it effective under state law. This Court reversed
the judgment of the state Supreme Court upon the ground that petitioners had

been denied due process f law in being held estopped to challenge the validity
of the agreement on the theory, accepted by the state court, that the earlier
litigation, in which petitioners did not participate, was in the nature of a class
suit. In arriving at its result, this Court did not reach the issues presented by the
cases now under consideration.
16

It is well, at the outset, to scrutinize the terms of the restrictive agreemens

involved in these cases. In the Missouri case, the covenant declares that no part
of the affected property shall be (355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 681) 'occupied by
any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the
use of said property * * * against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any
portion of said property for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or
Mongolian Race.' Not only does the restricton seek to proscribe use and
occupancy of the affected properties by members of the excluded class, but as
construed by the Missouri courts, the agreement requires that title of any
person who uses his property in violation of the restriction shall be divested.
The restriction of the covenant in the Michigan case seeks to bar occupancy by
persons of the excluded class. It provides that (316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 642)
'This property shall not be used or occupied by any person or persons except
those of the Caucasian race.'

17

It should be observed that these covenants do not seek to proscribe any

particular use of the affected properties. Use of the properties for residential
occupancy, as such, is not forbidden. The restrictions of these agreements,
rather, are directed toward a designated class of persons and seek to determine
who may and who may not own or make use of the properties for residential
purposes. The excluded class is defined wholly in terms of race or color.;
'simply that and nothing more.'6

18

It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected from
discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to
acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property. Equality in the enjoyment of
property rights was regarded by the framers of that Amendment as an essential
pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the
Amendment was intended to guarantee. 7 Thus, s 1978 of the Revised Statutes,
derived from 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which was enacted by
Congress while the Fourteenth Amendment was also under consideration,8
provides:

19

'All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.'9

20

This Court has given specific recognition to the same principle. Buchanan v.
Warley, 1917, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149, L.R.A.1918C, 210,
Ann.Cas.1918A, 1201.

21

It is likewise clear that restrictions on the right of occupancy of the sort sought
to be created by the private agreements in these cases could not be squared with
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by state statute or
local ordinance. We do not understand respondents to urge the contrary. In the
case of Buchanan v. Warley, supa, a unanimous Court declared unconstitutional
the provisions of a city ordinance which denied to colr ed persons the right to
occupy houses in blocks in which the greater number of houses were occupied
by white persons, and imposed similar restrictions on white persons with
respect to blocks in which the greater number of houses were occupied by
colored persons. During the course of the opinion in that case, this Court stated:
'The Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes enacted in furtherance of its
purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire property without
state legislation discriminating against him solely because of color.'10

22

In Harmon v. Tyler, 1927, 273 U.S. 668, 47 S.Ct. 471, 71 L.Ed. 831, a
unanimous court, on the authority of Buchanan v. Warley, supra, declared
invalid an ordinance which forbade any Negro to establish a home on any
property in a white community or any white person to establish a home in a
Negro community, 'except on the written consent of a majority of the persons
of the opposite race inhabiting such community or portion of the City to be
affected.'

23

The precise question before this Court in both the Buchanan and Harmon cases,
involved the rights of white sellers to dispose of their properties free from
restrictions as to potential purchasers based on considerations of race or color.
But that such legislation is also offensive to the rights of those desiring to
acquire and occupy property and barred on grounds of race or color, is clear,
not only from the language of the opinion in Buchanan v. Warley, supra, but
from this Court's disposition of the case of City of Richmond v. Deans, 1930,
281 U.S. 704, 50 S.Ct. 407, 74 L.Ed. 1128. There, a Negro, barred from the
occupancy of certain property by the terms of an ordinance similar to that in the
Buchanan case, sought injunctive relief in the federal courts to enjoin the
enforcement of the ordinance on the grounds that its provisions violated the
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such relief was granted, and this Court
affirmed, finding the citation of Buchanan v. Warley, supra, and Harmon v.
Tyler, supra, sufficient to support its judgment.11

24

But the present cases, unlike those just discussed, do not involve action by state

legislatures or city councils. Here the particular patterns of discrimination and

the areas in which the restrictions are to operate, are determined, in tne first
instance, by the terms of agreements among private individuals. Participation of
the State consists in the enforcement of the restrictions so defined. The crucial
issue with which we are here confronted is whether this distinction removes
these cases from the operation of the prohibitory provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
25

Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 1883, 109 U.S. 3, 3
S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835, the principle has become firmly embedded in our
constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.
That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.12

26

We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements standing alone cannot

be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed to pt itioners by the
Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements are
effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that
there has been no action by the State and the provisions of the Amendment
have not been violated. Cf. Corrigan v. Buckley, supra.

27

But here there was more. These are cases in which the purposes of the
agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts of the
restrictive terms of the agreements. The respondents urge that jjdicial
enforcement of private agreements does not amount to state action; or, in any
event, the participation of the State is so attenuated in character as not to
amount to state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, it is suggested, even if the States in these cases may be deemed to have
acted in the constitutional sense, their action did not deprive petitioners of rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We move to a consideration of these
matters.

II.
28

That the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities
is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of
this Court. That principle was given expression in the earliest cases involving
the construction of the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, in
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Rives, 1880, 100 U.S. 313, 318, 25 L.Ed. 667,
this Court stated: 'It is doubtless true that a State may act through different

agencies,either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and

the prohibitions of the amendment extend to all action of the State denying
equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these agencies or by
another.' In Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 1880, 100 U.S. 339, 347, 25
L.Ed. 676, the Court observed: 'A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or
its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way.' In the Civil Rights Cases,
1883, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17, 3 S.Ct. 18, 21, 27 L.Ed. 835, this Court pointed out
that the Amendment makes void 'state action of every kind' which is
inconsistent with the guaranties therein contained, and extends to
manifestations of 'state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or
executive proceedings.' Language to like effect is employed no less than
eighteen times during the course of that opinion.13
29

Similar expressions, giving specific recognition to the fact that judicial action is
to be regarded as action on the State for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, are to be found in numerous cases which have been more recently
decided. In Twining v. New Jersey, 1908, 211 U.S. 78, 90, 91, 29 S.Ct. 14, 16,
53 L.Ed. 97, the Court said: 'The judicial act of the highest court of the state, in
authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws, is the act of the state.' In
BrinkerhoffFaris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 1930, 281 U.S. 673, 680, 50
S.Ct. 451, 454, 74 L.Ed. 1107, the Court, through Mr. Justice Brandeis, stated:
'The federal guaranty of due process extends to state action through its judicial
as well as through its legislative, executive, or administrative branch of
government.' Further examples of such declarations in the opinions of this Court
are not lacking.14

30

One of the earliest applications of the prohibitions contained in the Fourteenth

Amendment to action of state judicial officials occurred in cases in which
Negroes had been excluded from jury service in criminal prosecutions by
reason of their race or color. These cases demonstrate, also, the early
recognition by this Court that state action in violation of the Amendment's
provisions is equally repugnant to the constitutional commands whether
directed by state statute or taken by a judicial official in the absence of statute.
Thus, in Strauder v. West Virginia, 1880, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664, this
Court declared invalid a state statute restricting jury service to white persons as
amounting to a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the colored
defendant in that case. In the notice and opportunity to defend, has, Ex parte
Virginia, supra, held that a similar discrimination imposed by the action of a
state judge denied rights protected by the Amendment, despite the fact that the
language of the state statute relating to jury service contained no such
restrictions.

31

The action of state courts in imposing penalties or depriving parties of other

substantive rights without providing adequate notice and opportunity to defen,
has, of course, long been regarded as a denial of the due process of law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings
Co. v. Hill, supra. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 1878, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565.15

32

In numerous cases, this Court has reversed criminal convictions in state courts
for failure of those courts to provide the essential ingredients of a fair hearing.
Thus it has been held that convictions obtained in state courts under the
domination of a mob are void. Moore v. Dempsey, 1923, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct.
265, 67 L.Ed. 543. And see Frank v. Mangum, 1915, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct.
582, 59 L.Ed. 969. Convictions obtained by coerced confessions,16 by the use
of perjured testimony known by the prosecution to be such,17 or without the
effective assistance of counsel,18 have also been held to be exertions of state
authority in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

33

But the examples of state judicial action which have been held by this Court to
violate the Amendment's commands are not restricted to situations in which the
judicial proceedings were found in some manner to be procedurally unfair. It
has been recognized that the action of state courts in enforcing a substantive
common-law rule formulated by those courts, may result in the denial of rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the judicial
proceedings in such cases may have been in complete accord with the most
rigorous conceptions of procedural due process.19 Thus, in American Federation
of Labor v. Swing, 1941, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855,
enforcement by state courts of the common-law policy of the State, which
resulted in the restraining of peaceful picketing, was held to be state action of
the sort prohibited by the Amendment's guaranties of freedom of discussion.20
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1940, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213,
128 A.L.R. 1352, a conviction in a state court of the common-law crime of
breach of the peace was, under the circumstances of the case, found to be a
violation of the Amendment's commonds relating to freedom of religion. In
Bridges v. California, 1941, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159
A.L.R. 1346, enforcement of the state's common-law rule relating to contempts
by publication was held to be state action inconsistent with the prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment.21 And cf. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago,
1897, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979.

34

The short of the matter is that from the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment until the present, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that

the action of the States to which the Amendment has reference, includes action
of state courts and state judicial officials. Although, in construing the terms of
the Fourteenth Amendment, differences have from time to time been expressed
as to whether particular types of state action may be said to offend the
Amendment's prohibitory provisions, it has never been suggested that state
court action is immunized from the operation of those provisions simply
because the act is that of the judicial branch of the state government.
III.
35

Against this background of judicial construction, extending over a period of

some three-quarters of a century, we are called upon to consider whether
enforcement by state courts of the restrictive agreements in these cases may be
deemed to be the acts of those States; and, if so, whether that action has denied
these petitioners the equal protection of the laws which the Amendment was
intended to insure.

36

We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in the full and
complete sense of the phrase. The undisputed facts disclose that petitioners
were willing purchasers of properties upon which they desired to establish
homes. The owners of the properties were willing sellers; and contracts of sale
were accordingly consummated. It is clear that but for the active intervention of
the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would
have been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint.

37

These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States have merely
abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such
discriminations as theys ee fit. Rather, these are cases in which the States have
made available to such individuals the full coercive power of government to
deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property
rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire
and which the grantors are willing to sell. The difference between judicial
enforcement and nonenforcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference
to petitioners between being denied rights of property available to other
members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment of those rights
on an equal footing.

38

The enforcement of the restrictive agreements by the state courts courts in these
cases was directed pursuant to the common-law policy of the States as
formulated by those courts in earlier decisions.22 In the Missouri case,
enforcement of the covenant was directed in the first instance by the highest
court of the State after the trial court had determined the agreement to be

invalid for want of the requisite number of signatures. In the Michigan case, the
order of enforcement by the trial court was affirmed by the highest state
court.23 The judicial action in each case bears the clear and unmistakable
imprimatur of the State. We have noted that previous decisions of this Court
have established the proposition that judicial action is not immunized from the
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment simply because it is taken pursuant to
the state's common-law policy.24 Nor is the Amendment ineffective simply
because the particular pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced,
was defined initially by the terms of a private agreement. State action, as that
phrase is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to
exertions of state power in all forms. And when the effect of that action is to
deny rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the
obligation of this Court to enforce the constitutional commands.
39

We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in

these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws
and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand. We have noted
that freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoyment of property
rights was among the basic objectives sought to be effectuated by the framers
of theFourteenth Amendment. That such discrimination has occurred in these
cases is clear. Because of the race or color of these petitioners they have been
denied rights of ownership or occupancy enjoyed as a matter of course by other
citizens of different race or color.25 The Fourteenth Amendment declares 'that
all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the
States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment
was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by
law because of their color.'26 Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 U.S. at 307,
25 L.Ed. 664. Only recently this Court has had occasion to declare that a state
law which denied equal enjoyment of property rights to a designated class of
citizens of specified race and ancestry, was not a legitimate exercise of the
state's police power but violated the guaranty of the equal protectin of the laws.
Oyama v. California, 1948, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct. 269. Nor may the
discriminations imposed by the state courts in these cases be justified as proper
exertions of state police power.27 Cf. Buchanan v. Warley, supra.

40

Respondents urge, however, that since the state courts stand ready to enforce
restrictive covenants excluding white persons from the ownership or occupancy
of property covered by such agreements, enforcement of covenants excluding
colored persons may not be deemed a denial of equal protection of the laws to
the colored persons who are thereby affected.28 This contention does not bear
scrutiny. The parties have directed our attention to no case in which a court,
state or federal, has been called upon to enforce a covenant excluding members

of the white majority from ownership or occupancy of real property on grounds

of race or color. But there are more fundamental considerations. The rights
ceated by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms,
guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights.29 It is,
therefore, no answer to these petitioners to say that the courts may also be
induced to deny white persons rights of ownership and occupancy on grounds
of race or color. Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.
41

Nor do we find merit in the suggestion that property owners who are parties to
these agreements are denied equal protection of the laws if denied access to the
courts to enforce the terms of restrictive covenants and to assert property rights
which the state courts have held to be created by such agreements. The
Constitution confers upon no individual the right to demand action by the State
which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to other individuals.
And it would appear beyond question that the power of the State to create and
enforce property interests must be exercised within the boundaries defined by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 1946, 326 U.S. 501, 66
S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265.

42

The problem of defining the scope of the restrictions which the Federal
Constitution imposes upon exertions of power by the States has given rise to
many of the most persistent and fundamental issues which this Court has been
called upon to consider. That problem was foremost in the minds of the framers
of the Constitution, and since that early day, has arisen in a multitude of forms.
The task of determining whether the action of a State offends constitutional
provisions is one which may not be undertaken lightly. Where, however, it is
clear that the action of the State violt es the terms of the fundamental charter, it
is the obligation of this Court so to declare.

43

The historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment became a part of the
Constitution should not be forgotten. Whatever else the framers sought to
achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary concern was the establishment of
equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights and the preservation
of those rights from discriminatory action on the part of the States based on
considerations of race or color. Seventy-five years ago this Court announced
that the provisions of the Amendment are to be construed with this fundamental
purpose in mind.30 Upon full consideration, we have concluded that in these
cases the States have acted to deny petitioners the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Having so decided, we find it
unnecessary to consider whether petitioners have also been deprived of property
without due process of law or denied privileges and immunities of citizens of

the United States.

44

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missuri and the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan must be reversed.

45

Reversed.

46

Mr. Justice REED, Mr. Justice JACKSON, and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE took
no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

The trial court found that title to the property which petitioners Shelley sought
to purchase was held by one Bishop, a real estate dealer, who placed the
property in the name of Josephine Fitzgerald. Bishop, who acted as agent for
petitioners in the purchase, concealed the fact of his ownership.

Kraemer v. Shelley, 1946, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679.

Sipes v. McGhee, 1947, 316 Mich 614, 25 N.W.2d 638.

The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 'All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'

Corrigan v. Buckley, 1926, 271 U.S. 323, 330, 331, 46 S.Ct. 521, 523, 524, 70
L.Ed. 969.

Buchanan v. Warley, 1917, 245 U.S. 60, 73, 38 S.Ct. 16, 18, 62 L.Ed. 149,
L.R.A.1918C, 210, Ann.Cas.1918A, 1201.

Slaughter-House Cases, 1873, 16 Wall. 36, 70, 81, 21 L.Ed. 394. See Flack,
The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Oyama v. California, 1948, 332 U.S. 633, 640, 68 S.Ct. 269, 272, the section
of the Civil Rights Act herein considered is described as the federal statute,
'enacted before the Fourteenth Amendment but vindicated by it.' The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was reenacted in 18 of the Act of May 31, 1870,
subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 Stat. 144.

14 Stat. 27, 8 U.S.C. 42, 8 U.S.C.A. 42.

10

Buchanan v. Warley, 1917, 245 U.S. 60, 79, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149, L.R.A.
1918C, 210, Ann.Cas.1918A, 1201.

11

Courts of Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia

have also declared similar statutes invalid discussed, do not involve action by
state Amendment. Glover v. Atlanta, 1918, 148 Ga. 285, 96 S.E. 562; Jackson
v. State, 1918, 132 Md. 311, 103 A. 910; Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 1940, 217
N.C. 119, 6 S.E.2d 867, 126 A.L.R. 634; Allen v. Oklahoma City, 1936, 175
Okl. 421, 52 P.2d 1054; Liberty Annex Corp. v. Dallas, Tex.Civ.App. 1927,
289 S.W. 1067; Irvine v. Clifton Forge, 1918, 124 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 310.

12

And see United States v. Harris, 1883, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290;
United States v. Cruikshank, 1876, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588.

13

Among the phrases appearing in the opinion are the following: 'the operation of
state laws, and the action of state officers, executive or judicial'; 'state laws and
state proceedings'; 'state law * * * or some state action through its officers or
agents'; 'state laws and acts done under state authority'; 'state laws or state action
of some kind'; 'such laws as the states may adopt or enforce'; 'such acts and
proceedings as the states may commit or take'; 'state legislation or action'; 'state
law or state authority.'

14

Neal v. Delaware, 1881, 103 U.S. 370, 397, 26 L.Ed. 567; Scott v. McNeal,
1894, 154 U.S. 34, 45, 14 S.Ct. 1108, 1112, 38 L.Ed. 896; Chicao , B. & Q.R.
Co. v. Chicago, 1897, 166 U.S. 226, 233235, 17 S.Ct. 581, 583, 584, 41
L.Ed. 979; Hovey v. Elliott, 1897, 167 U.S. 409, 417, 418, 17 S.Ct. 841, 844,
42 L.Ed. 215; Carter v. Texas, 1900, 177 U.S. 442, 447, 20 S.Ct. 687, 689, 44
L.Ed. 839; Martin v. Texas, 1906, 200 U.S. 316, 319, 26 S.Ct. 338, 50 L.Ed.
497; Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 1907, 207 U.S. 20, 35, 36, 28
S.Ct. 7, 12, 52 L.Ed. 78, 12 Ann.Cas. 757; Home Telephone and Telegraph Co.
v. Los Angeles, 1913, 227 U.S. 278, 286, 287, 33 S.Ct. 312, 314, 57 L.Ed. 510;
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 1922, 259 U.S. 530, 548, 42 S.Ct. 516, 524, 66
L.Ed. 1044, 27 A.L.R. 27; American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 1927, 273 U.S.
269, 274, 47 S.Ct. 353, 355, 71 L.Ed. 639; Mooney v. Holohan, 1935, 294 U.S.
103, 112, 113, 55 S.Ct. 340, 341, 342, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406; Hansberry
v. Lee, 1940, 311 U.S. 32, 41, 61 S.Ct. 115, 117, 85 L.Ed. 22, 132 A.L.R. 741.

15

And see Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 1912, 224 U.S. 270, 281, 282, 32 S.Ct.
406, 409, 56 L.Ed. 760, Ann.Cas.1913D, 936; Hansberry v. Lee, 1940, 311
U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22, 132 A.L.R. 741.

16

Brown v. Mississippi, 1936, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682;

Chambers v. Florida, 1940, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716; Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 1944, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192; Lee v.
Mississippi, 1948, 332 U.S. 742, 68 S.Ct. 300.
17

See Mooney v. Holohan, 1935, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98
A.L.R. 406; Pyle v. Kansas, 1942, 317 U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214.

18

Powell v. Alabama, 1932, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R.
527; Williams v. Kaiser, 1945, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363, 89 L.Ed. 398;
Tomkins v. Missouri, 1945, 323 U.S. 485, 65 S.Ct. 370, 89 L.Ed. 407;
DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 1947 329 U.S. 663, 67 S.Ct. 596.

19

In applying the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct.
817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 144 A.L.R. 1487, it is clear that the common-law rules
enunciated by state courts in judicial opinions are to be regarded as a part of the
law of the State.

20

And see Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 1942, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86
L.Ed. 1178; Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 1943, 320 U.S. 293, 64
S.Ct. 126, 88 L.Ed. 58.

21

And see Pennekamp v. Florida, 1946, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed.
1295; Craig v. Harney, 1947, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249.

22

See Swain v. Maxwell, 1946, 355 Mo. 448, 196 S.W.2d 780; Koehler v.
Rowland, 1918, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217, 9 A.L.R. 107. See also Parmalee
v. Morris, 1922, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330, 38 A.L.R. 1180. Cf. Porter v.
Barrett, 1925, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532, 42 A.L.R. 1267.

23

Cf. Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 1913, 227 U.S. 278,
33 S.Ct. 312, 57 L.Ed. 510; Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 1907,
207 U.S. 20, 28 S.Ct. 7, 52 L.Ed. 78, 12 Ann.Cas. 757.

24

Bridges v. California, 1941, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159
A.L.R. 1346; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 1941, 312 U.S. 321, 61
S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855.

25

See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1886, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220;
Strauder v. West Virginia, 1880, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664; Truax v. Raich,
1915, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131, L.R.A.1916D, 545,
Ann.Cas.1917B, 283.

26

Restrictive agreements of the sort involved in these case have been used to
exclude other than Negroes from the ownership or occupancy of real property.

We are informed that such agreements have been directed against Indians,
Jews, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans, Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos,
among others.
27

See Bridges v. California, 1941, 314 U.S. 252, 261, 62 S.Ct. 190, 193, 86 L.Ed.
192, 159 A.L.R. 1346; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1940, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 308,
60 S.Ct. 900, 905, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352.

28

It should be observed that the restrictions relating to residential occupancy

contained in ordinances involved in the Buchanan, Harmon and Deans cases,
cited supra, and declared by this Court to be inconsistent with the requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied equally to white persons and Negroes.

29

McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 1914, 235 U.S. 151, 161
162, 35 S.Ct. 69, 71, 59 L.Ed. 169; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 1938,
305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208; Oyama v. California, 1948, 332 U.S.
633, 68 S.Ct. 269.

30

Slaughter-House Cases, 1873, 16 Wall 36, 81, 21 L.Ed. 394; Strauder v. West
Virginia, 1880, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664. See Flack, The Adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.